Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 24 of 2025 Reserved on: 26.03.2025 Date of Decision: 10th April 2025. Abdul Khalik ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Gill, Advocate. For the Respondent/State. : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested vide FIR No. 46/2024 dated 10.04.2024 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act registered at Police Station Puruwala District Sirmaur. The petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no evidence against the petitioner. He is a law-abiding citizen and 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) permanent resident of Paonta Sahib. Two accused have been enlarged on bail by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib. The petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Nobody received any injury and no MLC was issued. The offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is not made out. The petitioner has filed the bail petition bearing Cr.MP(M) No .1714 of 2024, which was dismissed by this Court on 18.09.2024. The present case was registered due to the enmity. There is a delay in the progress of the trial; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that on 10.04.2024 at about 10:30 am, Gurvinder @ Vinder, Inderjeet Singh @ Inder, Mukesh and the petitioner Abdul Khalik along with two persons visited the house of the informant. Gurvinder and Inderjeet shot at the informant but he escaped. The other persons were armed with iron rods and pistols. Gurvinder@ Vinder also shot at Shweta Thakur, the informant’s sister. The assailants ran away from the spot. Gurvinder used to visit Kiran, who was a tenant of the informant. He argued with Kiran on 09.04.2024. The informant asked Kiran to vacate the room, after which Gurvinder shot at the informant. Other accused had 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) accompanied him. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police found the marks of the bullet on the pillar. The police arrested Mukesh Kumar and Abdul Khalik. Abdul Khalik made a statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act that he had concealed the pistol, which could be got recovered by him. He got a pistol recovered in the presence of witnesses Aarif Khan, Tajinder Singh and HC Bhupinder Singh. The police seized the pistol. The other weapons were also recovered at the instance of the other accused. These were sent to FSL and as per the report, the pistol falls within the purview of the Arms Act. Firearm discharge residues were detected in the barrel of the pistol. The petitioner is a member of a gang led by Gurvinder @ Vinder. He had joined the other assailants to attack the informant. An FIR No. 94/2023 dated 26.06.2023 has been registered in Police Station Puruwala for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 and 323 read with Section 34 of IPC. The petitioner can commit a similar offence in case of release on bail and he can intimidate the witnesses. The challan has been filed before the Court and the matter was listed before the learned Trial Court on 18.01.2025 for consideration of charge. Hence, the status report. 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) 3. I have heard Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 4. Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect him with the commission of the crime. The FIR does not show that the petitioner had used a gun and the recovery of the gun from the petitioner will not implicate him. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randeep Singh @ Rana versus State of Haryana, 2024: INSC:887 in support of his submission. 5. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He had shot at the informant. He can intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. The recovery of the gun was effected at his instance, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh 6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:— “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) 9. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P, 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1714 of 2024 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 18.09.2024. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 that once a bail application has been dismissed, subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J. only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 12. Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, wherein it was observed: - 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 13. Similarly, in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, the Supreme Court held that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court must consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then determine why the subsequent bail application should be granted. It was observed: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier 10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 14. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.” 15. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: “30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.” 16. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551 that successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstance, which means the change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstance. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutatory principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But, the power to decide such subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 17. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) 18. It was asserted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial. However, the copies of the order sheets were not filed. An application was filed for placing on record the zimini orders, but the statement of Kiran was placed on record instead. Therefore, there is nothing to indicate that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, which is not attributable to the petitioner. The fact that the statement of one witness has been recorded demonstrates that the trial is progressing normally. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to bail on the ground of delay in the progress of the trial. 19. It was submitted that the case against the petitioner is false. No person was injured, and an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was made out. The other co-accused have been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This Court had considered these pleas in the earlier bail petition filed by the petitioner and had rejected them. This Court does not sit in appeal over the judgment refusing bail, and it is impermissible for the Court to hold that the petitioner has not committed any offence after having given a prima facie finding regarding the petitioner’s 13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) involvement in the commission of the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. 20. It was submitted that the victim has not supported the prosecution case and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, and dacoity Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of trial. Bail cannot be granted because there are some discrepancies in the deposition, which affects the credibility of the victim. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its final 14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:10018 ) conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only in the event that the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 21. Thus, the bail cannot be granted because the victim has not supported the prosecution case. 22. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 23. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) 10th April,2025 Judge (Saurav Pathania)