1 2025:CGHC:1718-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1895 of 2019 {Arising out of judgment dated 20.11.2019 passed in Sessions Trial No.67/2018 by the learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja} Jagan @ Jagendra Singh Mandavi, S/o. Shri Sarvbeshwar Singh Mandavi, Aged About 26 Years, R/o. Village Karagidih, Police Station Lundra, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. V.K.Pandey, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate (Division Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Judgment on Board (10.01.2025) ASHOK SAHU Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2025.01.13 10:31:45 +0530 2 Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2019, passed by the learned Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, in Sessions Trial No.67/2018, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.04.2018 at 8:00 P.M. in a rented house of Sadaqat Hussain, Takiya Road, Police Station- Ambikapur, the appellant assaulted his wife Parvati Bai (now deceased) by hand & fist, by which, she suffered grievous injuries and died; thereby, the offence has been committed. The matter was reported to the police, pursuant to which, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-5, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-6, Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-13 and dead body of deceased Parvati Bai was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. J.S.Saruta (PW-1), who proved the post-mortem report vide Ex.P-1, according to which, cause of death was stated to be shock due to fracture of skull 3 bone and internal hemorrhage. After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. 3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 23 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has not examined any witness but has exhibited the document Ex.D-1. 4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him for life imprisonment against which the present appeal has been preferred. 5. Mr. V.K.Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that taking into the prosecution case as it is, at the most, the offence under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. is made out against the appellant and therefore, the conviction of appellant for offence under Section 302 of 4 I.P.C. be converted to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and he be sentenced for the period already undergone, as he is in jail since 25.04.2018. 6. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence. He further submits that it is not a case where the conviction of appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. can be converted to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C.; therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The first question for consideration as to whether the death of deceased Parvati Bai was homicidal in nature has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative in para 27 of its judgment relying upon the post-mortem report (Ex.P-1) proved by Dr. J.S. Saruta (PW-1), according to which, cause of death was stated to be shock due to fracture of skull bone and internal haemorrhage, which in our considered opinion is a correct finding of fact based on 5 evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 9. Now, the next question is, whether the appellant has caused the death of his wife Parvati Bai ? 10. The trial Court has culled out the incriminating circumstances in paragraph 25 of its judgment and held that the death of deceased was homicidal in nature. The appellant and deceased both were residing together in a rented house and dead body of deceased was found inside the house of appellant on 25.04.2018, which he failed to explain as to how and in what circumstances his wife has died. Therefore, the trial Court while applying Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act proceeded to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. The said finding recorded by the trial Court that the appellant and deceased both were residing together and dead body was found inside the house and appellant has failed to explain as to how and in what circumstances his wife has died in paragraph 50 & 67 is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and accordingly, we hereby 6 affirm the said finding that it is the appellant who had caused the death of his wife. 11. Now, the question would be whether the case of the appellant would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of I.P.C. and, as such, his conviction under Section 302 of I.P.C. can be altered to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C., as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh1 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a hit of anger. Of course, the 1 (2017) 3 SCC 247 7 offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden 8 quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 13. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when and if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of I.P.C. and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death, but considering the nature of injuries i.e. (i) fracture of right parietal bone (ii) haematoma on right parietal region (iii) subdural haematoma and other injuries, it appears there was no premeditation and intention on the part of appellant to cause death, but the appellant must have had knowledge that the injuries caused by him is likely to cause death. It is the fit case where the conviction of appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. deserves to be converted to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. 9 15. In view of the above, the conviction of appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. is altered to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and the appellant is sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. 16. In the result, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 17. Let a certified copy of this judgment along-with the original record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith for necessary information & action, if any. A copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge Ashok