[2025:RJ-JP:44306] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12035/2009 1. Smt. Asha Devi W/o Late Shri Vijendra Singh, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Village And Post Ranpura, Tehsil Mandarayal, District Karauli (Rajasthan) 2. Ajay Singh S/o Late Shri Vijendra Singh, Aged About 24 Years, R/o Village And Post Ranpura, Tehsil Mandarayal, District Karauli (Rajasthan) ----Petitioners Versus 1. State of Rajasthan through Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur (Raj.) 2. Inspector General of Police, RAC II, Office of Additional Director General of Police, Armed Battalions, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 3. Commandant, 8th Battalion, RAC (IR) Delhi ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Dhanraj Bhaskar, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shubham Sharma, Advocate for Mr. Somitra Chaturvedi, A.G.C. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI Order 04/11/2025 : By way of filing instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has assailed the order dt.01.10.2008 passed by the respondent No.3/Commandant, 8th Battalion, RAC (IR) Delhi [For short 'the Disciplinary Authority'] whereby he was dismissed from service after exercising the powers under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short 'the Rules of 1958). The petitioner has also assailed the order dt.12.03.2009 passed by the respondent No.2/Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur (for short 'the Appellate Authority), whereby the appeal [2025:RJ-JP:44306] (2 of 4) [CW-12035/2009] of the petitioner filed against the aforesaid punishment order dt.01.10.2008 was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The petitioner was appointed to the permanent & substantive post of Constable in the 6th Battalion, RAC Dholpur on 05.08.1992. On 01.09.1994, he was transferred & posted in the 8th Battalion RAC Ganjipur Delhi-96. The petitioner was issued a charge- sheet on 13.11.2007 alleging two charges against him. He filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet, stating that based on the evidence of the Additional Commander & Constable - Shri Anand Singh, as well as, his medical examination and the statement of the Doctor, Charge No.1 had not been proven against him. The Inquiry Officer, however, found the charges to be proved, and based on that finding, the disciplinary authority passed punishment order dt. 01.10.2008 while dismissing the services of the petitioner. The petitioner had also preferred an appeal against the punishment order dt.01.10.2008, which was dismissed by the ld. Appellate Authority on the ground of limitation. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that there is no evidence showing that the petitioner consumed liquor during duty hours, and further the statement of the employee from whom charges originated has not been recorded. Thus, the Charge No.1 has not been proven at all against the petitioner. According to the statement of the Medical Officer, the petitioner was not under the influence of liquor. The Inquiry Officer & the disciplinary authority failed to consider the reply submitted by the petitioner and wrongly concluded that the charges were proved, thereby, imposing punishment upon him. Counsel further submits that the ld. Appellate Authority, without considering the fact that the delay in filing the appeal occurred under the bona-fide circumstances as the medical condition of the petitioner was not well, dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. [2025:RJ-JP:44306] (3 of 4) [CW-12035/2009] Relying upon the law laid down by this Court in the case of Anuman Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1998 (3) WLC (Raj.) 235, and as per Note (ii) of Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1958, learned counsel contends that the punishment order was passed by an incompetent authority without any jurisdiction. Based on the evidence & material available in the inquiry record, the charges have not been proved against the petitioner. Counsel further contends that it is an established precedent that in the circumstances where an employee consumed liquor after completing duty hours, then dismissal from service is not a justified punishment. Counsel also contends that the ld. Appellate Authority committed an illegality in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation. As per settled law, even if an appeal is barred by limitation, the Appellate Authority is required to decide the appeal on its merits instead of dismissing it solely on the ground of limitation. On the other-hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has submitted that the petitioner himself, in his statement recorded during the departmental enquiry before the Inquiry officer, admitted that he had consumed liquor, thereafter fell asleep, and forgot to unload & un-cock his riffle. The petitioner, in fact, submitted an appeal before the respondent No.2, who is not an appellate authority. The respondent No.2 dismissed the petitioner's appeal as being time- barred. During departmental enquiry conducted under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, all the charges were found proved against the petitioner. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the impugned orders & the material made available on record. Upon hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties and perusal of the record as well as the impugned orders, this Court finds that the ld. Appellate authority dismissed the petitioner's appeal solely on the ground of delay without considering the explanation offered by [2025:RJ-JP:44306] (4 of 4) [CW-12035/2009] the petitioner for such delay. The said authority failed to examine the appeal on its merit, resulting into denial of substantive justice. The appellate forum, when empowered by statutes to condone the delay, is required to exercise such discretion both fairly and judiciously, taking into account the rational underlying delay and the broader interest of justice. Mechanically rejecting the appeal without considering the explanation of the petitioner, undermine due process and frustrates statutory safeguards. In view of the legal position that a liberal approach is to be adopted in condoning delay, particularly in service matters involving livelihood consequences, this Courts considers that the impugned order dt.12.03.2009 cannot be sustained. The principles of natural justice require that, wherever possible, the matter involving livelihood and service should be adjudicated substantively instead of being dismissed on procedural grounds. On a careful reading of the impugned order dt.12.03.2009, it is apparent that the ld. Appellate Authority did not properly consider whether sufficient cause for delay was made out, nor did it offer cogent reason for declining condonation. As a consequence, the impugned order dt.12.03.2009 reflects a lack of proper application of mind and a failure to discharge the authority's statutory duty. Consequently, the writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dt.12.03.2009 passed by the ld. Appellate Authority rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation is hereby, set aside. The ld. Appellate Authority is directed to decide the petitioner's appeal afresh on its own merits in accordance with law. (VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI),J ASHOK