[2025:RJ-JP:44235] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 383/2025 1. Amar Singh S/o Ramjilal, (Deceased) Through His Legal Heirs. 1/1. 1/2. 1/3. 1/4. 1/5. 2. Mansingh S/o Late Amar Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur Bhola S/o Late Amar Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur Kamla D/o Late Amar Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur Lajja D/o Late Amar Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur Lado D/o Late Amar Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur Vijay Singh S/o Parmoli, (Deceased) Through His Legal Heirs:- 2/1. Varsha Widow Of Late Vijay Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur 2/2. Rajpal S/o Late Vijay Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur 2/3. Bhandari S/o Late Vijay Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur 2/4. Krishna D/o Late Vijay Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur 2/5. Madhu D/o Late Vijay Singh, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur ----Appellants Versus 1. Shibbu S/o Arruba, (Deceased) Through His Legal Heirs. 1/1. Soumoti Widow Of Late Shibbu, (Now Deceased) R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur 1/2. 2. Oma D/o Late Shibbu W/o Ashok, R/o Khohra, Tehsil Bayana, District Bharatpur Sadhuram S/o Late Shibbu, R/o Bhopar, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur ----Respondents [2025:RJ-JP:44235] (2 of 5) [CSA-383/2025] For Appellant(s) : Mr. Arjun Singh Khangrot through VC For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 04/11/2025 1. Instant Civil Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed by and on behalf of plaintiffs, assailing the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2025, passed in Civil First Appeal No.103/2021 (29/17)(07/16) CIS No.103/2021 titled as Amar Singh & Anr. Versus Shibbu & Anr., by Additional District Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur, dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 29.01.2016, passed in Civil Suit No.272/2010 (172/2007), by the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction, in respect of the plot in question. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants through VC and from perusal of the material on record, it is apparent that the plot in question, measuring approximately 40x30 sq. ft. is an open plot, on which plaintiffs claimed to have put few stones and planted a tree. 3. Plaintiffs could not produce any document to show title/ownership of the plot in question so also his possession, as admissible in the eye of law. A document of granting permission to raise construction by Gram Panchayat dated 21.03.1985 (Ex.2), has not been found to have nexus with the plot in question and further, it has been observed that such permission was later on [2025:RJ-JP:44235] (3 of 5) [CSA-383/2025] cancelled by Additional District Collector, Bharatpur, vide judgment dated 26.02.1997. 4. It has been transpired from the record that according to defendants, plot in question is of common use for the villagers particularly belonging to Dhakran Community. 5. In view of the concurrent finding of facts based on the available evidence on record that plaintiffs miserably failed to prove their ownership so also established possession over the plot in question, in the opinion of this Court, the two Courts below have not erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit seeking declaration of ownership and protect his possession over the subject plot. 6. Counsel for the appellants could not point out any perversity, manifest illegality or jurisdictional error in concurrent fact findings, which do not illicit any substantial question of law for consideration by this Court in this Second Appeal. It is trite law that involvement of substantial question of law is sine qua non to entertain the Second Appeal within the scope of Section 100 of CPC. 7. The scope of the High Court to grant indulgence in concurrent fact findings recorded by the two courts below, is extremely limited and confined to the existence of a substantial question of law, while exercising its power and jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. In a series of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been categorically held as an established principle of law that the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or to come to its own conclusion. The High Court cannot set aside the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below, when such findings are based [2025:RJ-JP:44235] (4 of 5) [CSA-383/2025] on appreciation of evidence. In this regard, reference may be given to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of S. Subramanian Vs. S. Ramasamy [(2019) 6 SCC 46]. The relevant portions of the judgment i.e. Paragraphs 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, are being reproduced hereunder:- “7.4 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per a catena of the decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 CPC, the second appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam' , in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal. 7.5. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1 SCC 434]. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: "Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise." 7.6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and the substantial questions of law formulated/framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be substantial questions of law.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case C. Doddanarayan Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy [(2020) 4 SCC 659], has [2025:RJ-JP:44235] (5 of 5) [CSA-383/2025] observed that where two courts have reached a finding, which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against provisions of law and neither can it be said that any Judge acting judiciously and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then High Court is not required to interfere with such fact findings while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 9. As a final result, the present second appeal is devoid of substance & merits, hence, same is hereby dismissed. No costs. 10. Record be sent back forthwith. 11. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. (SUDESH BANSAL),J PCG/45