1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FAM No. 35 of 2017 Reserved On 23/09/2025 Delivered On 21/11/2025 1 - Rasida Bano Aged About 54 Years Divorced Wife Of Mohd. Amin, Caste Muslim Sunni, R/o Village Umjhar, Post And Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh ...............Defendant No.1, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Mohd. Amin S/o Late Mohd. Yasin, Aged About 58 Years Caste Musalman Sunni, Occupation Service, Senior Ovarman, S E C L Charcha R.O., R/o Charcha, Post Line Quarter No.144, Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Rihana Begum D/o Miraj Bilal Bek, Aged About 39 Years W/o Amin Khan, Caste Musalman, R/o Charcha, Post Line Quarter No.144, Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh ................Plaintiffs, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Chief General Manager, S E C L Near Kachhahri, Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Sub Area Manager, Charcha R.O. Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 2 5 - Chief Personnel Manager, S E C L Baikunthpur Area, Office Of The Chief General Manager, Near Kachhahri, Baikunthpur, District Koria, Chhattisgarh ................Defendant No.2 To 4, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G. M. Hasan, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : None despite service of notice For Respondents No.3 to 5 Amicus Curiae : : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate along with Azka Alam, Advocate Mr. Ali Asgar, Advocate (Division Bench) Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 21.12.2016 (Annexure A/1), passed by the Presiding Officer Prabhat Shastri Judge, Family Court, District Koria (C.G.), in Civil Suit No.64A of 2014, whereby the Family Court allowed the said suit in part and granted a decree of divorce. 2. In this case, It is an admitted and undisputed fact that both parties profess the Muslim faith. Approximately thirty years ago, the applicant, Smt. Rasida Bano, was lawfully married to the non- applicant. From their matrimonial union, three sons were born, including Applicant No. 2, Aftab Alam. It is further an undisputed fact that Aftab Alam has been visually impaired (blind) since birth, 3 and that the non-applicant is presently employed with South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL). 3. Facts of the present case, in brevity, are that the alleged divorce between respondent No. 1 and the appellant, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiffs”) instituted a suit before the learned Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.) under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, seeking a decree of divorce against the appellant and further direction to the South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL) authorities to substitute the name of plaintiff No. 2 in place of the appellant in the relevant official records. It is an admitted fact that the marriage between plaintiff No. 1 and the appellant, Smt. Rasida Bano, was solemnized in accordance with Muslim Law on 12.03.1981, and from their wedlock, three sons were born, all of whom have now attained majority. It is also undisputed that during the subsistence of marriage, plaintiff No. 1 nominated the appellant and their children in various financial schemes and paid the consideration amount for the purchase of land bearing Khasra Nos. 14 and 322, admeasuring 1.194 hectares, purchased in the appellant’s name in the year 1986. The plaintiffs have further averred that after about five to seven years of marriage, the appellant began quarrelling with plaintiff No. 1, leveled false allegations against him, and even attempted to defame him by associating his name with one lady named Radha, thereby 4 subjecting him to social and mental harassment within the locality and among relatives. Owing to such conduct, plaintiff No. 1 allegedly divorced the appellant in the year 2012 in accordance with Muslim Law, and subsequently, considering his daily needs, contracted a second marriage with plaintiff No. 2 on 30.12.2013, also under Muslim Law. Thereafter, plaintiff No. 1 submitted an application before respondent Nos. 3 to 5 (SECL) for deletion of the appellant’s name and insertion of the name of plaintiff No. 2 in his service and nomination records; however, the SECL authorities rejected the said request, leading to the filing of the present suit for declaration, divorce, and consequential direction to amend the SECL records. The appellant, in her written statement, denied the allegations except for the admitted facts and specifically contended that the land in question was purchased with the financial assistance of her brother, not by plaintiff No. 1. She further alleged that within one year of marriage, plaintiff No. 1 began assaulting and harassing her and, to avoid his marital obligations, fabricated false and baseless allegations of divorce. She asserted that no valid proceedings for divorce ever took place, that the document purporting to show a second marriage between plaintiff No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2 is forged and fabricated, and that the alleged second marriage is invalid in law, rendering plaintiff No. 2 merely a concubine and not a legally wedded wife. Consequently, she argued that the question of deleting her name from SECL records does not arise and 5 prayed for dismissal of the suit. Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (SECL), in their joint written statement, submitted that plaintiff No. 1 himself had requested that the names of the appellant, Smt. Rasida Bano, and their children, Aftab Alam, Faiyyaz Alam, and Firoz Alam, not be deleted from the records and, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit. During trial, the plaintiffs adduced the evidence of plaintiff No. 1 and one Abdul Hakim Khan, while the appellant/defendant No. 1 examined herself, Sabrunnisha (her sister-in-law), and Faiyyaz Alam (her son). Upon providing adequate opportunity to both parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence, after due consideration thereof and upon hearing the arguments advanced by the respective parties, the learned Family Court partly decreed the suit, holding that divorce between plaintiff No. 1 and the appellant stood established, and accordingly passed judgment and decree dated 21.12.2016. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant respectfully submits that she is the legally wedded wife of respondent No. 1, their marriage having been solemnized at Baikunthpur, District Koria, on 12.03.1981, in accordance with Sunni Muslim Law, and from their lawful wedlock three sons were born, all of whom have now attained majority. During their marital life, respondent No. 1 had invested in certain financial schemes and deposited amounts in the name of the appellant, and with the assistance of her brother, the appellant also purchased 6 agricultural land in her own name. However, with the passage of time, the behaviour of respondent No. 1 changed, as he became addicted to liquor and developed an illicit relationship with another woman, which resulted in frequent quarrels, cruelty, and physical assault upon the appellant, ultimately disturbing the peaceful matrimonial life. Consequently, the appellant and respondent No. 1 began residing separately. It is further submitted that respondent No. 1, on his own accord, pronounced three talaqs upon the appellant and thereafter submitted an application to his employer, South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL), seeking substitution of the appellant’s name from his service records and nomination forms; however, the said application was rightly rejected by the SECL authorities. Thereafter, in 2012, respondent No. 1 filed a suit before the learned Family Court, Baikunthpur, seeking declaration of divorce (talaq), wherein the learned Family Court erroneously declared the talaq but failed to pass a decree, having no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The learned Family Court nevertheless proceeded to recognize respondent No. 2 as the wife of respondent No. 1, despite holding the suit as not maintainable, rendering the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.2016 wholly illegal, null, and void. The appellant submits that as per Sections 2 and 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, she is legally entitled to receive maintenance, including payment of mehar, iddat, and a monthly maintenance amount of Rs. 4,000/- as earlier 7 directed, which respondent No. 1 has willfully failed to pay. The impugned order of the learned Family Court is thus erroneous, unjust, and incomplete, having been passed without proper evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence on record and without due consideration of the appellant’s pleadings and rebuttals. The appellant further submits that even under Muslim Law, a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance so long as she remains unmarried, as upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further submitted that respondent No. 1 has deliberately absconded and is avoiding payment of lawful maintenance to his wife and their visually impaired son, Aftab Alam. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to allow the present appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.12.2016 passed by the learned Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 65A/2014, and further be pleased to grant maintenance to the appellant and her son in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order passed by the Learned Family Court is bad in law, illegal, arbitrary, perverse, and contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and applicable legal principles, therefore, the judgment passed by the Learned Family Court be set aside. 8 5. Mr. Ali Asgar, Amicus Curiae submits that the appellant and respondent No.1, both belonging to the Sunni Muslim community, were lawfully married on 12.03.1981, and from their wedlock three sons were born, one of whom, Aftab Alam, is blind since birth. It is an admitted position that in the year 2012, respondent No. 1 pronounced Talaq upon the appellant in accordance with Sunni Shariyat, and thereafter, after the lapse of a certain period, contracted a second marriage with Smt. Rihana Begum (respondent No. 2). Subsequent to the said remarriage, respondent No. 1 submitted an application before the South Eastern Coalfields Limited (respondent Nos. 3 to 5) seeking necessary changes in his service and nomination records in favour of respondent No. 2; however, the said application was rejected by SECL, which led respondent No. 1 to institute a civil suit seeking a declaration of divorce between himself and the appellant and a consequential direction to SECL to record the changes accordingly. The learned Family Court, vide judgment and decree dated 21.12.2016 (Annexure A-1), partly allowed the said suit by declaring that divorce between the appellant and respondent No. 1 stood established in accordance with Muslim Law, while declining to grant the remaining relief pertaining to modification of SECL records. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present First Appeal primarily on the grounds, inter alia, that the alleged Talaq was invalid and ineffective in law, as neither the Mehar amount nor the maintenance for the Iddat 9 period had been paid to her. Upon careful examination of the testimony of PW-1 Abdul Hakim Khan, it appears that the Talaq was pronounced by respondent No. 1 in the presence of the appellant and her relatives, thereby satisfying the requirement of pronouncement under Muslim Law. As regards the payment of Mehar and maintenance during Iddat, Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, provides an independent statutory remedy for recovery of such amounts, and mere non-payment thereof does not render the Talaq invalid or inoperative in law. It is further submitted that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), whereby the practice of instant triple Talaq (Talaq-e- Biddat) was declared unconstitutional, and the subsequent legislative enactments passed pursuant thereto, have no retrospective effect and therefore do not govern the facts of the present case, the alleged Talaq having taken place in 2012, prior to the said pronouncement. Hence, the legality and validity of the Talaq in question must be assessed in light of the prevailing personal law and statutory provisions existing at the time of its pronouncement. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 3 to 5, South Eastern Coalfields Limited (hereinafter referred to as “SECL”), most respectfully submit that while the ex-employee, Shri Mohd. Amin Khan (Respondent No. 1 herein), was in active 10 service, he instituted Civil Suit No. 65A of 2014 before the Learned Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.), on 16.12.2014, seeking a declaration that his marriage with the appellant, Smt. Rashida Bano, stood dissolved by divorce under Muslim Law, and further prayed for a decree directing SECL to record the name of his alleged second wife, Smt. Rehana Begum (Respondent No. 2), in Form F, Form G, and Form H of his service records, and to delete the name of the appellant from documents relating to medical and other employment-linked facilities. That in response to the said suit, SECL, as respondents No. 3 to 5, filed a detailed written statement on 23.02.2015, submitting therein that as per the official service records maintained by the company, the name of Smt. Rashida Bano continued to be recorded as the lawful wife of the employee, and the names of their sons, Aftaab Alam, Ayaaz Alam, and Firoz Alam, were duly entered as dependents in the records. The Learned Family Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 21.12.2016, partly allowed the said civil suit, declaring that the marriage between the plaintiff (Mohd. Amin Khan) and the defendant No. 1 (Rashida Bano) stood dissolved by divorce, but declined to grant the relief directing SECL to make corresponding changes in its records. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant preferred the instant First Appeal on 23.01.2017 before this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 1, Shri Mohd. Amin Khan, who was employed as an Overman at Churcha 11 Mines under SECL (NEIS No. 2248144), retired from service on 28.02.2017, and his name was accordingly struck off from the company rolls with effect from 01.03.2017, whereafter all his terminal and retiral dues were duly settled and paid to him. Subsequently, on 08.09.2018, the said ex-employee submitted an application along with an affidavit to SECL, requesting deletion of the name of his first wife, Smt. Rashida Bano, as nominee, and substitution of the name of his second wife, Smt. Rehana Begum, in the service records. In response, SECL, vide communication dated 19.12.2018, duly informed Shri Mohd. Amin Khan that since he had already retired from service, the company rules did not permit alteration of dependent or nominee details after retirement. SECL further submits that as there exists an inter se matrimonial dispute between the appellant and respondents No. 1 and 2, the company remains a formal and pro-forma party to the proceedings, having no personal or substantive interest in the outcome of the dispute, particularly in view of the fact that all retiral and financial benefits have already been duly disbursed to respondent No. 1, Shri Mohd. Amin Khan. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. In the present case, It is an admitted and undisputed fact that both parties profess the Muslim faith. Approximately thirty years ago, the applicant, Smt. Rasida Bano, was lawfully married to the non- 12 applicant. From their matrimonial union, three sons were born, including Applicant No. 2, Aftab Alam. It is further an undisputed fact that Aftab Alam has been visually impaired (blind) since birth, and that the non-applicant is presently employed with South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL). 9. The facts relating to the marriage between the parties and the birth of their children are not in dispute. Insofar as the issue of divorce is concerned, it is an admitted position that both parties belong to the Muslim community and are governed by Mohammedan Law. Accordingly, the matter of divorce is to be regulated by their customary personal law, namely the Sunni Shariat. 10. Under the said law, a divorce (talaq) is to be pronounced by the husband upon the wife in accordance with the tenets of Mohammedan Law, which require that the pronouncement be made in the presence of two competent witnesses. Once such pronouncement is made, and the witnesses duly acknowledge the same, the divorce becomes effective and complete in the eyes of law. 11. In the present matter, there is no substantial dispute regarding the fact that the divorce between the parties was effected in accordance with the requirements of Muslim Law. 13 The learned Trial Court has carefully considered every relevant aspect of the evidence and, upon proper appreciation thereof, has rightly held that the divorce between the parties had already taken place in accordance with law. The said finding does not call for interference, quashing, or setting aside. 12. Upon consideration of the evidence of PW–1, namely, Abdul Hakind Khan, it was revealed that a written divorce (Talaqnama) had been executed by the husband and was read over to the wife by her sister-in-law (bhabhi). It is further deposed that the said Talaqnama was duly signed by the wife. At the time of pronouncement of talaq, the brother and sister-in-law of the appellant, as well as other family members, were present. However, the husband admitted that he had not paid any amount towards the Iddat period. 13. The husband, while deposing, categorically stated that the talaq was pronounced by him in the presence of witnesses. He further stated that the wife had subjected him to cruelty and had made false allegations of illicit relations with another woman. Owing to such behaviour and her failure to adhere to marital obligations, he had pronounced talaq thrice, saying “Talaq, Talaq, Talaq,” and had also issued a written 14 Talaqnama. The said divorce, according to him, was effected in accordance with the principles of Shariat, and there was no illegality in the process. He further stated that he had refunded the amount of Mehar (dower) but had not paid any amount towards Iddat, which fact he candidly admitted in his examination-in-chief. He also stated that he had moved an application for change of nomination in his service records and service book after pronouncing the talaq. 14. The witness also admitted that three children were born from the wedlock, one of whom is visually impaired and resides with the wife. The wife has moved an application for maintenance and is presently receiving a sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month for herself and the said specially-abled child. 15. DW–1, namely, Rashida Bano, the wife, examined herself and denied the pronouncement of talaq. She contended that the alleged divorce was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Shariat. According to her, an application was required to be submitted before the concerned Anjuman Committee, and thereafter, in the presence of three witnesses, the talaq ought to have been pronounced. Since no such procedure was followed, the alleged divorce, according to her, is void and not in conformity with law. She 15 also asserted that neither the amount of Mehar nor any amount towards Iddat had been paid to her, and that no written Talaqnama was served upon her. Hence, she maintained that the divorce was not duly proved. However, on careful scrutiny of her evidence, nothing material could be elicited to discredit the husband’s version regarding the pronouncement of talaq. 16. DW–2, namely, Sabrunnisha, another witness produced by the appellant-wife, also denied the assertion that any talaq had been given by the respondent-husband. 17. From the evidence of all the witnesses, the factum of divorce is well established. The appellant has failed to produce any cogent material to dispute the divorce initiated by the husband. Under Muslim personal law, there is no codified statutory procedure for Talaq under the Shariat; however, based on the evidence on record, the divorce appears to have been duly effectuated in accordance with law. Accordingly, the learned Family Court's finding with respect to Talaq is affirmed and in accordance with legal principles. 18. With regard to the second issue concerning the amount of maintenance, there is nothing on record to indicate the basis 16 on which the Family Court concluded that the husband is earning only Rs. 47,225/- as appears from the salary slip pertains to June 2012. It is a well-settled principle of law that even after divorce, a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband unless and until she remarries. In the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that the wife has contracted a second marriage after obtaining the divorce. Further, from the pleadings and evidence, it appears that the appellant-wife is having a specially abled child (Blind) and she is residing with her and completely dependent upon her. 19. The SECL has furnished the address of the respondent, Amin Khan, as evident from the mobile phone records, and counsel for the appellant has furnished the details of the bank account, which are as under: विषयः- श्रीमती रशीदा बा नो बानो म म० अमनो FAM 35/2017 प्रकरण, म नोनोयः उच्च न्यः यः लयः, विबाल सपुर। श्री अमीन खान आ० मी . यासीन, एनईआईएसी 22460971, वरीया ओव्हरीमीन चरीच मीईन, बैकु ण्ठपुरी क्षेत्र मी कुया रीत थे जो दि%न&कु 28.02.2017 कु सीव निनव(त्त हुए ह+- 1. श्री अमीन खान कु, कु ल ग्रेच्या0टी2 रीशि4 रू० 10,000,00.00 ( %सी लखा रूपुया) कु भुगतन दि%न&कु- 17.11.2019 कु निकुया जो चकु ह। 2. श्री अमीन खान कु, कु ल सीएमीपुएफ रीशि4 कु भुगतन सीएमीपुएफ कुया लया द्वारी निकुया गया ह 3. श्री अमीन खान कु, सीएमीपुएफ द्वारी स्वकु( त कु ल मीशिसीकु पु4न रीशि4 रु० 19008.00 निनर्धा रिरीत कु, गई ह। 4. श्री अमीन खान कु सीव पुस्तिस्तकु मी उनकु पुत निनम्ननसीरी ह- 17 Vill- Batrauli Bazar, Police Station-Turpatti Near Rly. Station- Kalbkuinya, Distt-Deoria (U.P.) मी बैईल पुरी श्री अमीन खान सी बैत हुई, उन्हCन बैतया निकु उनकु वत मीन पुत निनम्ननसीरी ह श्री अमीन खान आ० मी . यासीन Vill-Sonapali, PO- Dhankoda Police Station- Dhannupali Sambhalpur (ODISHA) Pin-768 008 Mobile No:- 7999358349 Account No: - 11428683296 Bank - SBI” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Abdul Samad Vs. State of Telangana & Anr. Reported in (2025) 2 SCC 49 has held and the relevant paragraph are as under :- “12. The legislature through Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subsequently by introducing Section 125CrPC, 1973, sought to carry on the efficacious remedy through a summary procedure in favour of a wife, including a divorced woman, and others as applicable. To better comprehend the instant provision, the same is reproduced hereinbelow: “125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.—(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain— 18 (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the First Class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means: Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub- 19 section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person. Explanation.—For the purposes of this Chapter— (a) “minor” means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. (2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. 20 (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation.—If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be 21 considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section in living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.” 13. Numerous decisions of this Court went on to state that Section 125CrPC, 1973 is a measure for social justice to protect the weaker sections, irrespective of applicable personal laws of the parties, as contemplated through Articles 15(3) and 38 of the Constitution of India. This Court similarly held in the decision of Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi [Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 563] that the nature of power and jurisdiction vested with a Magistrate by virtue of the 22 instate provision is not punitive in nature and neither it is remedial, but it is a preventive measure. It was also observed that while any such right may or may not exist as a consequence of any of the personal laws applicable to the parties concerned, they shall continue to exist distinctively, and independently as against the secular provision. 14. The purpose of Section 125CrPC, 1973 has been spelt out to prevent vagrancy and destitution of the person claiming rights through invoking the procedure established under the said provision. However, in Inderjit Kaur v. Union of India [Inderjit Kaur v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 344 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 132] , it was clarified qua the wife that such a right is not absolute in nature and is always subject to final determination of the rights of the parties by appropriate courts. Further emphasis has also been placed on the expression “unable to maintain herself” and that the burden of proof is on the wife to prove the existence of the said circumstances leading to such inability. This is, in addition, to the requirement to establish that the husband has “sufficient means” to maintain her, and is, however, neglecting or refusing to do so. 23 15. In Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali [Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, (1980) 4 SCC 125 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 916] , it was categorically observed by this Court that enactment of the said provision charges the court with a deliberate secular design to enforce maintenance or its equivalent against the humane obligation, which is derived from the State's responsibility for social welfare. The same is not confined to members of one religion or region, but the whole community of womanhood. 16. At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the personal laws concerned which allegedly stand in conflict with the secular provision of Section 125CrPC, 1973. The 1986 Act was brought about by the legislature as an attempt to clarify the position laid down. 17. A five-Judge Bench in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] extensively dealt with the issue of maintenance apropos the obligation of a Muslim husband to his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself, either after having been given divorce or having had sought one. The Bench unanimously went on to hold that the obligation of such a husband would not 24 be affected by the existence of any Personal law in the said regard and the independent remedy for seeking maintenance under Section 125CrPC, 1973 is always available. It also went on to observe that, even assuming, there is any conflict between the secular and Personal law provisions in regard to maintenance being sought by a divorced wife, the Explanation to second proviso to Section 125(3)CrPC, 1973 unmistakably shows the overriding nature of the former. While elaborating on the said observation, it explained that the wife has been conferred with the right to refuse to live with her husband who has contracted another marriage, let alone three or four other marriages. 18. After the pronouncement of the aforesaid verdict, a controversy is said to have emerged anent the true obligations of a Muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife, particularly beyond the iddat period. Parliament, as an attempt to clarify the position, brought about the 1986 Act. Herein, it was sought to specify the entitlements of such a woman at the time of divorce. Section 3 of the 1986 Act deals with this aspect and reads as follows: 25 “3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to— (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband; (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. (2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not been made or paid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not 26 been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under sub- section (2) by a divorced woman, the Magistrate may, if he is satisfied that— (a) her husband having sufficient means, has failed or neglected to make or pay her within the iddat period a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the children; or (b) the amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower has not been paid or that the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to her, make an order, within one month of the date of the filing of the application, directing her former husband to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may determine as it and proper having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband or, as the case may be, for 27 the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in clause (d) of sub- section (1) the divorced woman: Provided that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to dispose of the application within the said period, he may, for reasons to be recorded by him, dispose of the application after the said period. (4) If any person against whom an order has been made under sub-section (3) fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance or mahr or dower due in the manner provided for levying fines under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and may sentence such person, for the whole or part of any amount remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or until payment if sooner made, subject to such person being heard in defence and the said sentence being imposed according to the provisions of the said Code.” 20. Elaborating on the prevalence of Section 125CrPC, 1973 as a secular protection available to women across communities, it was observed in para 33 as follows : (Danial Latifi case [Danial Latifi 28 v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] , SCC pp. 763-64) “33. In Shah Bano [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] this Court has clearly explained as to the rationale behind Section 125CrPC to make provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced Muslim wife and this is clearly to avoid vagrancy or destitution on the part of a Muslim woman. The contention put forth on behalf of the Muslim organisations who are interveners before us is that under the Act, vagrancy or destitution is sought to be avoided but not by punishing the erring husband, if at all, but by providing for maintenance through others. If for any reason the interpretation placed by us on the language of Sections 3(1)(a) and 4 of the Act is not acceptable, we will have to examine the effect of the provisions as they stand, that is, a Muslim woman will not be entitled to maintenance from her husband after the period of iddat once the talaq is pronounced and, if at all, thereafter maintenance could only be recovered from the various persons mentioned in Section 4 or from the Wakf Board. This Court in Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corpn., Bombay [Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corpn., 29 Bombay, (1985) 3 SCC 545] and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] held that the concept of “right to life and personal liberty” guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution would include the “right to live with dignity”. Before the Act, a Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband was granted a right to maintenance from her husband under the provisions of Section 125CrPC until she may remarry and such a right, if deprived, would not be reasonable, just and fair. Thus the provisions of the Act depriving the divorced Muslim women of such a right to maintenance from her husband and providing for her maintenance to be paid by the former husband only for the period of iddat and thereafter to make her run from pillar to post in search of her relatives one after the other and ultimately to knock at the doors of the Wakf Board does not appear to be reasonable and fair substitute of the provisions of Section 125CrPC. Such deprivation of the divorced Muslim women of their right to maintenance from their former husbands under the beneficial provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are otherwise available to all other women in India cannot be stated to have been effected by a 30 reasonable, right, just and fair law and, if these provisions are less beneficial than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a divorced Muslim woman has obviously been unreasonably discriminated and got out of the protection of the provisions of the general law as indicated under the Code which are available to Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian women or women belonging to any other community. The provisions prima facie, therefore, appear to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution mandating equality and equal protection of law to all persons otherwise similarly circumstanced and also violative of Article 15 of the Constitution which prohibits any discrimination on the ground of religion as the Act would obviously apply to Muslim divorced women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion. It is well settled that on a rule of construction, a given statute will become “ultra vires” or “unconstitutional” and, therefore, void, whereas on another construction which is permissible, the statute remains effective and operative the court will prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature does not intend to enact unconstitutional laws. We think, the latter 31 interpretation should be accepted and, therefore, the interpretation placed by us results in upholding the validity of the Act. It is well settled that when by appropriate reading of an enactment the validity of the Act can be upheld, such interpretation is accepted by courts and not the other way round.” While the Court prima facie observed the said provisions to be violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, the latter interpretation, seeking to uphold the validity, was eventually adopted and the 1986 Act was read down to not foreclose the secular rights of a divorced Muslim woman. 21. The position that the rights under Section 125CrPC, 1973 would also be accessible to a divorced Muslim woman was substantially reiterated in Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan [Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 873 : (2009) 14 Scale 331] , whereby this Court, through a cumulative reading of the decision in Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] , reached the said conclusion. 22. The same question of law again knocked on the doors of this Court in Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. 32 [Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P., (2014) 12 SCC 646 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 155 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 170] wherein the five-Judge Bench also took the assistance of the observations made in the decision in Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] . While acknowledging the similar parameters and considerations for the purpose of adjudicating petitions under both the laws, secular and personal, it held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC, 1973 to seek her right of maintenance even if she does not exercise her choice of election as stipulated under Section 5 of the 1986 Act. 24. Subsequently, in Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan [Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan, (2014) 12 SCC 636 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 162] , this Court had to consider the maintainability of a petition under Section 125CrPC, 1973 vis-à-vis a situation where a petition under Section 3 of the 1986 Act has been subsequently moved. Holding that an election under Section 5 of the 1986 Act was not imperative, since both the petitions were moved before a Magistrate, it clarified that even for the purpose of adjudicating a petition under the 33 Personal law, specifically in regard to maintenance for a divorced Muslim woman, the parameters of Section 125CrPC, 1973 would be applicable. 25. It is imperative to acknowledge that the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “the FCA, 1984”) had excluded the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under Chapter IX CrPC, 1973, of which Section 125 is a part, wherein a Family Court had been established for the area or jurisdiction concerned. After the enactment of the FCA, 1984, a situation arose where a divorced Muslim woman moved a Family Court under Section 125CrPC, 1973, and a similar circumstance was dealt in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan [Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 274 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 785] in light of the question of law at hand. Herein, while relying on the earlier mentioned judgments of this Court, it observed that the Family Court concerned had rightly, and without a shadow of a doubt, held that Section 125CrPC, 1973 would be applicable. The relevant para 9 is reproduced below : (SCC pp. 712-13) “9. First of all, we intend to deal with the applicability of Section 125CrPC to a Muslim woman who has 34 been divorced. In Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan [Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan, (2014) 12 SCC 636 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 162] , this Court after referring to the Constitution Bench decisions in Danial Latifi v. Union of India [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. [Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P., (2014) 12 SCC 646 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 155 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 170] had opined as follows : (Shamim Bano case [Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan, (2014) 12 SCC 636 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 162] , SCC p. 644, paras 13-14) ‘13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even after an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. We may note that while taking note of the factual score to the effect that the plea of divorce was not accepted by the Magistrate which was upheld by the High Court, the Constitution Bench [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] opined 35 that as the Magistrate could exercise power under Section 125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman under the Act, the order did not warrant any interference. Thus, the emphasis was laid on the retention of the power by the Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate consequence. 14. Slightly recently, in Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan [Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 873 : (2009) 14 Scale 331] , a two-Judge Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] , has ruled that : (Shabana Bano case [Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 SCC 666 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 216 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 873 : (2009) 14 Scale 331] , SCC p. 672, para 21) “21. The appellant's petition under Section 125CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only.” Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 36 1984, yet the principle stated therein would be applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated by the Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa [Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P., (2014) 12 SCC 646 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 155 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 170] .’ In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow of doubt that Section 125CrPC has been rightly held to be applicable by the learned Family Judge.” 26. Before perusing the submissions made by the counsel, it is paramount to also consider the bare text of the provisions concerned vis-à-vis their comparative dissection. Under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, the entitlements or rights of a divorced Muslim woman, wider than the ambit of maintenance, arise as against the obligations of her former husband emanating from their divorce. Per contra, under Section 125CrPC, 1973, a woman seeking maintenance has to establish that she is unable to maintain herself. The right to seek maintenance under Section 125CrPC, 1973 is invokable even during the sustenance of marriage and, thereby is not contingent upon divorce. 37 27. Another distinction vis-à-vis the aforementioned provisions, relates to the time period within which proceedings initiated thereunder are to be decided. While a petition moved under Section 3(2) of the 1986 Act is to be decided in regard to a husband's liability under Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act within a period of one month, there is no such statutory time- frame prescribed under Section 125CrPC, 1973. However, there is an obligation to determine the interim maintenance within a period of 60 days while dealing with a petition under Section 125CrPC, 1973. Moreover, failure to comply with such order passed under Section 3(2) of the 1986 Act may lead to issuance of a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance as directed under the said order and may also sentence him to imprisonment till the payment is made or for a term which may extend to one year. On the other hand, equivalent non-compliance of an order passed under Section 125CrPC, 1973 may result in imprisonment for a term of one month or until the payment is made. 28. After the advent of the decision in Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] , numerous High Courts 38 also went on to contemplate and analyse the instant question of law. A quick examination of the said judgment by various High Courts allows us to categorise the decisions rendered therein into two sets of views. The first view in certain judgments so rendered held that the remedy is to be exclusively exercised under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, impliedly holding that the rights under the secular provisions stood extinguished. Another view in certain other judgments allowed a divorced Muslim woman to seek the remedy of maintenance under Section 125CrPC, 1973 while explicit existence of Section 3 of the 1986 Act was recognised. 29. The set of judgments, that went on to hold that the rights of a divorced Muslim woman are to be exercised through the provisions of the 1986 Act and specifically under Section 3 therein, and, not through the secular provision of Section 125CrPC, 1973. One decision by a Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in Shahid Jamal Ansari v. State of U.P. [Shahid Jamal Ansari v. State of U.P., 2008 SCC OnLine All 1077] is brought to our attention by the learned Amicus Curiae whereby the Court opined that a divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance from her former husband by virtue of 39 secular provision of Section 125CrPC, 1973 and the 1986 Act, being a complete code in itself on the subject-matter of maintenance, prevails. 30. Deviating from the aforesaid approach, certain High Courts adopted a beneficial interpretation, that is to say, that the non obstante clause in the 1986 Act, in no manner bars the remedy under Section 125CrPC, 1973. In this regard, a reference has been made to a decision of the Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat in Mumtazben Jusabbhai Sipahi v. Mahebubkhan Usmankhan Pathan [Mumtazben Jusabbhai Sipahi v. Mahebubkhan Usmankhan Pathan, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 279] , a decision of the High Court of Kerala in Kunhimohammed v. Ayishakutty [Kunhimohammed v. Ayishakutty, 2010 SCC OnLine Ker 567] , the decisions of the High Court of Allahabad in Humera Khatoon v. Mohd. Yaqoob [Humera Khatoon v. Mohd. Yaqoob [Humera Khatoon v. Mohd. Yaqoob, 2010 SCC OnLine All 202] , Sazid v. State of U.P. [Sazid v. State of U.P., 2011 SCC OnLine All 1059] , Jubair Ahmad v. Ishrat Bano [Jubair Ahmad v. Ishrat Bano, 2019 SCC OnLine All 4065] , and Shakila Khatun v. State of U.P. [Shakila Khatun v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 75] , and the decision of a Single Judge of the High Court 40 of Bombay in Khalil Abbas Fakir v. Tabbasum Khalil Fakir [Khalil Abbas Fakir v. Tabbasum Khalil Fakir, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 23] . 31. Amongst these set of decisions, the one rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala in Kunhimohammed [Kunhimohammed v. Ayishakutty, 2010 SCC OnLine Ker 567] has significantly occupied the field in regard to the limited question of law before us. A perusal of the instant judgment showcases the same to be in line with the ratio decidendi rendered by this Court in the decision in Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] by holding that there is no express extinguishment of the rights under Section 125CrPC, 1973 and neither the same was intended or conceived by the legislature while enacting the 1986 Act. It was observed that the domains occupied by the two provisions are entirely different as the secular provision stipulates an inability to maintain oneself for invoking the said rights while Section 3 of the 1986 Act stands independent of one's ability or inability to maintain. Thereby, adopting a harmonious and purposive approach amidst the two alleged conflicting legislative protections. 41 34. Thus, the High Court of Telangana, while modifying the order(s) of the Family Court, was correct in upholding the maintainability of the petition filed under Section 125CrPC, 1973 by Respondent 2 herein. Therefore, there is no infirmity in its impugned order dated 13-12-2023 [Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, 2023 SCC OnLine TS 4436] . 38. To affirm, reliance is placed on paras 28 and 29 of the decision in Danial Latifi [Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 266] , which are reproduced below : (SCC pp. 760- 62) “28. A careful reading of the provisions of the Act would indicate that a divorced woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision for maintenance. It was stated that Parliament seems to intend that the divorced woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and, therefore, the word “provision” indicates that something is provided in advance for meeting some needs. In other words, at the time of divorce the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs. Reasonable and fair provision may include provision 42 for her residence, her food, her clothes, and other articles. The expression “within” should be read as “during” or “for” and this cannot be done because words cannot be construed contrary to their meaning as the word “within” would mean “on or before”, “not beyond” and, therefore, it was held that the Act would mean that on or before the expiration of the iddat period, the husband is bound to make and pay maintenance to the wife and if he fails to do so then the wife is entitled to recover it by filing an application before the Magistrate as provided in Section 3(3) but nowhere has Parliament provided that reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited only for the iddat period and not beyond it. It would extend to the whole life of the divorced wife unless she gets married for a second time. 29. The important section in the Act is Section 3 which provides that a divorced woman is entitled to obtain from her former husband “maintenance”, “provision” and “mahr”, and to recover from his possession her wedding presents and dowry and authorises the Magistrate to order payment or restoration of these sums or properties. The crux of the matter is that the divorced woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and 43 maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband. The wordings of Section 3 of the Act appear to indicate that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations : (1) to make a “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorced wife; and (2) to provide “maintenance” for her. The emphasis of this section is not on the nature or duration of any such “provision” or “maintenance”, but on the time by which an arrangement for payment of provision and maintenance should be concluded, namely, “within the iddat period”. If the provisions are so read, the Act would exclude from liability for post-iddat period maintenance to a man who has already discharged his obligations of both “reasonable and fair provision” and “maintenance” by paying these amounts in a lump sum to his wife, in addition to having paid his wife's mahr and restored her dowry as per Sections 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d) of the Act. Precisely, the point that arose for consideration in Shah Bano case [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] was that the husband had not made a “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorced wife even if he had paid the amount agreed as mahr half a century 44 earlier and provided iddat maintenance and he was, therefore, ordered to pay a specified sum monthly to her under Section 125CrPC. This position was available to Parliament on the date it enacted the law but even so, the provisions enacted under the Act are “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid” as provided under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act and these expressions cover different things, firstly, by the use of two different verbs — “to be made and paid to her within the iddat period” it is clear that a fair and reasonable provision is to be made while maintenance is to be paid; secondly, Section 4 of the Act, which empowers the Magistrate to issue an order for payment of maintenance to the divorced woman against various of her relatives, contains no reference to “provision”. Obviously, the right to have “a fair and reasonable provision” in her favour is a right enforceable only against the woman's former husband, and in addition to what he is obliged to pay as “maintenance”; thirdly, the words of The Holy Quran, as translated by Yusuf Ali of “mata” as “maintenance” though may be incorrect and that other translations employed the word “provision”, this Court in Shah Bano case [Mohd. Ahmed Khan 45 v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] dismissed this aspect by holding that it is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, whether “mata” was rendered “maintenance” or “provision”, there could be no pretence that the husband in Shah Bano case [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] had provided anything at all by way of “mata” to his divorced wife. The contention put forth on behalf of the other side is that a divorced Muslim woman who is entitled to “mata” is only a single or one-time transaction which does not mean payment of maintenance continuously at all. This contention, apart from supporting the view that the word “provision” in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act incorporates “mata” as a right of the divorced Muslim woman distinct from and in addition to mahr and maintenance for the iddat period, also enables “a reasonable and fair provision” and “a reasonable and fair provision” as provided under Section 3(3) of the Act would be with reference to the needs of the divorced woman, the means of the husband, and the standard of life the woman enjoyed during the marriage and there is no reason why such provision could not take the form of the regular payment of 46 alimony to the divorced woman, though it may look ironical that the enactment intended to reverse the decision in Shah Bano case [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] , actually codifies the very rationale contained therein.” 21. From the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is well-settled that a Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance even after divorce. In the present case, the appellant filed an application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. before the Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.), seeking maintenance for herself as well as for her specially- abled (blind) son. Vide order dated 24.06.2016, the learned Family Court categorically held that the appellant-wife was residing separately due to the refusal and neglect by the husband, and therefore, she had sufficient grounds to live apart. However, while adjudicating the claim for maintenance, the Family Court further observed—on the basis of the evidence led by the parties—that the appellant was the owner of 2.95 acres of agricultural land upon which she had constructed two shops, one of which was being used as a grocery shop. It was also noted during the Commissioner’s inspection that she was storing paddy on the said land. On 47 this premise, the Family Court concluded that she had adequate means to sustain herself and was, therefore, not entitled to any personal maintenance. Consequently, the claim for maintenance filed by the wife was rejected. From the evidence on record and the Commissioner’s report, it is evident that the respondent-wife possesses 2.95 acres of agricultural land on which a residential house and two shops have been constructed, generating rental income. Relying on this, the learned Family Court held that she had sufficient independent means to maintain herself and, therefore, declined her claim for personal maintenance. Nevertheless, the Family Court awarded a sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month towards the maintenance of the specially-abled (blind) child. 22. The learned Family Court failed to appreciate that there is no substantive evidence on record to establish that the wife derives sufficient income from agricultural yield or from any other source. A mere observation that she owns 2.95 acres of agricultural land and two shops does not, by itself, prove that she is earning adequate income to sustain herself and her specially-abled (blind) son. On the contrary, a perusal of the entire record reveals that the respondent-husband is receiving a pension of Rs. 19,008/- per month, he has also received Rs. 10,00,000 as Gratuity amount and has received 48 handsome amount towards CMPF fund, and therefore possesses sufficient financial capacity to maintain his divorced wife and their specially-abled child. In view of the fact that the decree of divorce granted by the husband under their customary law has already been affirmed, and considering the age and circumstances of the parties, the need for maintenance becomes even more compelling. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the wife is entitled to claim maintenance notwithstanding the divorce. 23. In the considered opinion of this Court and taking into consideration the above submissions and the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above this Court is of the considered opinion merely because the wife owns 2.95 acres of agricultural land and derives a nominal income from two shops, her claim to maintenance cannot be out- rightly denied. Various factors emerging from the evidence support the view that the Family Court rightly declined to make corrections in the service records of the husband, given that the wife is residing separately along with her visually impaired son. This Court is of the view that the wife does not have a sufficiently regular source of income to maintain herself and her specially-abled child. 49 24. Accordingly, the wife is held entitled to maintenance of Rs. 4,000/- per month for herself and an additional Rs. 4,000/- per month for the specially-abled child, in the absence of any other permanent source of income for their sustenance while deducting the amount which is being paid by respondent No. 1 as maintenance to his specially-abled (blind) son. The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part. 25. Even though notice was duly served upon the husband, he has failed to appear before this Court. As such, this Court is unable to obtain an affidavit of his income. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the State and taking into account that the respondent-husband was in regular government service of SECL and after retirement he was received handsome amount. Further, he is also getting pension, therefore, this Court directs the concerned respondent department to deduct the maintenance amount of Rs. 4,000/- each (total Rs. 8,000/-) from the pension account of the respondent-husband and remit the same directly to the bank account of the appellant-wife after getting her mobile no and bank account details. 26. With respect to the deletion of name or change of nomination, respondent No.1 (husband) is at liberty to change 50 his nomination and substitute the name of the respondent- wife in accordance with law. The respondent department is directed to effect such change in the service records upon the submission of a due application by respondent No.1 (employee). 27. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in-part. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the counsel appearing for the respondent-husband as well as to respondent No.1 directly. 28. This Court places on record its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae, Shri Ali Asgar, Advocate. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website. 23/09/2025 21/11/2025 Operative Full 21/11/2025 21/11/2025 Saxena 29. T