- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 1066 OF 2023(SC-ST) BETWEEN: SRI GOVINDAPPA, S/O LATE A K VENKATARAYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, R/AT SOPPAHALLI VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, CHIKKABALLAPUR TALUK AND DISTRICT. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. VISHWANATH R HEGDE, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, M.S BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDI, BENGALURU 560 001, REP BY ITS SECRETARY. 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHIKKABALLAPUR, CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT. 3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, CHIKKABALLAPUR, CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT. Digitally signed by PRAJWAL A Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 4. SRI. RAMAPPA, S/O HANUMAPPA, AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS, 5. SRI. AKKALAPPA, S/O VENKATARAYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS, 6. SRI. CHENNARAYAPPA, S/O VENKATARAYAPPA, AGED MAJOR, RESPONDENTS 4 TO 6, R/AT SOPPA HALLI VILLAGE, DIBBUR POST, KASABA HOBLI, CHIKKABALLAPUR TALUK AND DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 16/12/2021 IN WP NO.5682/2014 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT AND DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION AND ETC. IA NO.1/2024 IS FILED UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT PRAYING TO CONDONE THE DELAY OF 495 DAYS IN FILING THIS APPEAL. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS ALONG WITH IA NO.1/2024 THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated 16.12.2021 in W.P.No.5682/2014 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 herein by stating in paragraph No.11 as under: “11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi's (supra) case held that application under Section 5 of PTCL Act must be invoked within a reasonable time. Though statute does not prescribe any limitation for filing of an application, it has to be filed within a reasonable time. Admittedly, in the present case, an application filed by respondent No.4 is beyond reasonable time and thus there is inordinate delay in invoking Section 5 of the PTCL Act. Hence, on these grounds itself respondent No.3 ought to have rejected an application on the contrary allowed application filed by respondent - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 No.4. Respondent No.2 also failed to consider the point of limitation and proceeded to pass the impugned order. Thus, the impugned order passed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 are arbitrary and erroneous and contrary to law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos.2 & 3 are liable to be set aside. In view of the above discussions, I proceed to pass the following:- ORDER Writ Petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 12.09.2011 passed by respondent No.3 vide Annexure-G and order dated 20.01.2014 passed by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-H are hereby quashed and set aside. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 In view of disposal of writ petition, I.A.No.1/2020 does not survive for consideration.” 2. Mr.Vishwanath R Hegde, learned counsel for the appellant, who was the respondent No.4 before the learned Single Judge, do concede that the challenge was made by the appellant herein under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands ) Act, 1978 (‘the PTCL Act‘ in short), in the year 2011, alleging that the sale deed dated 15.07.1968 is in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act before the Assistant Commissioner (respondent No.3). 3. Respondent No.3 has allowed the application of respondent No.4 and declared the sale deeds dated 15.07.1968 and 10.09.1968 as null and void. 4. The challenge made by the respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 herein, before the Deputy Commissioner resulted in the dismissal of the same. In the writ petition filed by respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6, the learned Single Judge has set - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 aside the orders passed by respondent Nos.3 and 2 dated 12.09.2011 and 20.01.2024, respectively. 5. The leaned Single Judge has referred to the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in 2018(1) KAR.L.R. 5 (SC) and in the case of VIVEK M.HINDUJA AND OTHERS VS M.ASHWATHA AND OTHERS reported in 2018(1) KAR.L.R. 176 (SC). 6. In paragraph Nos.9 and 10 of the impugned orders, the learned Single Judge has referred to the aforesaid judgments before concluding in paragraph No.11, what we have already reproduced herein above. We agree to the conclusion that has arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 7. The submission of Mr.Hegde, learned counsel for the appellant is primarily in respect of the amendment brought to Section 5(1) of the PTCL Act, whereby the sub-Clauses (c) and (d) have been incorporated. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 8. Suffice to state that, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.A.No.210/2023 decided on 25/11/2024 has in paragraph Nos.4.4 onwards, while referring the aforesaid amendments has held as under: “4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub- clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, “(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” 4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings. 4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis- à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (Para 22) 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. 6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as above, the judgment and award of the learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly disposed of.” - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:8485-DB WA No. 1066 of 2023 9. In view of the aforesaid conclusion and also the fact that the appeal has been filed with a delay of 495 days, we dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. It follows the appeal and I.A.No.1/2024 are dismissed. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE SMC List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3