1 2025:CGHC:52411-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 756 of 2022 Ghooran Singh S/o Shobhnath Singh, Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Gangoti, Police Chowki Basdei, P.S. Surajpur, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Chowki Basdei, P.S. Surajpur, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Saurabh Dangi, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Soumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on board Per Ramesh Sinha, C hief Justice 28.10.2025 1. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant-accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.03.2022, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surajpur, District- Surajpur (C.G.) in Sessions ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.10.29 10:26:22 +0530 2 Trial No.67/2019, whereby the appellant-accused has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month. 2. The brief case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 23.09.2019 at about 3:30 PM, the complainant Shankar Singh was present at his house when he heard the sound of a quarrel outside. On coming out, he saw the accused Ghurran Singh and his son, the deceased Jagbar Singh, engaged in a heated dispute over the issue of feeding grass to the cattle. The deceased objected that the accused was feeding all the grass at once, despite it being cut from his field. The accused retorted angrily, stating that as he was the father, the deceased should not interfere in every matter. In the course of the altercation, the deceased struck the accused on the thigh with a bamboo stick, whereupon the accused picked up a thick iron rod lying nearby and struck the deceased on the back of his head, causing severe bleeding and instantaneous death at the spot. 3. On the report of the complainant Shankar Singh, who witnessed the incident, a case was registered at Police Outpost Basdei, Police Station Surajpur, as Crime No. 335/2021 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. During investigation, panchnama (Ex.P/1) was prepared and summons 3 under Section 175 of Cr.P.C. was given to the witnesses vide Ex.P/2A and Ex.P/2. Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P/3 and merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P/6, on the basis of which, First Information Report was registered vide Ex.P/6A. Thereafter, crime details form has been prepared vide Ex.P/7. Memorandum of the accused has been recorded vide Ex.P/8, at his instance, an iron rod has been seized vide Ex.P/9. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/11. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination to the District Hospital, Surajpur vide Ex.P/18A. Dr. Anish Kumar (PW-8) has conducted the postmortem of the deceased and gave his report vide Ex.P/19 opining that the cause of death was shock due to brain hematoma and the death was homicidal in nature. The appellant was arrested on 24.09.2019 vide Ex.P/10. 4. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 302 of the IPC was filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur, who thereafter committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. During the trial, charge under Section 302 of the IPC was framed and read over to the accused, to which he abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-14 and exhibited 26 4 documents i.e. Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/26. In defence, the accused- appellant has not examined any witness, but exhibited one document i.e. Ex.D/1. The documentary and material evidence were also brought on record to establish the guilt of the accused. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.03.2022, convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed. 7. Mr. Saurabh Dangi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment and inebriated condition. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, in inebriated condition, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that: (a) there was no premeditation; (b) the incident ensued during a sudden domestic quarrel; (c) the appellant was inebriated; (d) the assault consisted of a single 5 blow; and (e) intention to cause death is absent; at best knowledge can be imputed. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 8. On the other hand, Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly attacking him with an iron rod on his head due to which, he succumbed to the injury on the spot, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased namely Jagbar Singh was homicidal in nature ? 6 11. In this regard, as per the statement of Dr. Anish Kumar (PW-8), on 24.09.2019, when the dead body of the deceased Jagbar Singh, son of accused Ghurran Singh, was brought for postmortem examination, he conducted the autopsy. On external and internal examination of the body, he found that the body was of normal height and build, aged about 45 years. It was in a state of rigor mortis, with eyes and mouth open, foam oozing from the mouth and nose, and semen discharge present. A lacerated wound measuring 5 cm × 2 cm was found on the back of the head, with fracture of the skull’s frontal lobe and accumulation of blood in the injured portion of the brain. No other external injuries were noticed on the body. 12. On internal examination, it was found that the thoracic membrane, ribs, foramina, and lungs were normal, though both lungs contained blood and foam. The larynx and trachea were also filled with foam. The right chamber of the heart contained blood, while the left chamber was empty. The stomach contained undigested food, the small intestine was filled with water, and the large intestine contained undigested food. The spleen and kidneys were congested, while the diaphragm, esophagus, bladder, and genitals were normal. 13. According to the doctor, the cause of death was respiratory failure due to blood clotting in the brain, and the nature of death was homicidal. He opined that the death had occurred within 12 to 24 7 hours prior to the postmortem examination. His detailed postmortem report is Ex.P/19. 14. Further, on 18.10.2019, on an application submitted by Constable Hridaylal Patle (No. 780) of Police Station Basdei, Surajpur, for a query report regarding the iron rod seized from accused Ghurran Singh in Crime No. 335/2019 under Section 302 IPC, Dr. Anish Kumar (PW-8) examined the weapon. He found that the iron rod measured 62 cm in length and 7 cm in width, and opined that the injuries noted on the deceased during postmortem could have been caused by the said rod, which was sufficient to cause death. His query report is Ex.P/20. 15. PW-2 Shankar Singh, who is stated to be an eye-witness to the incident, has deposed in his evidence that he knew both the accused Ghooran Singh and the deceased Jagbar Singh, who were father and son. The incident took place on the Paran day of the Jiutiya festival. At about the relevant time, while he was taking his meal at home, he heard sounds of a quarrel outside. On coming out, he saw the accused and the deceased engaged in a heated argument over the issue of feeding grass to their cattle. He went near them and tried to intervene to pacify the situation, but at that very moment, the accused Ghooran Singh picked up an iron rod and struck the deceased Jagbar Singh on the head, causing a bleeding injury, as a result of which the deceased fell down and died on the spot. 8 16. He further stated that at that time, Shakunti, Jageshwar, and Raghuvar Singh also arrived at the spot. They tried to give water to Jagbar Singh, but he had already succumbed to his injuries. He then reported the matter at Police Outpost Basdei, on the basis of which a case intimation (Ex.P-4) and a report (Ex.P-6A) were recorded, bearing his thumb impression. The police thereafter reached the spot, prepared a spot map (Ex.P-7) and a panchnama (Ex.P-1) at his instance, on which his thumb impressions were obtained. He also deposed that the memorandum statement of accused Ghooran Singh (Ex.P-8) was recorded in his presence, wherein the accused disclosed that he would produce the iron rod used in the offence. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the police seized the iron rod (Ex.P-9) at the instance of the accused in his presence, and he identified the same. The arrest of the accused (Ex.P-10) was also made in his presence. He further stated that the local Patwari prepared a site map (Ex.P-11) on his pointing out. 17. During cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that the accused and the deceased lived separately but shared cordial relations. He also admitted that on the date of the incident, it was the Paran of the Jiutiya festival and the deceased had consumed alcohol. He stated that when he came out, he saw both quarrelling and pushing each other over feeding grass to the cattle. He denied the defence suggestion that the deceased had struck the accused with a stick or that he fell on a stone causing injury to his own 9 head. He reiterated that the accused struck the deceased with an iron rod, which caused his death. He further admitted that he is illiterate and affixed his thumb impressions on the police documents without knowing their contents, as the police did not read them over to him. He denied having any enmity or land dispute with the accused and also denied the suggestion that he was falsely implicating the accused. 18. From a perusal of the aforementioned prosecution witnesses, namely PW-2 Shankar Singh and PW-8 Dr. Anish Kumar, it is apparent that the prosecution has established the essential facts of the case. The testimony of PW-2 Shankar Singh, an eye- witness to the incident, clearly reveals that on the Paran day of the Jiutiya festival, a quarrel ensued between the accused Ghooran Singh and his son, the deceased Jagbar Singh, over feeding grass to the cattle. During the altercation, the accused, in a fit of anger, picked up an iron rod and struck the deceased on the head, resulting in a grievous head injury and instantaneous death. The medical evidence of PW-8 Dr. Anish Kumar corroborates the ocular version. As per the post-mortem examination conducted on 24.09.2019, the deceased sustained a lacerated wound measuring 5 cm × 2 cm on the back of the head, along with fracture of the skull and accumulation of blood in the brain, which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The doctor opined that the cause of death was respiratory failure due to blood clotting in the brain, and the nature 10 of death was homicidal. Furthermore, as per the query report (Ex.P/20), the doctor confirmed that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the iron rod seized from the possession of the accused. Thus, the ocular testimony of PW-2 finds full corroboration from the medical evidence of PW-8, establishing beyond doubt that the deceased Jagbar Singh died a homicidal death caused by a blow inflicted by the accused Ghooran Singh with an iron rod during the course of their altercation. 19. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Jagbar Singh was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 20. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question. 21. The prosecution has relied upon the testimony of Shankar Singh (PW-2) who has claimed himself to be an eyewitness to the incident. According to him, According to him, on the Paran day of the Jiutiya festival, while he was having his meal at home, he heard sounds of a quarrel outside and, on coming out, saw the accused Ghooran Singh and the deceased Jagbar Singh (his son) 11 engaged in a heated dispute over feeding grass to the cattle. He intervened to pacify them, but at that very moment, the accused picked up an iron rod and struck the deceased on the head, causing a bleeding injury which resulted in the deceased’s instantaneous death. 22. In his cross-examination, Shankar Singh (PW-2) has made certain admissions which appear to favour the appellant. He admitted that the accused and the deceased lived separately but shared cordial relations. He further admitted that on the date of the incident, it was the Paran day of the Jiutiya festival and that the deceased had consumed alcohol. He also stated that when he came out of his house, he saw both the accused and the deceased quarrelling and pushing each other over feeding grass to the cattle. These admissions indicate that the incident occurred suddenly in the course of a quarrel between the father and son. He denied the defence suggestion that the deceased had struck the accused with a stick or that he fell on a stone and sustained injury, but he reiterated that the accused struck the deceased with an iron rod. He denied having any enmity or land dispute with the accused and also denied the suggestion of false implication. 23. From the above, it is evident that the testimony of Shankar Singh (PW-2), being an eyewitness to the occurrence, directly attributes the fatal blow to the accused-appellant Ghooran Singh. Despite a lengthy cross-examination, his version regarding the actual 12 assault has remained consistent and unshaken. No material contradiction or omission has been elicited so as to discredit his presence at the spot or to cast any serious doubt upon the veracity of his evidence. His account of the quarrel between the accused and the deceased, followed by the sudden act of the accused striking the deceased with an iron rod, stands corroborated by the medical and other documentary evidence on record. 24. In view of the above discussion, it stands proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 24.09.2019, at about 11:00 a.m., the accused Ghooran Singh assaulted his son Jagbar Singh with an iron rod during a sudden quarrel over feeding grass to the cattle, causing a grievous head injury that proved fatal. The prosecution has successfully established its case through cogent ocular, documentary, and medical evidence, leaving no room for reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused. 25. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 26. The distinction between intention and knowledge in the context of Section 299 and Section 300 IPC is crucial in determining the 13 culpability of the appellant. Intention denotes a conscious desire to bring about a particular result, whereas knowledge implies awareness that a particular consequence is likely to ensue. In the present case, while the appellant's actions were undoubtedly culpable, the circumstances suggest that he did not intend to cause the death of his wife. However, it is evident that he knew that his actions were likely to cause harm. 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the following facts are salient: • No premeditation or prior motive has been proved by the prosecution. • The incident occurred inside the home following a sudden quarrel late at night. • There was one fatal blow with a household tangi; there is no evidence of repeated assault or pursuit. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. The State Rep. By The Inspector of Police, 2023 INSC 632, readily held when a case would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC rather than Section 302 of the IPC, emphasizing that Part II applies where “murder is never established” and only knowledge (not intention) is attributable; it also surveys classic “single blow” cases altering Section 302 to Section 304 Part II (e.g., Jawahar Lal, Camilo Vaz, Jai Prakash, Kulwant Rai, Hem Raj, Pulicherla Nagaraju) and ultimately converts the conviction to Section 304 Part II. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:- 14 “20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man. 21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:- 1. The nature of the weapon used. 2. The place where the injuries were inflicted. 3. The nature of the injuries caused. 4. The opportunity available which the accused gets. 22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word 'intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:- "The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.” 23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:- "6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult 15 to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.” 24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:- "The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off. without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?" 25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and 'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that 'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into 16 consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. 26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly explained. It is as under:- "Knowledge and intention must not be confused. 17. …… Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C. 18. …..A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of quilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention. 19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death' but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of quilt is presumed." It has been further observed therein as under:- "26. ... Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to 17 cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304. I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable." 27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40). 28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:- "To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed......... 18 Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it." 29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:- "In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............ Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word "recklessness". In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur." 30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. 31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an 19 offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death. 32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC? SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:- 33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of 'culpable homicide' and 'murder', respectively. In terms of Section 299, 'culpable homicide' is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon 'knowledge'. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in 'culpable homicide', that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with 'murder', although there is no clear definition of 'murder' in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' is its species and all 'murders' are 'culpable homicides' but all 'culpable homicides' are not 'murders'. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289) 34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:- "12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' is species. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice- versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically 20 recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304." 35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. 'Culpable homicide' may or may not amount to 'murder', in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a 'culpable homicide is murder', the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail. 36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. 'culpable homicide' and 'murder' respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections. This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections. 37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if 21 courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:- Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done- Subject to certain culpable homicide is murder if the exceptions act by which the death is caused is done- INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of such causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 29. Recently, in Velthepu Srinivas v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 107, the Supreme Court converted a Section 302 of the IPC conviction to Section 304 Part II for one accused, sentencing him to 10 years, where the role and circumstances 22 evidenced lack of intention but knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:- “28. Even though, A-3 might not have had the common intention to commit the murder, nevertheless, his participation in the assault and the wielding of the stone certainly makes him culpable for the offence that he has committed. While we acquit A-3 of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he is liable for the offence under 304 Part II IPC. The law on Section 304 Part II has been succinctly laid down in Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1, where it was held that: 14. This section is in two parts. If analysed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused…. 29. In the past, this Court has considered factors such as lack of medical evidence to prove whether the act/injury was individually sufficient to cause death 1, a single blow on head with a hammer2 and lack of cogent evidence of the eye-witnesses that the accused shared a common intention to commit murder 3 as some factors to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. 30. Returning back to the facts of the case, there is certainly no escape from coming to the conclusion that A-3 should have had the knowledge that the use of a stone to hit the head of the deceased is likely to cause death. However, as demonstrated 1 Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 754. 2 Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 16 SCC 479. 3 Ghana Pradhan & Ors. v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 451. before, the evidence is insufficient to 23 deduce a conclusion that he shared a common intention with the other accused to commit the murder of the deceased. Considering the role that A-3 has played, we hold him guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. 31. The perusal of the evidence would reveal that it is not the case of the prosecution that A-3 was along with the other accused while the deceased was dragged to the house. The deposition would reveal that after the other accused assaulted the deceased with sword, A-3 came thereafter and assaulted the deceased with stone lying there. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has not been in a position to establish that A-3 shared the common intention with the other accused to cause the murder of the deceased. 32. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the conviction and sentence of A-1, A-2 and A-4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and dismiss their Criminal Appeal No. 2852 of 2023 against the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 2005 dated 26.04.2022. We acquit A-3 of the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and convict him under Section 304 Part II and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for 10 years. To this extent, the appeal of A-3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. ” 30. The record satisfies the Chronological four-part test: (i) sudden quarrel; (ii) no premeditation; (iii) heat of passion; (iv) no evidence of undue advantage or cruelty (there is no repetition of blows; the weapon appears to be available in the house; the assault was momentary). Thus, Exception 4 is attracted; the offence cannot be murder. 31. So far as recovery and medical consistency are concerned, the recovery of iron rod (Ex.P/10) on the appellant’s disclosure and the medical opinion (Ex.P/19) that the said weapon could have caused the injuries sustained by the deceased, undoubtedly, 24 fortify authorship and connect the accused with the assault. These circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution version. However, such factors, by themselves, cannot automatically elevate the offence to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, particularly when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel and was confined to a single blow. 32. On careful consideration of the ocular and medical evidence, it is evident that the incident was not a pre-planned or premeditated act. The occurrence arose out of a domestic altercation concerning the grazzing of cattle, in the heat of passion, firstly deceased assaulted and accused and then, the appellant caused injury to the deceased by an iron rod. In such a setting, it would not be proper to ascribe to him the intention of causing death or of inflicting that very particular injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The single blow on the vital part of the head, however, certainly warrants imputation of knowledge on the part of the appellant that his act was likely to cause death. Therefore, while intention is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, knowledge is clearly attributable, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of Section 304 Part II IPC. 33. In view of the above, this Court holds that the appellant is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC. His culpability is writ large from the fact that he 25 inflicted the fatal blow with iron rod upon his son, which ultimately resulted in his death. Nonetheless, the attendant circumstances, namely the absence of premeditation, the occurrence being in the course of a sudden quarrel, and the appellant’s inebriated condition, justify the alteration of conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the conviction of the appellant- accused for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC as well as the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. Considering that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant-accused to cause death of the deceased but the injuries caused by him were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the appellant-accused is convicted for offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of IPC. Since the appellant-accused is in jail from 24.09.2019 to 11.10.2023 and since 17.06.2024 till now i.e. more than 5 years, 4 months and 28 days, taking into consideration the period he has already undergone, we award him sentence already undergone by him and the fine sentence imposed by the learned trial Court shall remain intact. Accordingly, the appellant-accused be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other case. 35. This criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 26 36. Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu