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2025 DAILYLAW 47319 (CHH)

Hirmen v. Parmanand and Ors.

SA/106/2016 · 2025-11-13

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:55744 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 106 of 2016 1 - Hirmen D/o Amar Sai Aged About 31 Years W/o Budhram, R/o Village Basajhal, Tehsil Sitapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ...........Plaintiff ... Appellant versus 1 – Parmanand S/o Munshi Ram, Aged About 66 Years, Caste Kanwar, R/o Village Basajhal, Tehsil Sitapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Surguja District Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Rudraram S/o Jaichand, Aged About 46 Years, Caste Kanwar, R/o Village Basajhal, Tehsil Sitapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ...........Defendants ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Nishi Kant Sinha, Advocate For State : Mr. Kalpesh Ruparel, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 14-11-2025 1. The present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 31-10-2015 passed by the learned District Judge, Ambikapur District Surguja in Civil Appeal No.38A/2011 whereby the first appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 30-04-2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class II Sitapur, District Surguja in Civil Suit No.90A/2007 is affirmed. Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2025.12.11 19:28:47 +0530 2 2. For the sake of convenience the status shown in the civil suit of the parties are being taken in this appeal also. 3. Initially plaintiffs Amar Sai and Hirmen had filed a civil suit for declaration of their title and for deletion of name of defendant No.1 over the suit property and mutation of his name. During pendency of the suit plaintiff No.1 Amar Sai has died and his name has been deleted. 4. The suit of the plaintiff was that they governed by Hindu law. The suit land shown in the para 1 of the plaint total area 4.61 acre was owned by grand- father of the plaintiff, namely, Baiga S/o Marchui. The father of defendant No.1 Munshiram was patel of village Bansajhal and presently he is patel of the village. Rin Pustika of the suit land was given to defendant No.1 to pay the land revenue, but the same has not been returned back. Her grand-father Baiga has never alienated any part of the suit land to anyone, but the defendants have illegally got mutated their names in the revenue records of the suit land. The plaintiff came to know about the fact of mutation on 14-05- 2002 and then she filed the suit for declaration of her title. 5. The defendants No.1 and 3 have contested the suit and filed their written statement. They pleaded in the written statement that the father of defendant No.1 namely, Munshiram was in possession of the suit land since 1944 and he got its nazrana. The name of Munshiram was recorded in the Adhikar Abhilekh and after his death defendant No.1 and 3 are in possession of the same. The plaintiff had never been in possession of the suit land. In the year 1954 name of Munshiram was recorded in the revenue records and after his death names of defendants No.1 and 3 have been mutated and thus, the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed. 6. After considering the pleadings of the respective parties, the learned trial Court has framed the following issues for its consideration:- “1- D;k oknhx.k oknHkwfe ds ,dek= LoRokf/kdkjh ,oa vkf/kiR;/kkjh gSa\ 3 2- D;k oknhx.k oknHkwfe ds jktLo vfHkys[kksa es ls izfr0 dz0 1 dk uke foyksfir dj viuk uke vafdr djokus ds vf/kdkjh gSa\ 3- D;k oknhx.k dk okn vof/k esa gS\ 4- D;k ;g okn bl U;k;ky; ds Jo.k {ks=kf/kdkj esa gS\ 5- lgk;rk ,oa okn O;;\” 7. To prove its case the plaintiff has examined herself as PW-1, Bhonduram (PW-2), Dhursai (PW-3) and Manohar (PW-4) and she relied upon the documents Ex.-P/1 to P/4 which are the revenue documents. 8. The defendants have examined DW-1 Parmanand, DW-2 Sukhna and produced documents Ex.-D/1 to D/5 which are the revenue documents and Adhikar Abhilekh. 9. After appreciating the evidence produced by the parties, the learned trial Court has held that the plaintiff has failed to prove her title over the suit property and from the document Ex.-P/4 as well as Ex.-D/5 the name of Munshiram is recorded in the revenue record/Adhikar Abhilekh since 1954-55 which shows his possession also since then and also held that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land since 1944 and as per provision of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, her right over the suit property is extinguished and her suit has been dismissed. 10. The first appeal filed by the plaintiff has also been dismissed by the learned District Judge Surguja place Ambikapur. Hence, this second appeal. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the suit property belongs to grand-father of the plaintiff and the learned trial Court as well as learned first appellate Court have not considered the fact that the revenue entries are only for fiscal purposes and does not give any right or title over the property to a person whose name has been recorded, yet considering the mutation entry in the revenue records the plaintiff is non- suited. The learned Courts below have also erred in holding that the said settlement was raiyati rights and not the Bhumiswami rights and therefore, no 4 right is being conferred upon defendants over the suit property and therefore, the appeal involved substantial question of law for its determination. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the record of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. 13. As per the claim of the plaintiff that the suit property was her grand-father’s property and settlement was done in his name. He has never sold the suit land to anyone during his lifetime. In support of her claim she filed document Ex.-P/1 which is the Sarguja settlement document in which the name of Badga Kumhar was recorded as Raiyati. This document was came into existence at the time of Surguja estate settlement. From the document Ex.- P/4 filed by the plaintiff which is record of rights of the year 1954-55 the name of Munshiram was mutated in place of Badga Kumhar on the basis of the fact that he is in possession of the land since 1944. The said document Ex.-P/4 is also relied by the defendants and filed his document Ex.-D/5, both these documents are copy of record of rights of the year 1954-55. From these two documents the possession of Munshiram appeared. All the documents filed either by the plaintiff or by the defendants the name of defendants have been mutated and in no any document name of the plaintiff or her ancestor have been mutated. In another document Ex.-P/3 relied upon by the plaintiff which is a consent letter executed by the parties on 03-06- 2001, it has been mentioned that since 50 years back Amar Sai S/o Badga left the village after handing over their property to the ancestors of the defendants, this also shows the possession of the defendants and his ancestors since long back. 14. PW-2 Bhondu and PW-3 Dhur Sai have also admitted in their evidence that defendants are in possession of the suit land. 15. After considering the entire evidence produced by the authorities the learned trial Court has come into conclusion that the ancestors of the defendants were in possession of the suit property since 1944 and the plaintiff was not in 5 possession of the same and since the plaintiff is not in possession since 1944 her right is extinguished as provided under Section 27 of the Limitation Act. 16. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides that:- “27. Extinguishment of right to property.─ At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” 17. Article 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provided the limitation of 12 years to claim for possession of the property from the date when they dispossessed and from the date when the possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff and as per Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, after determination of the period of limitation for instituting the suit for possession of the property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. In the present case, the plaintiff or her ancestors was not in possession since 1944 which is well within knowledge of the plaintiff, yet within 12 years she has not claimed her right over the property and therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the right of the plaintiff over the property is extinguished is based on proper appreciation of evidence as well as law. Further, the learned trial Court has also found that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation which also appears to be correctly decided in view of Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 18. The learned trial Court has conclusively held that the plaintiff has failed to prove her right over the suit property by producing proper evidence. The finding recorded by the learned Courts below does not suffers from any perversity or illegality. 19. In the matter of Vishwanath Agrawal Vs, Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 36 & 37 as under:- 6 “36. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh [(1997) 3 SCC 546] it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 37. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao [(1999) 3 SCC 573] it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board [(2007) 14 SCC 138].” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Dayal & Another, 2019(8)SCC 637, has observed in paragraphs 16 & 17 as under: “16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose,J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43). 17. In our opinion, if any one or more ground, as mentioned above, is made out in an appropriate case on the basis of the pleading and 7 evidence, such ground will constitute substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.” 21. Accordingly, this Court does not find any question of law much less the substantial question of law involved in the present appeal for its determination and the second appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 22. Parties shall bear their own cost(s). Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil