1 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 2025:CGHC:59558 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 90 of 2016 Premshankar Yadav S/o Sammesingh Yadav Aged About 32 Years R/o Aurda, P.S. Pussore, Distt. Raigarh Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Raigarh, Distt. Raigarh Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 94 of 2016 Rishikesh Sao @ Babalu S/o Shri Shivcharan Sao Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Gad Umariya, P.S. Chauki Jute Mill, Kotwali Raigarh, Distt. Raigarh, Civil And Rev. Distt. Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Pusaur, Distt. Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRA No. 136 of 2016 Pyarelal Sao S/o Nathuram Sao Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Aurada, P.S. Pusaur, District Raigarh, Civil And Rev. Distt. Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Pusaur, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.12.11 10:34:00 +0530 2 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 For Respective Appellants : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha and Ms. Indira Tripathi, Advocates. For Respondent : Mr. R.C.S. Deo, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 08/12/2025 1. Since all the appeals arising out of same sessions trial, therefore, they are being considered and decided by this common order. 2. These criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C is against impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.01.2016 passed in Sessions Trial No. 05/2014 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Raigarh, District Raigarh, C.G., whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:- For Appellant-Premshankar Yadav in (CRA No.90/2016) Conviction Sentence U/s 370 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulation. U/s 363 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs. 200/- with default stipulation. U/s 506-B of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs. 100/- with default stipulation. U/s 8 of POCSO Act Rigorous imprisonment for 4 years and fine of Rs. 200/- with default stipulation. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 For Appellant Pyarelal Sao (CRA No.136/2016) and Rishikesh Sao in (CRA No.94/2016) Conviction Sentence U/s 342 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 1 month and fine of Rs. 200/- with default stipulation. U/s 370/34 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulation. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 30.11.2013 the complainant-Manbodh PW-1, father of victim has lodged a report at Police Station Pussore that on 27.11.2013, he and his wife had gone to the fields to cut the crop, leaving their daughter/the prosecutrix/PW-2 at home. When they returned, they found that the prosecutrix was not present at the house. They assumed that she might have gone to meet her friend. When she did not return even by late night, they searched for her among their family members and neighbours, but she could not be found. On 30.11.2013, the prosecutrix informed them through mobile that she was in Bilaspur. On hearing his daughter’s voice, the complainant told her that he was coming to bring her back, but she told him not to come there. The complainant went to Bilaspur and searched for her, but she could not be traced. On the basis of which, police started searching the victim and during the 4 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 investigation, on 05.12.2014, the prosecutrix recovered from Gad Umariya. Appellants were arrested. Medical examination of the victim was conducted. With regard to ascertain the age of the victim, Dakhil Kharij Register was seized. After completing the investigation, the final report was prepared. 4. After framing the charges against the accused/appellants, the charges were read out and explained to the appellants, they denied committing the crime and demanded trial. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined 13 witnesses in its support. Statement of the accused/appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C were recorded, wherein they have pleaded their innocence and false implication in the matter. 6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the present case. Learned counsel would submit that the conviction against the appellants is bad in law and it is not supported by the evidence of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the complainant has not stated regarding the trafficking the prosecutrix by the appellants. There is no eye witness in the case. Moreover, looking 5 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 to the statement of prosecutrix, the appellants have not trafficking the prosecutrix in any manner. The appellants have been convicted on the basis of doubt and there is no corroborative evidence against them. Learned trial Court failed to see the deposition of prosecutrix P.W.-2 as there is various contradiction and omission of material point as stated in written statement before police as marked as Ex.P-5 and on that ground the conviction of appellants/accused could not be maintained. Further, the learned trial Court failed to see the deposition of P.W.-2 prosecutrix on which she denied the averment of written statement marked as Ex.P-5 as on her not doing work, her mother used to make taunt on her, therefore, she has gone to her maternal uncle without informing her parents. The prosecution has failed to prove the fact that the prosecutrix/victim was below 18 years of age at the time of incident. The victim had not raised voice for help. Hence, without there being any cogent evidence, the conviction of the appellants is bad in the eyes of law. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants and submits that the conviction of the appellants is well merited which does not call for any interference. There is clear evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question arises before this Court whether the victim was minor on the date of incident or not?. 11. Victim (PW-2) stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 12/05/1996 and she does not know the name of teacher who got her admission in Class 1st.. PW-1, father of victim stated that he does not know the exact date of birth of his daughter/victim. 12. Chhavilal Choudhary PW-13 Principal who produced the Dakhil Kharij Register has stated in his statement that in Sr.No.580 of the register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 12/05/1996. Moreover, in cross-examination, he stated that the entries in the dakhil-kharij register was recorded on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Class 5th. He categorically stated that he cannot say whether the age can be recorded less or more at the time of admission in the Class 1st . 13. Perusal of the aforesaid statements of the witnesses would show that the entries in the dakhil kharij register was made on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Class 5th. However, PW-13, Principal stated that he does not know anything regarding the entry of date 7 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 of birth in the dakhil kharij register of Class 1st. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the 8 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- 9 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 15. As far as the conviction of accused under Section 370 of IPC is concerned, very recently in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, 10 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was 11 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not 12 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 16. Thus, applying the well settled principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh (supra) and from the medical evidence with regard to the age of the victim, it is held reliable that the victim was major aged about between 16-18 years at the time of incident, according to the principles of the Supreme Court. In the above judgment that the victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 17. Except for evidences of dakhil kharij register, no other evidence like ossification test report have been produced by the 13 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. The oral evidence of the witnesses victim (PW-2), father of victim (PW-1) and also Dakhil Kharij Register are not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident because in the dakhil kharij register which was present in the case, the date of birth was recorded on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Class 5th and the author of the registration of date of birth in Dakhil Kharij Register of Class 1st, has not been examined. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the Dakhil Kharij Register of Class 1st on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor. 18. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offence under Section 370, 363, 342 and 506-B of IPC. 19. The appellants have been convicted for offence of kidnapping. Kidnapping has been defined under Section 359 of the IPC. According to Section 359 of the IPC, kidnapping is of two kinds: 14 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Section 361 of the IPC defines kidnapping from lawful guardianship which states as under:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.- Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.” 20. The object of Section 359 of the IPC is at least as much to protect children of tender age from being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the the protection of the rights of parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane persons. Section 361 has four ingredients:- (1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind. (2) Such minor must be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years or age, if a female. (3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. (4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian. So far as kidnapping a minor girl from lawful guardianship is concerned, the ingredients are : (i) that the girl was under 18 years of age; (ii) such minor was in the keeping of a lawful 15 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 guardian, and (iii) the accused took or induced such person to leave out of such keeping and such taking was done without the consent of the lawful guardian. 21. PW-2, victim stated in her evidence that she knows appellants. On 27.11.2013 at around 10:30 a.m., she was at her home. At that time, the accused Premshankar came there; her parents had gone to the fields and her brother had gone to school. Premshankar asked her what she was doing and why she had not gone to school. She told Premshankar that she had to write a practical project, so she had not gone to school. After that, Premshankar went away. Then, after five minutes, Premshankar came again and gave her a laddoo, saying it was God’s offering and she should eat it. She said she would not eat it, but the accused Premshankar insisted, saying nothing would happen. After that she lost consciousness. Then Premshankar brought her on a bike to Mangalam Weighbridge. At the weighbridge, the accused poured water on her head, after which she regained consciousness. She asked Premshankar at the weighbridge where he had brought her. Premshankar replied that he had brought her for an outing. She then asked him to drop her home, but Premshankar refused to take her home and kept her locked up there. She further stated in her Court testimony that Premshankar and Pyarelal kept her at Mangalam Weighbridge for nine days. On 28.11.2013, they took her to a forest in Jamgaon. 16 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 There, the accused Premshankar was talking to someone over the phone. The victim asked Premshankar what he was talking about, and he told her he was talking about liquor. From there, the accused took her back to Mangalam Weighbridge. On 29.11.2013, the accused Premshankar took her from Raigarh to some small place. There, he locked her in a bathroom and went somewhere. Premshankar then consumed liquor and told her to call her family and tell them that she was in Chhote Bilaspur, doing a computer course, and that the person running the computer course would give her five thousand rupees. She refused, saying she would not say that. Then Premshankar threatened that he would kill her, saying he would break a liquor bottle lying there and kill her. This witness also stated that she then called her family and told them that she was in Chhote Bilaspur and doing a computer course. She again asked Premshankar to take her home, but he brought her back to the weighbridge. The accused kept her locked inside Mangalam Weighbridge. On 30.11.2013, the accused Premshankar came to the weighbridge along with Pyarelal. Then both opened the door and gave her a water bottle and some food. After that, the accused Premshankar shut the door again and ran away. The victim’s uncle had called the number from which the accused had made her talk to her family. Then the Crime Branch traced the location of the victim, and after that the police arrested the 17 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 accused Premshankar and Pyari. In cross-examination, this witness categorically stated that accused Pyarelal never confined/detained her and never said anything to her. In written report Ex.P-5, she had stated that the accused Premshankar wanted to sell her and if this fact is not written in Ex. P-5, then she cannot explain the reason for that. She further stated that she had gone to her maternal uncle’s house in Kanthipali and stayed there for 4-5 days. She further stated that she does not know what is written in Ex. P-5, because she was not fully conscious. She further stated that she was not fully conscious and is not confident whether she wrote in Ex. P-5 that the accused Premshankar took her towards the Jamgaon forest and was talking to another man over the phone about selling someone. 22. PW-1, father of victim, stated in his evidence that the incident took place last year during the paddy harvesting season. In the house, her daughter/victim and two boys, Kavi and Ravi, were there. Victim was studying in Class 10th. When he returned after harvesting paddy at 5 p.m., he saw that vicitm was not at home. Then, they searched nearby, but she was not found. Thereafter, he filed a written report at Police Station Pusaur. He further stated that her daughter was found 9–10 days later at the weighing station on Umariya Road. She told us that Premshankar had taken her away on a motorcycle. 18 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 In cross-examination, he stated that on 30.11.2013, her daughter called over mobile phone and told him that she was in Bilaspur. He further stated that accused Premshankar called him Uncle. There is no issue in the interaction between our family members and the family members of accused Premshankar. The witness states on his own that the victim did not go with Premshankar; so when asked whom she went with, she stated that it was indeed Premshankar who took her along. However, he did not see her going with Premshankar. 23. PW-4, brother of victim stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, he had gone to Kusmunda for work. When he returned home in the evening at around 5 o’clock, victim was not there. Then they searched for victim nearby, but she was not found. When victim did not return for two days, he along with his father went to the Pusaur police station. He stayed outside the police station while his father went inside to lodge the report. After 5–6 days, his sister called him on his mobile. His sister told him that she was in Raipur doing computer training and told to not find her. Later on the same day, she called again and said that she was near Bhupdevpur in Bilaspur village (Raigarh district). After that, he came to know that her sister was at the weighbridge (Dharmkanta). Thereafter, they went to the weighbridge. He stood outside the weighbridge. When her sister was brought out from the room of the weighbridge, he saw her. From there, the police 19 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 brought her to Pusaur police station. The police did not question me outside; they questioned me at his house. In cross-examination, he stated that he cannot tell the day, date, or year of the incident. It is correct to say that he did not see who took her sister from his house. It is correct to say that he did not see who kept his sister at Dharmakanta. His statement was recorded two or three days after his sister left. It is correct to say that when he gave his statement at house, at that time, he did not know who had taken his sister and where she was taken. 24. PW-12 Dr. A.K. Bhagat, who conducted the Medical examination of victim and submitted its report vide Ex.P-17, in which, he stated that in 05.12.2013 at 10:45 PM, female constable Mamta Sahu, Constable No. 115 of Pusaur Police Station, brought victim 17 years, before her for examination. During the medical examination, she found that she was fully conscious and aware. Her pulse was 76 per minute, blood pressure was 110/70 mm Hg. Chest was clear, heart was normal. The abdomen was also normal, and there were no signs of any external injuries. 25. In the case at hand, the testimony of PW-2, the victim, is materially inconsistent and unreliable. In her cross-examination she categorically admitted that the accused Pyarelal never confined or detained her, nor did he say anything to her. She further stated that she was not fully conscious and could not affirm whether the allegations attributed to accused Premshankar in Ex. 20 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 P-5 were actually made by her. Her own admission that she stayed for 4–5 days at her maternal uncle’s house, coupled with her inability to explain why crucial allegations were not recorded in Ex. P-5, renders her version doubtful. PW-1, the father of the victim, also conceded that he did not see the accused taking his daughter and further admitted that the victim herself had telephoned him informing that she was in Bilaspur. PW-4, the victim’s brother, likewise stated that he neither witnessed who took the victim nor knew where she was kept, and his statement was recorded after a delay of two to three days, further diminishing its evidentiary value. The medical evidence of PW-12, Dr. A.K. Bhagat, also contradicts the prosecution’s narrative of coercion or confinement, as the victim was found fully conscious, oriented, without any external injuries, and in normal physical condition. The Victim PW-2 also categorically stated that she called her family and told them that she was in Bilaspur and doing a computer course. Apart from that, the victim was never illegally detained by accused Rishikesh and Pyarelal nor they helped accused Premshankar in any manner. Importantly, the case is not of human trafficking as the basic ingredients of Section 370 are completely missing. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the act/omission of the appellants, if any, would not tantamount to “taking” within the meaning of Section 361 of the 21 CRA Nos. 90/2016, 94/2016 & 136/2016 IPC. Similarly, there is no evidence of enticing the minor victim by the appellants. 26. In light of these material contradictions, omissions, and the absence of any cogent, consistent, or corroborative evidence showing forcible taking, wrongful confinement, trafficking, or intimidation, the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 370, 363, 342, and 506-B IPC beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 27. For the foregoing reasons, all the appeals are allowed. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants are reported to be on bail. Their bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of the BNSS. 28. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/Amardeep