1 2025:CGHC:6737-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 90 of 2025 1 - Bhagwat Das Asture S/o Shri Ram Dayal Asture Aged About 82 Years Retired Principal, R/o Sahyog, Bada Ashok Nagar, Durga Chouk, Devram Gali Gudhiyari, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, S.C. And S.T. Development Department, Mantralaya At Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Commissioner S.C. And S.T. Development, Indravati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Assistant Commissioner S.C. And S.T. Development, Office Of Collector Campus, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Director Directorate Of Public Instructions, Indravati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For appellant : Mr. Tanmay Thomas, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, G.A. Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 06.02.2025 1. The present writ appeal has been filed by the writ appellant who was the petitioner in the writ petition, against the impugned order dated 26.11.2024 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No. 5895/2016 2 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Lecturer vide order dated 26.03.1977 and was posted at Govt. Higher Secondary School, Ranapur, Dist- Jhabua. After successfully completion of 8 years of continuous service, he was promoted to the post of Principal vide order dated 11.12.1985 on the pay scale of 1000-30-1210-40-1450-EB. After his promotion, he was posted at Higher Secondary School, Kewara, Dist- Surguja, CG( the then M.P.). The petitioner is superannuated on 01.05.2005 from Govt. Higher Secondary School, Chhura, Dist- Gariyaband (earlier Dist- Raipur) and at the time of his retirement, the petitioner was on the pay scale of Rs. 8000-275-13,500. 3. While the petitioner was in service, the then State government of Madhya Pradesh issued a Circular on 19/04/1999 regarding time bound pay scale by which it has been provided that if the total service of the employee is more than 12 years after his regular appointment then he is entitled for Krammonati. Therefore, in view of the Circular dated 19/04/1999, the petitioner is also entitled for first Krammonnati after completion of 12 years of his regular service as the petitioner has completed more than 28 years of his service and during that period, he was promoted only once i.e. on the post of Principal from the post of Lecturer and thus, the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of next higher pay scale which is Rs. 10,000-325-15,200. The petitioner moved his representation to the authorities for grant of benefit of Krammonnati and the Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development Department had issued a letter on 10.01.2012 to make available the service books of the principles to sanction the Krammonnati after completion of their 12-16 years of service. The other similar situated employee have been granted the benefit of circular dated 19/04/1999 but the petitioner is deprived by the same. Being aggrieved by the inaction of the respondents, the petitioner filed a WPS No. 174/2016 before this Court which was disposed of on 04.03.2016 with the direction to decide the representation filed by the petitioner in the light of order passed by this court on 20.06.2011 in WPS No. 3135/2011. In compliance of the order dated 04.03.2016, the petitioner had submitted his detailed representation on 22.11.2016 along with the copy of the order passed in WPS No. 174/2016 and WPS No. 3135/2011. The representation of the petitioner is rejected by the authorities on 10.06.2016 by holding that the petitioner is not entitled to get the pay scale of Rs. 10,000-325-15,200 under Krammonnati Yojna which is under challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner had claimed the following reliefs in the 3 writ petition:- 10.1 This, Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside/ quashed the order impugned dated 10.06.2016 (Annexure P-9) passed by P-101 respondent no. 4. the 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass suitable order in favour of petitioner that he be given the higher scale of pay Rs. 10,000-325-15,000/-; 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court further direct the respondents to immediately take necessary action of the petitioner's case and he be given all benefits as per the circular dated 19.04.99. 10.4 That this Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to issue any other writ/order direction being deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10.5 That this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to dispose of the writ petition at motion stage and direct the respondent authorities immediately to pay all the benefits which the petitioner has right to get his dues. 10.6 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem, fit according to the fact and circumstance of the case along with the cost of the petitioner. 4. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge on 26.11.2024 and after hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitioner on delay and latches which is under challenge in the present writ appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the writ appellant would submit that by the Circular dated 19.04.1999, the petitioner was entitled for the higher pay scale and without there being any claim by the petitioner, it is the duty of respondent authorities to grant him the benefit of higher pay scale. The non-payment of higher pay scale would affect the pensionary benefit of the petitioner. The learned Single Judge has also erred in considering the Circular dated 24.04.2006 whereas the Circular dated 19.04.1999 is relevant in the present case and the claim of the petitioner is based on the Circular dated 19.04.1999. He would also submit that the writ petition filed by the petitioner cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches as grant of benefit under the circular is the continuing cause of action and there is no limitation prescribed for it. When the grievance of the petitioner was not settled, he earlier filed the WPS No. 174/2016 which was disposed of on 04.03.2016 and thereafter, his representation was dismissed on 10.06.2016 4 immediately thereafter the petitioner has filed the instant petition which cannot be said to be suffered by delay and latches. Therefore, the impugned order is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside and the relief claimed in the writ petition may be granted to the petitioner. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supported the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge and submits that there is no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by learned Single Judge and the writ appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the document annexed with the writ petition as well as the writ appeal. 8. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Lecturer vide order dated 26.03.1977 and thereafter, he was promoted on the post of Principal vide order dated 11.12.1985 and he superannuated on 01.04.2005. In the meantime, on 19.04.1999, a Circular was issued by the then State government by which it has been provided that the employees after the continuous service of 12 years on the post would be entitled to get higher pay scale. The petitioner was promoted on the post of Principal vide order dated 11.12.1985 and as per his claim after completion of 12 years of his service i.e. in the year 1997 he is entitled for grant of time bound pay scale but he did not claimed the same till his retirement i.e. in the year 2005. He claimed the benefit of Circular dated 19.04.1999 in the year 2016 by filing the WPS No. 174/2016 which was disposed of on 04.03.2016 and ultimately his representation has also been rejected on 10.06.2016 by the authorities concerned. From the pleadings and documents, it is quite vivid that the benefit of Circular dated 19/04/1999 is claimed by the petitioner in the year 2016 when he filed his WPS No. 174/2016 i.e. after about 17 years of the issuance of said Circular which definitely suffered from delay and latches. 9. In the matter of Rushi Bhai Jagdish Bhai Pathak Vs. Bhawnagar reported in (2022) SCC online SC 64, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the delay and latches in claiming relief and held in Para 9 of its judgment:- 5 9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed. The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence.5 Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and Others, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, in the following words: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps. not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in 6 either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 10. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitranand Behra Vs. State of Orissa reported in 2023 live law SC 883 held in Para-21 which is as under:- 21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: "To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application Administrative Tribunal). One to of the the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of 7 filing of the writ petition." (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches 21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". unreasonable delay It or thus involves negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no 8 statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. determine the difference between To the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We already have discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on other. The 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes against a particular act. knowledge comes passive knowledge From the acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms. and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. essential, parties. is We distinction acquiescence. Hence, what the conduct only dealt involving When of with a is the the mere acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis." (emphasis supplied) (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301: "36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In 9 the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the was challenge ground that allowed to representative the be of on primarily respondent represented was by choice. his the not a The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. XXX 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court that observed if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that deprived the of person who has his rights has been not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, action, the delay furnishes a cause in which some cases of as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, en, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment intentional act to acknowledge, implies as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409: 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464: (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in 10 Halsbury's Laws of England (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500], SCC pp. 470-71, paras 12-13) "12. 470-71, paras 12-13) "12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: of 'In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of Laches. 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious Financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of 11 such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?" 39. Before proceeding further... it is important to clarify distinction between "acquiescence" and "delay and laches". Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress completed, and after violation is which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1: (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram OnLine Cal 30 literal sense, means Charan Das, 1925 SCC AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In the term acquiescence silent assent, concurrence, [See Vidyavathi or Kapoor tacit consent, acceptance, Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5: AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance.. [See "Introduction", U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331: (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid acquiescence legal position, the on part inactive of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in 12 the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation." (emphasis supplied) 11. The Court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. The duty of the Court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification, there must be a life during which a person must approach the Court for their remedy, otherwise, there would be unending and uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 12. In the present case also the petitioner has claimed the benefit of Circular dated 19.04.1999 by filing writ petition in the year 2016 and thus, we found that the order passed by learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay and latches, does not suffers any perversity or illegality. 13. Upon perusing the impugned order, we notice that the same has been rendered by the learned Single Judge with cogent and justifiable reasons. In an intra-court appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities are noticed. Learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition by the impugned order has adverted to all the facts of the case. 14. Therefore, we do not find any sufficient ground to differ with the reason assigned by the learned Single Judge in its order and therefore, the writ appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2025.02.21 11:36:40 +0530