[2025:RJ-JP:43622] HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16271/2025 Nanagram Meena S/o Late Mangalram (Mangla), aged about 50 Years, R/o Dyodhachod, Tehsil Bassi, District, Jaipur. ----Petitioner Versus 1. Sitaram Meena S/o Late Bhorilal Meena, R/o Singhlo Ki Dhani, Village Heerawala, Tehsil Bassi, District Jaipur, Raj. 2. Jagdish Meena S/o Shri Jeetram Meena, R/o Village Dyodhachod, Tehsil Bassi, District Jaipur, Rajasthan, 302012. Aadhar No.7615-6490-2262. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ramniwas Meena with Dr. Ramroop Meena For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 30/10/2025 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the Additional District & Session Judge, Bassi, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, whereby the petitioner's application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for impleadment in the suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 27.10.2024 has been rejected. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present petitioner is a necessary and proper party, because he is recorded as Khatedar of 1/4th share of the disputed Khasra; property has not been partitioned by means and bounds, therefore, he ought to have been impleaded as party-defendant in the suit. [2025:RJ-JP:43622] (2 of 5) [CW-16271/2025] 3. Heard and considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. From the facts of the record, it is evident that the present suit for specific performance has been filed in respect of an agreement to sell dated 27.10.2024, whereby the original defendant/respondent-Jagdish Meena has agreed to sell his 1/4th share of the suit property, and the present suit has been filed only in respect of 1/4th share of the defendant/respondent-Jagdish Meena. The petitioner then filed an application dated 19.05.2025 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for impleading the petitioner as a party-defendant to the suit, which was contested by the plaintiff/respondent vide reply dated 07.07.2025. The learned Trial Court, after careful deliberation, rejected the application preferred by the petitioner. 5. Further, it is also evident from the record that the plaintiff is neither a party to the agreement dated 27.10.2024 nor has he any semblance of a title with regard to the suit property. On the contrary, he has a 1/4th share in the remaining property. Even otherwise, it is also abundantly clear that the plaintiff in the main suit has not sought any relief against the petitioner. 6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal1, has held as under: "10. As noted herein earlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, 1 2005 INSC 228 [2025:RJ-JP:43622] (3 of 5) [CW-16271/2025] the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small 1834 (40) Eng R 848 made the following observations: "It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract for sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a Court of law, giving damages only for the non performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as in law, the contract constitutes the right and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it." [Emphasis supplied] ........ 12. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. ........ 15. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub- rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC "all the questions involved in the suit" it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff/appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff/appellant on one hand and Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into....... ........ 17. That apart, there is another principle which cannot also be forgotten. The appellant, who has filed the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight [2025:RJ-JP:43622] (4 of 5) [CW-16271/2025] unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law, as already discussed above." 7. Thus, it is trite law that in a suit for specific performance of a contract, for deciding the question of whether a party is a proper party, the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. 8. In the present writ petition, the question in the main suit for specific performance, is with regard to the specific performance of the contract for sale dated 27.10.2024, which only involves the plaintiff/respondent-Sitaram Meena and the defendant/respondent-Jagdish Meena. If the petitioner is impleaded in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged, and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. 9. Even otherwise, the plaintiff is having dominus litis, and he cannot be compelled to add parties against whom he does not wish to fight, unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. As discussed hereinabove, there exists no compulsion of law to implead the petitioner in the main suit, as: (i) the petitioner is neither a party to the agreement to sale dated 27.10.2024 nor does he have any semblance of title over the suit property; (ii) the plaintiff has not claimed any relief against the petitioner; (iii) the petitioner is Khatedaar of 1/4th of the share of the remaining property and not the suit property itself; and (iv) that there is no legal impediment in passing an effective decree in the absence of the petitioner in the main suit. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be a necessary or proper party in the present suit for specific performance, and thus the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner lack merit. [2025:RJ-JP:43622] (5 of 5) [CW-16271/2025] 10. Since the learned Trial Court, after detailed examination of facts and the relevant law, has rightly rejected the application filed by the petitioner for impleadment as party-defendant. 11. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, perversity, or legal infirmity so as to call for any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Accordingly, the present writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 13. All other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J SOURAV /30