HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.608 OF 2010 Between:- Shaik Mohammad Ibrahim. ...PETITIONER AND State of AP and others ...RESPONDENT **** DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 27.03.2025 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No 2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No 3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 * THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO + CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.608 OF 2010 % 27.03.2025 # Between: Shaik Mohammad Ibrahim. ...PETITIONER AND State of AP and others ...RESPONDENT ! Counsel for the Petitioners :V.Mallik ^ Counsel for the Respondent :P. Akhila Naidu, Assistant Public Prosecutor < Gist: > Head Note: 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 ? Cases referred: 1) (2002) 6 SCC 650 2) AIR 1951 SC 196 3) AIR 1962 SC 1788 4) 2003 (12) SCC 406 5) 1978 (1) ALT 397 6) 1978 CrlJ 549 7) AIR 1979 SC 1360 8) 2000 (1) BLJR 37 9) AIR 1988 SCC 1789 10) 1996 CRI.L.J.2720 11) AIR 1999 SCC 1482 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 608/2010 ORDER: Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’) against the judgment dated 18.03.2010 in Crl.A.No.123 of 2009, on the file of the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Markapur, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for brevity ‘the Act’) vide judgment dated 21.08.2009 in C.C. No.158 of 2007, on the file of the learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Markapur. 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri V. Mallik, the learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the grounds of the revision argued that in Ex.P7 label, there are no signatures of the petitioner, P.W.1 and the mediator; the evidence of the P.W.1 is not trustworthy; failure to see the explanation of P.W.1 with regard to the non- seizure of the records or invoice of the muster roll is not properly explained except saying that P.W.1 is not concerned with the said aspect; the visit of the P.W.1 is highly doubtful as he had not prepared any sketch of the scene of 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 offence and noted physical marks of the scene in Ex.P9 while preparing the alleged panchanama; Ex.P1 was only a photocopy and an unattested one which ought not to have been relied upon; P.W.2 is only an indirect witness who had stated that he did not know about the inspection conducted by P.W.1; and urged to allow the revision case. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the inspection took place in the year 2004; nearly 21 years have passed by. The revision case was filed about 14 years ago; the petitioner was in jail for about 9 years; it is not the allegation that the product was adulterated, but it was only a misbranding of sans IBS Certification; right to speedy justice is the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India in favor of the petitioner is being violated and requested to impose the sentence which the petitioner had already undergone, by taking lenient view. 5. Per contra, Ms. P. Akhila Naidu, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, argued that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 disclosed that the petitioner had contravened the provisions of Sections 7 (2) and 2 (6) (k) of ‘the Act.,’ and it is punishable under Section 16 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act’; there was no misreading of evidence; no material irregularity was committed by the learned courts below; evidence of the witnesses cannot be re-appreciated at the stage of revision and urged to dismiss the revision case. However, with regard to the sentence that could be imposed on the petitioner, it is submitted that some 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 lenience may be shown as this case is not a case of adulteration, but only a misbranding for want of procuring IBS Certification. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 7. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.123 of 2009 dated 18.03.2010, passed by the learned VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Markapur, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. In this connection, it is apposite to refer to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar 1 wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ...In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has no right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3,at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional 2AIR 1951 SC 196 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 11. The learned Trial Court had examined the P.Ws.1 to 3 and marked exhibits P1 to P12 to bring home the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. It is proved by the prosecution that the petitioner/accused is the Managing Partner of water manufacturing unit M/s. Himasagar Industries, Station Road, Markapur. It is clearly proved that on 25.10.2004 at about 3.00 10 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 p.m., PW.1/J.Venkateswarlu along with his attender N.V.Rama Rao, visited the manufacturing unit of Himasagar Packaged Drinking Water Plant for inspection. At the time of his inspection, the petitioner was present and looking after the business, and revealed that he was the Managing Partner of the manufacturing unit. PW.1 had disclosed his identity as Food Inspector, the purpose of his visit and secured PW.3/Shaik Mohammad Kasim Vali to act as mediator, inspected the plant and found 5 bags of Himasagar packaged drinking water, each bag having 100 pouches of each 250 ml packaged drinking water in sealed condition kept for sale for human consumption. The label declaration of the sealed pouch is, "Himasagar Packaged Drinking Water Net contents 250 ml batch No. date of packing, see outer cover. MRP.Rs.2/- inclusive of all taxes" best before 21 days from the date of packing, store in cool & dry place protected from direct sunlight. Processed and packed by : M/s. Himasagar Industries, Station Road, Markapur, Prakasam District. Processed through Reverse Osmosis, Micron Filtration, U.V. treatment & Ozonisation". 12. PW.1 had suspected the said 250 ml., Himasagar Packaged Drinking Water Pouches as adulterated and purchased 36 packets from one bag out of 5 bags by paying its cost Rs.72/- and obtained cash receipt in the presence of PW.3. PW.1 served a notice in Form-VI on petitioner intimating that the purchased Himasagar Packaged Drinking Water Pouches will be sent to the Public Analyst, Hyderabad for analysis and obtained acknowledgment in the 11 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 presence of PW.3. PW.1 had divided them into three equal parts of 36 pouches, sealed plastic containers with caps and affixed seal labels bearing No.ZIII/AFC/MKPR/15252/2004 on each sample container. The paper slips, issued by the Asst. Food Controller & Local (Health) Authority, Zone-III Guntur bearing Code & SI.No.ZIII/AFC/MKPR/15252/2004 were pasted and PW.1 obtained the signature of accused and PW.3 in such manner that the paper slips and wrapper paper both carry a part of the signature. 13. It was established further that PW.1 had prepared the panchanama of his inspection read over to the accused in the presence of PW.3, the mediator and obtained the signature of the petitioner and mediator. On 26.10.2004, PW.1 sent one part of the sample along with Form-VII memorandum with specimen impression seal to the Public Analyst, Hyderabad. On 23.12.2004 PW.1 received public analyst report No.751/2004, dt: 06.12.2004 through Assistant Food Controller, Zone-III, Guntur. In the report of the Public Analyst, it was opined that the sample did not have IBS certification and was therefore misbranded. 14. It was further evident that on 02.02.2005 PW.1 submitted his report to the Director of Food (Health) Authority, Hyderabad vide letter No.ZIII/AFC/MKPR/15252/2004, dt:02.02.2004. On 28.03.2006 PW.1 received the letter Rc.No.11116/F7/2004, dt.20.03.2006 from the Director and Food (Health) Authority, Hyderabad through the Gazetted Food Inspector, 12 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 Prakasam District. In the letter, the Food (Health) Authority accorded written consent for institution of prosecution against the petitioner for the offence committed by him under Section 7(ii) and 2 (ix) (k) and punishable under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of ‘the Act.,’ read with Sub Rule of 28 of Rule 49 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (for brevity ‘the Rules’) for manufacturing of sale of Himasagar Packaged Drinking water, in violation of the provisions of ‘the Act’. 15. It is clear from the evidence of P.W.1 that on 25.10.2004 at 03:00 pm, P.W.1 had inspected the premises of the petitioner in the presence of P.W.3 and found the petitioner kept 5 bags, 250 ml water bags each contained 100 packets. On suspicion, he had opened the packets and verified the water packets. P.W.1 purchased 36 water packets from one bag after 5 bags by paying Rs.72/- to the petitioner, who was present at the time of inspection and obtained cash receipt from the petitioner vide Ex.P5 by disclosing his intention to send the same to the public analyst in order to find the adulteration and drafted Ex.P9 in the presence of the petitioner and P.W.3-mediator and sent the sample to chemical analysis. Later, on receipt of the report, prosecution was initiated against the petitioner. 16. In this case, P.W.1 is the inspecting officer of the premises of the petitioner. The evidence of P.W.1 cannot be lightly brushed aside. The learned trial court and also the learned appellate court firmly believed that the 13 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 petitioner had indulged in misbranding of the product, of course, there was no adulteration committed by the petitioner. Prosecution orders under Ex.P23 were obtained and the requirements as per law were complied with. P.W.3 mediator admitted that the signatures on Ex.P5 cash receipt and Ex.P9 panchanama. Even though the mediator turned hostile, evidence of P.W.1 carries much weight. Evidence of P.W.1 is corroborated with Ex.P5-cash receipt. Ex.P9 panchanama, Ex.P17 analyst report, Ex.P23 Prosecution Orders and Ex.P21 Pouch seized from the scene of offence. Nothing useful was elicited from the cross-examination of P.W.1 and 2 that they were speaking falsehood and that a false case was foisted against the petitioner. 17. It is not the case of the petitioner that P.W.1 has no authority to inspect the premises, seize the samples, send the same to the analyst and prosecute the petitioner for indulging in violation of the provisions of ‘the Act’. P.W.1 has the authority to do the above activities. The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence from his side to support his contentions, when the prosecution had discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the petitioner. The delay in launching of prosecution was properly explained by P.W.2 that P.W.1 was transferred and P.W.2 had succeeded his place and later obtained the prosecution orders and initiated the proceedings. 18. Clause (c) of Rule 16 of ‘the PFA Rules.,’ states that the paper slip of the size that goes round completely from the bottom to the top of the container 14 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 shall be pasted, the signature or the thumb impression of the person from whom the sample is taken being affixed and the paper slip and wrapper both shall carry part of the signature. With regard to the prime contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the sample did not contain the signature of the petitioner, P.W.1 and the mediator, it has to be pointed out that the P.W.1 in his compliant and also chief examination had categorically testified that the sample contains the signature of the petitioner/accused, and himself. However, it is important to observe that in the cross-examination, P.W.1 stated that, it did not contain the signature; of course, P.W.1 was not declared hostile by the prosecution. The sample labels are not readily available with this Court for verification. Not containing the signature on the label is a question of fact, which cannot be appreciated at this stage by this Court. Further, any inadvertent admission in the cross-examination of the witness cannot carry much weight inasmuch as the averments of complaint and chief examination are otherwise. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.Prakash Singh Chauhan4, the Hon’ble Apex Court extracted the definition misbranding, at Paragraph No.4 as under: “[4] "Misbranding" has been defined under Section 2(ix) of the Act. For the purpose of facts of this case, the relevant sub-clause reads thus: 42003 (12) SCC 406 15 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 "2. (ix) 'misbranded' an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded (a)-(d)*** (e) if false claims are made for it upon the label or otherwise; (f)-(j) *** (k) if it is not labelled in accordance with the requirements of this Act or rules made thereunder;" 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Prakash Singh Chauhan, at paragraph Nos.5 and 6 held as under: “[5] The entire case of the prosecution is that the package containing the water in question was sold to the Inspector with an oral representation made by the Assistant Plant In-charge as mineral water but this in our opinion does not constitute an offence attracting the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. In our opinion, the case of the prosecution does not also fall under sub-clause (e) or (k) of Section 2 of the Act. In our opinion, this appeal is liable to be dismissed on this short ground. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. Crl.As. Nos. 1034-35 and 1036 of 2001 [6] These appeals are filed by the co-accused against certain observations made by the High Court in its impugned judgment. In the connected matter, we have held today that there is no misbranding of the products sold by the respondents to the Inspector who purchased the same. We have decided the said appeal on the above short ground and we are of the opinion that all other observations made in the Judgement were not necessary for disposal of the petition before the High Court, therefore, it is open to the appellants herein to put forward their defence based on the above findings of ours before the trial court.” 21. In Prakash Singh Chauhan, the Hon’ble Apex Court left it open to the appellants therein to submit their defense based on the findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court before the learned trial court. 16 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 22. In another case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Food Inspector, Anakapalli Municipality v. Kapusetti Polipilli 5 , at Paragraph No.1, it is held as under: “…The Food Inspector ought not to have given the second sample bottle to the accused but ought to have sent the 2nd and 3rd bottles to the local health authority. Moreover, the Food Inspector ought to have also taken signature or thumb-impression of the accused on these samples which he has not done so. In these circumstances, to my mind, the trial Court was correct in acquitting the accused.” 23. The facts and decision in Kapusetti Polipilli is that the Food Inspector ought to have given his 2nd sample bottle to the accused therein and ought to have sent the 2nd the 3rd bottles to the Local Health Authority. Rule 11(1)(b) of ‘the Act’ says as under: 11. Procedure to be followed by food Inspectors: (1) When a food inspector takes a sample of food for analysis, he shall- “(a) give notice in writing then and thereof his intention to have it so analysed to the person from whom he has taken the sample and to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 14A. (b) except in special cases provided by rules under this Act, divide the sample then and there into three parts and mark and seal or fasten up each part in such a manner as its nature permits and take the signature or thumb impression of the person from whom the sample has been taken in such place and in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that where such person refuses to sign or put his thumb impression the food inspector shall call upon one or more witnesses and take his or their signatures or thumb impressions, as the case may be, in lieu of the signature or thumb impression of such person; (c) (i) send one of the parts for analysis to the public analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority; and 51978 (1) ALT 397 17 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 (ii) send the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of this section and sub sections (2A) and (2E) of section 13. (2) Where the part of the sample sent to the public analyst under sub-clause (7) of clause (c) of sub-section (l) is lost or damaged, the Local (Health) Authority shall, on a requisition made to it by the public analyst or the food inspector dispatch one of the parts of the sample sent to it under sub-clause (ii) of the said clause (c) to the public analyst for analysis. (3) When a sample of any article of food or adulterant is taken under sub-section (l) or sub-section (2) of section 10, the food inspector shall, by the immediately succeeding working day, send send a sample of the article of food or adulterant or both, as the case may be,in accordance with the rules prescribed for sampling to the public analyst for the local area concerned. (4) An article of food seized under sub-section (4) of section 10, unless destroyed under sub-section (4A) of that section, and any adulterant seized under sub-section (6) of that section shall be produced before a magistrate as soon as possible and in any case not later than seven days after the receipt of the report of the public analyst.” 24. The facts and circumstances of Kapusetti Polipilli case are not relevant to the present case in hand for adjudication. Therefore, the decision is not of much use to the petitioner. 25. In another decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in G. Chandramouli v. State 6 , with regard to the question of law that requirement under Section 11(3) of ‘the Act.,’ i.e., the Food Inspector shall send the sample by immediately succeeding work day to the analyst is mandatory or directory, His Lordship Jayachandra Reddy, j, observed that it is only directory in nature, and Paragraph No.10 is relevant and it is extracted hereunder: “The learned counsel next relied on a decision of this Court in Public Prosecutor v. Sreeramulu 1975 (2) APLJ (HC) 145. In that case Madhusudan Rao, J, held that Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of 61978 CrlJ 549 18 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 Food Adulteration Act is mandatory. Reliance is also placed on Food Inspector, Vuyyuiu v. P. Samu4raiah 1977 (2) APLJ (SN) 64 wherein Justice Muktadar held failure to give a notice to the accused informing him of his right to ask the Court to send one of the sample bottles retained with the lociil authority, to the Central Food Laboratory as provided Under Sections 11 and 13, is a contravention of the mandatory provision. The learned counsel relying on these two derisions contended that for the same reason Section 11 (S) also must be held to be man-dalory. As already held whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory depends on so many factors, The principles laid down in these decisions cannot universally be applied to all the other provisions in the Act and Rules. As already mentioned, the only point urged in this revision is that Section 11 (3) is mandatory and the contravention of the same is sufficient to vitiate the proceedings. There is no definite plea on behalf of the petitioners that the delay of one day in sending the sample has caused any prejudice to the petitioners. The lower appellate Court held Section 11 (3) to be mandatory but as already mentioned dismissed the revision on the ground that there was no evidence that the Food Inspector tampered with the samples. However, for the aforesaid reasons the finding of the lower appellate court that Section 11 (3) is mandatory, cannot be upheld and the Criminal Revision has to be dismissed on the ground that Section 11 (3) is only directory and that the infraction of the same by the Food Inspector viz, sending the sample to the Public Analyst with the delay of one day has not caused any prejudice to the accused.” 26. In G.Chandramouli, it is held that Section 11(3) of ‘the Act.,’is directory in nature, any infraction of the said procedure by the Food Inspector sending the sample to the public analyst with a delay of one (01) day had not caused any prejudice to the accused. The decision in G.Chandramouli case is also not relevant for consideration in the present case. Any involuntary and inadvertent admission made by P.W.1 in his cross-examination with regard to a statement that the sample did not contain the signature is only inconsequential and no much weight can be given to that statement. Anyhow, as pointed out earlier this fact cannot be re-appreciated in the evidence of a 19 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 witness of the prosecution like sitting in a second appellate court, which is not permissible as per the decisions of the Hon’be Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad, D Stephens and K Chinnaswamy Reddy. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned appellate court under Sections 16 (1) (a) (i) of ‘the Act.,’ shall be maintained. 27. With regard to the imposition of sentence of imprisonment of Six (06) months and as confirmed by the learned appellate court, it is to be observed that the alleged contravention took place in the year 2004 i.e., 21 years ago. The Criminal Revision Case was filed 14 years ago. This is not a case where the petitioner indulged in adulteration of the food product. It is a case of misbranding only where there was no IBS certification obtained. 28. The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar7.This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar8. 29. The petitioner was in jail for about nine (09) days and he paid the fine amount. As a young entrepreneur, at the age of 25 years, the petitioner established M/s. Himasagar Industries, Markapur. Now, he is about 42 years. 7AIR 1979 SC 1360 8 2000 (1) BLJR 37 20 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh9, Paragraph Nos.5 and 6 held as under: “5. Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial court and the High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not made clear reference to clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Court should take strict view of such matter. 6. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and sustain. the fine along with the default sentence." 31. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Des Raj v. State of Haryana10, at para Nos.8 & 9, held as under: "8. The respective arguments have been considered carefully. It is not disputed that the sample in question was taken on 29-8-1987 and the prosecution was launched against him on 9-10-1987. After a long and protracted trial the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by order dated November 7, 1992 which has been confirmed by the appellate Court by order dated November 17, 1995. In other words, the petitioner has been undergoing the turmoil of a criminal prosecution for the last about eight years. 9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. These are meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This is how the Courts shall understand this right, and have gone to the extent of 9AIR 1988 SCC 1789 101996 CRI.L.J.2720 21 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 quashing the prosecution after such inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is correct thatalthough minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction." 32. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Haripada Das v. State of West Bengal11, in para No.6 held as under: "6. This appeal is directed against the conviction of the appellant under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated mustard oil. Although in the samples drawn by the Food Inspector, no impurity or objects injurious to health could be detected but it was found that the saponification value exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit and the B.R. reading also exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering that the appellant was released on bail by this Court long back and because of the protracted litigation up to this Court he has also suffered a lot of mental agony and also financial hardship and also considering the fact that he had already undergone imprisonment for more than three weeks, we feel that in the facts of the case the ends of justice will be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. We, however, direct that besides the fine imposed by the Courts below, the appellant will have to pay a fine Rs. 5,000/- within four weeks from today, in default he will have to undergo imprisonment for three months. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bail bonds stand discharged." 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhapur in Swaroopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan in CRL.R.P.No.115 of 2007 dated 05.02.2025 wherein at page No.9 it is held as under: 11AIR 1999 SCC 1482 22 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 "9. This Court finds that the petitioner was a milk vendor and there is no reason available with it to disbelieve the report of the Public Analyst, wherein the sample of milk drawn from the petitioner was found to be Adulterated. However, in the opinion of this Court, since the incident relates to the year 1997 and the petitioner has suffered the agony and trauma of protracted trial for about 27 years coupled with the fact that the petitioner has spent some period in custody, it will be just and proper if the sentence awarded to him by the learned trial Court for the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is reduced to the period already undergone by him." 34. Therefore, taking into consideration the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass, Haripada Das and the decision of High Court of Rajasthan in Swaroopa Ram, and the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Des Raj, this is a fit case where some lenience is required to be taken in imposing the sentence of imprisonment. As observed supra, the petitioner had paid the fine amount of Rs.1,000/- and further volunteered that on amount of Rs.10,000/- may imposed towards additional fine, as measure of penance. There are no similar prior or subsequent adverse antecedents reported against the petitioners as fairly submitted by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Ends of justice would be met, if the petitioner is further imposed a fine for an amount of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) excluding of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only) paid by the petitioner while preferring the appeal. 35. Therefore, in view of obtaining the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Criminal Revision Case is disposed of maintaining the conviction 23 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 for the offence under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of ‘the Act.,’ sustaining the imposition of fine Rs.1,000/- and while sentencing the petitioner to the sentence which he had already undergone, besides directing the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards fine excluding the fine amount of Rs.1,000/- as imposed by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 36. The additional fine amount of Rs.10,000/- shall be paid by the petitioner within two (02) months from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the petitioner shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for three (03) months. 37. The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Markapur shall take necessary follow up steps. 38. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 27.03.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked B/o SCH 24 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.608 of 2010 Dated 27.03.2025 257 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 608/2010 27.03.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked B/o SCH