1 2025:CGHC:52644-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 477 of 2010 State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Deleted (Sahdev Ram Kushwaha @ Pusau) In Compliance Of Honble Court Order Dated 09-11-2010. 2 - Deleted (Kailash Ram Kushwaha,) In Compliance Of Hohble Court Order Dated 09-11-2010. 3 - Raghubar Prasad Kushwaha S/o Shadev Ram Kushwaha, Aged About 36 Years R/o Sukhri, P/s Gandhinagar, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Tarawati Kushwaha W/o Raghubar Prasad Kushwaha Aged About 35 Years R/o Sukhri, P/s Gandhinagar, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Smt. Laxmaniya Bai W/o Sahdev @ Pusau Kushwaha Aged About 50 Years R/o Sukhri, P/s Gandhinagar, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Deleted (Mohan Lal Kushwaha) In Compliance Of Hohble Court Order Dated 22-10-2024. ... Respondent(s) For Applicant(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, G.A. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sundar Lal Sahu and Mr. Santosh Bharat, Advocates MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.10.30 16:11:30 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J . 29.10.2025 1. Heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for appellant / State. Also heard Mr. Mr. Sundar Lal Sahu, learned counsel for respondents. 2. This leave to appeal under Section 378(3) and memorandum of appeal under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment dated 14.12.2009 passed by the Upper Sessions Judge Ambikapur, Surguja (F.T.C.) in Sessions Trial No. 134/2007, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents from the charges under Section 147, 148 & 302/149 of the IPC. 3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 11.01.2007 at about 11:30 p.m., complainant Lalchand (P.W.-3) lodged an information at Police Station Gandhinagar stating that on the same day at about 8:00 p.m., his friend Omprakash Singh, resident of Ranpur Kala, had come to his house. After taking dinner, both of them went to a betel shop near the market, and while returning at about 9:15 p.m., in front of the house of Pasau Kushwaha, they saw Pasau, his son Raghubar, Kailash, Nano (son-in-law of Pasau), wife of Pasau, and wife of Raghubar, all armed with axes and clubs, coming out of the house and assaulting them, accusing them of being police informers. 3 Lalchand managed to escape and ran towards the house of Kripashankar, brother of Omprakash, to inform him about the incident. However, as Kripashankar was not present, Lalchand returned to the spot along with Vishal (nephew of Kripashankar), niece Ashwani, and Shriram Yadav. There they saw that the accused persons had brutally assaulted Omprakash, who was lying unconscious and bleeding from his head, having sustained multiple injuries. Shriram offered him some water, after which Omprakash regained consciousness. They then arranged a vehicle and took him to the Ambikapur Hospital, where the doctor, upon examination, declared him brought dead. On receiving the information from Lalchand, Sub- Inspector S.C. Shukla (P.W.-16) recorded the marg intimation (Ex.P-4) at about 11:30 p.m. on 11.01.2007, and thereafter, the FIR (Ex.P-5) was registered at Police Station Gandhinagar. During investigation, inquest (Ex.P-15) was prepared, and the information regarding the crime was sent to the Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur (Ex.P-17). The memo for post-mortem examination (Ex.P-2) was also prepared, on which Dr. J.K. Railwani (P.W.-1) conducted the post-mortem and submitted his report (Ex.P-1). Subsequently, the case diary was handed over to Sub-Inspector Gopal Vaishya (P.W.-17) for further investigation. He recorded the statements of witnesses, prepared the inquest (Ex.P-20), and seized blood-stained and plain soil (Ex.P-10) from 4 the spot. On the memorandum (Ex.P-12) of accused Kailash, a blood-stained axe and club (Ex.P-11) as well as blood-stained clothes (Ex.P-13) were recovered. The accused persons were arrested, and the seized articles were sent for FSL examination. After completion of the investigation, the final charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambikapur. 4. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused denied the charges framed against them and, in their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pleaded innocence, asserting that they have been falsely implicated in the present case. 5. The learned trial Court has framed the charges against the respondents and after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record by the impugned judgment of acquittal has acquitted the respondents from the charges as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment. Hence, this acquittal appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State vehemently argued that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, this Court nevertheless possesses wide powers to re- appreciate the entire evidence on record. The settled legal position is that if, upon such reappraisal, it is found that the view 5 taken by the trial Court is perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence, then the appellate Court is well within its jurisdiction to reverse the acquittal and record conviction. An acquittal that results from ignoring vital evidence, misreading the testimony of material witnesses, or by giving undue weight to trivial inconsistencies cannot be allowed to stand. He further submits that the learned trial Court erred to give this finding that the accused persons have right of private defense under Section 96 and 97 of the I.P.C. because looking to the statements of the eye witnesses Lalchand @ Bablu (P.W.-3), Shriram (P.W.-6), Ashwani Kumar (P.W.-11) and Vishal Kumar Singh (P.W.-12) and looking to the number of injuries sustained by the deceased which was opined in the postmortem report vide (Ex.P-1) which is proved by Dr. J.K. Railwani (P.W.-1) and also other material collected by the prosecution, against the accused persons, it is apparently clear that the right of private defense was available to the accused persons but they had exceeded their right and caused multiple injuries to the deceased and therefore the impugned judgement, passed by the learned trial Court is bad-in-law and liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the accused / respondents supports the impugned judgment of acquittal and submits that learned trial Court after considering the evidence available on record has rightly acquitted the accused / respondents, which warrants no interference by this Court. 6 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial Court. 9. The learned trial Court, upon a careful and comprehensive appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, arrived at the following material findings: (a). From the testimony of Smt. Radhika (PW-2), it was established that on the date and time of the incident, the deceased Om Prakash and his companion Lalchand alias Bablu (PW-3), both in an inebriated condition, came to her house and misbehaved with her. They forcibly entered her home, hurled abuses, and attempted to outrage her modesty. The deceased Om Prakash even removed her clothing and insulted her. When her husband Kailash (accused) intervened to protect her, a scuffle ensued in the courtyard, during which Kailash also sustained injuries. Dr. J.K. Relwani (PW-1), through Ex.P-2, confirmed that Kailash had sustained burn blisters and contusions consistent with injuries caused by hot and hard objects within 24 hours of the occurrence. (b). Several prosecution witnesses including Rajudas (PW-7), Sajan Ram (PW-8), Kapil Dev Singh (PW-9), Ramdhani Ram (PW-10), Ramprasad (PW-14), and Kalamsai (PW-15) consistently admitted in their cross- 7 examinations that the deceased Om Prakash had a criminal background. They described him as a habitual offender involved in multiple cases of robbery, assault, and sexual offences, feared by villagers for his violent behaviour. They also confirmed that on the night of the incident, the deceased Om Prakash and Lalchand had entered the house of accused Kailash and assaulted him while attempting to molest his wife, Radhika. (c). The Investigating Officer S.C. Shukla (PW-16) corroborated this version, testifying that several criminal cases including those relating to robbery, assault, and rape had been registered against deceased Om Prakash. Documentary evidence such as entries from the Village Crime Book and Crime Registers (Ex. C-1 series) substantiated this criminal history. (d). On this evidentiary foundation, the Trial Court concluded that the deceased Om Prakash, being a known criminal, entered the house of accused Kailash at about 10:00 p.m. in a drunken state and attempted to molest or rape his wife, Smt. Radhika (PW-2). During the ensuing scuffle, accused Kailash sustained injuries while defending his wife’s honour. 8 (e). In such a situation, the Court held that the accused persons had a legitimate right of private defence of their body and that of Radhika under Sections 96 and 97 of the Indian Penal Code. The act of the accused in causing the death of Om Prakash was held to have been committed in the exercise of this right, particularly in view of Section 100 IPC, which extends the right of private defence to causing death when an assault is made with the intention of committing rape. The Court relied on the principle laid down in Jagmania v. State of Chhattisgarh (Cr.A. No. 230/2006, decided on 11.11.2008), holding that when an attack is made with an intention to commit rape, the person assaulted or anyone acting on their behalf has the right to cause such harm, even to the extent of death, to avert the attack. (f). Rejecting the prosecution’s argument that the extent of injuries exceeded the scope of private defence, the Court referred to Bhura Singh v. Pankaj, 1992 SC (Notes) 53, p.295, observing that in such imminent situations, the degree of force used cannot be weighed on a golden scale. The Court held that the conduct of the accused, given the circumstances and the antecedents of the deceased, was justified. 9 10. On this basis, the trial Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, and 302/149 IPC against the accused persons. It held that the act resulting in the death of Om Prakash was committed in lawful exercise of the right of private defence and did not constitute murder under Section 300 IPC.. 11. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the respondents could not be held guilty of the charges levelled against them. Consequently, the respondents were acquitted of all charges. The Court emphasized that the acquittal was not a reflection of their character but a reflection of the prosecution’s failure to discharge its burden of proof. 12. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 13. In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala, 10 reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Para-25 as under: “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 14. Applying these principles and in light of the observation made by the learned trial Court, we proceed to examine the matter. 15. Upon a careful reappraisal of the entire record, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has minutely examined the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective. The trial Court has taken note of the material facts that on the date of the incident, the deceased Om Prakash, in a drunken state, along with Lalchand alias Bablu (PW-3), entered the house of accused Kailash late in the night and attempted to molest and outrage the modesty of his wife, Smt. Radhika (PW-2). It has also been recorded that when accused Kailash tried to protect his wife, a scuffle ensued 11 between the parties in which Kailash also sustained injuries. The medical evidence of Dr. J.K. Relwani (PW-1) corroborates that the said injuries were caused within the period corresponding to the time of occurrence. Several prosecution witnesses have further admitted during cross-examination that the deceased Om Prakash was a person of criminal background, involved in several cases of assault, robbery and rape and was known in the locality as a habitual offender. 16. In view of the above facts, the learned trial Court concluded that the accused persons were compelled to act in defence of their person and property, and more particularly, to protect the honour of Smt. Radhika (PW-2). The Court, therefore, held that the acts of the accused were committed in the lawful exercise of their right of private defence under Sections 96 to 100 of the Indian Penal Code. It was further observed that the incident occurred suddenly and in circumstances where there was an imminent threat to the safety and dignity of the woman of the house. The trial Court rightly held that in such a situation, the accused could not be expected to measure the degree of force required to repel the attack with precision, and the resulting death of Om Prakash was the outcome of the bona fide exercise of the right of private defence. Consequently, the Court recorded a finding that no offence under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 IPC was made out against the accused persons and acquitted them of the said charges. 12 17. Having regard to the above findings, the pivotal question is whether the acquittal recorded by the trial Court is perverse or unreasonable warranting interference. 18. The law in this point regarding appeals against acquittal is well settled. The appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence but interference is limited. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Court held that if two views are possible, the appellate Court must not substitute its own view merely because it may be different, interference is permissible only if the trial Court’s findings are manifestly perverse. This principle has been followed in varoius other judgments whereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that acquittal can be interfered with only if the findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. 19. Applying these principles, this Court finds that the trial Court’s view is based on a plausible appreciation of evidence, and cannot be termed perverse or illegal. 20. Upon a careful re-evaluation of the entire evidence on record, this Court is satisfied that the trial Court’s conclusions rest on a coherent and well-supported appreciation of the relevant materials. The contemporaneous testimony of Smt. Radhika (PW- 2) who described the forcible entry, the abusive conduct and the attempt to outrage her modesty by the deceased Om Prakash and his companion, and who stated that her husband Kailash 13 intervened finds tangible corroboration in the medical evidence (Ex.P-2) of Dr. J.K. Relwani (PW-1), which records recent burn and contusion injuries on Kailash consistent with a scuffle occurring within the timeframe of the incident. The statements of independent witnesses such as Rajudas (PW-7), Sajan Ram (PW- 8), Kapil Dev Singh (PW-9) and others, though not uniform in every minutia, uniformly disclose the deceased’s reputation for violence and his propensity to brawl when intoxicated, these admissions in cross-examination materially strengthen the factual matrix that the deceased was a dangerous person who forcibly entered the house and created an imminent threat. The Investigating Officer (PW-16) and the documentary extracts from the crime registers corroborate the existence of multiple antecedent complaints against the deceased, thereby lending weight to the trial Court’s finding about his antecedents. The prosecution’s case rests largely on the occurrence of a beating causing death, it did not exclude the possibility that the assault was a reaction to an immediate and grave threat to the person and honour of Radhika. While the medical evidence demonstrates that the deceased received severe injuries, the question for assessment is not the harshness of the result alone but whether, on the facts as found, the accused had a bona fide and reasonable belief of imminent danger and responded in the exercise of private defence. The trial Court has carefully considered the suddenness of the occurrence, the nocturnal 14 setting, the inebriated state of the deceased, the contemporaneous injuries on Kailash and the consistent thread of testimony indicating an attempt to outrage the woman of the house, on that holistic appraisal it reached a plausible conclusion that the accused acted to repel an attack and to protect another. 21. No material contradiction or legal irregularity has been demonstrated that would render the trial Court’s view inherently improbable or perverse, the inconsistencies in peripheral details are neither such as to impeach the core narrative of forcible entry and attempted outraging of the modesty, nor sufficient to displace the benefit of doubt which must, in criminal cases, avail the accused where two reasonable views are open. 22. Considering the totality of evidence and the legal standards governing criminal accountability, this Court is of the firm view that the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court is both just and legally sound. There is, therefore, no compelling reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 23. It is also pertinent to note that the matter pertains to the year 2010, and after the lapse of considerable time, no compelling reason has been demonstrated to disturb the well-reasoned acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State, being devoid of substance and merit, stands dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is affirmed and maintained. 15 24. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet