- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA WRIT PETITION NO.103935 OF 2024 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: SRI. DANESHWER SHIRAGUPPI S/O HANMANTH SHIRAGUPPI AGE. 31 YEARS, WAS WORKING AS RESERVE POLICE CONSTABLE, R/O.JANWAD, TQ. ATHANI, DIST. BELAGAVI-591240. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. VIJAY SARATHY, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SHARANABASAVARAJ C.S., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT (HOME DEPARTMENT) VIDHAN SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001. 2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE OPPOSITE OF MARTHAS HOSPITAL, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. 3. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE BELAGAVI CITY, BELAGAVI-590001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR R1-R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO, ISSUE APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI TO SET ASIDE/QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER, DATED 19/12/2023 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Digitally signed by MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 BELAGAVI BENCH, BELAGAVI IN APPLICATION NO.11190/2022 (ANNEXURE-F) AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION NO.11190/2022 FILED BY THE PETITIONER & ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT) The petitioner, who is an Armed Police Constable, is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by the order dated 19.12.2023 passed in Application No.11190/2022 by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Belagavi (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) by which the petitioner’s challenge to order of discharge dated 22.03.2022 is rejected. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was selected and appointed as Armed Police Constable (APC) by order of appointment dated 07.03.2020 (Annexure-A). The appointment of the petitioner, initially, was on probation for a period of 2½ years. During the period of probation, the petitioner was discharged from service under impugned order dated 22.03.2022 in exercise of powers under Rule 5(1)(b) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Probation) Rules 1977 (for short, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 ‘the 1977 Rules’) on the allegation that the petitioner had brought disrespect to the Police Department by committing heinous offence. Hence, it was held that the petitioner is not entitled to continue in service as his service was not satisfactory. Questioning the said order of discharge, the petitioner was before the Tribunal in Application No.11190/2022. The Tribunal under impugned order dated 19.12.2023 rejected the petitioner’s application holding that the foundation of discharge is not on act of misconduct but on unsuitability of the applicant as he had not shown integrity by getting involved in a criminal case during the probation period. Questioning the said order, the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition. 3. Heard Sri. Vijay Sarathy and Sri. Sharanabasavaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri. G.K.Hiregoudar, learned Government Advocate for respondents-State. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 4. Sri. Vijay Sarathy, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the order of discharge is not an order simplicitor, but an order which attaches stigma. Learned - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 counsel would invite attention of this Court to the impugned order and submits that the allegations of misconduct are made against the petitioner and further it is held that the petitioner by participating in criminal offence has brought disrespect to the Police Department and also he has committed heinous offence which disentitles him to continue in the Police Department. The said finding would definitely be a stigma and by attaching stigma a government servant cannot be sent out of service. 5. Learned counsel, Sri. Vijay Sarathy places reliance on the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sri. Ramesh Malli Vs. The Deputy Inspector General of Police (Wireless), Police Department and Anr.1, and referring to paragraphs 17 & 18 would submit that when allegations of misconduct are made, an inquiry as contemplated under Rule 7 of the 1977 Rules would be necessary. He also submits that the recital of the order of discharge would decide as to whether the order of discharge is simplicitor or stigmatic. Again, learned counsel referring to the impugned order of discharge submits that the recital in the order of discharge makes amply clear 1 ILR 2022 KAR 2023 - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 that the order of discharge is not an order of discharge simplicitor, but an order attaching stigma. Thus, he prays for allowing the writ petition by setting aside the order passed by the appointing authority as well as the Tribunal. 6. Per contra, Sri. G.K.Hiregoudar, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents-State would submit that the impugned order of discharge is an order of discharge simplicitor and it only indicates reasons for coming to the conclusion to discharge the petitioner. The order of discharge which indicates the reasons cannot be construed as an order attaching stigma. The learned Government Advocate referring to the order of the Tribunal submits that the Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that taking note of the cogent material justifying unsuitability, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the order of discharge is an order of discharge simplicitor. Thus, he supports the order of the Tribunal and prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 7. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the writ petition papers, the only point that falls for consideration is, - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 Whether the order of discharge is an order of discharge simplicitor OR an order of discharge attaching stigma, and whether the order of discharge as well as the order passed by the Tribunal requires interference? 8. The answer to the above point would be in the affirmative i.e. order of discharge attaches stigma and that the order of discharge and the impugned order of the Tribunal requires interference at the hands of this Court. 9. The law with regard to discharge of probationers is well settled. This Court in Ramesh Malli’s case (supra), considering several decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 17 to 22, has held as follows: “17. The law with regard to discharge of probationer and as to whether it is punitive or simplicitor and how to find out as to whether the order of discharge is simplicitor or punitive is well settled. Whether an order of termination is simplicitor or punitive is ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. A careful perusal of the above order of discharge, it could be dissected into three parts ie: (i) preamble (ii) final conclusion and order. Preamble portion of the order would always indicates the reason or basis for the order. In other words preamble portion of the order would be the foundation for the decision and order. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 Preamble portion of the order of discharge discloses the arrest of the petitioner, remanding him to judicial custody and his release on bail. It also indicates registration of Crime No. 291/2019 under Section 66 (c) and 66 (d) of Information Technology Act and on several sections of IPC. It also alleges that the petitioner working in the office of D.G.P. (Control Room), Bengaluru, has taken the written examination for the post of P.S.I. and has illegally taken the question paper pertaining to the said written examination from accused No.8-Nagaraj, A.S.I., with a malafide intention and has paid the money and cheque and involved in the commission of the crime. Further it alleges that the petitioner having joined the post of Police Constable on 01.07.2017 accepting the terms and conditions of appointment involved in the commission of offence during probationary period, acted irresponsibly, exhibited misconduct while on duty and having participated in the criminal offence and having undergone judicial custody, damaged the reputation of the department known for discipline. The order portion clearly indicates that the petitioner exhibited “PÀvÀðªÀåzÀ°è ¨ÉÃdªÁ¨ÁÝj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ zÀÄ£ÀðqÀvÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀæzÀ²ð¹“ (exhibited irresponsibility in duty and misconduct). When the misconduct is the foundation for discharge it requires enquiry as contemplated under Rule-7 of 1977 Rules. The Apex Court has held that if the misconduct is the foundation for discharge, such order becomes bad in law. 18. From a reading of the above order it can be said that it is not an order of discharge simplicitor and it is a stigmatic order. The recital in the order of discharge - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 refers to involvement of petitioner in commission of crime and his detention in judicial custody, which itself would be stigmatic. Moreover a reading of the order of discharge also indicates that the respondent No.2 had obtained report from the Police Inspector with regard to the alleged incident. The said report was also the basis for discharge. 19. The Tribunal failed to appreciate the basis or foundation on which the order of discharge was passed. The Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the application of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is discharged from service on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him which is not so. The Tribunal relying on the decision of the apex Court in State Bank of India & others Vs. Palak Modi (2013 AIR SCW 76) was of the view that the probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of period of probation on general unsuitability for the post held by him. 20. It is true that the petitioner has no right to hold the post and he can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the probationary period for general unsuitability, but a probationer cannot be discharged imputing allegations amounting to misconduct. If any misconduct is alleged, then enquiry under Rule 7 of ‘1977 Rules’ is necessary. The Tribunal observed at paragraph no. 16 that the petitioner is alleged to have been involved in a criminal case relating to certain malpractice in the selection process, which is a serious allegation. When such being the allegation it cannot be said that the order of discharge is discharge simplicitor. Definitely the order - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 of discharge is an order of discharge imputing serious allegations against the petitioner which are not proved in any enquiry as required under Rule 7 of ‘1977 Rules’. Rule 6 of ‘1977 Rules’ would be inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The petitioner is not discharged on account of general unsuitability as concluded by the Tribunal. 21. This Court need not go behind the order to find out as to whether the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for the misconduct. On the face of the order of discharge, it is manifest that the order of discharge is a camouflage for order of dismissal for misconduct. 22. The apex Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee V. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 has laid down principles to determine as to whether the order of termination or discharge is punitive or simplicitor or allegations against probationer were foundation. Relevant portion reads as follows: “19. As to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. In this area, as pointed out by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab, there is no difference between cases where services of a temporary employee are terminated and where a probationer is discharged. This very question was gone into recently in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. and reference was made to the development of the law from time to time - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 starting from Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India to the concept of “purpose of enquiry” introduced by Shah, J. (as he then was) in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das and to the seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and to post-Samsher Singh case-law. This Court had occasion to make a detailed examination of what is the “motive” and what is the “foundation” on which the innocuous order is based. 20…….. 21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as “founded” on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. 25. In the matter of “stigma”, this Court has held that the effect which an order of termination may have on a person’s future prospects of employment is a matter of relevant consideration. In the seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab Ray, C.J. observed that if a simple order of termination was passed, that would enable the officer to “make good in other walks of life without a stigma”. It was also stated in Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana that if the order contained a stigma, the termination would be bad for “the individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of reputation which may affect his future prospects”. - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 10. In the case on hand, the allegation against the petitioner, as could be seen from the order of discharge, is as under: “DUÀ ¸ÀzÀj J¦¹ ºÁUÀÆ Dgï.¦.L, rJDgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÉÃj D¸ÀàvÉæAiÀÄ M¼ÀUÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀÄvÀÛªÀÄÄvÀÛ ºÀÄqÀÄPÀÄvÁÛ ºÉÆÃzÁUÀ C°è PÀtÂÚ£À «¨sÁUÀzÀ ºÀwÛgÀ ¸ÀAvÉÆõÀ zÁæPÉë EzÀÄÝ, CªÀ¤UÉ vÀªÀÄä ¥ÀjZÀAiÀÄ ºÉý, CªÀgÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁj¸À vÉÆqÀVzÁUÀ CªÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄUÉ PÀtÂÚ£À PÀ®gÀ ¨Áè¬ÄAqÀ£É¸ï (ªÀuÁðAzsÀvÉ) ¸ÀªÀĸÉå EzÀÄÝ, CzÀPÉÌ ªÉÊzÀågÀ°è «£ÀAw¹ ¥Á¸ÀÄ ªÀiÁrPÉƼÀî®Ä §A¢gÀÄvÉÛÃ£É CAvÁ w½¹zÀgÀÄ. 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CzÀgÀAvÉ ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀgÀÄ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ J¸ï.¦. r.J.Dgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥Àj²Ã°¹ G¯ÉèÃTvÀ (3) gÀ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è ¥Àj²Ã®£Á ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ. ¸ÀzÀj ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÆ® - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 C¨sÀåyðAiÀiÁzÀ ²æà ¸ÀAvÉÆõÀ zÁæQë EvÀ¤UÉ PÀtÂÚ£À ªÀuÁðAzsÀvÉ ¸ÀªÀĸÉå EzÀÝgÀÆ J¦¹-3776, zÁ£ÉñÀégÀ ²gÀUÀĦà gÀªÀgÀÄ DvÀ¤UÉ ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁr PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¨Á»gÀªÁV PÀtÂÚ£À ªÀuÁðAzsÀvÉ ¥ÀjÃPÉëAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Á¸ï ªÀiÁr¹gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ºÁUÀÆ G¯ÉèÃTvÀ (4) gÀ°è ¸ÀzÀj ¥ÀæPÀgÀtPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ DgÉÆævÀgÁzÀ (1) ²æà ¸ÀAvÉÆõÀ ²æÃ¥Àw zÁæPÉë, ªÀAiÀiÁ: 24 ªÀµÀð, ¸ÁB »gÉÃPÉÆÃr, vÁB aPÉÆÌÃr. 2) ²æà zÁ£ÉñÀégÀ ºÀtªÀÄAvÀ ²gÀUÀĦà, J¦¹-3776, rJDgï ¨É¼ÀUÁ« ºÁUÀÆ 3) ²æà ¸ÀAiÀÄåzÀ EªÀiÁªÀĸÁ§ aªÀÄäzÀ J¦¹-362, ¹JDgï, ¨É¼ÀUÁ« gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À ªÉÄÃ¯É ªÀiÁ£Àå eÉ.JªÀiï.J¥sï.¹ 4£Éà £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥ÀvÀæ vÀAiÀiÁj¹ ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ ¹.¹.£ÀA: 444/2021 £ÉÃzÀÄÝ EgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ ¦.J¸ï.L (PÁ & ¸ÀÄ) J.¦JªÀiï.¹ ¥Éǰøï oÁuÉ ¨É¼ÀUÁ« £ÀUÀgÀ zÀªÀgÀÄ w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. J.¦¹-3776, zÁ£ÉñÀégÀ ºÀtªÀÄAvÀ ²gÀUÀĦà, r.J.Dgï WÀlPÀ, ¨É¼ÀUÁ« f¯Éè gÀªÀgÁzÀ ¤ÃªÀÅ F PÀbÉÃj DzÉñÀ ¸ÀASÉå: ¹§âA¢/£ÉêÀÄPÁw/J¦¹/.217/2018, (D.¥ÀÄ.¸ÀA:152/2020) ¢£ÁAPÀ: 07/03/2020 gÀ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ¸À±À¸ÀÛæ ¥Éǰøï PÁ£ÀìmÉç¯ï ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ £ÉêÀÄPÁw ºÉÆA¢, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 02/06/2020 gÀAzÀÄ PÀvÀðªÀåPÉÌ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀÄwÛÃj. ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀgÀÄ £ÉêÀÄPÁw ºÉÆA¢zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ¢AzÀ 2 ªÀµÀð 06 wAUÀ¼À ¥ÉÇæèÉõÀ£Àj CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°ègÀÄwÛÃj. PɹJ¸ïDgï (¥ÉÇæèÉõÀ£Àj) ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 1977 gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ-5 (1) (©) gÀ°è £ÉêÀÄPÁw ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀ ¸ÀPÁðj £ËPÀgÀ£ÀÄ ºÉÆA¢zÀ ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÉÆAzÀ®Ä ¸ÀÆPÀÛ£ÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ ¤zsÀðj¹zÀgÉ DvÀ£À£ÀÄß ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ «ªÀÄÄPÀÛPÉƽ¸À§ºÀÄzÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ w½¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. J¦¹-3776, zÁ£ÉñÀégÀ ºÀtªÀÄAvÀ ²gÀUÀĦà, rJDgï WÀlPÀ, ¨É¼ÀUÁ« f¯Éè gÀªÀgÁzÀ ¤ÃªÀÅ ¥Éǰøï E¯ÁSÉAiÀÄAvÀºÀ ²¹Û£À E¯ÁSÉAiÀÄ°è PÀvÀðªÀå ¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ, ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀ C¥ÀgÁ¢üPÀ PÀvÀðªÀå J¸ÀVzÀÄÝzÀjAzÀ ªÉÄð£À ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¤ªÀÄä£ÀÄß 2£Éà DgÉÆævÀgÉAzÀÄ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ ¥ÀvÀæ ¸À°è¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ ¤ÃªÀÅ C¥ÀgÁzsÀ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV ¥Éǰøï E¯ÁSÉUÉ CUËgÀªÀ vÀgÀĪÀAvÀºÀ WÉÆÃgÀ DgÉÆÃ¥À J¸ÀV E¯ÁSÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgÉAiÀÄ®Ä CvÀȦÛzÁAiÀÄgÁVgÀÄwÛÃj. DzÀÝjAzÀ ¤ÃªÀÅ GªÉÄÃzÀĪÁjPÉ CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è EgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ F PɼÀPÀAqÀAvÉ DzÉñÀªÀ£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÀr¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ.” 11. The allegation against the petitioner, in sum and substance, is that the petitioner helped three candidates in recruitment of APC by getting through medical examination contrary to the Rules. Further, it also indicates that the petitioner has committed heinous offence and has brought - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 disrespect to the Police Department which disentitles him to continue in service as his service is unsatisfactory. The averments in the impugned order itself indicate misconduct or allegations of misconduct against the petitioner. When a person, who is discharged from service on allegation of certain misconduct during his probationary period, attracts Rule 7 of 1977 Rules and requires conducting of enquiry. 12. The Tribunal is not justified in coming to the conclusion that the material justifies the unsuitability of the petitioner and that foundation of discharge is not an act of misconduct. When the language and the averment in the order of discharge explicitly makes it clear about the misconduct, the Tribunal could not have come to the conclusion that the allegations are foundation for petitioner’s unsatisfactory service or unsuitability of the petitioner. The decision or the ratio laid down by this Court in Ramesh Malli’s case (supra) would aptly apply to the present case also. By following the ratio laid down the Ramesh Malli’s case (supra), this writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following: - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6239-DB WP No. 103935 of 2024 ORDER i) Writ Petition is allowed. ii) The impugned order of the Tribunal passed in Application No.11190/2022, dated 19.12.2023, as well as the impugned order of discharge dated 22.03.2022 by respondent No.3 are hereby quashed. iii) Respondent No.3 is directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. However, petitioner would not be entitled for backwages as he has not worked. iv) Liberty is reserved to respondent No.3 to take appropriate action against the petitioner in accordance with law. Pending I.As., if any, do not survive for consideration and are disposed of accordingly. Sd/- (S G PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (C.M. POONACHA) JUDGE KMS LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 12