1 2025:CGHC:3075 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 2442 of 2024 1 - Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance Through Branch Manager, Branch Office, First Floor, Hinduja Complex, 22 Paras Nagar Chowk, Near Railway Line, Devendra Nagar Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Niman Tairas Kerketta S/o Late Dhanam Singh Kerketta Aged About 61 Years Resident Of Village Lodam, Jashpur, At Present - Shanti Nagar, Bankimongra, Thana Bankimongra, Tahsil Katghora, Dist.- Korba (C.G.) 2 - Smt. Letaren Kerketta W/o Late Tairas Kerketta Aged About 60 Years Resident Of Village Lodam, Jashpur, At Present - Shanti Nagar, Bankimongra, Thana Bankimongra, Tahsil Katghora, Dist.- Korba (C.G.) 3 - Jitesh Bhagat S/o Babulal Bhagat Aged About 25 Years R/o Lodam, Lohapara, Police Chowki - Lodam, Thana - Jashpur, Dist. And Tahsil Jashpur (C.G.) 4 - Pradeep Prasad Sahu S/o Kheleshwar Sahu Aged About 50 Years R/o Vikas Nagar, Batauli, Gumla, Thana - Gumla, Dist. - Gumla (Jharkhand) ... Respondents For Appellant : Ms. Pragya Mishra, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 17/01/2025 1. Heard on admission. 2. In the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the award passed by the learned First Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 153/2021 dated 11.03.2024, whereby the learned Tribunal has passed an award in favour of the claimants to the tune of Rs.12,67,694/- and the amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 7% per annum. Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH 2 3. Claimants No.1 & 2 are the parents of the deceased who filed a claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming therein compensation to the tune of Rs.79,10,000/- before the learned Claims Tribunal. 4. The appellant/Insurance Company has moved an application (I.A. No. 01/2024) for condonation of delay as there is a delay of 175 days in filing the instant appeal. 5. Ms. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company/appellant would submit that the appeal is filed with a delay of 175 days as the certified copy of the award was not supplied within limitation. She would further submit that after obtaining permission from the Head Office, the appeal was preferred. She would contend that the Court should take a lenient view while dealing with an application for condonation of delay. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records. 7. Admittedly, the appellant has preferred this appeal against the award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal dated 11.03.2024. In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated as under:- “3.That the instant appeal is filed with a delay of about 15 days. It is respectfully submitted that after the award was passed the A tribunal, handed over the copy of award to the counsel of the appellant and the same was sent to the appellant company at Indore. 4. That the copy of impugned award was sent to the Regional Office of the appellant company at Indore and it was suggested by the Regional Office to seek legal opinion with regard to filing of the appeal from the local counsel and from the counsel of the High Court. Hence again the copy and all other relevant papers were sent to the counsel at Bilaspur. 5. Thereafter the opinion of the counsel was received and the same was forwarded to regional office Indore for taking final decision with regard to filing of the appeal. Thereafter decision to file the instant appeal was taken by the head office of the appellant company. It is humbly submitted that in these circumstances the 1175). appeal became barred by limitation of about 1741 175 days. 3 6. There was no deliberate delay or dilatory tactics adapted by the appellant to file the instant appeal beyond limitation. The reasons assigned of about 75 days delay in filing the appeal constitute sufficient cause and there is no deliberate delay. The Hon'ble Court may kindly take liberal approach in this regard in the interest of justice.” From a perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it appears that there is no description of the date when the application was moved before the learned Tribunal to obtain certified copy and when it was supplied to the appellant. It is also nowhere stated that when the matter was forwarded to the Regional Office and when the permission was granted by the Regional Office to prefer the appeal and thus, in the opinion of this Court, the appellant/Insurance Company has not explained the delay properly. 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 4 9. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide 5 is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 10. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 6 11. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 13. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 14. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha