1 2025:CGHC:54986 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 526 of 2015 1 - Ramesh Kumar S/o Dayaram Mandavi, Aged About 30 Years Caste- Gond, R/o Panarapara, Pravir Ward No.02, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Smt. Revti Sethiya W/o Devendra Sethiya, Aged About 35 Years R/o Hikmi Para, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - Abdul Rashid S/o Late Abdulgadi, Aged About 55 Years Caste Musalmaan, R/o Thakur Road, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. 2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt. Bastar, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Vikas A Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondents 1 : Shri Keshav Dewangan, Advocate. For State : Shri Kalpesh Ruparel, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 11.11.2025 1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellants against the impugned order dated 01.07.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge (FTC), Bastar at Jagdalpur in Civil Appeal No.3-A/2015 whereby the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the appellants was dismissed and consequently their First Appeal was also dismissed. Their First Appeal was arising out judgment and decree dated 21.082014 passed by the IIIrd Civil Judge, Class-II, Jagdalpur in 2 Civil Suit No.16-A/2010 whereby the suit of the plaintiffs have been dismissed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of parties shown in the Civil Suit are being taken in the present Second Appeal. 3. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction over the suit property situated at Panarapara Pravir, Ward No.2, Jagdalpur which was shown in Schedule-A annexed with the plaint. It is pleaded that the plaintiff Vimla Bai is the wife of Abdulgadi who was residing over the suit property along with her children. They were residing there from the lifetime of Abdulgadi and after his death they became owner and possession holder of the suit property. However, the name of defendant No.1 was illegally mutated in the revenue record of the suit property behind the back of the plaintiff. She was residing with Abdulgadi since 40-50 years and she was his second wife. Earlier they were having good relation with the defendant No.1, but on 21.08.2007 when the plaintiff filed an application for mutation of their name in the revenue record of the suit property, their relation with the defendant No.1 became constrain and her application for mutation of their name in the revenue record was rejected by the Nazul Officer, Jagdalpur with liberty to file Civil Suit in the case. The plaintiffs are legal heir of late Abdulgadi and are in possession of the subject property since 40-50 years and therefore by virtue of adverse possession they perfected their title over the suit property. 4. The defendant No.1 resisted the claim of the plaintiff and filed his written statement, denied the plaint averment and pleaded that the plaintiff is claiming the suit property by virtue of Will and the executor of the Will was not having absolute right over the suit property to execute 3 the Will in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property and she is claiming adverse possession which is contradictory and her suit itself is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 5. On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, the trial court framed five issues and after recording evidence of the parties dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.08.2014. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree dated 21.08.2014, the plaintiffs filed their First Appeal before the Additional District Judge (FTC), Bastar at Jagdalpur on 24.12.2014 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In the application, the plaintiffs have averred that the counsel who represented them before the trial court had assured that after obtaining certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court he will file the appeal and they were assured upon the assurance given by their counsel. On 15.12.2014 when they inquired about the status of their appeal, their counsel informed that it is too late to file the appeal and now the appeal cannot be filed. 6. The first appellate court rejected the application filed by the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stating that no sufficient ground to condone delay in filing the appeal has been explained and consequently the appeal also got dismissed on 01.07.2015 which is under challenge in this Second Appeal. 7. This Court on 29.09.2015 admitted the appeal for hearing on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether the first appellate court’s appreciation regarding the delay is not satisfactorily explained is perverse? 4 2. Whether not drawing decree as per impugned order dated 01.07.2015 by the first appellate court is hereby perverse? 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the first appeal filed by the plaintiffs was barred by 120 days. Sufficient cause for delay was shown while filing the application, however the findings recorded by the first appellate court on the application for condonation of delay is erroneous. The court has not considered the reasons for condonation of delay in its proper perspective. Apart from this, while rejecting the appeal being barred by limitation, the trial court ought to have considered the merits of the case and should not have asked for explanation of day to day delay. Therefore, the impugned order dated 01.07.2015 suffers from perversity and illegality and the same is liable to be set aside. 9. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and submits that there is no merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 10. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 11. The trial court has passed the judgment and decree dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs which was for declaration of title and permanent injunction over the suit property. While giving findings on the issues, the trial court has considered that plaintiff is unable to prove the Will executed in her favour and she is not entitled to mutate her name after death of Abdulgadi. From perusal of impugned order it is quite vivid that dismissal of the appeal is consequent to rejection of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellants. In the application they have specifically averred that they were under 5 assurance of their counsel who represented them before the trial court that he will take care of the appeal, however, when they came to know that no appeal was filed by his counsel, they filed the appeal along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 held that the Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 13. The question of consideration of condonation of delay was also under consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 as observed that sufficient cause should be construed liberally, delay is not appears to be malafide and deliberate. Paragraphs 11 & 12 as observed is reproduced herein below: “11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period may lead to for launching the remedy unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in maxim the interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" 6 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction SO as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]." 14. Similarly, in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 15. Considering the grievance of the appellant and the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred case, this court is of the opinion that the first appellate court has committed an error in rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Therefore, the substantial question of law No.1 is decided in affirmative and it is held that the trial court has erred in rejecting the application of the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the appeal holding that limitation has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellants. 16. So far as the substantial question of law No.2 is concerned, since the substantial question of law No.1 is decided in favour of appellants, the substantial question of law No.2, in the opinion of this court, is not relevant to be discussed and decided at present for the reason that the impugned order is already set aside and delay in filing first appeal is condoned. 7 17. In this view of the the matter, the appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted back to the first appellate court to decide the case on merits without being influenced by the earlier order rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 18. The parties are directed to appear before the first appellate court on 10.12.2025. Record of trial court as well as first appellate court be sent back to the first appellate court forthwith. 19. Decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder