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2025 DAILYLAW 47324 (RAJ)

PRAKASH MEENA S/O SHRI HANUMAN SAHAY v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

SOSA/1390/2025 · 2025-10-15

Ashutosh Kumar, Inderjeet Singh

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

[2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Criminal Misc. II Bail Application No. 1390/2025 (Suspension of Sentence) In D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 258/2023 Prakash Meena S/o Shri Hanuman Sahay, Aged About 35 Years, Resident Of Saldawas, Police Station Chandwaji, District Jaipur (Raj.) (At Present Confined In Central Jail, Jaipur) ----Applicant Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.P. 2. Victim, R/o Basna, Jamwaramgarh, Jaipur Rural, Rajasthan ----Respondents For Applicant(s) : Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sudesh Kumar Saini, Addl.G.A. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Order 15/10/2025 1. The matter is heard on the second application seeking suspension of sentence. 2. Counsel for the accused-applicant submits that the applicant- accused has been convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 3/4 of POCSO Act. 3. Counsel for the accused-applicant has annexed the certificate under Rule 311 (3) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules to the effect that accused-applicant is in judicial custody. Counsel for [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (2 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] the applicant-accused submits that the applicant-accused has been falsely implicated in this matter and the appeal is not likely to be heard in near future. Counsel further submits that the accused-applicant has served the sentence of more than four and a half year. It is accordingly prayed that the substantive sentence imposed upon the applicant-accused be suspended during the pendency of the appeal. 4. This Court had previously adjudicated upon and dismissed the first application for suspension of sentence preferred by the applicant-accused by a reasoned order dated 05.02.2024. The said order reads, inter alia, as follows: “1. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has informed the Court that the victim/complainant has been duly informed about filing of the present appeal as well as suspension of sentence application. 2. Copy of the compliance report dated 20.01.2024 submitted by the SHO, Police Station Chandwaji, District Jaipur (Rural), Rajasthan is taken on record. 3. This suspension of sentence application has been filed by the appellant alongwith the appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellant has annexed the certificate under Rule 311 (3) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules to the effect that during the trial, the appellant was on bail and the sentence of life imprisonment has been awarded to the appellant under Section 3/4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 vide judgment and order dated 21.08.2023 in Sessions Case NO.31/2019. 5. Counsel for the appellant submits that no birth certificate was produced before the trial Court and the appellant is in custody for more than two years and six months. Counsel further submits that hearing of the appeal may take long time, hence, the sentence awarded to the appellant may be suspended and he be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal. Counsel further submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this matter. Counsel further submits that the samples taken were kept in malkhana and sent for examination to the FSL after a delay of seventeen days. [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (3 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] Counsel further submits that age of the victim is doubtful as the certificate of the school where the victim was first admitted was not produced before the trial Court. 6. In support of the submissions, counsel for the appellant relied upon the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 1. Angana and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2009) 3 Supreme Court Cases 767. 2. Sunil Kumar Vs. Vipin Kumar and Others reported in (2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 868. 3. P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 846. 4. Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand and Another reported in (2008) 13 Supreme Court Cases 133. 5. Babu Singh and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1978 CRI. L. J. 651 (1). 7. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has opposed the application for suspension of sentence and submitted that according to the statement of victim (PW- 1), the appellant has committed rape with her. According to Exhibit P-10-School Entrance (SR Register) the age of the victim is 15 years and three months. He further submits that the headmaster of the government school who issued certificate was also examined as PW-5 and lastly prayed for dismissal of the suspension of sentence application. 8. He relied upon the DNA report (Ex.P-25), according to which the result of the examination was positive which reads as under:- 1. Mixed DNA profile was obtained from stains detected on exhibit no. 1 (Underwear of victim), 3(Jeans Pant of Accused), 5(Vulvo-Vaginal swab of victim) & 6(Vulvo-Vaginal swab slide of victim). 2. Alleles of male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no.10 (Blood sample of accused) and female DNA profile obtained from exhibit no.9 (Blood sample of victim) are accounted in the mixed DNA profile obtained from stains detected on exhibit no.1 (Underwear of victim), 3 (Jeans pant of Accused) & 6(Vulvo Vaginal swab slide of victim). 3. Alleles of female DNA profile obtained from Exhibit no. 9 (Blood sample of victim) [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (4 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] are accounted in the mixed DNA profile obtained exhibit no.5 (Vulvo-Vaginal swab of victim).” 9. He relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ganesan Vs. State (Criminal Appeal No.680/2020 (Arising from SLP (Crl.) No.4976/2020) decided on 14.10.2020 where in para No. 9 it has been held as under:- 9. In the present case, the appellant- accused has been convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 7, punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. We have gone through the entire judgment passed by the learned trial Court as well as the relevant evidence on record, more particularly the deposition of PW-1 father of the victim, PW-2 mother of the victim and PW-3 victim herself. It is true that PW-2 mother of the victim has turned hostile. However, PW-3 victim has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She has narrated in detail how the incident has taken place. She has been thoroughly and fully cross-examined. We do not see any good reason not to rely upon the deposition of PW3 – victim. PW3 aged 15 years at the time of deposition is a matured one. She is trustworthy and reliable. As per the settled proposition of law, even there can be a conviction based on the sole testimony of the victim, however, she must be found to be reliable and trustworthy. “9.1 Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in the case of Vijay alias Chinee (supra), it is observed in paragraphs 9 to 14 as under: “9.In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (5 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (6 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. This suspension of sentence application filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed for the reasons; firstly, the victim (PW-1) in her statement has specifically levelled the allegation against the accused with regard to committing rape with her; secondly, the DNA report (Ex. P-25) was found positive which goes against the accused-appellant; thirdly, age of the accused at the time of alleged incident was 29 years and the victim was a minor girl aged 15 years and three months; and lastly, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and looking to the seriousness of the offence(s) committed by the appellant against the minor girl, We are not inclined to grant the indulgence to the appellant as prayed for. 12. Hence, the application for suspension of sentence stands dismissed.” 5. Learned Additional Government Advocate vehemently opposed the application seeking suspension of sentence. 6. Upon careful consideration, this Court is of the view that the first application seeking suspension of sentence having been dismissed on merits, and in the absence of any material change in circumstances, except for the additional duration of incarceration undergone by the applicant-accused, no justifiable ground has been made out warranting a different conclusion at this stage. [2025:RJ-JP:42296-DB] (7 of 7) [SOSA-1390/2025] 7. Consequently, in view of the earlier order passed by this Court on 05.02.2024, the present (second) application for suspension of sentence stands dismissed. (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J AARZOO ARORA /24-S.