2025:HHC:19453 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.10 of 2013 Reserved on: 28.05.2025 Date of Decision: 24.06.2025 Ajeet Singh ....Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellant : Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 15.12.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour, District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 30.03.2010 and order of sentence dated 06.04.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2025:HHC:19453 Paonta Sahib District Sirmour, H.P., (learned Trial Court) was upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 192 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act). It was asserted that the police received information on 09.10.2005 that one case of an accident was brought to the Pawar Nursing Home. HC Dev Raj (PW-8) and Constable Surinder Dutt went to Pawar Nursing Home for the verification of the information. HC Dev Raj (PW-8) filed an application (Ext. PW-8/A) to seek the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding the competence of the injured to make the statement. The Medical Officer opined that the injured was not fit to make a statement. A request was made for the medical examination of the injured. Dr. Inderjieet Singh (PW-5) conducted the medical examination of the injured and issued a report (Ext.PW-5/A). HC Dev Raj (PW-8) went to the spot where Dishi Verma (PW-1) made a statement (Ext.PW-1/A)that he was present on the roof of his house on 09.10.2005 at about 12:30 p.m. A 3 2025:HHC:19453 scooter was coming from Badripur, which was being followed by a tractor. The informant heard some noise while getting down the roof. He went to the spot and found that a tractor had hit the tree towards the left side of the road. One scooter bearing registration No. HP17-2638 was crushed under the tyres of the tractor. The injured scooterist was taken to Pawar Nursing Home for treatment. Accused Ajeet Singh was driving the vehicle, and the accident had occurred due to his negligence. The statement was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW8/B) was registered. HC Dev Raj (PW-8) conducted the investigation. He took the photographs (Ext.P-1 to P-9), whose negatives are P-10 to P-18. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-8/D). He seized the tractor and scooter vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). He seized the delivery challan, insurance, and driving license vide memo (Ext.PA). X-rays(Exts.P-4 and P-7) were taken, and the fracture was detected in the part x-rayed. Subsequently, information was received that the injured had died at PGI, Chandigarh. Inquest report (Ext.PW-8/F) was prepared. An application (Ex.PW-8/G) was filed for post-mortem examination. The deceased was referred to Sector 16, Government Hospital, Chandigarh, for the post-mortem examination. Dr. Naresh Sharma (PW-6) conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and issued the 4 2025:HHC:19453 Post Mortem report (Ext.PW-6/E), mentioning that the death had taken place due to the injuries which could have been caused in a road side accident. HHC Subhash Chand (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the tractor and the scooter. He found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicles, which could have led to the accident; however, the damage was caused to the vehicles due to the accident. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 304-A of IPC and Section 192 ofM.V. Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Dishi Verma (PW-1) is the informant/eyewitness. Malkiyat Singh (PW-2) did not support the prosecution's case. Jainder Singh (PW-3) produced the documents of the vehicle. Deepak (PW-4) produced the documents of the scooter. Dr. Inderjeet Singh (PW-5) conducted the medical examination of Chaman Lal. Dr. Naresh 5 2025:HHC:19453 Sharma (PW-6) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. HHC Subash Chand (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. ASI Devi Raj (PW-8) investigated the case. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He did not lead any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC and Section 192 of the M.V. Act. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under:- Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three months and was directed to pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. 304-A of IPC The accused was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. 192 of the M.V. The accused was sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months and was directed to pay a fine of₹3000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to 6 2025:HHC:19453 Act. undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the tractor in a rash and negligent manner. His tractor had hit the scooter and dragged it for a distance of about 42 feet. The tractor was stopped after damaging a tree on the roadside. This suggested that the accused was driving the vehicle at a very high speed, and he failed to apply the brakes after the accident. Even if the scooterist had not given any signal before turning, the accused was supposed to maintain a reasonable distance between his vehicle and the scooter to avoid the collision. The accused had purchased the tractor on 28.06.2005, and he was required to get the tractor registered on or before 28.07.2005. The accident occurred on 09.10.2005; however, the tractor was not registered, and the offence punishable under Section 192 of the M.V. Act was made out in the present case. Hence, the accused was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned 7 2025:HHC:19453 Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and orders passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the evidence. The judgments are contrary to the facts, and there was no evidence to show that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life. The accused was driving the tractor very carefully at a normal speed. The accident occurred because the deceased turned the vehicle without giving any signal. Dishi Verma (PW-1) also stated that there was no fault of the accused and the accident occurred due to the sudden turning of the deceased at point ‘Y’. The accused had applied for permanent registration, and the conviction under Section 192 of the M.V. Act was not justified. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender K.Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 8 2025:HHC:19453 10. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the accused is innocent. Learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing him. There was no evidence of any rashness or negligence on the part of the accused. Learned Courts below convicted the petitioner-accused simply because the accident had taken place. This was not permissible.The prosecution was required to prove the negligence of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no evidence showing the negligence of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence on record and this Court should not interfere with the appreciation of the evidence made by learned Courts below unless there is some perversity. No perversity was shown, and the learned Courts below had taken a reasonable view, which could have been taken on the evidence on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9 2025:HHC:19453 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed: 10 2025:HHC:19453 “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be 11 2025:HHC:19453 reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651that it is impermissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of 12 2025:HHC:19453 justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 13 2025:HHC:19453 14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14 2025:HHC:19453 18. Dishi Verma (PW-1) stated that he was climbing the staircase of his roof when he saw a collision between scooter and the tractor. Both vehicles were coming from Badripur. A small tree was damaged by the impact of the tractor. The scooter was crushed beneath the front tyres of the tractor. The accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that there was no negligence of the accused. One road turns towards the bus stand, and the other road turns towards the bazaar. The tractor was not being driven at a high speed. The scooterist was turning towards the bazaar. He admitted that it is necessary to give an indicator while turning towards the bazaar. He did not remember whether the scooterist had given any signal toturn towards the bazaar. The tractor was towards its side; no accident would have occurred if the scooterist had not turned. 19. The site plan (Ext.PW-8/D) shows a ‘Y’ junction. The bazaar is shown towards the right side. As per the version of this witness, the scooterist had turned the scooter towards the right side. He was not sure whether any signal was given by the scooterist or not. 15 2025:HHC:19453 20. The Rules of the Road Regulations 1989 deal with the rules to be followed by drivers while driving a motor vehicle. Rule 3(b) provides that the driver of the motor vehicle shall draw as near as may be possible to the centre of the road along which he is travelling and arrive as nearly as may be on left-hand side of the road, which the driver is entering. 21. Rule 13 deals with the signal given by the drivers. It reads that when the vehicle is about to slow down, a driver shall extend his right arm with the palm downward and to the right of the vehicle and shall move the arm so extended up and down several times in such a manner that signal can be seen by the driver of the vehicle which may be behind him. 22. Rule 3(c) provides that when about to turn to right or to drive to the right hand side of the road, to pass another vehicle or for any other purpose, a driver shall extend his right arm in a horizontal position outside of and right of the vehicle with the palm turned to the front. 23. Rule 14 provides that the signal referred to in Regulation 12 may also be simplified by mechanical or electronic devices. 16 2025:HHC:19453 24. It is apparent from these rules that the driver of the vehicle intending to turn right has to give an appropriate signal, and he has to take the vehicle to the centre of the road. The statement of Dishi Verma (PW-1) does not show that the driver had complied with this provision. Therefore, the scooterist failed to comply with the rules. 25. Learned Trial Court held that the accused was supposed to maintain a distance from the vehicle moving in the front, and failure to do so by the accused, amounts to negligence. 26. Rule 23 reads that driver of the motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision, if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop, therefore, the driver of the vehicle following another is under an obligation to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the collision. 27. In the present case, the suggestions given to Dishi Verma (PW-1) show that the accident occurred because the scooterist had turned his scooter toward the bazaar without 17 2025:HHC:19453 giving a signal. It has already been held above that the scooterist was under an obligation to give a signal and take the vehicle to the centre of the road; however, the accident would have been avoided had there been sufficient distance between the scooter and the tractor. Since the accused, being the driver of the tractor following the scooter, was under an obligation to maintain a sufficient distance from the scooter, and the accident would not have occurred had the accused maintained the sufficient distance. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the accused to adhere to Rule 23.It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nishan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 765 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 405 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 268: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 463that where the driver of the vehicle following another had failed to maintain sufficient distance, he was negligent. It was observed at page 770: “12. The finding so recorded by the Tribunal has been af- firmed by the High Court, by observing that the evidence was clearly indicative of the fact that the Maruti car was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, which was the cause for accident of this nature and resulting in death of one of the passengers in the Maruti car. The Maruti car was driven by none other than PW 2 Manjeet Singh. In his evidence, he has admitted that the subject truck was run- 18 2025:HHC:19453 ning ahead of the Maruti car for quite some time, about one kilometre and at the time of the accident, the distance between the truck and the Maruti car was only 10-15 ft. He has also admitted that the law mandates maintaining a sufficient distance between two vehicles running in the same direction. It is also not in dispute that the road on which the two vehicles were moving was only about 14 feet wide. It is unfathomable that on such a narrow road, the subject truck would move at a high speed as alleged. In any case, the Maruti car, which was following the truck, was expected to maintain a safe distance, as envisaged in Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, which reads thus: “23. Distance from vehicles in front. —The driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.” The expression “sufficient distance” has not been defined in the Regulations or elsewhere. The thumb rule of suffi- cient distance is at least a safe distance of two to three seconds gap in ideal conditions to avert collision and to allow the following driver time to respond. The distance of 10-15 ft between the truck and the Maruti car was cer- tainly not a safe distance, for which the driver of the Maruti car must take the blame. It must necessarily follow that the finding on the issue under consideration ought to be against the claimants.” 28. Malkiyat Singh (PW-2) stated that the accident had not occurred in his presence. He was permitted to be cross- examined; however, he denied that the accused hit the scooter from the rear. He was cross-examined with reference to his previous statement, and he denied the same. It is apparent 19 2025:HHC:19453 from the statement that he has not supported the prosecution's case, and no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 29. Jainder Singh (PW-3) and Deepak (PW-4) reached the spot after the accident, and their statements do not show the manner of the accident. 30. Site plan (Ext.PW-8/D) shows that the vehicle had left the road and was stopped after hitting a tree. The attention of this Court was drawn towards the photographs to submit that it was a bush and not a tree. This is not correct. The photographs( Ext.P-6 to P-9) clearly show a tree which has been damaged due to the impact. The scooterist is shown trapped under the front tyres of the tractor. 31. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had failed to stop the vehicle even after the impact, and the tractor was stopped after hitting a tree. This shows that the accused was driving the vehicle at such a speed that he was unable to control it. This also shows the negligence of the accused. 20 2025:HHC:19453 32. The accused did not dispute in the revision petition that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He specifically stated that he was driving the vehicle carefully and that there was no negligence on his part. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 33. It was submitted that learned Courts below erred in relying upon the suggestion made to Dishi Verma (PW-1) in his cross-examination. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 382: - “34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of the prosecution does not depend on the satisfaction made to a witness. 35. In Tarun Bora v. State of Assam [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], a three- judge Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADA Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under Section 365IPC read with Sections 21 2025:HHC:19453 3(1) and 3(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. 36. In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], this Court, while considering the evidence on record, took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by this Court in paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under: (Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], SCC pp. 43-44) “15. The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night, he was carried away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place, and when his eyes were opened, he could see his younger brotherKumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it was he who took him in an Ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. In cross-examination, the witness stated as under: ‘Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes, nor did he assault me.’ 17. This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of the accusedTarun Bora in the whole episode. This will clearly suggest the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not 22 2025:HHC:19453 participate in blind-folding the eyes of the witness, nor assaulted him.” 37. In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34: 1987 SCC (Cri) 256], this Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC. While reappreciating the evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the cross-examination of PW 4 Sube Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court, taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam Vir, was established on the spot at the time of the occurrence. We quote the following observations made by this Court in paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under (SCC p. 36) “8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination- in-chief that he had identified the accused at the time of the occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-examined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased. 9. In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a shirt of white shirt. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a cream- coloured shirt of cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said it is not correct that Dharam Vir, the accused, was wearing a shirt of a cream colour and not a white colour at that time.’ The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the 23 2025:HHC:19453 above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir on the spot at the time of occurrence.” 38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on a point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.” 34. Therefore, the learned Courts below had not erred in relying upon the suggestions made to Dishi Verma (PW-1). 35. It was duly proved by the statement of Dr. Inderjeet Singh (PW-5) that Chaman Lal had sustained injuries. Dr. Naresh Sharma (PW-6) proved that Chaman Lal had died due to the injuries sustained by him, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, it was proved that the death of Chaman Lal was caused due to the negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court had 24 2025:HHC:19453 rightly sentenced and convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC. 36. It is undisputed that the accused was not carrying the registration certificate of the tractor. It was submitted in the petition that the tractor was newly purchased, and the accused had applied for the registration of the tractor. This submission will not help the accused. 37. Section 39 of the M.V. Act specifically provides that no person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall permit the vehicle to be driven unless the vehicle is registered and the vehicle carries a registration mark displayed in the prescribed form. Therefore, it was essential for the accused to carry a registration certificate while driving the vehicle, and he could not take shelter behind the plea that he had applied for the registration certificate. 38. Chapter 3 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 deals with the process of registration of the motor vehicle. Rule 47 provides that an application for registration of the motor vehicle shall be made to the Registering Authority 25 2025:HHC:19453 within 7 days from the date of taking delivery of such vehicle, excluding the period of journey. 39. In the present case, no application was filed to show that any such application for registration of the tractor was filed, and a registration certificate was not issued; therefore, the learned Court below had rightly held that the petitioner had violated Section 39 of the M.V. Act, which is punishable under Section 192 of the M.V. Act. 40. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC and three months each for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of IPC and Section 192 of M.V. Act. Keeping in view the fact that one precious life was lost, the sentence of six months is lenient, and no interference is required with it. 41. No other point was urged. 42. Consequently, the present revision petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 26 2025:HHC:19453 43. The records of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of this judgment for the information 44. The present revision petition stands disposed of along with pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2025. (ravinder)