1 2025:CGHC:3864 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 2289 of 2024 Branch Manager The New India Assurance (Wrongly Typed As Insurance) Co. Ltd. Sada Complex, T.P. Nagar Korba, C.G. (N. A. No. 3) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Smt. Kaushaliya W/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G. (Claimant) 2. Minor Shreya Kumari D/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar Aged About 10 Years Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Kaushaliya, Aged About 33 Years, W/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar, R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G.(Claimant) 3. Minor Bhumi D/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar Aged About 8 Years Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Kaushaliya, Aged About 33 Years, W/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar, R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G.(Claimant) 4. Minor Adarsh Kanwar S/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar Aged About 04 Months, Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Kaushaliya, Aged About 33 Years, W/o Late Mangal Bhawan Kanwar, R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G.(Claimant) 5. Nand Lal S/o Late Bhawan Singh Aged About 68 Years R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G.(Claimant) 6. Smt. Jal Kunwar W/o Shri Nandlal Aged About 63 Years R/o Village Khairbhawna, P.S. Urga, Distt. Korba, C.G.(Claimant) 7. Ejajul Ansari S/o Mohd. Usman Ansari Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Nigiya, P.S. Rehla, District Palamu (Jharkhand), Present Address J.K.T. Company, Transport Nagar, Korba, P.S. Kotwali Korba, Tahsil And District Korba, C.G. (N. A. No. 1) 8. J. K. Associate 1/b 1st Floor 65b, T.P. Nagar Korba, P.S. Kotwali Korba, Tahsil And District Korba, C.G. (N.A. No. 2) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Advocate 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 22/01/2025 1) Heard on I.A. No. 2/2024, an application for condonation of delay. 2) Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company submits that an award was passed on 01.07.2024 by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (FTC), Korba. He further submits that an application under Section 152 of CPC was moved before the learned tribunal for correcting the multiplier and the same was rejected vide order dated 23.08.2024. He contends that thereafter on account of official process, there was a delay of 58 days in filing the instant appeal. He further contends that the application to obtain the certified copy was moved on 03.09.2024 and the same was supplied on 13.09.2024. He prays to condone the delay caused in filing the instant appeal. 3) Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the documents available on the record. 4) It is already settled that limitation would start running from the date of award i.e. from 01.07.2024 and any application moved thereafter would not give a fresh cause of action as the Insurance Company is challenging the award passed by the learned tribunal. An application was moved under Section 152 of CPC and the same was rejected by the tribunal vide order dated 23.08.2024, thereafter, no steps were taken by the Insurance Company to file an appeal whereas it was filed on 18.11.2024. There is no explanation with regard to the delay in the application pertaining to the period between 23.08.2024 till the filing of 3 the appeal. 5) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 6) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage 4 simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 7) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; 5 (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 8) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest 6 for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 9) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 11) Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya