1 2025:CGHC:16827 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 1167 of 2024 1 - Goverdhan Singh S/o Prahlad Singh Kanwar Aged About 54 Years R/o Madwadhodha, House No. 77, Gandhi Chowk, Bankimongra, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. (Complainant) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Ram Dayal Uikey S/o Kunj Singh Uikey, Aged About 58 Years, Ex- M.L.A. Pali, Tanakhar Vidhan Sahba Kshetra, Korba, Chhattisgarh. R/o House No. C/32, Near Maharana Pratap Chowk, Parijat Colony, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Accused) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey and Mr. Titra Ram Patel, Advocates For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sumit Singh and Ms. Vaishali Jeswani, Advocates S B.: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board SHYNA AJAY Digitally signed by SHYNA AJAY Date: 2025.04.11 17:16:40 +0530 2 09/04/2025 1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2024 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba in Criminal Case No.176/2024, whereby, the respondent/accused has been acquitted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ( in short “the Act”). 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant/complainant and the respondent were familiar to each other. The respondent/accused needed some money to contest in the Legislative Assembly Election pertaining to the year 2023, for which, the appellant/complainant gave Rs.3,00,000/- in the second week and Rs.3,50,000/- in the last week of October, Rs.23,50,000/- in the month of November and in aggregate, Rs.30,00,000/- was given as loan to the respondent. For repayment of the above loan, the respondent/accused gave a cheque dated 30.11.2023 for an amount of Rs.30,00,000/-. When the said cheque was presented for collection, it got dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds vide Ex.P/2 and thereafter, a legal notice-Ex.P/3 was sent. However, even thereafter, when the payment was not made, a complaint case was preferred. The complainant examined himself and exhibited 8 documents. The trial Court, after evaluating the evidence, acquitted the accused/respondent. Hence, this Appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. He submits that as the respondent has not disputed the signature on the cheque, there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of the Act and the said 3 presumption was not rebutted by the respondent/accused. Hence, learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the appeal. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would support the impugned judgment. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent would place reliance on the matter of K. Subramani Vs. K. Damodara Naidu, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 99, wherein, referring to the decision of the three Judge Bench rendered in the matter of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441, it has been held that it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. He further submits that in the matter of K. Subramani (supra), the complainant therein failed to produce the bank statement to substantiate his claim and further failed to explain the source of money and thus, the acquittal recorded by the trial Court was upheld. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 6. In the matter of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a matter of appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidences on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidences brought on record contrary to law. 4 7. Further, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, [(2006) 10 SCC 617], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 8. If we examine the facts of the present case in light of the principles laid down in the afore-stated judgments, it is explicit that the trial Court has assigned cogent reasons while passing the impugned order as the 5 complainant has neither explained the source of money nor produced the statements of his Bank accounts to prove his capacity to lend such a huge amount of loan. Further, the complainant has also deposed that he has arranged the money to the tune of Rs.23,50,000/- from one Harpal Singh but the said person has not been examined. Moreover, no document has also been executed in this regard. Hence, the transaction itself is doubtful. 9. For the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the respondent/accused has successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, therefore, the view taken by the trial Court is a possible one, which has been arrived at after appreciation of the evidence available on record. 10. Resultantly, this Appeal fails and his hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Shyna