IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI *** +W.P.No.31839 of 2017 Between: # K. Subramanyam and 2 others … Petitioners AND $ State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. By Its Principal Secretary to Government, School Education Department and 3 others ... Respondents Date of Order pronounced on: 24.12.2026 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No May be allowed to see the judgments? 2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No to Law Reporters/Journals: 3. Whether the Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No Of the Judgment? 2 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 *IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI *HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM % Dated: 24.12.2025 +W.P.No.31839 of 2017 Between: # K. Subramanyam and 2 others … Petitioners AND $ State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. By Its Principal Secretary to Government, School Education Department and 3 others ... Respondents ! Counsel for the Petitioner : Aka Venkataramana ^Counsel for the Respondents : G.P. for School Education Date of Order pronounced on : 24.12.2025 <GIST : >HEAD NOTE : ? Cases referred : 1) 1954 (1) SCC 170 2) 2011 (5) SCC 435 3) 2013 (10) SCC 136 4) (1992) 3 SCR 658 5) 1993 SCC (1) 645 ___________________________________ JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM 3 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 APHC010101962017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3504] WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM WRIT PETITION NO: 31839/2017 Between: 1. K. SUBRAMANYAM, S/O C.V. SUBBAIAH AGED 70 YEARS CORRESPONDENT S.K.C.V.S. HIGH SCHOOL PRODDUTUR, KADAPA DISTRICT 2. K. SIVA KRISHNA KUMAR, S/O K. SUBRAMANYAM AGED 38 YEARS SECONDARY GRADE TEACHER S.K.C.V.S. HIGH SCHOOL PRODDUTUR, KADAPA DISTRICT 3. N. DAMODAR, S/O RAMACHANDRAIAH AGED 41 YEARS SECONDARY GRADE TEACHER S.K.C.V.S. HIGH SCHOOL PRODDUTUR, KADAPA DISTRICT ...PETITIONER(S) AND 1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DISTRICT 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, ANDHRA PRADESH, IBRAHIMPATNAM, AMARAVATHI 3. THE DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, KADAPA 4. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR KADAPA, - ...RESPONDENT(S): 4 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ or order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDAMUS declaring the proceedings in RC No. 7925/B5/2017 dated .08.2017 issued by the 3rd Respondent as highly illegal, arbitrary, contrary to the provisions of A.P. Education Act and the Rules made thereunder and without power or jurisdiction and consequently quash or set aside the same and pass Counsel for the Petitioner(S): 1. AKA VENKATARAMANA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR REVENUE (AP) 2. GP FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION (AP) 5 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 The Court made the following ORDER: The instant writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed seeking the following main prayer: “…to issue an appropriate writ or order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDAMUS declaring the proceedings in RC No. 7925/B5/2017 dated 08.2017 issued by the 3rd Respondent as highly illegal, arbitrary, contrary to the provisions of A.P. Education Act and the Rules made thereunder and without power or jurisdiction and consequently quash or set aside the same …” Brief Facts of the Case : 2. The case of the petitioners is that the S.K.C.V.S.High School was established in the year 1962 by S.K.C.V.S. Charities, Proddutur, Kadapa District. Right from its institution, the school was admitted into grant-in-aid and recognition was also granted on year to year basis from 1962 to 1978. Thereafter, the school was permanently recognized by the competent authority vide proceedings No.7551/D3/78-1 dated 31.08.1979. While so, on the alleged complaint made by one Mr.D.Veerachari of Proddatur Village of Kadapa District, the 3rd respondent issued a show cause notice vide R.C.No.7925/B5/2017, dated 03.09.2017 against the petitioners calling upon them to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against them and also sought for the explanation within a period 6 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 of 10 days from the date of receipt of show cause notice. Challenging the said show cause notice, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioners. 3. Heard Sri A.Venkataramana, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Assistant Government Pleader for School Education appearing for the respondents 1 to 4. Perused the material on record. Arguments of Respective Counsel : 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri A. Venkataramana submits that the 1st petitioner, who worked as a correspondent of the school, is no more. Hence, no cause of action survives as against the 1st petitioner. So far as petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, he submits that both are working as Secondary Grade Teachers, in S.K.C.V.S. High School, Proddutur, and had challenged the action of the 3rd respondent in issuing a show cause notice as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submits that on 21.09.2017, this Court was pleased to grant an interim stay against the impugned proceedings dated 03.09.2017 and the same has been continuing as on today. 5. On the other hand, respondents have not filed any counter refuting the assertions of the writ petitioners. However, learned Assistant Government Pleader for School Education, while supporting the impugned show cause notice dated 03.09.2017 issued by the 3rd respondent, submits that consequent to the representation submitted by one D.Veerachari, the 7 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 3rd Respondent District Administration caused enquiry by issuing show- cause notice to the petitioners, wherein, all the allegations levied against the petitioners are held to be proved. He also submits that, as per the instructions issued by the 4th respondent, the instant show-cause notice dated 03.09.2017 has been issued calling for explanation as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against the petitioners. Analysis of the Court : 6. The bone of contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that apparently, the impugned show cause notice issued by the 3rd respondent is beyond the jurisdiction, as the petitioners 2 and 3 are Secondary Grade Teachers in S.K.C.V.S High School, Proddutur, Kadapa District. 7. In this backdrop of the rival submissions asserted by the respective counsels, this court now ventures into admitted facts involved in the Lis. The 1st petitioner, who worked as correspondent to the S.K.C.V.S High School, Proddutur, is no more and the instant case now only pertains to the petitioners 2 and 3, who are working as Secondary Grade Teachers in the S.K.C.V.S High School, Proddutur. The impugned notice dated 03.09.2017 was issued by the 3rd respondent and for the sake of comprehensive view, the same was extracted here under: 8 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 “It is informed that in the reference 1st cited, Sri D Veerachari, has given a written complaint against certain staff working in SKCVS High School, Proddatur. Based on the complaint, the Departmental enquiry has been conducted and the District Administration has ordered for issue show cause notice to the Management and accused teachers, since all allegations leveled by petitioner are held proved during the course of enquiry. In view of the circumstances and facts the allegations leveled against the Management / teachers are proved, and as per the instructions issued in the reference 6th cited, by the District Collector, Kadapa the Correspondent SKCVS High School, Sri M.Damodharam, SGT and Sri Siva Krishna, SGT of SKCVS, High School, Proddatur is called upon to show cause as to why a disciplinary action against the Correspondent and teachers should not be taken on the allegations leveled against them. The said Correspondent and teachers are instructed to submit their explanation within 10 days from the date of the receipt of the proceedings through the Deputy Educational Officer, Proddatur failing which action will be initiated as per procedures without any notice.” 8. A plain reading of the above notice reveals that, consequent to a representation preferred by one D.Veerachari, who is the third party, a departmental enquiry has been conducted by the 3rd respondent authorities, wherein, all allegations levelled against the petitioners were proved. Consequently, the petitioners were called upon to show cause as to why a disciplinary action ought not to be initiated against them, which 9 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 clearly indicates that the departmental enquiry had already been conducted against the petitioners by the District Administration Authorities. 9. The Andhra Pradesh Education Act,1982, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1982’) was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws for the development, regulation, and control of the educational system in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It is apt to state that, in exercise of the powers vested by Section 99 read with Sections 20, 21, 79 and 83 of the ‘Act’, the A.P Educational Institutions (Establishment, Recognition, Administration And Control of Institutions of Higher Education) Rules,1993 (in short ‘Rules, 1993’) were framed. 10. In the above said Rules,1993, Rule 19 dealt with disciplinary control, which read as under: 19. Disciplinary Control:- (1) The disciplinary powers are vested with the management in general. The appellate authority against the actions of the management is the competent authority as defined in rule 3. Subject to the provisions of the Act: (a) No employee should be kept under suspension by the management except as provided in Section 79 of the Act. (b) An employee who is kept under suspension shall be paid subsistence allowance at one half of the salary drawn by him immediately before suspension plus allowances admissible on such salary; (c) An order of suspension may at any time be revoked by the next higher authority to the competent authority; 10 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 (d) In addition to the penalties specified in sub section (1) of Section 79 of the Act the following penalties may also be imposed against any employee for negligence of duty, disobedience of orders, misconduct, violation of code of conduct or for other sufficient cause: (i) Fine, (ii) Censure, (iii) Withholding of increments or promotion, (iv) Reduction to a lower rank in seniority or reduction in the time scale of pay, (v) Recovery from pay the whole or part of the pecuniary losses caused to the Government or to the institutions by negligence or breach of orders; (e) No employee shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to the management. (f) In every case where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified, the ground on which the action is proposed shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges. The charges shall be communicated to the person charged together with statement of allegations and their basis and of any other circumstances leading to the charges. The person charged shall be required within a reasonable time to put a written statement of defence and to state whether he desires an oral enquiry or only to be heard in person for the charges. The charged person shall be permitted to peruse the records and take extracts from such records as he may specify, provided that the management may for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse such permission, if in its opinion such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the interest of the institution to allow access thereto. If an oral enquiry is desired by the person charged the 11 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 management shall appoint an Enquiry Officer who shall be superior in rank to the charged person to conduct enquiry. At that enquiry oral evidence may be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witness, to give evidence in person and to have such witness called as he may wish, provided that the authority conducting the enquiry may for special and valid reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness; After the enquiry has been completed the person charged shall be entitled to put in, if he so desires, any further written statement, of his defence. If no oral enquiry is held and a person charged desires to be heard in person, a personal hearing shall be given to him by the authority directed by the management. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and the statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. (g) After examination of the report of the Enquiry Officer or where no enquiry has been held on consideration of the statement of defence of the person charged and other circumstances of the case, the management shall issue a show cause notice of not less than two weeks to the charged officer enclosing the report of the Enquiry Officer. After considering the explanation the management may impose any of the penalties. Provided that in the case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank the management should get prior approval of the authority or officer under sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act; (h) The above provisions shall not apply where the authority to impose the penalty is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably/practicable to hold an enquiry or to inform the employee in writing of the allegations or charges on which action is proposed to be taken or where it is proposed to impose the penalty 12 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 on the ground of conduct which lead to his conviction on a criminal charge which involved moral turpitude. In such cases, the management shall obtain prior permission from the competent authority. A bare perusal of the above provision makes it crystal clear that the disciplinary powers are vested with the management. It is only when the disciplinary action is initiated by the management that a right of appeal arises, and such appeal lies before the competent authority as defined in Rule 3 of the Rules,1993. Rule 3 of Rules,1993 reads as under: 3. Competent Authorities: - For the purpose of the rules, the following shall be the competent authorities] Category of Schools Competent Authority (1) (2) (1)(a) Pre-Primary, Primary and Upper Primary Schools District Educational Officer (b) Oriental Schools, Hindi Pathasalas, Hindi Vidyalayas, Sanskrit Pathasalas and Special Schools. (2) Secondary Schools. [Government] 11. A plain reading of the above rule, clearly reveals that disciplinary powers against the Secondary Grade Teachers of the aided schools are vested with the management only, and not within the realm and scope of 13 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 the concerned District Educational Officer and any appeal against the orders of the Management lies to Government. 12. Apparently, in the case on hand, petitioner Nos.2 and 3 herein are working as Secondary Grade Teachers in S.K.C.V.S High School, Proddutur, Kadapa District. Hence, the 3rd respondent, who is the District Educational Officer, is not the competent authority in terms of Rule 3 coupled with Rule 19 of the Rules, 1993. Therefore, the impugned show notice dated 03.08.2017, issued by the 3rd respondent, is beyond his jurisdictional powers. 13. In this context, it is appropriate to discuss about the significance of jurisdiction and its implications. Jurisdiction is a combination of two Latin words i.e., juris (law) and diction (to speak), combining which, the jurisdiction means the appropriate forum that has the power to speak the law. Jurisdiction has the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact, as well as the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy which falls within the territorial or pecuniary limits of its authority. It also refers to the power or authority which is conferred upon by the legislature to hear and determine causes between the parties to pass appropriate orders. Such power is conferred upon an authority by the legislature and the said authority must strictly act within the limits of that power and it cannot usurp the jurisdiction of other authorities or encroach upon others domain. 14 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 14. Hence, the jurisdiction of an authority plays a pivotal role and if an authority lacks jurisdiction, it ought not to venture into the facts and pass orders. Any orders passed by the said authority without jurisdictional powers, the same would be rendered insignificant and would amount to nullity. It is a settled legal principle that an order passed without jurisdiction is liable to be set aside in its entirety, as the defect therein goes to root of the matter. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the dictum of Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan1 vividly explained the significance of the jurisdiction, which reads as under:- “…..6. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject- matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties…..” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court, by examining all the aspects, more particularly, the consequences that follow when authorities exercise powers beyond the scope of their jurisdiction in Joint Action Committee 1 1954 (1) SCC 170) 15 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 of Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DG of Civil Aviation2, held as follows:- “…..26. The contention was raised before the High Court that the Circular dated 29-5-2008 has been issued by the authority having no competence, thus cannot be enforced. It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority. In a democratic set-up like ours, persons occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and decision-making authority and be prepared to give way to carry out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal. (Vide Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. of Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896] , Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar [(1984) 2 SCC 41 : AIR 1984 SC 322] , Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001 SC 2524] and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen [(2010) 11 SCC 557 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 524 : AIR 2010 SC 2210] .) 27. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji [1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16] , Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia [(2004) 2 SCC 65 : AIR 2004 SC 1159] and Pancham Chand v. State of H.P. [(2008) 7 SCC 117 : AIR 2008 SC 1888] observing that an authority vested with the power to act under the statute alone should exercise its discretion following the procedure prescribed therein and interference on the part of any authority upon whom the statute 2 (2011) 5 SCC 435 16 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the constitutional scheme. 28. In view of the above, the legal position emerges that the authority who has been vested with the power to exercise its discretion alone can pass the order. Even a senior official cannot provide for any guideline or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a particular manner…….” 17. In Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Dir. Health Services, Haryana and Ors3., the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of jurisdiction in the context of a government servant seeking retiral benefits under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and held that a decree passed without statutory jurisdiction is null and void, and this defect can be challenged at any stage including execution. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply.” 3 2013 10 SCC 136 17 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 Hence, by virtue of above statutory provisions as well as settled legal principles that once any forum or authorities passed any order without jurisdictional competence, the same would be rendered as nullity. 18. Before parting with the case, this court deems it appropriate to note its concern, in view of pivotal role played by education in every student's life. Education holds a position of supreme significance in a constitutional democracy, serving as the cornerstone of individual empowerment, social advancement, and national development. It is inevitably connected with human dignity, equality, and the meaningful enjoyment of other fundamental rights. The State and its instrumentalities are, therefore, under a constitutional duty to ensure that the educational framework is governed in a just, transparent, and non-arbitrary manner. Any lapse, omission, or arbitrary exercise of powers by educational authorities in the discharge of their statutory and constitutional functions strikes at the very root of the constitutional mandate and causes serious prejudice to students, who constitute a vulnerable and aspiring segment of society. 19. The right to life and personal liberty, includes the Right to Education as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Ms. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka4 . In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 12. “Right to life” is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to 4 (1992) 3 SCR 658 18 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue. The right to education flows directly from right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens. 20. The Apex Court in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors5 discussing on Right to Education, held as under: “….The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution So far as the right to education is concerned, there are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Article 41 says that the “State shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of underserved want.’ Article 45 says that “the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.’ Article 46 commands that ‘the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation…..” 5 1993 SCC (1) 645 19 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 21. The Act, 1982 and Rules made thereon i.e., Rules, 1993 define the specific powers and jurisdiction of the respondent authorities and they must act within their parameters only. In fact, they are embodied with the benevolent objects coupled with the fact that to mould the future of the Children so as to turn them into the responsible citizens of our Mother India. 22. It is apt to mention that, after the above key note judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court, Article 21-A was inserted in Part III of our Constitution, thereby making right to education a fundamental right w.e.f. 01.04.2010, which lays the constitutional responsibility on the State and its authorities to provide free and compulsory education to all children aged 6 to 14 years 23. Hence, in view of benevolent objects and responsibilities rest on the respondents, this court expects the respondent Education Department authorities, who are playing vital role in imparting the education in the State of Andhra Pradesh should work within the four walls of their statutory scope & realm and contribute their concrete efforts towards building the nation in all aspects through the students, who are the citizens of tomorrow, rather than devoting their invaluable time to matters beyond their statutory jurisdiction. 24. From the conspectus of the above facts and law, coupled with the statutory provisions enunciated in the Act 1982 and Rules, 1993, the impugned notice dated 03.09.2017 issued by the 3rd Respondent is liable to be set aside as it is arbitrary, illegal and also without jurisdiction. 20 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 25. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. Consequently, the impugned notice in Rc.No.7925/B5/2017 dated 03.09.2017 issued by the 3rd Respondent is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, all pending applications shall stand closed. ______________________________ JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM Date: 24.12.2025 Note: LR to be marked B/o. Dvs 21 MRK, J W.P.No.31839 of 2017 145 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM WRIT PETITION No.31839 of 2017 Date: 24.12.2025 Dvs