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2025 DAILYLAW 4411 (CHH)

MOTIRAM CHAUHAN ALIAS GUDDAN CHAUHAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRA/216/2024 · 2025-07-17

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2025:CGHC:33967-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 216 of 2024 1 - Motiram Chauhan Alias Guddan Chauhan S/o Ramlal Chauhan Aged About 23 Years R/o Achritpali Thakur Devta Chowk, PS- Malkharoda, Distt- Janjgir- Champa, CG 2 - Purshottam Chaauhan Alias Nanki Chauhan S/o Ramlal Chauhan Aged About 22 Years R/o Achritpali Thakur Devta Chowk, PS- Malkharoda, Distt- Janjgir- Champa, CG ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Office, Malkharoda, Distt- Janjgir- Champa, CG ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Varun Sharma, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 18.07 .2025 1 Heard Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 2 This criminal appeal filed by the appellants/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.07.18 18:41:15 +0530 2 directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.12.2023 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.27 of 2021, by which the appellants has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for one year to each of the appellant. 3 It is an admitted fact that due to the death of accused Ramlal Chauhan, the proceedings against him had abated vide order dated 02.09.2023 before the trial Court. 4 The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the informant Sajan Chauhan (PW-2) lodged a report at Police Station Malkharoda to the effect that on 28.03.2021, at about 10:15 PM, accused Motiram @ Guddan along with three to four of his companions from another locality was taking away wood belonging to the family of Sanjay Chauhan, which was kept near the Shiva Temple, for the purpose of burning in Holika Dahan. When the informant objected, the companions of Guddan Chauhan agreed and desisted, but Guddan Chauhan started threatening the informant and began pushing him. The informant narrated the incident to his uncle, Bali Chauhan (since deceased), over the phone. Subsequently, Guddan went to his house and returned near the temple with his brother Nanki Chauhan, carrying a stick. Guddan again threatened the informant and pushed him with the stick. The 3 informant’s uncle Rakesh Chauhan intervened and rescued him. Guddan thereafter, started abusing the informant’s mother and sister and also abused his brother Nanki. The informant, along with his uncle Bali Chauhan, started going towards their house, and again informed Bali Chauhan of the events over the phone. In the meantime, Bali Chauhan arrived at the scene along with his friends Ramkumar Yadav and Dinesh Chandra. Despite that, Guddan continued hurling abuses at the mother and sister of the informant. Bali Chauhan confronted Guddan in the lane in front of Lakhiram Chauhan’s house and questioned him about his abusive behavior. 5 It is further case of the prosecution that at that relevant time, Guddan’s father Ramlal Chauhan arrived with a stick and assaulted Bali Chauhan. Guddan also stated that he would kill Bali, pulled out a sharp- edged weapon from his waist, i.e. knife and assaulted Bali with the help of said knife. Nanki Chauhan joined in the assault with a stick, causing grievous injuries to Bali, who started bleeding profusely. When the informant tried to intervene and support Bali, Ramlal Chauhan and Nanki Chauhan assaulted him as well. The informant’s grandmother Lalabai Chauhan (PW-7) also arrived to intervene, but was struck with a stick by Ramlal Chauhan. As a result of the assaults, Bali Chauhan fell unconscious. The incident was witnessed by Dinesh Kumar Chandra (PW-13), Ramkumar Yadav (PW-5), and other residents of the locality. Following the incident, Sajan Chauhan (PW-2), along with Ramkumar Yadav (PW-5), Dinesh Kumar Chandra (PW-13), Rakesh Chauhan 4 (PW-10), and his mother Savitri Chauhan, have taken Bali Chauhan to Dabhra Government Hospital in the Omni van of Rakesh Chauhan (PW-10), from where, he was referred to Malkharoda Hospital. However, on arrival at Malkharoda Hospital, Bali Chauhan was declared dead. 6 According to the prosecution, Bali Chauhan died due to continuous assaults made with sharp weapons and sticks. Sajan Chauhan and Lalabai Chauhan, who were the eyewitnesses to the incident have also sustained injuries during the incident. On the basis of the report lodged by Sajan Chauhan, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P/2, on the basis of which, Crime No.106/2021 under Sections 294, 506, 323, 302, 34 IPC was registered at Police Station Malkharoda vide First Information Report Ex.P/1. Injured Sajan Chauhan’s medical examination was conducted and reports Ex.P/17 (for Sajan Chauhan), Ex.P/21 (for Lalabai Chauhan), and Ex.P/22 (for Neha Chauhan) were obtained. The inquest proceedings were conducted and the postmortem was conducted on the body of Bali Chauhan and postmortem report (Ex.P/18) was received. During investigation, sharp-edged weapon (knife) and blood-stained saree were seized from accused Motiram @ Guddan vide Seizure Memo (Ex.P/8). A bamboo stick and white full- sleeve shirt were seized from accused Purushottam vide Seizure Memo (Ex.P/9). A bamboo stick was seized from accused Ramlal Chauhan vide Seizure Memo (Ex.P/10). Plain and blood-stained soil and a knife cover were seized from the scene vide Seizure Memo (Ex.P/7). The 5 seized articles were sent for its chemical examination to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur, and according to the FSL report (Ex.P/42), the blood stains were found on the seized articles, but the group was inconclusive. 7 Statements of the witnesses were recorded. After due investigation, the Police filed charge-sheet against the appellants before the jurisdictional criminal Court under Sections 294, 506, 323, 302, 34 IPC. and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and thereafter, transferred to the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa for trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 8 During their examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused persons stated that they had eloped with a girl named Renu Chauhan from Bali village and took her to Malkharoda, where they solemnized marriage. It is alleged that the said incident caused anger and resentment in Sajan, the nephew of Bali. On the occasion of Holi, a dispute arose between the uncle and nephew over this very issue, which escalated into a physical altercation, during which Bali sustained injuries. The accused have pleaded innocence and claimed that all the prosecution witnesses have falsely deposed against them solely with the intention of protecting Sajan. They further contended that Bali's niece had eloped and married accused Motiram approximately two years ago, which is the root cause of the false implication in the present case. 6 9 After appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case, trial Court has framed charges against the accused-appellants for offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC and proceeded on trial. 10 In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 21 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-21 and exhibited 45 documents as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/45. In defence, the accused have examined one witness, namely Girdhari Chauhan as DW-1, to support their version of events, but they have not exhibited any document. 11 The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 21.12.2023, convicted the accused-appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced him as as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment. Hence, this criminal appeal has been filed. 12 Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted on the face of it, then also the appellants are said to have caused injuries to deceased on the spur of the moment, as there was some dispute to the effect that the accused Motiram Chauhan @ Guddan had married with niece of the deceased. There was no motive or intention on 7 the part of the appellants to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellants caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellants is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) IPC. Further, as appellants are in jail since 29.03.2021 and they have completed near about 04 years and 04 months, and therefore, considering the period they had already undergone, they be awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by them. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 13 Per contra, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that in view of statements of the prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 IPC. It has been contended that appellants have committed heinous crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 302 IPC requires 8 to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 14 We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 15 The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased- Bali Chauhan was homicidal in nature ? 16 The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statements of Ku. Neha Chauhan (PW-1), Sajan Chauhan (PW-2) and Lala Bai (PW-7), who are the injured eyewitness to the incident as well as Dr. Ravindra Sidar (PW-12), who conducted postmortem, stated that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to excessive blood loss and the nature of death was homicidal. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Bali Chauhan was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 17 The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellants is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 9 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants ? 18 The cause of death assigned in the postmortem report of the deceased as already noticed are ‘coma due to grievous injury on left side of frontal and partial region of head leading to cardio-respiratory arrest’. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 19 Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused/appellants herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by relying upon the testimony of Dr. Ravindra Sidar (PW-12), who conducted postmortem had opined that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to excessive blood loss and the nature of death was homicidal. The Doctor ultimately opined through his report the nature of death to be homicidal. Thus, on the basis of testimony of Dr. Ravindra Sidar (PW- 12), it is clear that it is the appellants herein who on the fateful date and time has caused grievous injuries to the deceased, due to which he died. As such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellants/accused who has caused injuries over the body of the 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 10 deceased and caused his death. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 20 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 21 It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 11 ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 22 The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 12 fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 23 The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 13 (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital 14 immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 24 Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 25 Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 15 Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 16 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that 17 there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 26 In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 27 Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 18 28 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found 19 to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of 20 the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to 21 cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and 22 murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, 23 extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions 24 applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 29 The most important eyewitness of the case are the injurued eyewitnesses who have also suffered grievous injuries over their persons i.e. Ku. Neha Chauhan (PW-1), Sajan Chauhan (PW-2) and Lala Bai (PW-7). 30 Ku. Neha Chauhan (PW-), who is niece of the deceased has stated in her evidence that she knew the accused persons. On the date of the incident, accused Guddan, Nanki, and another person were carrying wood. When her brother Sajan stopped them, Guddan and Nanki assaulted her brother Sajan with a stick, saying that no one had the authority to stop them. When her uncle Rakesh intervened and tried to pacify them, Guddan and Nanki went back to their house. She further stated that at about 9:00 PM, Guddan returned with his father Ramlal and co-accused Nanki. At that relevant time, Guddan was armed with a 25 knife, while Nanki and Ramlal carried sticks. They came in front of her house and started abusing. When her brother Sajan stopped them, he called their uncle Bali Chauhan. Upon Bali Chauhan’s arrival, when he tried to stop the accused from abusing, Guddan assaulted Bali Chauhan with a knife, while Nanki and Ramlal assaulted him with sticks. Bali Chauhan sustained injuries on his forehead, chest, waist, and thigh and fell down covered in blood. When she, her grandmother, and her brother tried to intervene, the accused assaulted them as well. They took Bali Chauhan by car to Dabhra Hospital, from where he was referred to Malkharoda Hospital. However, Bali Chauhan died at Malkharoda Hospital during treatment. 31 In cross-examination, Ku. Neha Chauhan (PW-1) has admitted that there had been a prior dispute between her uncle Bali Chauhan and the accused persons over the proposed elopement and marriage of Parmeshwari and Guddan. She also admitted that she had not personally seen who was carrying the wood; this information was given to her by her brother. Similarly, she had not witnessed who was involved in the initial fight and had come to know about it from her brother. She further stated that when the fight occurred, her uncles Rakesh and Bali were called. At that time, Bali Chauhan was at Chhapora. She was not present when the accused persons fought with her brother Sajan. She clarified that the fight she referred to took place near the house of the accused persons. She denied the suggestion of the defence that her uncle Bali Chauhan returned to the scene with four companions at 11:00 PM. She also denied not being present when her uncle went to the 26 scene. She admitted that there was no light at the scene and it was dark. Due to the darkness, it was not possible to clearly see who was hitting whom. She admitted that it was Bali Chauhan and Guddan Chauhan who were fighting with each other. 32 Sajan Chauhan (PW-2) has deposed that he knew the accused persons. The deceased Bali Chauhan was his uncle. On the date of the incident, accused Guddan, Nanki, Dinesh, Sanjay, and another individual were present at the spot. When some people were carrying wood, he stopped them. At that time, Guddan and Nanki started arguing with him, questioning who had the authority to stop them. His uncle Rakesh intervened and pacified the situation, after which Guddan and Nanki returned to their house. Later, at around 9:00 PM., Guddan returned along with his father Ramlal. Guddan, Nanki, and Ramlal were armed with sticks. They came in front of his house and started abusing. When he tried to stop them, he called his uncle Bali Chauhan. On Bali Chauhan’s arrival, when he tried to pacify them and stop the abuse, Guddan assaulted Bali Chauhan with a knife, while Nanki and Ramlal assaulted him with sticks. Bali Chauhan sustained injuries on his forehead, chest, waist, stomach, back of the head, and thigh at eight places in total. Covered in blood, Bali Chauhan collapsed on the spot. When Sajan Chauhan attempted to intervene, the accused assaulted him as well. He took his injured uncle Bali Chauhan to Dabhra Hospital by car, from where Bali was referred to Malkharoda Hospital. However, Bali Chauhan died during treatment at Malkharoda Hospital and he had lodged the report of the incident at Malkharoda Police Station. 27 33 In cross-examination, Sajan Chauhan (PW-2) has admitted that Parmeshwari was his real sister and that she had eloped and married accused Guddan. Both families had ongoing disputes because of this incident. He further admitted that the accused were carrying the wood belonging to Sanjay Chauhan. When he objected, the accused left the wood and went home. He stated that the accused later returned and began abusing in front of his house while carrying knives and sticks. The time was around 10:30 to 11:00 PM. He clarified that his house and the house of the accused were close enough to be visible from one another. When the accused were standing outside his house with weapons, his uncle Bali was in Chhapora. He had called his uncle, and it took about 10 minutes for Bali to reach the village from Chhapora by motorcycle. At that time, the accused were openly challenging and threatening him in front of his house. When Bali arrived, he went with him, along with Ramkumar, Dinesh, and Rakesh, to the place where the accused were standing, in order to reason with them. He denied the suggestion of the defence that his uncle went to the spot angrily because of his sister’s elopement with Guddan. He further clarified that his uncle did not start any fight; rather, it was the accused who attacked him with a knife and sticks. He admitted that there was no light at the spot and the place was dark. He stated that there were around 10-15 persons present, including Babla, Lakhiram, Sanjay, Shankar, Ashok, and Dinesh, who came after the fight had begun. The fight broke out within two to three minutes of their arrival. He admitted that in the darkness, he could not clearly see who was hitting whom. However, he 28 reiterated that Guddan had a knife and Nanki and Ramlal had sticks. Although he claimed to have seen this despite the darkness, he stated that he could not say whether anyone else had witnessed it. He denied the defence suggestion that Bali was killed by his wife’s family or that he himself had not witnessed the incident. 34 Lala Bai (PW-7), who is mother of the deceased has deposed in her evidence that the incident occurred last year during the festival of Holi. She stated that the three accused killed her son Bali in front of her house at around 10:00 PM. She was present at the spot at that time, standing in front of her house. She specifically stated that accused Motiram stabbed her son Bali on his chest, stomach, thigh, and head with a knife. Accused Ramlal assaulted Bali with a stick, and accused Nanki also hit Bali with a stick. According to her, many people were present at the spot during the incident. The accused collectively assaulted Bali and knocked him to the ground. She further deposed that when she, along with her granddaughter Neha and grandson Sajan, tried to intervene, Ramlal struck her with a stick, due to which she lost consciousness. Her son Bali was taken to Dabhra Hospital by villagers in a car. However, she asserted that her son Bali had already died on the spot. She further stated that the incident originated when the accused were carrying wood for the Holi celebration. When her grandson Sajan objected to this, the accused dropped the wood and assaulted Sajan. Thereafter, the accused approached her house while hurling abuses. When Bali tried to stop the accused from abusing his mother and sister, the accused assaulted him. 29 35 In cross-examination, Lala Bai (PW-7) has admitted that the accused Motiram had eloped with Dilram’s daughter and had gone to Jammu and Kashmir for work. She further admitted that she was not present at the time of the initial incident involving the carrying of wood and that her grandson Sajan had informed her about this. She denied the suggestion that it was dark at the time of the incident and stated that there was light at the place. She admitted that she was not present at the very beginning of the incident but came running to the spot upon hearing her granddaughter scream. She denied the defence suggestion that the fight had ended by the time she arrived. She also denied the suggestion that she did not know who had assaulted whom. 36 In defence, the accused have deposed that accused Motiram had eloped with a girl from the Chauhan family and took her to Malkharoda, where he married her. Due to this incident, there was animosity between the families, and Bali's nephew Sajan was angry. On the day of Holi, an argument took place between Bali and his nephew Sajan over the said matter, which escalated into a physical altercation, during which Bali sustained injuries. All the prosecution witnesses had given false statements in order to protect Sajan, as Bali’s niece had eloped and married accused Motiram two years prior to the incident. It has been further deposed that Ramkumar and Dinesh arrived at the spot after a delay of 15 to 20 minutes, by which time Sajan was not present. The mother and niece of the deceased were found crying at the spot, and they had not disclosed the name of the person who had assaulted them. There was no light at the place of occurrence, making it impossible to 30 properly identify the assailants. Therefore, according to the defence, the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. 37 Conviction of the accused-appellants is mainly based on the evidence of Dr. Ravindra Sidar (PW-1), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased, vide Ex.P/18 and he found following injuries on the dead body of the deceased:- “1. An incised cut mark was found on the left thigh of the deceased whose length was 5 x 2 x 1 cm. 2. There was a lacerated wound on the left side of the deceased's chest, the length of which was six times two and a half times the width of the wound. 3. A torn wound was found on the head of the deceased whose size was 4 x 2 x 1 cm. 4. A torn wound on the right hand of the deceased measuring 3 x 3 x 1 cm. 5. Cut wound on the right side of the deceased's stomach whose size is 4 x 2.5 x 1 cm. 6. The skull, cranium, cervix, brain and spinal cord of the deceased were normal. 7. The lungs and trachea of the deceased were normal. 8. The deceased's right lung was ruptured. 9. The left lung of the deceased was bloodless. 10. The deceased's perion was filled with pericrusium blood. 11. The deceased had a heart rupture. 31 12. The deceased's large vessels were normal. 13. Food was present in the stomach of the deceased. 14. The deceased had half-digested food in the small intestine and residual matter in the large intestine. 15. Liver, spleen, kidney, bladder, internal and external genitalia of the deceased were normal. 16. The 7th and 8th rib bone of the left side of the deceased was broken. Opinion- The cause of death of the deceased was excessive bleeding and the nature of death was homicidal.” 38 According to Dr. Ravindra Sidar (PW-12), the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to excessive blood loss and the nature of death was homicidal 39 Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above- stated judgments, it stands established from the testimony of informant Sajan Chauhan (PW-2), eye-witnesses Ku. Neha Chauhan (PW-1), Ramkumar Yadav (PW-5), Lalabai Chauhan (PW-7), Rakesh Chauhan (PW-10), and Dinesh Kumar Chandra (PW-13) that on 28.03.2021 at around 10:15 PM, there was a quarrel between the accused persons and the family of the informant concerning the removal of wood meant for Holika Dahan, initial altercation escalated when accused Motiram alias Guddan Chauhan returned with his brother Nanki Chauhan and 32 father Ramlal Chauhan, all armed with weapons and Motiram alias Guddan assaulted deceased Bali Chauhan with a knife on his chest, stomach, thigh, and head, and Ramlal Chauhan and Nanki Chauhan assaulted him with sticks, causing multiple grievous injuries. The injured Bali Chauhan was immediately taken to Dabhra Government Hospital and referred to Malkharoda Hospital, where he was declared dead on arrival. The medical evidence corroborates the ocular testimony in respect of the nature and number of injuries inflicted upon the deceased. It is apparent that though there was no premeditation on the part of the appellants to cause death of deceased. The appellants did not had any intention to cause death of deceased, but by causing such injury, he must had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by them would likely to cause death of Bali Chauhan, as such, the case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellants herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. “(i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 40 Considering the above-stated facts, also considering the evidence of witnesses and taking into consideration that at present appellants, namely Motiram Chauhan alias Guddan and Purshottam Chauhan alias Naki are aged about 23 years and 22 years, respectively and they are in 33 jail since 29.03.2021 and have completed near about 04 years and 04 months, the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I IPC. 41 Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the IPC is set aside, however, they are convicted under Section 304 Part-I/ 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The fine sentence imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. The appellants are stated to be in jail since 29.03.2021 being the date of arrest. They are directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 42 The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated hereinabove. 43 Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu