1 2025:CGHC:19005 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 18 of 2025 1. Shri Arjun Prasad Dubey (In Person) Age - 77 Years 11 Months, S/o Late Shri Gaya Prasad Dubey, Address- House No. 323 Union Bank Ki Baju Gali Ganjpara- Bemetara, District Bemetara (C.G.) Pin- 491335. ... Petitioner versus 1. President, Priyadarshini Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti Maryadit 445 B, Priyadarshni Nagar Raipur (C.G.) 2. Sub Registrar Sahkari Samitiya (Paikeg) Vivekanand Complex, Pension Bada, Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Petitioner in Person SB: Hon'ble Mr. Parth Prateem Sahu, J Order On Board 21.4.2025 1. Petitioner has filed this petition seeking review of the CAV Order dated 3.9.2024 passed in WPC No.3803/2023 by which writ petition filed by petitioner has been dismissed. 2. This review petition has been filed inter alia on the grounds that: 2 • the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum Raipur has wrongly held that suit should have been filed within two years from notice dated 14.8.2010 and the cause of action has not arisen from the notice dated 24.2.2014. Cause of action firstly arisen when allotment of plot was cancelled and secondly, when notice regarding allotment of land was not replied. Claim of petitioner cannot be held to be barred by limitation because possession of plot has not been delivered to him till date, hence there was continuing cause of action in favour of petitioner. Thus, the orders of the District Forum and National Forum rejecting claim of petitioner being barred by limitation are liable to be set aside. • the High Court has not considered permission letter dated 22.4.1991 (Annexure P-20 to writ petition) in its proper perspective. Further, the High Court erred in holding that petitioner ought to have presented the matter within two years from 1.2.1993. • It was wrongly concluded that petitioner ought to have filed the matter within two years of 1.2.1993, the date on which petitioner made complaint to the Collector regarding demand of Rs.40/- per sq. ft. by respondent Society and for allotment of plot @ Rs.2/- per sq. ft. 3 • Petitioner has only demanded refund of development amount but it is wrongly mentioned that petitioner has demanded entire amount including cost of land. • While dealing with aspect of limitation, provisions of the Act of 2019 have been taken into consideration instead of the Act of 1986, which was repealed on 20.7.2020. 3. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the order which is sought to be reviewed. 4. Indisputably, the order which is sought to be reviewed in this petition, was unsuccessfully challenged by review petitioner before the appellate Court in WA No.788/2024 which came to be dismissed on 27.11.2024. This review petition is filed after dismissal of writ appeal on merits and thus the order under review stood merged in the order of the Division Bench. A review is not entertainable when during pendency of or prior to filing of review petition, the appellate court upheld the order under review and it stood merged in the order of appellate court. 5. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Vs. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. AIR 1958 SC 868 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held : “There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or 4 reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmation of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement.” 6. In case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another vs. N. Raju Reddiar and another, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 736, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed. 7. In Review Petition No.9/2012, parties being Anup Kumar Roy & ors vs State of Tripura & ors and decided on 20.6.2012, the High Court of Guahati (Agartala Bench), the question for consideration was whether after dismissal of appeal against the order under review, it is still open to the appellants of said appeal to seek review of not the judgment and order passed in writ appeal but of the judgment and order passed in petition against which intra-Court appeal had been preferred and dismissed. While answering said question, the High Court dismissed review petition recording that the order passed by 5 the Court in writ petition stood merged into the appellate Court and hence, review, if any, has to be sought of the appellate judgment and not the original order passed in writ petition. Relevant paras of the said decision are extracted herein below:- “3.The question, therefore, which arises for consideration, at the very threshold of this review petition, is: having already preferred an appeal and the appeal having been dismissed, whether it is still open to the appellants of the said appeal to seek review of not the judgment and order, dated 14-11- 2011, passed in W.A. No. 66/2006, but of the judgment and order, dated 15-9-2006, passed in Civil Rule 400/1996, against which intra-Court appeal, as mentioned above, had been preferred and dismissed? 14.The above aspect of the law has been succinctly and authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court, in Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala & Anr. (MANU/SC/0432/2000MANU/SC/0432/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 2587), in the following words :-- “…….(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it the decision by the sub-ordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter, which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by 6 the superior forum and the content or subject- matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability or merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing modified or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising it appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non- speaking order or a speaking one. In either case, it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order, refusing leave to appeal, is a speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then, the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Supreme Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract 7 the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation, (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C. (Emphasis added)” 15.What emerges from the law laid down, in Kunhayammed (MANU/SC/ 0432/ 2000MANU/ SC / 0432 /2000 : AIR 2000 SC 2587) (supra), is that where an appeal is provided against an order passed by a Court and the appeal is preferred, then, the decision of the lower Court merges into the decision of the appellate Court and it is the latter's decision, which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eyes of law. 21…….following observations of the Supreme Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, reported in MANU/SC/0804/ 1996MANU / SC / 0804 / 1996 : (1996) 3 SCC 463 : (AIR 1996 SC 3069), which read as follows : “3. It is contended for the respondent that the dismissal of the SLP does not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the order since the dismissal was a non-speaking order. We fail to appreciate the contention of the respondent. It is true that this Court has held that the dismissal of SLP without a speaking order does not constitute res judicata. The principle of res judicata is founded on public policy that the parties cannot be permitted to have the controversy directly or substantially in issue between the same parties or those claiming under the parties in the subsequent suit in the same proceedings in the subsequent stages cannot be raised once over. It 8 is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation. 4. But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had power under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate provision under the Tribunal acts to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court.” 8. Perusal of the contents of review petition would show that the review petitioner has filed this review mainly on the ground that the Court has committed illegality in affirming the rejection of claim of petitioner by the District Consumers Disputes Redressal Forum being barred by limitation, which is maintained by the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission as well as National Consumer Disputes Redresal Commission. The grounds raised in review petition are the same which have already been raised in writ petition, which were duly considered by this Court, therefore, the review cannot be filed for re-appreciation of the facts and the grounds raised in writ petition. In fact, the instant review petition on the grounds enumerated therein appears to be an appeal in disguise. The grounds taken by review petitioner are either that the finding recorded by the Court is not legally tenable, or that the same is perverse, or that the same is 9 unacceptable. A judgment/order may be wrong, erroneous, incorrect, legally untenable, etc. but nevertheless remains a valid judgment in the eyes of law against which the only course available for the aggrieved party is to go in appeal against the same. Such grounds do not constitute errors of fact or of law on the face of the record as would call for a review. In the case of Surendra Kumar Vakil & Ors. Vs. Chief Executive Officer, MP and Ors., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 126, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “10........A point that has been heard and decided cannot form a ground for review even if assuming that the view taken in the judgment under review is erroneous.” 9. Even, it is well settled in law that in the guise of review, rehearing is not permissible. In order to seek review it has to be demonstrated that order suffers from error apparent on the face of record. The scope of review is very limited and an order or judgment is open to review only if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of record. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Smt. Meera Bhanja vs Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in AIR 1995 SC 455 has observed thus: “8. It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, 10 Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order XLVII, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: “It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it…….” 10. In case of Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assam State Electricity Board and others, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 677, it was held thus:- “25. …....The scope of review has been reiterated by this Court from time to time. It is sufficient to refer the judgment of this Court in Parsion Devi and Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715, wherein in paragraph 9 following has been laid down: “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self- evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous 11 decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.” 11.Keeping in mind the decisions quoted above and considering the grounds raised by review petitioner in this review petition, this Court is of considered view that review petitioner failed to point any error apparent on the face of record warranting review of the order dated 3.9.2024 and further, the order sought to be reviewed is merged with the appellate order passed in writ appeal. Being so, the review petition being sans merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/- SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI