[2025:RJ-JP:19789] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2091/2007 Yogendra Prasad s/o Madanlal, r/o Village Jorawarpura, PS Kha- toli, Tehsil Pipalda, District Kota ----Non-claimant No.1/Appellant Versus 1. Ram Karan s/o Motilal 2. Kanti Bai w/o Ramkaran 3. Gulab Bai w/o Ramkaram All r/o village Jorawarpura, PS Khatoli, Tehsil Pipalda, District Kota ----Claimants/Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Amit Jindal on behalf of Mr. S. K. Jindal For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 12/05/2025 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act of 1988") assailing the award dated 20.04.2006 passed by Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kota (hereinafter to be referred to as "MACT, Court") in Claim Case No.312/2003 titled as "Ramkaran & Ors. Vs. Yogendra & Anr."), whereby the claim petition filed by the claimants-respondents has been partly allowed. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the claimants filed a claim petition on account of death of their son, Ramavtar. The accident occurred and resulted in his death due to the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. The said claim petition was allowed vide order dated 20.04.2006 against the appellant driver of the vehicle, with compensation of Rs.1,63,000/- along with interest 6% per annum. [2025:RJ-JP:19789] (2 of 4) [CMA-2091/2007] 3. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant with a delay of 303 days. 4. In the application for condonation of the delay, the appellant stated that he was totally unaware about passing of the impugned award because his counsel did not informed him. He only came to know about the award after receiving the notice of recovery by the SDO. The appellant further submits that, in view of these circumstances, the delay was caused on bonafide grounds, therefore, the delay may be condoned. 5. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 6. The bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the claim petition was allowed on 20.04.2006, and the said award was passed in the presence of the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, the appellant cannot take stand of unawareness about the passing of the order. Furthermore, a look of the proceedings indicates that the appellant himself remained negligent in not staying connected with his lawyer and taking updated status of the case. Consequently, the plea that his lawyer did not inform him about the decision is not bonafide. The reason assigned by the appellant in his application is very vague, general and flimsy. It appears that the appellant is attempting to hide his negligence by shifting the entire blame on his lawyer about the delay in receiving updates. Thus, considering the negligent attitude of the appellant, the explanation provided by the appellant is insufficient to justify an inordinate delay of 303 days. [2025:RJ-JP:19789] (3 of 4) [CMA-2091/2007] 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in " Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others " reported in [(2013) 12 SCC 649] held as under: "21.8 (viii) There is a distinction be- tween inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of a few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is at- tracted, whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour, and attitude of a party relating to its inac- tion or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of a liberal approach" 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation ," reported in (1971) 2 SCC 860, has held as under: "That law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when chal- lenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the ba- sis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermien- tibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limita- tions is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and sup- press stale, fake or fraudulent claims." [2025:RJ-JP:19789] (4 of 4) [CMA-2091/2007] 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash " reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101, has held as under: It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advo- cate who was appearing for the peti- tioners in the trial court. We have no- ticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and care- lessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to con- done long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial pro- ceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advo- cate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 10. In view of the facts stated above, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed for want of any sufficient cause mentioned in the application. 11. Accordingly, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed as being devoid of merit. 12. The present civil miscellaneous appeal stands dismissed. 13. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J Seema/29 Whether Reportable : Yes/No