1 2025:CGHC:57766 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2244 of 2025 1 - Rishabh Vishwakarma S/o Vikram Vishwakarma Aged About 21 Years R/o Village - Semra, Police Station - Podi, District - Manendragarh-Chrimiri-Bharatpur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station - Podi, District - Manendragarh-Chrimiri-Bharatpur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Shri Anil S.Pandey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Binu Sharma, PL (Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma ) Judgment on Board 27/11/2025 With the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions FTSC(POCSO), Manendragarh,District Koriya (CG) in Special 2 Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 15/2024 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 366 IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and sentenced him to undergo RI for three years with fine of Rs. 500/- u/s. 363 and to undergo RI for 10 years with fine of Rs. 2000/- u/s. 4 of the POCSO. Both the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 04.12.2023, the father of the prosecutrix lodged a missing report at Police Station Podi stating that his minor daughter, aged about 17 years, had left home on 03.12.2023 at around 09:30 a.m. for Silai Centre, Barkasur, but did not return till late night. Despite search amongst relatives and acquaintances, her whereabouts could not be traced. On the basis of the said report, Crime No. 170/2023 was registered initially for the offence under Section 363 IPC against unknown persons (Ex. P-7). During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered from the custody of the appellant. Her statement was recorded, wherein she alleged that the appellant had allured her on the pretext of marriage and had taken her to Raipur and thereafter to Jagdalpur, where she was kept in hotels and later in a factory room. She further alleged that the appellant repeatedly committed forcible sexual intercourse with her against her will. 4. On the basis of the statement of the prosecutrix, offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 were added against the appellant. The memorandum and seizure proceedings were conducted in accordance with law. The recovery panchnama of the prosecutrix was 3 prepared (Ex. P-5) and she was handed over to her father. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded (Ex. P-2). Spot maps were prepared (Ex. P-3, Ex. P-4, Ex. P-8). Seizure memos of clothes and articles were prepared (ExP-9, Ex. P-10, Ex. P-11). The prosecutrix was medically examined after obtaining consent from her father (Ex. P- 1). Vaginal slides and undergarments were seized and sealed in the presence of witnesses (Ex. P-29). The appellant was also medically examined and his samples were collected (Ex. P-30). The seized articles were sent for chemical examination through proper channel to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The chemical examination reports were received and placed on record as Ex. P-35 and Ex. P-38. 5. During investigation, the age of the prosecutrix was verified by collecting school records including admission register and scholar register, which were seized and proved through the concerned school authorities (Ex. P-14, Ex. P-15, Ex. P-16). As per the said documents, the. prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of alleged incident. The appellant was arrested during investigation and intimation of arrest was given to his family members (Ex. P-31 and Ex. P-32). After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent court, from where the case was committed to the Special Court for trial. The appellant abjured his guilt, pleaded innocence and claimed trial. 6. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses. Statement of the appellant was recorded 4 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which he denied the charges against him and pleaded innocence and false implication in the offence. 7. After appreciation of the evidence available on record, the trial court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence as being illegal, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record, submitting that the trial Court failed to appreciate the material inconsistencies and improbabilities in the prosecution case. It was contended that the prosecution case rests substantially on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, which, according to learned counsel, is not free from contradictions and embellishments. The conduct of the prosecutrix in voluntarily accompanying the appellant to different places for a considerable period without raising any alarm or seeking assistance, it was urged, belies the allegation of abduction and forcible sexual assault. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the evidence on record indicates that the prosecutrix had gone with the appellant of her own volition and that there was no use of force, threat or coercion. It was argued that the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 366 and 376 IPC are not established beyond reasonable doubt. It was further argued that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses from the alleged places of stay, such as hotel staff or factory employees, which casts serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution version. He submits that the medical and forensic evidence does not 5 lend conclusive corroboration to the allegations of repeated sexual assault, and that the chemical examination reports do not decisively link the appellant with the commission of the alleged offences. With regard to the age of the prosecutrix, it was contended that the prosecution relied solely upon school records without proving them strictly in accordance with law and without examining the author of the entries. It was submitted that the age determination is not free from doubt and that the benefit thereof ought to be extended to the appellant. 10. It was further submitted that even assuming the prosecutrix to be a minor, the evidence does not establish the offence of kidnapping or abduction, as she had voluntarily left her house and continued to remain with the appellant. Lastly, learned counsel contended that the sentence imposed is harsh and disproportionate to the facts and circumstances of the case and prayed for acquittal of the appellant. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the trial Court has correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record and has rightly held the appellant guilty for the offences proved against him. 12. It was contended that the testimony of the prosecutrix is cogent and trustworthy and inspires confidence. Learned State Counsel submits that the prosecutrix has consistently narrated the manner in which she was allured and taken away by the appellant on the pretext of marriage and was thereafter subjected to repeated sexual assault. Her version, stands duly corroborated by her statement recorded under 6 Section 164 CrPC, the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances. 13. He submits that minor inconsistencies or omissions, if any, in the statement of the prosecutrix do not go to the root of the matter and are bound to occur in the testimony of a victim of sexual assault. Such minor discrepancies, it was urged, rather reinforce the genuineness of the prosecution case and do not warrant rejection of her testimony. It was further contended that the conduct of the prosecutrix cannot be assessed on the touchstone of stereotypical assumptions. Merely because the prosecutrix did not raise an alarm or remained with the appellant for a certain period cannot be a ground to disbelieve her testimony, particularly in cases involving sexual offences. 14. Learned State Counsel emphasized that the age of the prosecutrix stands duly proved through reliable documentary evidence, namely the school admission and scholar registers, which were seized during investigation and proved through the concerned school authorities. As per the said documents, the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. In such circumstances, consent, even if assumed, is wholly immaterial in view of the statutory mandate of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It was argued that once the minority of the prosecutrix is established, the offences of kidnapping and aggravated penetrative sexual assault stand squarely attracted. The prosecution, it was submitted, has successfully proved that the appellant had taken the minor prosecutrix 7 out of the lawful guardianship of her parents and subjected her to repeated sexual assault. Learned State Counsel further submitted that the medical and forensic evidence lends due corroboration to the prosecution case. The seizure of biological samples, their forwarding to the Forensic Science Laboratory and the chemical examination reports form an unbroken chain supporting the version of the prosecutrix. 15. It was also contended that the non-examination of independent witnesses such as hotel staff or factory employees does not vitiate the prosecution case, as the testimony of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient to sustain conviction, particularly when it is found to be reliable and trustworthy. He submits that the sentence imposed by the trial Court is in consonance with the statutory mandate and the gravity of the offence. Considering the nature of the crime, the age of the victim and the manner in which the offence was committed, no case for interference with the sentence is made out and submits that the appeal may be dismissed. 16. Father of the victim appeared through the concerned DLSA and has raised objection. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 18. At the outset, the foremost question that arises for consideration is whether, on the date of the alleged incident, the prosecutrix was a minor. The determination of her age is of foundational importance, as it goes to the very root of the prosecution case. Upon the answer to this 8 issue hinges not only the applicability of the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, but also the relevance or otherwise of the question of consent. Therefore, before embarking upon an appreciation of the remaining evidence on record, it becomes imperative for this Court to first examine and conclusively determine the age of the prosecutrix as on the date of occurrence. 19. The prosecution relied upon the School admission and discharge register (Ex.P-16) which is sought to be proved by the Principal of the School (PW-7) and Head Master (PW-14) who have stated that at Sl. No. 628, name of the victim and her date of birth was mentioned as 18.11.2006, date of admission in the school was 05.07.2011. it was stated that the original school admission and discharge register is Ex.P- 39 and at Sl. No. 1045, the details of the prosecutrix has been mentioned and date of admission in the school was 05.07.2011, at class three. Father & Mother of the prosecutrix (PW-2 & 3) have stated that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 18.11.2026. Prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated that her date of birth is 18.11.2005. 20. The law with regard to determination of age in cases involving the POCSO Act is no longer res integra. The prosecution is required to prove the age of the victim with the same degree of certainty as required in criminal trials, namely beyond reasonable doubt. The burden squarely lies on the prosecution and does not shift to the accused. The prosecution, in the present case, sought to establish the age of the prosecutrix primarily on the basis of school records, namely the admission register and scholar register, which were exhibited during 9 trial. No birth certificate issued by a statutory authority such as the Municipal Corporation or Registrar of Births and Deaths was produced. 21. Dr. Aishwarya Jain (PW-11) is the Medical Officer of Community Health Centre, Manindragarh who medically examined the prosecutrix and gave her report wherein she has opined that there was no injury found over the body. According to her, there is no definite opinion regarding recent forceful sexual intercourse. 22. After going through the records, the deposition of the witnesses, statement of the Principal and Headmaster, the school admission and discharge register in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix has been got entered in the school is 05.07.2011. The author of the school admission register has not been examined 23. It is well settled that school records can be relied upon for determination of age only when they are proved in accordance with law and inspire confidence. The Supreme Court in Alamelu v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2011) 2 SCC 385 has categorically held that a school certificate is not conclusive proof of age unless the person who made the entry or who had special knowledge of the date of birth is examined, and the source of such information is disclosed. The Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the 10 prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 24. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “ 40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June,1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.- 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- 11 "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit 12 by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 13 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 25. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, 14 the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper 15 technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of 16 documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 26. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in 17 respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.” 27. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: 20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side 18 within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i)indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 19 28. Similarly, in Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 637, the Supreme Court observed that though school records may be considered, the Court must be satisfied about their authenticity and reliability, particularly with respect to the source of the date of birth mentioned therein. In the present case, though the school records were exhibited through school authorities, the prosecution failed to examine the author of the entry or to establish the source of information on the basis of which the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the school register. There is no evidence to show whether the date of birth was recorded on the basis of any contemporaneous document such as a birth certificate, or merely on the oral declaration of the parents at the time of admission. In Mahadeo (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that : “the date given in the matriculation or equivalent certificate must first of all be considered for the purpose of determining the age of the prosecutrix on the date of offence and, if that is not available, other means of determining the age of prosecutrix must be resorted to. While laying down this proposition, the Supreme Court took inspiration from rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (referred hereinafter as “Rules of 2007”). The said rule provided various means of assessing the age of a juvenile in conflict with law. The Supreme Court applied the same parameters for determining the age of a prosecutrix under the POCSO. Under rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007, the age determination inquiry shall obtain evidence relating to the age of the juvenile firstly, from the matriculation or equivalent certificates if available [r. 12(3)(a)(i)] and in its absence, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended (other than a play school) [r. 12(3)(a)(ii)], and in its absence, the birth certificate given by a municipality, corporation or a panchayat [r. 12(3)(a)(iii)]. Thereafter, the Supreme Court refers to rule 20 12(3)(b) and opines that it is only in the absence of any of the means provided in rr. 12(3)(a) (i) to (iii), that medical opinion could be sought to determine the age of the juvenile. Thereafter, the Supreme Court applies the same standard to determine the age of the prosecutrix under POCSO. 15. The question before this Court is whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahadeo supra binds all inferior Courts to accept the date of birth of the prosecutrix as entered in the school register as an indelible fact, prohibiting any enquiry into the reliability of such an entry? In Haryana Financial Corporation and anr., Vs.Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr – (2002) 3 SCC 496, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 19 that judgements are not to be interpreted as statutes and the observations of the Courts are not to be assigned the mathematical rigidness of a Euclid’s theorem. The observations of the Court are to be understood in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment was passed.” 29. A plain reading of the judgment in Mahadeo (supra) reveals that the Supreme Court had to borrow the means of determining the age of the prosecutrix from the provisions of r.12(3) (i) to (iii) of the Rules 8 of 2007, on account of the absence of an analogous provision in the POCSO. However, the Supreme Court never intended its opinion to forbid an enquiry by the Courts into the reliability of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, as entered in the school register. Such a view is further sustainable in the light of stringent and draconian provisions in the POCSO which require that the enquiry by the Court to ascertain the guilt of an accused under the provisions of the POCSO should be detailed and intense to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice by convicting an innocent or acquitting the guilty. The judgment does not require that the Courts consider the date of birth of the prosecutrix entered in the school register as gospel truth.” 21 30. The prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated that she used to go to Silai Centre in the morning at 9.30 am and on the date of incident, she had some hot talk with her mother and therefore she called the appellant by making a call and went with him to Raipur where she stayed for 4-5 days and thereafter they went to the factory at Jagdalpur where the appellant use to work and stayed in his room. When the appellant came to know that her parents were keeping a watch over her movements, he made arrangement for her to be seated in a train and sent her back to her parental home. Upon enquiry by her parents, she disclosed the fact to them and they took her to the police outpost. She was medically examined after taking consent from her parents. Prior thereto, her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded before the Magistrate. She has deposed that during her stay with the appellant he had established physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage. 31. In the present case, the evidence on record discloses material inconsistency regarding the date of birth of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix, in her deposition, stated that her date of birth is 18.11.2005, whereas her parents stated her date of birth as 18.11.2006. Such contradiction, touching the very foundation of the prosecution case, creates serious doubt about the correctness and authenticity of the date of birth projected by the prosecution. 32. Apart from the inconsistent oral testimony, the prosecution sought to rely upon the school admission and discharge register (Ex.P-16), which mentions the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 18.11.2006. Apart 22 from the inconsistent oral testimony, the prosecution sought to rely upon the school admission and discharge register (Ex.P-16), which mentions the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 18.11.2006. However, the said school record, though relevant, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age in the absence of evidence showing the basis on which such entry was made. The prosecution failed to establish that the date of birth recorded in the school register was based on any primary document such as a birth certificate issued by a statutory authority. 33. It is trite law that school records, in the absence of proof of their source and authenticity, cannot be treated as unimpeachable evidence for determination of age. In the present case, no birth certificate issued by the Municipal Corporation or the Registrar of Births and Deaths was produced. The author of the entry in the school register was not examined, nor was the source of information verified. Thus, the prosecution failed to produce primary, clinching and legally admissible evidence to establish the age of the prosecutrix. 34. Furthermore, the investigating agency did not conduct any ossification test or medical examination for age determination. When documentary evidence regarding age is doubtful or inconsistent, medical opinion assumes crucial significance. The failure of the prosecution to obtain an ossification test further weakens the prosecution case and reinforces the doubt regarding the minority of the prosecutrix. 23 35. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. Once the age of the prosecutrix is rendered doubtful, the very foundation for invocation of the provisions of the POCSO Act becomes unsustainable. 36. The absence of foundational evidence regarding the correctness of the date of birth recorded in the school documents assumes significance, particularly in view of the serious penal consequences flowing from a finding of minority under the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263 has reiterated that while school records may be a relevant piece of evidence, they must be subjected to careful scrutiny. 37. From the evidence of the parents of the prosecutrix it is quite vivid that she left the legal guardianship of her parents and eloped along with the appellant. The conduct of the prosecutrix would clearly demonstrate that she was a consenting party in eloping and she was recovered from the custody of the appellant by the villagers however, she has performed marriage with the appellant. 38. Consequently, the statutory presumption attached to minority and the legal irrelevance of consent cannot be mechanically applied in the present case. This finding on age necessarily compels this Court to scrutinize the remaining evidence on record on the parameters applicable to offences under the Indian Penal Code, keeping in view the 24 question of consent and voluntariness. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence available on record and has reached a perverse finding. The trial Court erred in treating the school records as conclusive proof of age and in overlooking the inconsistencies in the oral and documentary evidence, as well as the absence of medical and statutory proof of age. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix by producing primary, unimpeachable and reliable evidence. The school records, in the absence of proof of their source and authenticity, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age. The benefit of doubt arising from such failure must necessarily be extended to the appellant. 39. Once the age of the prosecutrix is rendered doubtful, the very foundation for invocation of the provisions of the POCSO Act becomes unsustainable. Consequently, the statutory presumption attached to minority and the legal irrelevance of consent cannot be mechanically applied in the present case. This finding on age necessarily compels the Court to scrutinize the remaining evidence on record on the parameters applicable to offences under the Indian Penal Code, keeping in view the question of consent and voluntariness. 40. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the trial court has not properly appreciated the evidence available on record and reached to a perverse finding. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is set aside. The appellant 25 stands acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The appellant is is in jail. He may be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.01.30 18:02:10 +0530