Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:81958 Court No. - 10 Case :- APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 No. - 61 of 2021 Appellant :- Bhartiya Rashtriya Rajmarg Pradhikaran Respondent :- Vakeel Ahmad And 4 Others Counsel for Appellant :- Pranjal Mehrotra Counsel for Respondent :- Raghav Dev Garg Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal,J. Heard Sri Panjal Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Raghav Dev Garg, learned counsel for the respondent. Present appeal has been filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the Act, 1996) against the order dated 1612.2020 by which application under section 34 of the Act, 1996 has been rejected. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the land of the respondents was acquired for the purpose of using the same for National High Ways for which notification under section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (in short the Act, 1956) was issued on 26.12.2013 and thereafter declaration under section 3D of the Act, 1956 was issued on 22.9.2014. He further submits that the competent authority declared the award on 7.7.2017 under section 3G of the Act, 1956. He further submits that against the award dated 7.7.2017, the respondent filed a petition under section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Arbitrator (District Judge), Bijnor who vide award dated 4.2.2019 remanded the matter to the competent authority with certain directions. He further submits that against the award dated 4.2.2019 the appellant filed a petition under section 34 of the Act, 1996 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 16.12.2020. He further submits that the Arbitrator without considering the material on record has enhanced the compensation and with certain direction remanded the matter to the competent authority, which is not permissible under law. He further submits that against the said remand order the appellant preferred an application under section 34 of the Act, 1996, but instead of deciding the same on merits has rejected the same. He further submits that the land in question was an agricultural land and the same was recorded in the revenue record as such on the date of publication of the notification under section 3A of the Act, 1956. He further submits that there is no order under section 133 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 declaring the land in question as non agricultural. He further submits that in absence of such declaration of the land in question the compensation other than the agricultural land is bad and the same is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the authorities have failed to consider this aspect of the matter. Per contra, Sri Raghav Dev Garg, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits that the application under section 34 of the Act, 1996 has rightly been rejected as the appellant has filed the application beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the Act. He further submits that while filing the application under section 34 of the Act, 1996 the appellant has not explained the sufficient cause for delay, therefore, the application has rightly been rejected. He further submits that the appellant has failed to show any cogent reason for condoning the delay. In support of his submission he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee (2025 INSC 639) . After hearing the learned counsel for the parties the Court has perused the record. It is not in dispute that the application under section 34 of the Act, 1996 was filed by the appellant beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the Act. On perusal of the application under section 34 of the Act, 1996 no sufficient cause has been explained for approaching the authority beyond the period of limitation. Even before this Court while filing the present appeal 27 grounds have been taken. On perusal of these grounds neither any sufficient reason for approaching the authority beyond the period of limitation nor any specific ground for condoning the delay has been taken. For the reasons aforesaid as well as the law laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in Tata Steel Ltd. (supra) holding that delay cannot be condoned in such matters, no interference is called for with the impugned order. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Order Date :- 13.5.2025 samz Digitally signed by :- SYED AKHTARMOHAMMAD MEQDAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad