[2025:RJ-JP:33401] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 269/2024 Sunil Dewan S/o Shri Madan Lal Dewan, Aged About 45 Years, Resident Of Patan, Tehsil Neemkathana, District Sikar (Raj.) Resident Of A-4/1 Ganesh Marg, Hawa Sarak, Jaipur Ant Presently Residing At 124 Tulsiram Marg, Vaishali Nagar, (Guru Jambeshwar Nagar Colony) Jaipur (Raj.). ----Plaintiff/Appellant Versus 1. Kedar Dewan S/o Late Shri Jagannath Dewan, Aged About 66 Years, Resident Of Plot No. B-70 Sahkar Marg, Lal Kothi, Jaipur (Raj,). 2. Sub Registrar Officer, Patan, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar, (Raj.). ----Defendants/Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. L.L. Gupta, alongwith Mr. Pratyush Sharma & Ms. Pratibha Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Adhiraj Modi Mr. Shreyansh Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Judgment Reserved on ::: August 21, 2025 Pronounced on ::: September 04, 2025 1. The instant civil first appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/ appellant under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 25.01.2024 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, No.3, Neem- ka-Thana (Raj.) [for short ‘the court below’] in Civil Suit No.11/2020 B.T. 97/2022 (CIS No.11/2020), Sunil Dewan v. [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (2 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] Kedar Dewan & Anr., whereby the court below while allowing the application filed by defendant/respondent No.1- Kedar Dewan under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, dismissed the plaint filed by the plaintiff/ appellant for specific performance of agreement and permanent injunction. 2. The facts borne out from the pleadings are that plaintiff /appellant filed a civil suit for specific performance and permanent injunction against the defendant /respondent on 08.09.2020 in the Court of Additional District Judge, No. 2, Neem-ka-Thana, Distt. Sikar (Raj.) which was registered at No.11/2020 B.T. 97/2022 mentioning therein that there is an agriculture land bearing old Khasra No. 309 measuring 0.82 hectare, Khasra No. 310 measuring 0.39 hectare, Khasra No. 311/1measuring 0.76 hectare, Khasra No. 312 measuring 0.11 hectare, Khasra No. 313 measuring 0.20 hectare, Khasra No. 314 measuring 0.51 hectare, in all 6 khasra measuring 2.79 hectare recorded in the name of defendant No. 1 Kedar Diwan. He was also having 1/5th share in land of khasra No. 306 measuring 0.15 hectares relating to a well. The defendant had agreed to sale the aforesaid land on 21.10.2008 for a consideration of Rs. 25.00 lac and an amount of Rs. 5.00 lac was paid on 21.01.2008 vide cheque No. 696738 and further amount of Rs. 5 lac was paid on 13.12.2008 vide cheque No. 588383. It was further pleaded that an amount of Rs. 10.00 lac was paid on 05.02.2009 vide cheque No. 288393. Having received Rs. 20.00 lac in advance, the defendant No. 1 had executed an agreement on 5/2/2009 in favour of plaintiff /appellant which was got [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (3 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] registered with the Sub Registrar on 09.02.2009. It was further pleaded in the plaint that there was a clause in the agreement wherein the defendant was permitted to repay the amount of Rs. 20.00 lac within 12 months on that event the agreement to be cancelled. However, the defendant though gave a cheque No. 389736 of Rs. 10.00 lac on 29.03.2010 and cheque No. 389737 of Rs. 10.00 lac on 29.03.2010 but both the cheques were dishonored on 28.05.2010 and 01.06.2010 and therefore the defendant did not avail the said right of cancellation of agreement having failed to repay the amount and agreement to sale remain in force. It was further mentioned that plaintiff called upon the defendant to execute the sale deed but looking to the relation, he assured that he will execute the sale deed very soon and plaintiff believed him as the defendant is a real Uncle of the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that land too was given in the possession of the defendant and he remained in possession but on 07.08.2020 when the plaintiff called upon defendant No. 1 to execute the sale deed he gave threatening that he will sale the property to others and refused to execute the sale deed. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform the contract but defendant had not executed the sale deed and refused to execute the sale deed on 7/8/2020. 3. After effecting service of summons upon the defendant/ respondent- Kedar Dewan, he moved an application on 15/9/2020 under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation mentioning that in the agreement period of 365 days was mentioned [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (4 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] during which sale deed to be executed and payment was to be made. It was further pleaded that as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the limitation for filing of the suit stand expired on expiry of 3 years from 365 days and therefore the suit is time barred and not maintainable. 4. The defendant No.1 filed written statement on 19.03.2021 wherein the factum of agreement was admitted but a false plea was taken that amount of Rs. 20.00 lac was repaid to Sh. Madan Lal-father of the plaintiff and therefore the agreement does not exists. The objection with regard to limitation too was raised. 5. The plaintiff /appellant filed reply to the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on 5/8/2022. 6. The Court below vide order dated 25.01.2024 while allowing the application filed by defendant/respondent No.1- Kedar Dewan under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, dismissed the plaint filed by the plaintiff/ appellant for specific performance of agreement and permanent injunction. Hence, this first appeal. 7. Mr. L.L. Gupta assisted by Mr. Pratyush Sharma and Ms. Pratibha Sharma, appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant submitted that the impugned order dated 25.01.2024 passed by the Court below is against the facts available on record and law applicable. He submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated 25.01.2024 and also erred in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation much relying upon the first part of Article 54 that too in absence of any calendar date fixed for [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (5 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] performance in the agreement. As a matter of fact, even as per the application 365 days was mentioned, there was no specific date fixed for performance in the agreement so as to invoke first part of Article 54 and therefore the limitation could not have been counted on the basis of first part of Article 54 i.e. after 365 days as mentioned in the order dated 25.01.2024. He also submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated 25.01.2024 in overlooking the fact that there is an averment in the plaint that denial was made by the defendant to execute the sale deed on 07.08.2020 and said fact could not have been disbelieved and limitation for filing the suit occurred / began on 07.08.2020 and not prior thereto. He also submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order and wrongly relied upon the judgment of Vimal Kanwar Vs Ashok which was not applicable and even was not related to rejection of plaint under order VII Rule 11 CPC but the finding of the Court below is against the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Ahmmad sahab Abdul Mulla V/s Bibijan and Ors., reported in AIR 2009 (SC) 2193 and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Urveshiben V/s Krishankant reported in AIRONLINE 2018 (SC) 955, and also judgment of apex court in the case of Madina Begam and Rathnavathi wherein it was specifically mentioned that the first part of Article 54 will be applicable only in case where the calendar date has been mentioned. If no specific date has been mentioned the [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (6 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] limitation would start only after notice of refusal. In the present case, the notice of refusal was pleaded by the plaintiff as on 07.08.2020 which could not have been disbelieved. He also submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated 25.01.2024 in rejecting the plaint overlooking that question of limitation is a mix-question of facts and law and there is an averment that plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform, it is the defendant who refuse to execute the sale deed on 07.08.2020 and therefore the plaint could not have been rejected. Counsel further submitted that the Court below has erred in passing the impugned order overlooking that time was not essence of contract and plaintiff was in possession of the land in disputes. 8. Counsel to support his submissions has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- A. Ahmmadasahab Abdul Mulla (deceased by LRs) v. Bibijan & Ors., reported in AIR 2009 SC 2193; B. Rathnavathi & Anr. v. Kavita Ganashamdas, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 6288; C. Madina Begum & Anr. v. Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 3554; D. Urvashiben v. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi, AIRONLINE 2018 SC 955; E. Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah & Ors. v. Anton Ellis Farel & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 1377; F. Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta, AIRONLINE 2007 SC 48; [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (7 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] G. Biswanath Banik & Anr. v. Sulanga Bose & Ors., reported in AIR 2022 SC 1519; H. Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Anr., reported in AIR 2020 SC 2721; I. Eldeco Housing & Industries Ltd. v. Ashok Vidyarthi, reported in AIRONLINE 2023 SC 1179; J. Ram Gopal Busar v. Smt. Bidam Devi & Ors. (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.28/2021), Decided on 15.9.2021 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court; K. Vundavalli Ratna Manikyam v. V.P.P.R.N. Prasad Rao, reported in AIRONLINE 2020 SC 179; L. P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, reported in AIRONLINE 2025 SC 641; M. Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 7109 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.4862 of 2025), decided on 23.05.2025; N. C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Ors. & other connected matters, reported in AIR 2022 SC 4724. 9. Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Adhiraj Modi and Mr. Shreyansh Sharma, appearing for the defendant/ respondent opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant and supported the impugned order passed by the court below. 10. In support of the submissions, Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- A. Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs., reported in (2020) 16 SCC 601; B. Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. v. Assam State Electricity Board & Ors. With other connected cases, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 677; and C. Usha Devi v. Ram Kumar Singh, reported in AIR 2024 SC 4591. [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (8 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] 11. Considered the submissions advanced by both the counsels appearing for the respective parties and gone through the impugned order including the record of the case. 12. The Court vide impugned order has allowed the application filed by the defendant/ respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint on the count that the suit has been filed beyond the limitation period. 13. Article 54 of Part-II of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, stipulates the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance as three years from the date fixed for performance, and in the alternative when no date is fixed, three years from the date when the plaintiff has notice that the performance has been refused. 14. Article 54 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act is quoted as under:- The Schedule *** Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates that once the limitation period has commenced, it continues to run, irrespective of any subsequent disability or inability to [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (9 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] institute a suit or make an application. The relevant clause of the agreement dated 05.02.2009 executed in between the parties is quoted as under:- “¼5½ ;g fd 'ks"k foØ; ewY;/ku jkf'k ds&5]00]000@&#i;s ¼v{kjs ik¡p yk[k :i;s½ ds fo"k; esa nksuks i{kdkjku~ ds e/; ;g r; gqvk gS fd f}rh; i{k bl ys[k&i= dh rLnhd dh fnukad ls vUnj fe;kn 365 fnol esa foØ;&i= gsrq vko';d eqnzkad Ø; dj bu ij foØ; i= VkbZi djok ysaxs o foØ;&i= iath;u djokus o 'ks"k foØ; ewY; dk :i;k vnk djus gsrq izFke i{k dks lwfpr dj nsaxsA izFke i{k bl lwpuk ij vfoyEc l{ke mi iath;d dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gksdj foØ;&i= dk iath;u f}rh; i{k vFkok f}rh; i{k ds uketn O;fDr] QeZ] dEiuh bR;kfn ds fgr esa djok nsxsa o blh le; f}rh; i{k 'ks"k foØ; ewY; dk :i;k izFke i{k dks vnk dj nsxsaA“ 15. Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant has submitted that the present suit filed by the plaintiff/ appellant is not covered under Part-I of Article 54 of the Limitation Act as no particular date has been mentioned in the agreement as regards the performance of the agreement. From the facts borne out from the pleadings and the specific Clause Nos. 1 and 5 of the agreement to sale dated 05.02.2009 executed between the parties is that out of total agreed sale consideration amount of Rs.25 lakhs, Rs. 5 lakhs were paid as an advance through cheque dated 13.12.2008, Rs. 5 lakhs were paid vide cheque dated 21.10.2008 and Rs.10 lakhs [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (10 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] were paid vide cheque dated 05.02.2009. It has also been agreed that the plaintiff-buyer shall make the payment of remaining Rs.5 lakhs and get executed the sale deed within a period of 365 days from the date of agreement. The aforesaid terms and conditions of the agreement clearly speak that the date fixed for performance of the agreement is the date on which 365 days completes from the date of agreement and that comes to 06.02.2010. Part-I of Article 54 of the Limitation Act speaks for the date fixed for performance of the agreement. Since as per Clause No. 5 of the agreement to sale executed in between the parties on 05.02.2009, the performance was to be made within a period of 365 days from the date of agreement. Hence, the date fixed for performance of the agreement is the day on which 365 days completes. The agreement itself speaks of the particular date for which the agreement was to be performed. The specific terms of the agreement is fixed for performance of the agreement and it is not a case where one has to ascertain the date for performing the agreement. 16. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant has referred the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ahmmadasahab Abdul Mulla (deceased by LRs). In that case the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 7 has observed as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (11 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] “7. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression `date fixed for the performance' is a crystallized notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part "time from which period begins to run" refers to a case where no such date is fixed. To put it differently, when date is fixed it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part the stress is on `when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused'. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances. Whether the date was fixed or not the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused and the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials and evidence to be brought on record. The expression `date' used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. We answer the reference accordingly. The matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench for deciding the issue on merits.” 17. The facts of the present case and Clause No.5 of the agreement to sale clearly suggest the date 06.02.2010 which is the date on which 365 days from the date of agreement completes and the Hon’ble Apex Court has also observed that the expression ‘date’ used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (12 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] 18. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/ appellant also referred the judgment delivered in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in para Nos.39 and 49 has observed as under:- 39. This takes us to the next question as to whether suit for specific performance was barred by limitation prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act? 49. Mere reading of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would show that if the date is fixed for performance of the agreement, then non-compliance of the agreement on the date would give a cause of action to file suit for specific performance within three years from the date so fixed. However, when no such date is fixed, limitation of three years to file a suit for specific performance would begin when the plaintiff has noticed that the defendant has refused the performance of the agreement.” 19. The facts of the present case clearly reveal of a particular date i.e. the day on completion of 365 days from the date of agreement and therefore it can be said that there is a date fixed as required under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. 20. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/ appellant has also referred the judgment delivered in the case of Madina Begum & Anr. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in para No.22 has observed as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (13 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] 22. As far as the present appeal is concerned, the agreement between Gulab Bai and Madina Begum did not specify a calendar date as the date fixed for the performance of the agreement. Consequently, the view expressed in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi on the first part of Article 54 clearly applies to the facts of the case. In taking a contrary view, ignoring the absence of a specified date for the performance of the agreement and reversing the Trial Court, the High Court has fallen in error. 21. Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant/ respondent No.1 referred the recent judgment delivered in the case of Usha Devi (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in para Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 13 has observed as under:- “9. Coming to the facts of the present case, we find that in the agreement dated 17.12.1989, it is specifically mentioned that the sale deed would be executed within one month from the date of the said agreement. The period of one month would expire on 16.01.1990, and once there is a specific date fixed for performance, the limitation period would be three years from the said date, which would expire on 16.01.1993. The Trial Court thus held that the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed in September 1993. 10. The First Appellate Court and the High Court went on the consideration that the agreement further recorded that this agreement would remain valid for a period of five years from today’s date i.e. date of the execution of the agreement to sell. [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (14 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] Placing reliance on this clause, in our considered opinion, is totally irrelevant. The performance was to take place within one month. The validity of the agreement is something different and does not change the date of performance. What was the reason for incorporating this clause of validating the agreement for five years is not spelled out in the agreement, but in any case, it does not change the date fixed for the performance. 11. As such, the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone. The appeal is thus liable to be allowed. Therefore, we have not entered into the other issues regarding the agreement to sell being valid or invalid. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside, and the suit is dismissed. However, it is directed that the appellants shall return the advance amount of Rs. 80,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 % per annum from the date it was paid to the appellants till the date it is paid. There shall however be no order as to costs.” In the case of Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in para Nos. 14 and 17 has observed as under:- “14. The above provision makes it clear that in event, a suit is instituted after the prescribed period, it shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The Court by mandate of law, is obliged to dismiss the suit, which is filed beyond limitation even though no [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (15 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] pleading or arguments are raised to that effect. The provisions of Sections 4 to 20 are exceptions when suit beyond the period of limitation as prescribed in the Schedule shall not be dismissed as required by Section 3. In this context, we need to refer to Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. Order VII deals with plaint. Order VII Rule 6 contains a heading “Grounds of exemption from limitation law”. Order VII Rule 6 is as follows:- “6. Grounds of exemption from limitation law. - Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed: Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. 17. We need to notice as to whether the petitioners in plaint have pleaded any exclusion of time under Section 19 of the Act or not. The plaint is filed as Annexure P/2 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016.A perusal of the plaint indicates that there is no pleading as to exception of limitation by running any fresh period of limitation as per Section 19. In paragraph 10, the details of delivery challans have been given, last challan being dated 04.10.1993 has been mentioned by which supply was made. In paragraph 12, details of payments received have also been mentioned, in which last being made on [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (16 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] 05.03.1994 has been mentioned, but for the last payment made on 05.03.1994, there was no pleading of an acknowledgment on the part of the respondents, which could result in start of fresh period of limitation. Further in paragraph 21, it has been further specifically pleaded that provisions of Limitation Act do not apply in view of the provisions contained in the Act, 1993 as because the Act, 1993 is having overriding effect over the Limitation Actand all other Acts. Paragraph 21 of the plaint is referred to for ready reference:- “21. That the transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants are duly maintained by the plaintiffs in the Books of Accounts like ledger, Sale Register etc., which are kept in the usual course of the business of the plaintiffs and those accounts between the plaintiffs and the defendants are in continuity and the interest payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs are carried over till date. As such the suit of the plaintiffs is in within time. Apart from that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply in view of the provisions contained in the Act, 1993 as because the Act of 1993 is having overriding effect over the Limitation Act and all other Acts.” 22. From the perusal of the agreement to sale dated 05.02.2009 it is revealed that the defendant/ respondent No.1 agreed to sale the land which is the subject matter of the suit for a consideration of Rs.25 lakhs, out of which Rs.20 [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (17 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] lakhs have been paid to him by the plaintiff- buyer through cheques and as per the specific terms incorporated in Clause No.5 of the agreement, the plaintiff was to make the payment of remaining sale consideration amount of Rs.5 lakhs and get executed the registered sale deed within a period of 365 days from the date of agreement. 23. On perusal of the averments made in the plaint, nowhere it has been indicated in clear terms that the plaintiff/ appellant was ready and willing to pay the balance amount and get the sale deed executed in his favour. Nowhere in the plaint it has been stated that during the period of 365 days from the date of agreement the plaintiff ever made any correspondence or issued any notice to the defendant/ respondent No.1 that he is ready and willing to pay the remaining sale consideration amount and to get the sale deed executed. In vague terms in para No.7 of the plaint, the plaintiff/ appellant has stated that lastly on 07.08.2020 when he asked the defendant/ respondent No.1 to execute the sale deed, he refused for that and then only the cause of action arose for filing the suit. Merely making a vague averment as regards the refusal that too when there is no specific averment in the plaint that he ever made any efforts or correspondence or issued notice to the defendant/ respondent No.1 for paying the remaining sale consideration amount and to get the sale deed executed in his favour by [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (18 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] the date fixed for performance of the agreement which is the day on completion of 365 days from the date of agreement. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, has observed as under:- “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181: "330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence". An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (19 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn.(2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).” 25. In the case of Ghewarchand v. Mahendra Singh, reported in (2018) 10 SCC 588, it was observed that when deciding upon the question of limitation, it is mainly required to see the plaint allegations and how the plaintiff has pleaded the accrual of cause of action for filing of the suit. 26. In the present case, since the last date was fixed for performance of the agreement which is the day on completion of 365 days from the date of agreement (05.02.2009). The suit has been filed on 08.02.2020 i.e. the beyond the period of three years from the date by which the agreement was to be performed. Therefore, the case is covered under the First Part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. As per the averments made in the plaintiff, the plaintiff/ appellant has not pleaded that by the date fixed for performance of the agreement, he was ready and willing to perform the agreement. There is no averment in the plaint as regards the same. 27. The other judgments referred by the counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ appellant related to Second Part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act and since the Court has come [2025:RJ-JP:33401] (20 of 20) [CFA-269/2024] to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiff/ appellant is barred by limitation in view of First Part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, no further observations are required for the Second Part. 28. In view of the discussion made above, the Court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 25.01.2024 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge No.3, Neem-ka-Thana, in Civil Suit No.11/2020 B.T. 97/2022 (CIS No.11/2020), Sunil Dewan v. Kedar Dewan & Anr. 29. Accordingly, this first appeal is dismissed. 30. In view of the judgment passed in the main appeal, the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also stand dismissed. 31. The Registry is directed to send back the record of the case to the concerned Court forthwith. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J Sharma NK/Dy. Registrar