SMT. RATHNAMMA @ MUNIRATHNAMMA v. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
WA/724/2023 · 2025-02-18
T M Nadaf, V Kameswar Rao
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 45490 (KAR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 45490 (KAR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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NC: 2025:KHC:7141-DB WA No. 724 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 724 OF 2023 (SC-ST) BETWEEN:
1.
SMT. RATHNAMMA @ MUNIRATHNAMMA AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, W/O LATE DASAPPA H T
2.
SRI. D SURESH, S/O LATE DASAPPA H T AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
3.
SRI. D GIRISH S/O LATE DASAPPA H T AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
4.
SRI. D SHANTHA KUMAR S/O LATE DASAPPA H T AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
APPELLANT NOS.1 TO 5 ARE RESIDING AT HANABAE VILLAGE, DODDABELAMANGALA HOBLI, DODDABALLAPURA TALUK BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 103 …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. NARASIMHA PRASAD S D, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by MADHUSHREE H Location: High Court of Karnataka
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AND:
1.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT OFFICE COMPLEX, 1ST FLOOR, BEERASANDRA VILLAGE, KUNDANA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK - 562 110
2.
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION, TUBAGERE, DODDABALLAPURA ROAD, DODDABALLAPURA - 561 203
3.
THE TAHSILDAR DEVANAHALLI SUB-DIVISION, DEVANAHALLI - 562 110
4.
SRI. HANUMAPPA @ MOTAPPA AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS, S/O MALUR APPAIAHNA
5.
SRI. DODDANNA S/O LATE KEMPANNA AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS
6.
SRI. NAGARAJA S/O HANUMAPPA AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
RESPONDENT NOS.4 TO 6 ARE RESIDING AT: YELIYUR VILLAGE AND POST, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK - 562 110
7.
SRI. D. MURALIDHARA, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
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S/O LATE DASAPPA H.T., R/AT HANABAE VILLAGE, DODDABELAMANGALA HOBLI, DODDABALLAPURA TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 562 103. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R1-R3;
SRI. M.RAMACHANDRA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R4 & R6)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.NO.7645/2020 DATED 13.08.2021 AND CONSEQUENTLY RESTORE THE SCHEDULE PROPERTY IN FAVOUR OF THE APPELLANTS, ETC.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO)
This appeal lays a challenge to the order dated 13.08.2021 in Writ Petition No.7645/2020 whereby, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants by stating in paragraph No.4 as under:-
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“4. It is found from the records that the application was filed by the petitioners who claim to be the legal heirs of the original grantee. Therefore, when this court sought for explanation for delay in filing the application, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were not aware of the transaction, and no sooner they became aware of the transaction, they approached the Assistant Commissioner. This explanation cannot be accepted since what has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the aggrieved person should approach the Assistant Commissioner within reasonable time. As could be seen from the records the 1st petitioner is aged about 60 years and therefore even as on 01.01.1979 the 1st petitioner was major by age. Therefore, no plausible explanation could be offered at the hands of the petitioner for the inordinate delay.”
2. Suffice to state the challenge of the appellants before the learned Single Judge was to an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, who set aside the order of Assistant Commissioner restoring the land in favour of the appellants. The Deputy Commissioner while allowing the appeal has held that there was an enormous delay of 33 years on the part of the appellants approaching the Assistant Commissioner.
3. Learned Single Judge has referred to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and
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another1. We have already reproduced paragraph No.4 of the judgment. On a similar issue, even a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.A.No.210/2023 dated 25.11.2024 has considered the judgments rendered by this Court and the Supreme Court and has in paragraph 4.6 onwards stated as under:-
“4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d),
"The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such
1 (2020) 14 SCC 232
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duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f),
"It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill.
That per se does not lend credence to the contention
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that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the
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above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus,
"The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning
“remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party.
It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on
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equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches,
"Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (Para 22) 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in
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the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play.
12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner- appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. 6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as above, the judgment and award of the learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly
disposed of.”
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4. In view of the clear exposition of law, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge is justified in dismissing the writ petition. Additionally, we find there is delay of 449 days in filing the appeal. So the appeal is rejected both on delay and on merits. No costs.
Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE
Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE
MH/- List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9