IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARA^ (Special Original Jurisdiction) ^ WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF APr|p TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B KRISHNA MOHAN O AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA WRIT PETITION NO: 37387 OF 2012 Between: K. Gandhi, S/o. Late Sita Ramaiah, Aged about 63 years, Occ: H.C.(1437) Kankipadu P.S. Vijayawada, Krishna District. ...Petitioner AND 1. The Government of A.P., Rep. by its Pri.Secretary Home (Police) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad. 2. The Director General and Inspector General of Police, Govt, of A.P. Hyderabad. 3. The Addi. Director General of Police (Administration), Govt, of A.P., Hyderabad. 4. The Commissioner of Police, Vijayawada, Krishna District. ...Respondents Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the order dated 27-04- 2011 in O.A.7213 of 2008 on the file of A.P. Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad as arbitrary and Violative of Article 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and Provisions of Administrative Tribunal Act by setting aside the said order and allow the OA as prayed for by setting aside the punishment of compulsory retirement dated 15-12-2005 issued by the 4^'" respondent and all. other consequential proceedings and directing reinstatement with continuity of service, back wages and all other attendant benefits with interest @ 12% per annum and the petitioner retirement benefits including full pension with interest @ 12% of the proceedings. the petitioner per annum grant costs LA. NO: 1 OF 2012(WPMP. NO: 47449 OF 2017) Petition under Section 151 CPC is filed praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the respondents to grant the petitioner full pension, gratuity, GPF, Earned Leave Salary, Group Insurance other retirement benefits as admissible to the petitioner as on the date of and compulsory retirement i.e., 15-12-2005 with arrears of pension and with interest @ 12% per annum, pending disposal of the writ petition such other order or orders in the interest of justice. Counsel for the Petitioner and pass : SRI. M PITCHAIAH Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES I The Court made the following: APHC010054532012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3527] WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B KRISHNA MOHAN THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA WRIT PETITION NO: 37387/2012 Between: K. Gandhi, Krishna Dist. ...PETITIONER AND PrI Secy Home Dept 3 Ors and Others Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.M PITCHAIAH Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.GP FOR SERVICES I ...RESPONDENT{S) 2 HBKM,J &AHHS.J W.P.No.37387of2012 The Court made the following: ORDER: (PerHon’ble Sri Justice B. Krishna Mohan) Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 2. This writ petition is filed questioning the order of the erstwhile Tribunal in O.A.No.7213 of 2008 dated 27.04.2011. 3. The petitioner herein approached the erstwhile Tribunal questioning the proceedings of the 4*^ respondent and the consequential proceedings of the 3'^'^ respondent and the proceedings of the 1®* respondent, wherein, the petitioner/applicant therein was made to retire from service compulsorily pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings held against him. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contends that the enquiry officer’s report does not favour proving of charge against the delinquent employee, for which, he refers to the report of the enquiry officer, wherein, it was observed that P.W.1 Devarakonda Venkateswara Rao (victim) stated that the charged officer did not beat him and he did not say before the Superintendent of Police, Kankipadu (who conducted preliminary enquiry) that the charged officer beat. He further deposes that he sustained injury on his leg when he was pulled by the Police into the Police Station. Relying upon this observation or recording of the statement of P.W.1 by the enquiry officer, the other material available on record/the evidence of the other witnesses need not be gone into as P.W.1, who was the main victim did not support the 3 HBKM.J & AHHS,J ^ W.P.No.37387 of 2012 articles of charge framed by the department. But, he did not dispute that the evidence of P.Ws.2 & 5 to 10 goes against the charged officer to show that there was an exhibited highhanded behaviour towards P.W.1 by beating him with lathi or stick causing bleeding injuries by the charged officer. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the enquiry officer did not take into consideration the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 and he ought not have relied upon the preliminary enquiry report also, as it cannot be used against the charged officer, as it was made behind his back. In sum and substance he argues that the evidence recorded and the documents marked by the enquiry officer will not yield to the proving of guilty of the charged officer in view of the single statement made by the P.W.1 that the charged officer did not beat him. Basing upon such defective enquiry officer’s report, the disciplinary authority/the respondent issued the proceedings, dated 15.12.2005 accepting the report of the enquiry officer and punished the petitioner herein/charged officer to undergo the punishment of compulsory retirement from service and the period of suspension from 13.07.2005 afternoon to the date of acknowledgment of the said proceeding was treated as ‘not on duty’. Aggrieved by the action of the 4*^ respondent, the petitioner went in appeal before the 3'''^ respondent and the same was rejected vide proceedings, dated 25.02.2006. On revision made by the petitioner before the 1®‘ respondent against the order in appeal, the 1®‘ respondent rejected the same - vide its merno, dated 23.05.2006. Consequently, the petitioner, as 5. 4 HBKM,J & AHHS.J W.P.No.37387of2012 stated supra, approached the erstwhile Tribunal by way of filing the above said OA and the same was dismissed on merits. 6. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Union of India vs. H.C.Goel\ dated 30.08.1963, wherein, it was observed as under:- “That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so. If it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No.3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the Impugned conclusion. In other words. If the whole of the evidence led In the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge In question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence we can case IS, ^ 1964 AIR Page 364 5 HBKM,J & AHHS.J W.P.No.37387of2012 legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the find-ing which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” Relying upon the said decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion are 7. in this case. He also refers to another decision of the Division Bench of the erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the matter of K.David Wilson vs. the Secretary to Government, Law Department (Legislative Affairs and Justice), Hyderabad^, dated 21.08.2001, wherein, at para Nos.27 & 28 it was observed as under. 8. [27] It is well settled that the disciplinary authority cannot make use of material or evidence collected by It in the course of preliminary enquiry against the delinquent official unless those materials and evidence are produced and proved in accordance with law in the regular departmental enquiry and the delinquent employee is given a fair opportunity to meet those adverse materials and evidence. In the instant case this well settled rule governing departmental enquiry Is completely breached. On that count also, the departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner is vitiated. [28] A departmental enquiry conducted for the purpose of disciplinary action against a public servant is not an empty formality. It is a serious proceeding intended to give the delinquent a chance to meet the charges and prove his innocence. The right of the delinquent officer to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence against him is a valuable any 2001 LawSuit (AP) 881 6 HBKM,J & AHHS,J W.P.N0.373Q7 of 2012 h. f right and in order to effectively exercise this right, it is necessary that the examination-in-chief of the witnesses should be recorded in the presence of the party against whom the deposition is made. An enquiry wherein examination-in-chief has been recorded in the absence of the person charged though he is allowed to cross-examine the witness, cannot be said to have been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. This position is well settled by the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. T.R. Varma, , Jagdish Prasad Saxana v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman SadasIva, AIR 1961 SC 1623 and a catena of other decisions to follow. The Calcutta High Court in Choudhury Union of India and others, 1957-1 LLJ 494 (Cal.), where the concerned employee was confronted with the evidence of the witnesses examined behind his back and where some of such witnesses were not tendered for cross-examination held that the enquiry was vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice and the dismissal order based on such enquiry must be held to be Invalid.” 9. Relying upon the said judgment, he further submits that the disciplinary authority cannot make use of any material or evidence collected by it in the course of preliminary enquiry against the delinquent officer unless those material and evidence are produced and proved in accordance v\/ith law in the regular departmental enquiry and the delinquent employee is given a fair opportunity to meet those adverse material evidence. He further submits that the enquiry conducted for the purpose of disciplinary action against the public servant is not an empty formality. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon another decision of the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of 10. 7 HBKM.J & AHHS,J ^ W.P.No.37387of2Q12 ^ A.L. Kaira vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.,^, in Civil Appeal No.2703 of 1981, dated 01.05.1984, wherein, at para No.19 it was observed as under: “19. The scope and ambit of Article 14 have been the subject matter of a catena of decisions. One facet of Article 14 which has been noticed in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCO 3] deserves special mention because that effectively answers the contention of Mr. Sinha. The Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in a concurring judgment in Royappa case observed as under: [SCO para 85, p. 38: SCO (L&S) p. 200] The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., "a way of life", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies: one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and Is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it Is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness In State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. ^(1984) 3 see 316 8 HBKM.J & AHHS.J W.P.No.37387 of 2012 I This view was approved by the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia [(1981) 1 see 722]. It thus appears well-settled that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equal of (sic) protection by Law. The Constitution Bench pertinently observed in Ajay Hasia case and put the matter beyond controversy when it said "wherever therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the Legislature or of the executive or of an 'authority' under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action". This view further elaborated and affirmed In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [(1983) 1 sec 305]. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 sec 248] It was observed that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is thus too late in the day to contend that an executive action shown to be arbitrary is not either judicially reviewable or within the reach of Article 14. The contention as formulated by Mr. Sinha must accordingly be negatived.” case was From that, the learned counsel for the petitioner points out that the executing authority cannot show arbitrariness in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and the impugned action suffers from such violation of article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-1 submits that, in view of the gravity of the articles of charge framed against the petitioner/charged officer and in view of the preliminary enquiry 12. 9 W.P.No.37387 of 2012 ^ conducted by the department, the discip^inary proceedings were duly initiated against the petitioner herein and the enquiry officer, after giving due opportunity to the petitioner, conducted the enquiry and basing upon the evidence on record and the documents marked, rightly held against the petitioner/the charged officer and relying upon the same, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement from service by also taking into consideration the age of the delinquent employee as 57 years at that time. Aggrieved by the said punishment, the petitioner also preferred an appeal, which was rejected by the competent appellate authority/the 3 respondent herein and still the petitioner filed revision before the 1 respondent, which was also rejected upon careful perusal of the findings of the enquiry officer and the proceedings of the original authority and the appellate authority. Assailing all these proceedings, the petitioner approached the erstwhile Tribunal in the above said OA, which was also dismissed on rd merits. As stated supra, since the departmental enquiry was conducted following the service rules, this Court may not show any inclination to interfere with the same at this stage. 13. In view of the above said facts and circumstances, upon consideration of the rival submissions made and upon perusal of the material available on record, it is to be seen that there was a serious allegation leveled against the petitioner/charged officer and there was a preliminary enquiry report followed by initiation of disciplinary proceedings after framing of the articles of charge, and appointment of enquiry officer. There is no dispute with regard to the 10 HBKM.J & AHHS,J W.P.No.37387of2012 conducting of enquiry, examination of witnesses, and marking of the documents by giving due opportunity at every stage for the charged officer/petitioner herein to participate in the proceedings by cross-examining the departmental witnesses and also by adducing his own evidence. It is born out of the record that Ex.PIO was marked and in support of the same, P.W.10 was also examined. As observed above, the evidence of P.W.2 shows that the victim was beaten by the Police and he sustained bleeding injuries. The evidence of P.Ws.5 to 9, who were present at the scene of offence in the Police Station, they supported the occurrence of the incident charged against the delinquent employee. The evidence of P.Ws.5, 6, 7 & 9 went against the charged officer, who exhibited high-handed behaviour towards P.W.1 by beating him with lathi or stick, causing bleeding injuries. P.W.3, who is none other than the son of P.W.1 deposed that the charged officer pulled his father and brother into the Police Station, due to which his father sustained bleeding injuries on his left leg. The charged officer beat him with lathi at his right elbow. The detailed enquiry officer’s report was examined by the disciplinary authority and the impugned proceedings were issued, dated 15.12.2005 imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement from service against the charged officer/the petitioner herein, with a further observation that the period of suspension from 13.07.2005 afternoon to the date of acknowledging that proceedings was treated as ‘not on duty’. As stated supra, the 3 respondent/appellate authority rejected the appeal vide proceedings, dated 25.02.2006 and the 1®' respondent also rejected the revision vide memo. rd 11 HBKM,J & AHHS.J W.P.No.37387 of 2012 ^ dated 23.05.2006. It is a well settled principle of law that the strict principles of evidence cannot be made applicable in the departmental proceedings and it is also not permissible for re-appreciation of evidence by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Unless it fails from any of the exceptions, which are extraordinary in nature, this Court should not sit in appeal over the decisions taken by the authorities concerned; viz., disciplinary authority, appellate authority and the revisional authority in concurrence of imposing the punishment against the charged officer. It is not a case of non-proving of the charge. We cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion though P.W.1 did not support in clear terms about the charge framed against the charged officer. But, other material evidence and witnesses supported the charges framed against the delinquent employee. Hence, it cannot be treated as no evidence forthcoming against the framed charge. When the authorities • y. concerned taken reasonably a possible view, this Court should not show indulgence even according to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. H.C.Goel case. Here is a case where the preliminary enquiry report was also placed in the departmental proceedings duly by adducing the evidence of appropriate witnesses in that behalf giving opportunity for the delinquent employee to cross-examine the said witnesses also. Hence it cannot be construed that solely relying upon the preliminary enquiry report the punishment was imposed in this case. Therefore, the Division Bench Judgment of erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K.David 12 HBKM,J & AHHS.J W.P.No.37387of2012 Wilson vs. the Secretary to Government, Law Department (Legislative Affairs and Justice), Hyderabad, case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. As there is no violation of article 14 of the Constitution of India in respect of delinquent employee/the petitioner herein, the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.L.KaIra vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., case is not applicable to this case, as the facts and circumstances are totally different. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Interim orders if any, deemed to have been vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. 14. As a sequel. Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. Sd/- M. SRINIVAS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To 1 PITCHAIAH Advocate [OPUC] GP FOR SERVICES I ,High - 1. OneCCto SRI. M 2. TwoCCsto [OUT] 3. Three CD Copies Court Of Andhra Pradesh. ksr HIGH COURT DATED:23/04/2025 ORDER ,,T—• ■ o i*i 11 n .. Current S8C«on ^ ITS X WP.No.37387 of 2012 e> xV DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS