- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:669 CRL.P No. 100914 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 100914 OF 2023 (482(Cr.PC)/528(BNSS)) BETWEEN: HANUMESH S/O. ERAPPA CHALUVADI AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, OCC. SELF EMPLOYED, R/O. KANDAKUR VILLAGE, TQ. KUSHTAGI, DIST. KOPPAL. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. ARAVIND D. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH POLICE SUB-INSPECTOR, KUSHTAGI, POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH. 2. SMT. LAXMAVVA W/O. MARUTESH DASAR AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCC. LABOURER, R/O. KANDAKUR VILLAGE, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT, TEGGINA ONI, KUSHTAGI, TQ. KUSHTAGI, DIST. KOPPAL-583277. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. PRAVEENA Y.DEVAREDDIYAVARA, HCGP FOR R1; NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/SEC. 482 OF CR.P.C. SEEKING TO, QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN S.C. NO.18/2021 PENDING ON THE FILE OF PRL. DISTRICT AND SESSION JUDGE, KOPPAL REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 376 OF IPC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR Digitally signed by B K MAHENDRAKUMAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH Date: 2025.01.21 09:48:47 +0530 - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:669 CRL.P No. 100914 of 2023 ORAL ORDER 1. The petitioner has been charge-sheeted for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. The prosecution’s case is that the petitioner, by promising to marry, induced the de facto complainant to engage in sexual intercourse and later breached the said promise. 3. Respondent No.2/de facto complainant, although served with notice, has not chosen to appear either in person or through her counsel. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent/State, and the learned counsel for respondent No.2. 5. A perusal of the charge-sheet material indicates that the petitioner and the de facto complainant were allegedly in a relationship from 5.3.2017 to 5.2.2020. The first alleged incident occurred in the year 2017, and the FIR was lodged only on 5.3.2020, after the relationship reportedly turned sour. 6. Admittedly, the de facto complainant was a married woman, aged 30 years, with a child born out of the said marriage. Therefore, during the subsistence of a valid marriage, the allegation that the petitioner breached a promise to marry and had sexual intercourse lacks substance. Even if the allegations are accepted at face value, they do not satisfy the essential elements required to constitute the alleged offence against the petitioner. - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:669 CRL.P No. 100914 of 2023 7. In a similar set of circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, ruled as follows: 8. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh as follows: “12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions, and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action… […] 14. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given with the intention to break it, and the breach of a promise made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled… […] 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman into engaging in sexual relations, there is a ‘misconception of fact’ that vitiates the woman’s ‘consent.’ However, a mere breach of a promise cannot be equated with a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise must have had no intention of fulfilling it at the time of making it. The ‘consent’ of a woman under Section 375 - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:669 CRL.P No. 100914 of 2023 is vitiated on the ground of ‘misconception of fact’ only when such misconception was the basis for her decision to engage in the act… […] 18. To summarize, for the ‘consent’ of a woman to be vitiated by a ‘misconception of fact’ arising out of a promise to marry, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) The promise of marriage must have been false, made in bad faith, and with no intention of being fulfilled at the time it was given; and (ii) The false promise must have been of immediate relevance and directly influenced the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The prosecution has not produced substantial evidence to establish that the promise made by the petitioner at the inception was false. Even if the allegations are accepted at face value, they, at best, constitute a breach of promise. In the absence of the essential elements required to establish the alleged offence, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 10. For the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed, and the impugned proceedings are quashed. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:669 CRL.P No. 100914 of 2023 11. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned proceedings in SC No.18/2021 on the file of Prl. District and Sessions Judge, Koppal, is hereby quashed. Sd/- (HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR) JUDGE JTR Ct:vh List No.: 3 Sl No.: 3