[2025:RJ-JP:44004] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 161/2024 Madhuri Widow of Prahlad Singh, Resident of Old Truck Union, Karauli Tehsil and District Karauli (Rajasthan). ----Appellant Versus 1. Rangbahadur Singh Son of Dashrath Singh Alias Jassu Singh, Resident of Harnagar, Tehsil and District Karauli(Raj.). 2. Narendra Singh Son of Rangbahadur Singh, Resident of Harnagar, Tehsil and District Karauli(Raj.). 3. Susma Wife of Narendra Singh, Resident of Harnagar, Tehsil and District Karauli(Raj.). 4. Sub-Registrar, Tehsildar Tehsil Karauli (Raj.). ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hari Krishna Sharma For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 03/11/2025 1. This Civil Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed by and on behalf of plaintiff, feeling aggrieved by dismissal of her civil suit for permanent injunction bearing No. 38/2013 by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Karauli vide judgment dated 15.10.2022 whereagainst Civil First Appeal filed by the plaintiff has also been dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Karauli, vide judgment dated 22.01.2024. 2. Heard counsel for appellant and perused the record. 3. Dispute between the parties is in respect of the property situated at Truck Union Colony, Karauli, detailed out in para No.1 of the plaint as also shown in the map appended thereto. [2025:RJ-JP:44004] (2 of 5) [CSA-161/2024] 4. It is not in dispute that prior to filing the present Civil Suit, appellant-plaintiff has filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, being Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.87/2011. In that petition, defendants to the present Suit were impleaded as non-petitioners and a compromise was entered into between the parties on 11.12.2014. The compromise along with map of the suit property are available on record as Exhibits-3 & 4 respectively and execution of such compromise between the parties is an admitted fact, as has been admitted by the appellant-plaintiff as well, in her evidence. 5. It is further not in dispute that in respect of portion in possession of the appellant-plaintiff, pursuant to such compromise, out of suit property, defendants filed a counter-claim for mandatory injunction to dispossess the appellant-plaintiff and the counter-claim was also dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 15.10.2022, while dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for permanent injunction, but thereagainst defendants did not prefer any First Appeal. 6. In the present Civil Suit, plaintiff asserted her possession over the suit property based on an oral partition dated 13.08.1999, but the factum of oral partition has concurrently not been found to be proved by both the Courts, rather it has come on record as an admitted fact that the suit property is in the absolute ownership of respondent No.1, who sold the same to respondent Nos.2 & 3. [2025:RJ-JP:44004] (3 of 5) [CSA-161/2024] The claim for permanent injunction, made by the appellant- plaintiff based on the theory of ‘oral partition’ has been dismissed on merits concurrently by both the trial Court and First Appellate Court in the judgment impugned dated 22.01.2024, acknowledged the compromise dated 11.12.2014 and has observed that the dismissal of the present Civil Suit shall not affect the rights of the parties to implement the compromise dated 11.12.2014 in accordance with the law. 7. Since, the present Civil Suit of the appellant-plaintiff is not based on the compromise dated 11.12.2014, and no perversity in the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below has been pointed, hence, this Court is of the view that findings of fact do not suffer from any perversity, manifest illegality or jurisdictional error, because from the appellant-plaintiff miserably failed to prove the factum of oral partition. No substantial question of law has been found to be involved in the present Civil Second Appeal. 8. The scope of the High Court to grant indulgence in concurrent fact findings recorded by the two courts below, is extremely limited and confined to the existence of a substantial question of law, while exercising its power and jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. In a series of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been categorically held as an established principle of law that the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or to come to its own conclusion. The High Court cannot set aside the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below, when such findings are based [2025:RJ-JP:44004] (4 of 5) [CSA-161/2024] on appreciation of evidence. In this regard, reference may be given to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of S. Subramanian Vs. S. Ramasamy [(2019) 6 SCC 46]. The relevant portions of the judgment i.e. Paragraphs 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, are being reproduced hereunder:- “7.4 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per a catena of the decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 CPC, the second appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam' , in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal. 7.5. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1 SCC 434]. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: "Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise." 7.6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and the substantial questions of law formulated/framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be substantial questions of law.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case C. Doddanarayan Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy [(2020) 4 SCC 659], has [2025:RJ-JP:44004] (5 of 5) [CSA-161/2024] observed that where two courts have reached a finding, which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against provisions of law and neither can it be said that any Judge acting judiciously and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then High Court is not required to interfere with such fact findings while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 10. As a final result and taking note of the fact the compromise dated 11.12.2014, executed between the parties and acknowledged by the First Appellate Court, this Second Appeal is hereby dismissed. No costs. 11. Records of both the Courts be sent back. 12. Stay application and other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (SUDESH BANSAL),J NITIN /52