APHC010464262025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] FRIDAY,THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 9213/2025 Between: Yemmala Ravendra @ Kiran ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND The State of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. CH ESWAR RAO POLISETTY Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: ORDER: Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail in Crime No.277 of 2025 of Kancharapalem Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, registered against the Petitioner/Accused herein for the offences punishable under Sections 69, 99 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNS’). 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 2. The prosecution case is that the complainant, residing with her parents and sister, developed a relationship with her maternal uncle, the accused Yemmala Ravendra, since 2017 on his assurance of marriage. Believing his promise, she entered into a physical relationship with him, during which she became pregnant in May 2022. At his insistence, she consumed abortion medicines, resulting in severe bleeding, and was treated at Sri Sai Adithya Hospital where it was confirmed she was 12 weeks pregnant. Though he initially agreed before elders to marry her, the accused later refused, claiming love with another woman and threatened that his family would commit suicide if he married the complainant. Alleging sexual exploitation on the false promise of marriage and miscarriage, she lodged a complaint at Kancharapalem Police Station on 12-06-2025. CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: 3. Sri Ch. Eswar Rao Polisetty, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the alleged offence, and that there is no prima facie material or cogent evidence connecting the Petitioner to the commission of the crime. It is further contended that the Petitioner is the sole earning member of his family and that his incarceration would result in grave hardship and irreparable prejudice to his dependents. The Petitioner undertakes to comply with any condition that 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper to impose while considering the prayer for grant of bail. 5. It is further submitted that the Petitioner is a permanent resident of Visakhapatnam and there exists no apprehension of his absconding or evading the due process of law. The Petitioner has extended full cooperation in the course of investigation and undertakes to continue such cooperation in all future proceedings. It is also urged that the nature of the allegations does not necessitate custodial interrogation, and that the imposition of appropriate conditions would suffice to secure the ends of justice. In view of the foregoing, it is urged to allow the petition. ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE: 6. Per contra, Ms.P. Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor has vehemently opposed the prayer for bail, asserting that the investigation is at a nascent and critical stage, with several material witnesses yet to be examined. It is submitted that the premature enlargement of the Petitioner on bail would be inimical to the sanctity and efficacy of the ongoing investigative process and may engender deliberate non-cooperation on the part of the Petitioner. The prosecution further raises an apprehension that, if released, the Petitioner may exert undue influence upon, or intimidate, prosecution witnesses, thereby impeding the administration of justice and vitiating the evidentiary foundation 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 of the case. It is also contended that there exists a palpable and imminent risk of the Petitioner absconding, thereby frustrating the due process of law. 7. Mr. Ramineni Sudheer, learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent while reiterating the contentions of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and vehemently opposed for enlarging the petitioner on bail. 8. In view of the gravity and allegations, coupled with the potential threat posed to the integrity of the investigation, it is submitted that the Petitioner is not entitled to the indulgence of discretionary relief and it is urged to dismiss the present Criminal Petition. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 9. In view of the rival submissions advanced by both the learned Counsel and upon a perusal of the prosecutorial narrative, the pivotal issue now meriting for consideration is: “Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of bail?” ANALYSIS: 10. As seen from the record, the petitioner was arrested on 02.08.2025. He has been in the judicial custody for the past 54 days. So far, eight witnesses are examined. The petitioner and the victim/2nd respondent/de-facto complainant are relatives. The learned counsel for the petitioner by filing certain photographs alleged that the victim/2nd respondent/de-facto 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 complainant has got an affair with another person that was the root cause for not marrying the 2nd respondent. The allegation against the petitioner is that he had participated sexual intercourse with the 2nd respondent on the pretext of love and he would marry her. 11. In Jahir v. State of Uttar Pradesh1 a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad at para Nos.8 to 11 held as under: 8. In Shrikant Upadhyay and others Vs State of Bihar and another, 2024 INSC 202 has observed as under "19. The relief of Anticipatory Bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and rotecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each individual case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome." 9. The power of anticipatory bail is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where the person is falsely implicated. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. 10. The court owes duty that justice is done to all the parties (i,e accused, prosecution, informant, complainant and victim). The citizens in terms of constitutional mandate are required to abide by law. Where from the material and allegation against an accused, offence is made out, the accused is required to show exceptional circumstances warranting the protection of liberty. No circumstances have been shown by applicant(s) to demonstrate that personal liberty of accused in the facts and circumstances of the case is required to be protected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the grant of anticipatory bail would lead to miscarriage of justice. 11. The Court is required to exercise jurisdiction of anticipatory bail on sound judicial principles. The court should be slow to grant anticipatory bail to an accused who does not abide by law and commits an offence. In the present case, it is not shown by the applicant(s) that the prosecution or complainant has falsely implicated the applicant(s). One cannot lose sight of the fact that unwarranted protection to an accused has adverse effect on 12024 AHC 135775 (Neutral Citation) 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 the peace and tranquillity of society at large and effects maintenance of law and order in the society. The jurisdiction of anticipatory bail permits the accused to be not produced before the ordinary jurisdictional court although ordinary jurisdictional court at grass root level have greater experience and exposure with regard to situation of maintenance of law and order at the local place. The process of anticipatory bail permits consideration of anticipatory bail by Session Court or High Court and not by Magistrate courts. Facts and circumstance of each case is to be examined at the time of consideration of anticipatory bail”. 12. In Pamarthi Chaitanyeswar Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh2 a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, at para Nos.28 and 29 held as under. “28...The specific overt acts alleged in the first information report as well as in the statement of victim recorded by police during investigation are the petitioner was after the victim saying that he loves and intending to marry her and made a promise marry: It happened in the year 2020; The petitioner used to visit the house of victim and developed acquaintance also with the parents of the victim; Therefore, the victim believed the promise of the petitioner that he would marry her; Hence, continued the friendship with the petitioner, While so, in the month of July 2021, one day, the victim visited the flat of the petitioner, He was alone in the flat: The petitioner sexually assaulted her saying that he will marry her; The victim believed him. The petitioner continued the friendship with the victim promising that he will marry her, after completing the education; Later, after completion of education, the petitioner went to Vijayawada, promising that he will speak with his parents about marriage. “...29...Therefore, when the above allegations are considered on their face value, prima facie they show that victim consented for the relationship with the petitioner as she sincerely believed his promises to marry, from inception till he left for Vijayawada, as truthful and he marry her. It must be remembered that at relevant point both were co-students in the college and became good friends. Therefore, no reason for the girl to suspect his bona- fides at that time. In fact, it is the contention of the petitioner that he could not marry her due to subsequent unforeseen events which are not under his control. Truth of these allegations cannot be gone into in a quash petition”. 13. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh3 a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, at para No.11 and 12 held as under: 2MANU/AP/1626/2024 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 “11...In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A reads as under: Section 114A-Presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.- in a prosecution for rape under Clause (a) or Clause(b) or Clause(c) or Clause (d) or Clause (e) or Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutor and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her. 12. In the present case in view of the facts as mentioned above we are satisfied that the consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law”. 14. In Gadapu Ravi Teja v. State of Andhra Pradesh4 a learned Single Judge of this Court, a decision relied on by the respondent No.2, at para No.7 held as under: “7...As seen from the record, the petitioner is aged about 31 years and the de facto complainant/respondent No.2 is aged about 26 years. Both are fully grown, both are working and they are educated. Because of love and affection in between them, they met physically on several occasions. Later, respondent No.2 got pregnancy. When she informed the same to the petitioner, the petitioner suggested her to get it aborted and gave some tablets. As the respondent No.2 consumed those tablets, the pregnancy got aborted. Even though, the respondent No.2 requested the petitioner to marry her, the petitioner did not oblige her request on the pretext that his mother and sister do not agree formarriage. As mentioned supra in Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no instance of the victim therein got pregnancy and it was 3MANU/SC/8531/2006 4Crl.P.No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 aborted at the instance of the petitioner therein. As rightly pointed out by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, the facts and circumstances of Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case and the instant case are distinguishable on facts and the ratio laid down by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court cannot be followed, as there are no merits in this criminal petition for grant of pre- arrest bail to the petitioner”. 15. In Gudibanda Karteek v. State of Andhra Pradesh5 a learned Single Judge of this Court, at para No.5 held as under: 5. A perusal of the material on record goes to show that this is a case of stalking, criminalized sexual intercourse committed by deceitful means on the pretext of love and marriage, causing simple hurt and miscarriage without her consent, criminal intimidation and insulting her by naming her caste. As seen from the contents of the FIR, A1, by promising to marry the de facto complainant, had physical contact with her several times. When she became pregnant, A1 introduced his brother A2, who gave tablets to her. Trusting the words of A1 that he would marry her, she took the tablets. Later, her pregnancy was removed. When she asked A1 to marry her, A1 abused her in filthy language by touching her caste and beat her. The offences alleged against A1 are very grave in nature. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigation is under progress and some more witnesses are to be examined”. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra6 wherein at para No.9 it is held as under: “9...In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC”. 17. In Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal7 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel appearing for the State has relied upon the definition of 'Rape' and would argue that the consent given by the minor is no consent and it would still be a rape. In our considered opinion, as regarding the rape being 5Crl.P.No.2166 of 2025 dated 27.03.2025 6 MANU/SC/0787/2025 7 Spl Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7004 of 2025 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 committed by the appellant when the prosecutrix was a minor, there is absolutely no evidence, and definitely no forensic evidence with the prosecution. It is only an allegation in the FIR after more than 03 years, in order to make out a case under the POCSO Act, that such an act of rape was committed three years back when she was a minor. She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant”. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi8 at para No.21 and 22 it is held as under: “”21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given 8(2023) SCC Online SC 89 10 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC”. 19. In Prithivirajan v. State9 at para Nos.6 and 7 it is held as under: “6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied : first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted”. 20. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra 10 at para Nos.12, 18, and 21 it is held under: “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish 92025 SCC OnLine SC 696 10(2019) 9 SCC 608 11 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 IPC has occurred”. 21. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand11 at para Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 it is held as under: “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross- examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999. 12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had 11(2020) 10 SCC 108 12 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letters exchanged reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to different communities. 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury. 14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent by the appellant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation, it being spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not to protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her”. CONCLUSION: 22. Considering the nature and gravity of allegation levelled against the Petitioner/Accused, his alleged role played in this case, and the period of 13 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 detention undergone by the Petitioner/Accused, this Court is inclined to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail with the following stringent conditions: i. The Petitioner/Accused shall be enlarged on bail subject to the executing a bond for a sum of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only), with two sureties each for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned VI Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Visakhapatnam. ii. ii. The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Station House Officer, Kancharapalem Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, on every Saturday in between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm, till cognizance is taken by the learned the Trial Court. iii. The Petitioner/Accused shall not leave the limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission from the Station House Officer concerned. iv. The Petitioner/Accused shall not commit or indulge in commission of any offence in future. v. The Petitioner/Accused shall cooperate with the investigating officer in further investigation of the case and shall make himself available for interrogation by the investigating officer as and when required. vi. The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person 14 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer. vii. Petitioner/Accused shall surrender his passport, if any, to the investigating officer. If he claims that he does not have a passport, he shall submit an affidavit to that effect to the Investigating Officer. 23. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 26.09.2025. Note:- Issue C.C today B/O KMS 15 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.9213 of 2025 Dated 26.09.2025 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.9213 of 2025 Date: 26.09.2025. Note:- Issue C.C today B/O KMS