THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE B.S.BHANUMATHI Civil Revision Petition No.349 of 2025 Between: Mulla Tanveer Ahmed and others ... Petitioners and Amma Ajit Health Care Pvt. Ltd. ... Respondent Counsel for the petitioners: 1. Shaik Mohammed Ismail Counsel for the respondent: 1. Varun Byreddy Date of order pronounced : 30.04.2025 Submitted for approval: THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE B.S.BHANUMATHI 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers Yes/No may be allowed to see the order? 2. Whether the copy of order may be marked Yes/No to Law Reporters/Journals? 3. Whether Her Ladyship wish to see the fair copy Yes/No of the order? ___________________ B. S. BHANUMATHI, J 2 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE B.S.BHANUMATHI +Civil Revision Petition No.349 of 2025 % 30.04.2025 # Between: Mulla Tanveer Ahmed and others ... Petitioners and Amma Ajit Health Care Pvt. Ltd. ... Respondent Counsel for the petitioners: 1. Shaik Mohammed Ismail Counsel for the respondent: 1. Varun Byreddy < Gist: > Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1 (2021) 2 SCC 1 2 C.R.No.5395 of 2016 (O & M), dated: 24.01.2023 3 (2000) 4 SCC 539 4 (2009) 10 SCC 103 5 (2003) 6 SCC 503 6 MANU/AP/0676/2016 7 MANU/AP/2321/2022 8 2024 SCC OnLine TS 1618 9 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7136 10 2015 (3) ALD 608 11 C.R.P. No. 2039 of 2014, dated. 22.08.2014 12 Arb.A./8/2024, dated: 30.01.2024 13 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 426 14 2022 SCC OnLine AP 888 15 MANU/UP/4807/2024 16 2022 SCC OnLine SC 928 17 (2014) 208 DLT 487 APHC010068322025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) Wednesday, The Thirtieth day The Honourable Ms. Justice B.S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No: 349 of 2025 Between: Mulla Tanveer Ahmed and others Amma Ajit Health Care Pvt. Ltd. Counsel for the petitioners: 1. Shaik Mohammed Ismail Counsel for the respondent: 1. Varun Byreddy The Court made the following: ORDER: This revision petition is filed under Article 227 of India against the order dated 03.02.2025 dismissing the petition in I.A.No.706 of 2024 in O.S.No.86 of 2024 on the file of the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurnool filed by the defendants under Order VII, Rule 11 C 2. The respondent / plaintiff filed suit not to evict the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property. The stating that there is an arbitration clause in the lease deed i.e., clause 3 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) The Thirtieth day of April Two Thousand and Twenty Five Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B.S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No: 349 of 2025 Mulla Tanveer Ahmed and others ... Pet and Amma Ajit Health Care Pvt. Ltd. ... Respondent Counsel for the petitioners: Shaik Mohammed Ismail Counsel for the respondent: The Court made the following: This revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 03.02.2025 dismissing the petition in I.A.No.706 of 2024 in O.S.No.86 of 2024 on the file of the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurnool filed by the defendants under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint. The respondent / plaintiff filed suit not to evict the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property. The defendants filed I.A.No.706 of 2024 here is an arbitration clause in the lease deed i.e., clause C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 [3311] Twenty Five Petitioners Respondent the Constitution of India against the order dated 03.02.2025 dismissing the petition in I.A.No.706 of 2024 in O.S.No.86 of 2024 on the file of the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurnool filed by the defendants The respondent / plaintiff filed suit not to evict the plaintiff from the defendants filed I.A.No.706 of 2024 here is an arbitration clause in the lease deed i.e., clause 4 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 No.17, which states that any dispute in respect of the plaint schedule property shall be referred to arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the Act”), however the plaintiff filed the suit suppressing the said clause, despite being fully aware of it and therefore, the suit is not maintainable and liable to be rejected. 3. 3. The respondent filed counter opposing the petition and contending that the subject matter of the case being a right in rem, is not arbitrable; that an arbitration clause in a contract does not automatically exclude the jurisdiction of a civil Court and but usually indicates that the parties have agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration; that as the petitioners were disturbing the petition schedule property and trying to evict the respondent from the property, the suit had been filed and an interim order of injunction was obtained against the petitioners, because the present case is not within the scope of the arbitration clause in the lease deed; and that, at the most, such a clause enables the parties to seek the civil Court’s jurisdiction to refer the dispute to arbitrator under Section 8 of the Act. 4. After hearing both parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition holding that when the terms No.17 and 18 of the lease deed are read together in a pragmatic way keeping in view the decision of the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia and others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation1, it can be safely concluded that the civil Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted and that when no arbitrator had been so far appointed with the consent of the parties, the civil Court certainly has jurisdiction. 5. Aggrieved by the order, this revision was filed. 1(2021) 2 SCC 1 5 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 6a. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the dispute regarding lease is no more a lis in rem, but a lis in personam and the dispute is arbitrable as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Drolia (supra). He further referred to the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Vinay Chhatwal Vs. Sukhdev Singh and Anr2, wherein it was held that a matter of rendition of accounts is arbitrable. In the case of Vidya Drolia (supra), at paragraph No.80, it was held as follows: “80. In view of the aforesaid, we overrule the ratio laid down in Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia, (2017) 10 SCC 706 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 82, and hold that landlord-tenant disputes are arbitrable as the Transfer of Property Act does not forbid or foreclose arbitration. However, landlord-tenant disputes covered and governed by rent control legislation would not be arbitrable when specific court or forum has been given exclusive jurisdiction to apply and decide special rights and obligations. Such rights and obligations can only be adjudicated and enforced by the specified court / forum, and not through arbitration.” 6b(i). He further contended that, as it is mandatory to refer the matter for arbitration when there is an arbitration agreement, the trial Court ought to have at least referred the matter to an arbitrator in view of Section 8 of the Act, treating the petition as one filed under such provision of law, since there is no dispute as to existence of arbitration clause in the lease deed. In support of the contention that it is mandatory to refer the case for arbitration when there is an arbitration clause, he referred to the following decisions: 2 C.R.No.5395 of 2016 (O & M), dated: 24.01.2023 6 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 (i) In P. Anand Gajapathi Raju Vs. P.V.G. Raju3, the Supreme Court held as follows at paragraphs No.5 and 8: “5. The conditions which are required to be satisfied under sub- sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 before the court can exercise its powers are: (1) there is an arbitration agreement; (2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party; (3) subject-matter of the action is the same as the subject- matter of the arbitration agreement; (4) the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. This last provision creates a right in the person bringing the action to have the dispute adjudicated by the court, once the other party has submitted his first statement of defence. But if the party, who wants the matter to be referred to arbitration, applies to the court after submission of his statement and the party who has brought the action does not object, as is the case before us, there is no bar on the court referring the parties to arbitration. 8. In the matter before us, the arbitration agreement covers all the disputes between the parties in the proceedings before us and even more than that. As already noted, the arbitration agreement satisfies the requirements of Section 7 of the new Act. The language of Section 8 is peremptory. It is, therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action or the appeal arising therefrom. There is no 3 (2000) 4 SCC 539 7 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 question of stay of the proceedings till the arbitration proceedings conclude and the award becomes final in terms of the provisions of the new Act. All the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties would now be governed by the new Act including the right to challenge the award. The court to which the party shall have recourse to challenge the award would be the court as defined in clause (e) of Section 2 of the new Act and not the court to which an application under Section 8 of the new Act is made. An application before a court under Section 8 merely brings to the court's notice that the subject-matter of the action before it is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement. This would not be such an application as contemplated under Section 42 of the Act as the court trying the action may or may not have had jurisdiction to try the suit to start with or be the competent court within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the new Act.” (ii) In Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd. Vs. Potluri Madhavilata4, the Supreme Court held as follows at paragraphs No.16 to 18: “16. The next question, an incidental one, that arises for consideration is whether the trial court must refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act, 1996. 17. Section 8 reads thus: “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. 4 (2009) 10 SCC 103 8 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 (2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.” An analysis of Section 8 would show that for its applicability, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) that there exists an arbitration agreement; (b) that action has been brought to the court by one party to the arbitration agreement against the other party; (c) that the subject-matter of the suit is same as the subject- matter of the arbitration agreement; (d) that the other party before he submits his first statement of the substance of the dispute, moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration; and (e) that along with the application the other party tenders the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof. 18. Section 8 is in the form of legislative command to the court and once the prerequisite conditions as aforestated are satisfied, the court must refer the parties to arbitration. As a matter of fact, on fulfilment of the conditions of Section 8, no option is left to the court and the court has to refer the parties to arbitration. There is nothing on record that the prerequisite conditions of Section 8 are not fully satisfied in the present case. The trial court, in the circumstances, ought to have referred the parties to arbitration as per arbitration Clause 22.” 9 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 (iii) In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums5, the Supreme Court held as follows at paragraphs No.13, 14 and 16: “13. A perusal of this clause clearly shows that the parties to the Dealership Agreement had agreed to refer their dispute arising out of the Agreement, of whatever nature it may be, to an arbitrator as contemplated in that Agreement. Section 8 of the Act in clear terms mandates that a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement to refer such parties to arbitration, the language of this section is unambiguous. 14. This Court in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539, has held that the language of Section 8 is peremptory in nature. Therefore, in cases where there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, it is obligatory for the court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement and nothing remains to be decided in the original action after such an application is made except to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. Therefore, it is clear that if, as contended by a party in an agreement between the parties before the civil court, there is a clause for arbitration, it is mandatory for the civil court to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. In the instant case the existence of an arbitral clause in the agreement is accepted by both the parties as also by the courts below but the applicability thereof is disputed by the respondent and the said dispute is accepted by the courts below. Be that as it may, at the cost of repetition, we may again state that the existence of the arbitration clause is admitted. If that be so, in view of the 5 (2003) 6 SCC 503 10 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 mandatory language of Section 8 of the Act, the courts below ought to have referred the dispute to arbitration. 16. It is clear from the language of the section, as interpreted by the Constitution Bench judgment in Konkan Rly, (2002) 2 SCC 388 that if there is any objection as to the applicability of the arbitration clause to the facts of the case, the same will have to be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal concerned. Therefore, in our opinion, in this case the courts below ought not to have proceeded to examine the applicability of the arbitration clause to the facts of the case in hand but ought to have left that issue to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal as contemplated in clause 40 of the Dealership Agreement and as required under Sections 8 and 16 of the Act.” 6b(ii). Further, he submitted that as the factual foundation was laid in the petition, though the relief was sought under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., the Court, on noticing the fact of existence of arbitration clause, can grant the relief under Section 8 of the Act, without a separate application and placed reliance on (i) M/s. N.C.C. Limited and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others6, a decision of the common High Court for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh; (ii) C.A. Goliakotwala and Co. Vs. Sri Kailasanadha Cotton Syndicate Private Limited7, a decision of this High Court; (iii) Naolin Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. Kalpana Industries8, a decision of the High Court of Telangana; and (iv) Madhu Sudan Sharma and others Vs. Omaxe Ltd.9, a decision of the High Court of Delhi. 6 MANU/AP/0676/2016 7 MANU/AP/2321/2022 8 2024 SCC OnLine TS 1618 9 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7136 11 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 6b(iii). Then, he submitted that citing a wrong provision does not disentitle the relief and referred to a decision of the common High Court for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in the case of Payala Gopi Vs. Tiebeam Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.10, wherein, at paragraph No. 5, it was held as follows: “5. This Court is surprised that the Lower Court is unmindful of this basic procedural aspect and dismissed the application purportedly on the ground that wrong provision of law was quoted. The Lower Court should do well to remember that procedure is handmaid of justice and that the substantive rights of the parties cannot be defeated by making hyper technical approach. Mere quoting of a wrong provision, obviously out of ignorance on the part of the Counsel appearing for the parties, cannot constitute a ground for rejection of an application, if the same is otherwise permissible under any other provision of law. …” 6b(iv). He further argued that a fresh copy of the lease deed is not required to be filed along with the petition as held by the common High Court for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in the case of M/s. Asian Securities and Estates Ltd., Vs. Mr. Mohammed Ajarudin11, wherein at paragraph No.25, it was held as follows: “25. In view of the pleadings and in view of the fact that the respondents herein / plaintiffs filed the certified copy of the Development Agreement along with the plaint before the other party filed an application to refer the dispute to an Arbitrator, the requirement under Section 8 (2) of the Act is not imperative. If the certified copy or original agreement is not on record, then the requirement of Section 8 (2) of the Act is mandatory. …” 10 2015 (3) ALD 608 11 C.R.P. No. 2039 of 2014, dated. 22.08.2014 12 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 7a. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that mere existence of the arbitration clause does not debar the civil Court from entertaining a suit, even if the dispute is arbitrable and so, the petition under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., is not maintainable; and that, at the most, a party to an agreement can seek the Court to refer the matter to an arbitrator under section 8 of the Act with the scope thereof, and therefore, the impugned order does not require any interference as there is no irregularity or illegality in the said order. He relied on the decisions in the following cases: (i) In M/S J.M.B. Construction and others Vs. Dr. Somesh Dhar and others12, at paragraphs Nos.5 and 23, it was held as follows: “5. On receipt of the notices, the appellants appeared and filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and Section 5 and 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, praying for referring the matter for arbitration and also prayed for modification of the ad- interim mandatory injunction in Misc (J) case no. 68/2024. 23. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion, this court is of the view that merely because there is an arbitration clause provides for referring the dispute and the claim to the arbitration, the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred, but the same is subject to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court has committed any error and / or acted illegally in dismissing the application filed by the appellants herein under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, by which, it was prayed to reject the plaint. No illegality has been committed by the trial court in dismissing the said application, which warrants any interference at the end of this Court.” 12 Arb.A./8/2024, dated: 30.01.2024 13 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 (ii) In M. Shankara Reddy Vs. Amara Ramakoteswara Rao13, paragraphs Nos.3, 17, 21 and 22 relevant to the point are excerpted here: “3. After the suit was filed, the first defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC pleading inter alia that the dispute between the parties should be settled according to arbitration as per Bye-law No. 248(c) of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Bye- laws. The said Bye-law was reproduced in para-4 of the application. However, instead of asking for an order under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) to refer the parties to arbitration, said defendant sought for rejection of the plaint. 17. Considering all of the above, the question that arises is whether the lower Court was right in “rejecting” the plaint. The lower Court should have seen that Section 8 of the Act only empowers the Court to “refer” the parties to arbitration but does not give the Court an option to reject a plaint. The lower Court also lost sight of the fact that Order VII Rule 11 CPC empowers the Court to reject the plaint, when there is “bar” to the suit because of any law. Section 8 of the Act is not a bar to a civil Court. It provides an alternative to a defendant against whom a civil suit is initiated to submit to the jurisdiction of the civil Court or to make an appropriate application at appropriate time under Section 8 of the Act seeking an order to refer the parties to arbitration. Therefore, Section 8 of the Act cannot be considered as a “bar” to the civil suit entitling the “rejection” of the plaint under Order-VII Rule-11 CPC. The “bar” under Order VII Rule 11 is an absolute bar to the us which enables the Court to reject the plaint at the threshold itself and by merely reading the plaint. The same is not the case here. 13 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 426 14 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 21. At first blush, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents appears to be reasonable, but it is particularly important to note that when a statute describes or requires a thing to be done in a particular manner; it should be done in that manner or not at all. The popular principle of law is settled in the very old case of Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) Ch.D 426, which is cited with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Shiv Kumar Chandha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1993 SCC (3) 161, and also in Ram Chandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joyti, (1975) 1 SCC 559. An application under Section 8 of the Act is an application that should be made in a particular manner and at particular time. The application should be accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof under Section 8(2) of the Act. Even the Andhra Pradesh Arbitration Rules, 2000 as framed by this Court that every application under Section 8 of the Act shall be duly signed and verified. It shall state the provision of law under which it is filed and contain a statement as described in Rule 4 of the Rules. Rule 4(2) also states a certified copy of the arbitration agreement and certified copies of the relevant documents shall be annexed to every such application. Similarly, Rule 7 says that if the application is not made in accordance with rules, the Court may reject the application but such rejection order shall not be made without giving an opportunity to the applicant to rectify the said defects. The hon'ble Supreme Court of India in P. Anand Gajapathi Raju's case, (2000) 4 SCC 539, also laid down that the manner and method in which an application under Section 8 of the Act should be filed. 22. In view of above discussion and legal position, this Court is of the opinion that the application that is filed in this case viz., I.A. No. 1751 of 2006 is not an application under Section 8 of the Act. It is 15 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking the rejection of the plaint of the plaint on the ground that the arbitration clause bars the suit.” (iii) In Chunduru Visalakshi Vs. Chunduru Rajendra Prasad14, the relevant paragraphs Nos.51 and 54 are excerpted here: “51. A perusal of the judgment in Syed Irfan Sulaiman Vs. New Amma Hospital, AIR 2017 Hyd 18, shows that in that case the defendant had filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the partnership deed. He had also filed an application in the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. In the present case, any application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking reference of the dispute to the arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the partnership deed was not filed. We have already held that the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC in the present case cannot be termed as composite application. The judgment in the case of Syed Irfan Sulaiman (supra) is as such distinguishable. 54. Following the judgment of this Court in M. Shankara Reddy Vs. Amara Ramakoteswara Rao, 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 426, by a Coordinate Bench, which applies to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not furnish a ground for rejection of the plaint, under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court below did not commit any illegality in not rejecting the plaint on the plea of the defendant that there was an arbitration clause.” 14 2022 SCC OnLine AP 888 16 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 (iv) In Anoop Maheshwari Vs. Thomas T. Kurian15, the relevant paragraph No.17 is excerpted here: “17. It is in that case also initially agreement had came to an end. On the point of maintainability of an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to question the suit in view of the arbitration clause, I find Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Chunduru Visalakshi v. Chunduru Rajendra Prasad, 2022 SCC OnLine AP 888, has considered amended provision as contained under Section 8 vide paragraph 42 and 43 and also vide paragraph 46 and 48 has dealt with this aspect of the power of the Court to reject the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC but that would be a case when it is tried on the aspect of maintainability of the suit as per Section 8 of Act, 1996 and Section 8, clearly stipulates for such an issue to be tried in suit before Civil Court or SCC court. Order VII Rule 11 CPC application would be maintainable only when there is a bar and since the amended provision Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not provide an absolute bar, therefore, the order VII rule 11 application would certainly not be maintainable.” 7b(i). He further submitted that, having filed the petition under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., the petitioners cannot now seek the petition to be treated as one under Section 8 of the Act as there is no opportunity for the respondent to take defence to oppose such a relief as it was neither pleaded in the petition nor argued before the trial Court nor raised in the grounds of revision. He further submitted that it is settled law that a relief not asked cannot be granted as held by the Supreme Court in 15 MANU/UP/4807/2024 17 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 Akella Lalitha Vs. Konda Hanumantha Rao16, at paragraph No.16 as follows: “16. Coming to address the second issue, while this Court is not apathetic to the predicament of the respondent grandparents, it is a fact that absolutely no relief was ever sought by them for the change of surname of the child to that of first husband / son of respondents. It is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice.” 7b(ii). He further submitted that since the considerations for the relief under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. are quite distinct from the considerations under Section 8 of the Act and that merely because there is a factual foundation in the petition, the relief should not be automatically granted, as the respondent has no opportunity to oppose the relief on the other grounds relevant to Section 8 of the Act. In this regard, he further submitted that if at all the relief under Section 8 of the Act has to be sought, there is limitation by virtue of Section 8(2) thereof which mandates that the defendant has to seek such relief before filing of the written statement. 8. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petition was filed before filing the written statement and therefore, it is not a hurdle. 9. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, mere existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement does not automatically oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court and the remedy is also 16 2022 SCC OnLine SC 928 18 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 provided under Section 8 of the Act, subject to limitations provided therein. Knowing full well, the same remedy was not availed by the petitioners and they have chosen to get the relief under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. Moreover, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners would indicate that the issue of lease is no more a lis in personam, but is lis in rem. Therefore, though an arbitrator has jurisdiction to deal with such an issue, as the civil Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted by mere presence of arbitration clause, the relief under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. cannot be granted. 10a. With regard to the relief under Section 8 of the Act is concerned, it is pertinent to refer the statements made in the affidavit annexed to the petition and the prayer in I.A.No.706 of 2024: “It is submitted that there is arbitration clause which is incorporated in the lease deed i.e clause no 17 "any dispute in respect of the plaint schedule property to be referred to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the verdict of given by the arbitrator shall be binding on the both parties of the lease deed ". The suit filed by the plaintiff being aware of the fact that default in payment of rent and issues is to be referred to arbitrators, deliberately by suppressing the fact of arbitration clause the suit is filed is liable to be rejected. It is submitted that since the clause no 17 of the registered lease deed that any dispute relating to the plaint schedule property and any kind shall be referred to arbitration by suppressing the fact the present plaint is filed and in view of the above condition in the lease deed the present suit is not maintainable as it is not maintainable under law. 19 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 Hence it is therefore praying that the honourable court may be please to reject the plaint and pass such other orders which the honourable court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 10b. It is correct that it is mandatory to refer the matter to an arbitrator as was decided in several cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, but the defendant must chose to get it done by seeking the relief. It cannot be granted unless the applicant seeks such relief within the period stipulated therein. Unless such relief is asked, the respondent has no opportunity of contesting the relief. Moreover, the scope of authority under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. and Section 8 of the Act are properly distinguishable. In the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju, (supra) the Supreme Court stated that the last provision creates a right in the person bringing the action to have the dispute adjudicated by the Court, once the other party has submitted his first statement of defence, but if the party, who wants the matter to be referred to arbitration, applies to the Court after submission of his statement and the party who has brought the action does not object, as in that case, there is no bar on the Court referring the parties to arbitration. As such, even if a defendant seeks reference, the plaintiff can object on tenable grounds. In the case of Magma Leasing and Finance Ltd (supra), the above noted observations were made in the context of the question before the Court whether an arbitration agreement survive even if its performance has come to an end. That apart, in that case the subject matter arose on filing a petition under section 8 of the Act and therefore the decision is not in the context of granting such relief in the absence of the application. Moreover, it was held that the relief can be granted once the pre-requisites stated are satisfied. The requisites include moving the Court for referring the parties to arbitration before the defendant submits his first statement of the substance of the dispute. In the case of 20 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (supra) also, the subject matter arose on filing a petition under section 8 of the Act. 10c. The decision of the common High Court at Hyderabad in M/s. N.C.C. Limited, (supra), at paragraph No.32 reads as follows: “32. It may be noted that Section 8(1) stipulates in no uncertain terms that a party who seeks to raise an objection thereunder to an action brought before a judicial authority must apply not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. In the present case, the 2nd defendant Corporation filed its written statement in 2015 but long prior thereto, it filed the subject I.A., under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC in which it raised, amongst other grounds, the applicability of Section 8 of the Act of 1996. The trial Court, however, was of the opinion that as the defendants had not filed a separate application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 they could not be permitted to raise such an objection under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. This pedantic approach was not warranted in the light of the broad language in which Section 8(1) of the Act of 1996 is couched. It is sufficient if the aggrieved party 'applies to the judicial authority, be it in whatever form or manner, under Section 8(1) of the Act of 1996, but before submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Filing of a separate application under Section 8(1) of the Act of 1996 is therefore not mandatory.” In this case, though the Division Bench declined the argument that a separate application is required for the relief under section 8 of the Act, it is important to note that though the subject petition was filed under Order VII, Rule 11(d) C.P.C., out of the three grounds taken in the petition, the third one is that as per the ‘Request for Proposal’, the parties were obligated to resolve their disputes through arbitration in the event the same could not be settled through conciliation proceedings, 21 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 and Section 8 of the Act, therefore, barred the plaintiffs from prosecuting the suit. The plaintiffs had an opportunity to answer it in their counter and the High Court also observed that there was no arbitration agreement and so section 8 of the Act has no application to that case. Hence, such an application is different from the one in the present case where there was no such opportunity. So, even if the application was filed before filing the written statement was filed in the present case, the petitioners cannot lean on the above decision to develop their contention for the first time just in the argument, merely as there was a mention of the arbitration clause in the affidavit which was stated in the context of lack of jurisdiction only, with no indication of intention to get the matter referred for arbitration. If at all the petitioners intended to get the matter referred for arbitration, nothing prevented them from expressly seeking the said relief under the relevant section of law. Instead, they have chosen the relief prayed in the petition. Therefore, the argument advanced is not acceptable. 10d. This Court has already taken the same view in the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners i.e., C.A. Goliakotwala and Co. (supra), wherein it was held as follows: “16. Of course, there is no format prescribed for filing an application under Section 8 of the Act. However, in one form or the other, the relief available under Section B of the Act should be claimed by the defendant not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. Therefore, if the defendant does not seek to refer the parties to arbitration, the Court does not, on its own, refer the matter. According to the petitioner, since the existence of arbitration clause is mentioned in the written statement and that the civil Court has no jurisdiction, it can be treated as an application by the defendant seeking reference of the parties to arbitration. It does not reflect the intention of the defendants to seek the Court to refer the parties to arbitration. What all can be culled 22 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 out from such statement in the written statement is that the defendants are denying the jurisdiction of the civil Court to deal with the matter.” 10e. In the decision of the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in Naolin Infrastructure Private Limited, (supra), it was held at paragraphs Nos. 2, 3 and 10 as follows: “2. This application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as, “the Act”) has been filed for appointment of an arbitrator. 3. Facts giving rise to filing of this application briefly stated are that the parties had entered into an agreement on 03.09.2016. The agreement admittedly contains an arbitration clause. A dispute between the parties under the agreement had arisen. Therefore, the applicant had issued a notice on 24.11.2018 to which the respondent submitted response on 05.12.2018. However, the applicant did not take any further steps. 10. The requirement contained in Section 8(1) of the Act is satisfied in the facts of the case by filing an application, namely the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, and it was brought to the notice of the Court that the arbitration agreement exists between the parties. The applicant has not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, it cannot be held that the applicant has not complied with the mandate contained in Section 8(1) of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the applicant is not entitled to invoke Section 11(6) of the Act is misconceived and the same does not deserve acceptance.” 10f. In Madhu Sudan Sharma and others case (supra), relevant part of paragraphs Nos. 40 and 45 are excerpted. At paragraph No. 40, the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Sharad P. 23 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 Jagtiani Vs. Edelweiss Securities Ltd17, at paragraphs 17 and 23, was referred, and at paragraph 45 held as follows. The relevant parts are excerpted. “40. … “17. In my view, the said legislative intent requires the Court to interpret Section 8 widely and not in a constricted and pedantic fashion, as would be the case if it were to be held that though by filing a separate application simultaneously with the filing of the written statement, reference to arbitration would be made but not if the plea to the same effect is taken in the written statement or if it were to be held that the absence of a prayer in the application or the written statement “to refer the parties to arbitration” would take away a right of having the disputes adjudicated by the agreed mode of arbitration. 23. I am therefore of the view that the defendant, inspite of having not filed an application under Section 8, but in view of the preliminary objection in the written statement, even though not referring to Section 8 and not expressly seeking the relief of reference to a arbitration, has invoked Section 8 of the Act and it is the bounden duty of this Court to refer the parties to arbitration.” 45. There was, indisputably, an arbitration clause between the parties. An objection, predicated on the arbitration clause, was specifically raised by the appellants, firstly in the application under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) for grant of leave to defend the suit and, consequent to grant of leave, in the written statement. That being 17 (2014) 208 DLT 487 24 C.R.P.No.349 of 2025 so, the learned ADJ was bound to refer the dispute between the parties to arbitration.” 10g. In view of this Court’s view noted above, this Court respectfully differs from the contrary views in the decisions of the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in Naolin Infrastructure Private Limited (supra), and the High Court of Delhi relied on by the petitioners in the case of Madhu Sudan Sharma and others (supra). 11. In the light of the above discussion, the argument that quoting a wrong provision of law does not debar granting the relief has no significance. Filing a fresh copy of the lease deed may not be required, if otherwise, the relief under section 8 of the Act can be granted. 12. As such, the trial Court rightly dismissed the petition. Therefore, this Court does not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order. 13. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, in this civil revision petition, shall stand closed. ___________________ B.S.BHANUMATHI, J Dt.30.04.2025 PNV