Page No.# 1/8 GAHC040004632025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./61/2025 Miss Yalam Yangfo and Anr Daughter of Late Niya Yangfo, resident of Village Hokka Village, Jollang, PO and PS Itanagar, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh. 2: Mohan Pao Age: Occupation : Son of Shri Lakung Pao resident of Kma Pao Village PO Sawa PS Chayang Tajo East Kameng District Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of AP represented through the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : T T Tara, Pondit Ronya,Kirmani Lollen,Terji Kamchi,Taba Tokur,Khoda Apa,Gamken Bam Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Page No.# 2/8 :: BEFORE :: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA O R D E R 26.03.2025 Heard Mr. T.T. Tara, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. G. Tado, the Addl. Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. This is a joint application under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 praying for quashing the proceedings of POCSO Case No.03/2023 arising out of Women Police Station Case No.154/2022 pending in the court of Special Judge (POCSO) Court, Yupia. 3. A girl (the first petitioner) claiming to be 15 years old in the year 2024 lodged a well drafted, four pages long FIR before police. The FIR seems to be drafted by a person who is well conversant in criminal law. 4. Be that as it may, the informant girl has alleged that on a promise of marriage, the second petitioner had committed sexual intercourse with her. She never disclosed anybody about the acts of the second petitioner. But when the girl became pregnant her, family started to put pressure upon her to disclose the name of the person. Then, she named the second petitioner. 5. In the meantime, the girl gave birth to a baby. 6. After registration of a case, police conducted DNA profiling of the person concerned and the doctor reported that the second petitioner is not the father of the baby delivered by the first petitioner. Page No.# 3/8 7. The doctors conducted ossification examination and determined the age of the girl to be between 18 to 20 years. 8. On conclusion of investigation, police filed the charge sheet against the second petitioner under Sections 373/367 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The trial court framed the charges under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Now, both parties have come together to this Court stating that the first petitioner is now 21 years old and already married to somebody else. She has claimed that without any basis she named the second petitioner to be the rapist. She further submits that continuation of the criminal proceeding before the trial court, would cause trouble in her family life. 10. Referring to the medical report available in the record, Mr. Tara has submitted that the ossification report disclosed that the first petitioner was between 18 to 20 years old at the time of occurrence. Mr. Tara has referred to the settled proposition of law which states that when there are two views before a criminal court, the view which goes in favour of the accused deserves to be accepted. 11. Per contra, Mr. Tado submits that though the DNA report failed to connect the second petitioner with the baby delivered by the first petitioner, there are some other evidences to support the allegation of rape by the second petitioner. According to Mr. Tado, the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC clearly implicated the second petitioner. 12. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides. 13. The Apex Court in the case of Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr., reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677, held that when a compromise has been arrived at between the parties, by which the parties have withdrawn all claims and allegations Page No.# 4/8 against each other, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in quashing the criminal proceedings since the same would be a futile exercise. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, reported in (2008)4 SCC 582 has held: “We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law." 15. In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [(2017)9 SCC 641], the Hon,ble Apex Court has held– “(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute Page No.# 5/8 has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. 16. In the case of Narinder Singh v State of Punjab [(2014)6 SCC 466], the Supreme Court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised. In the said context the Court further stated that “those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court Page No.# 6/8 would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits…” 17. The guidelines for consideration of a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604. Paragraph 102 of the judgment reads as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. Page No.# 7/8 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 18. Reverting to the case in hand, the DNA report suggested that the second petitioner is not the father of the child delivered by the first petitioner. This fact completely negates the allegation of rape brought by the first petitioner. 19. So far as the age of the first petitioner is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that the submission made by Mr. Tara deserves to be accepted under the given circumstances of the case. 20. To buttress his point, Mr. Tara has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that was delivered in Mahesh Mukund Patel –versus- U.P. and Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.001005/2025). The said case involves a 17 year old girl and the charges brought against the accused were under Sections 366, 376 etc. of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. There, the victim girl ultimately married the accused and she was living peacefully with him. 21. Under the said circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that since the accused and the victim was married, no purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution as it will cause undue harassment to the accused, the victim girl and their children. 22. The High Court refused to quash the proceeding. But the Supreme Court refused to agree with the High Court and quashed the proceeding for the aforesaid reason. 23. This Court is of the opinion that since the DNA report failed to support the case of the prosecution, there is no possibility of conviction of the second petitioner in the case before the trial court. So, allowing the criminal proceedings to continue before the trial court, would be noting but an abuse of the process of the court. 24. This is a fit case for exercising power under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023. Therefore, the criminal petition is allowed. Page No.# 8/8 25. The proceedings of POCSO Case No.03/2023 arising out of Women Police Station Case No.154/2022 pending in the court of Special Judge (POCSO) Court, Yupia, is quashed and set aside. The Criminal Petition is disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant