1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 16971 of 2025 Decided on: 10.08.2026 Lal Chand …..Petitioner Versus State of H.P and others ..Respondents ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Lokesh Thakur, Advocate vice Mr. G.R.Palsra, Advocate. For the Respondents: Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for respondents No. 1 to 3. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge Petitioner seeks directions to the respondents to return his land that was acquired by the respondents in the year 1972. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 3. From the pleadings and the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, following facts emerge:- (i) Certain lands including petitioner’s ancestral land bearing old Khasra No. 1558 measuring 2-2-2 bighas, incorporated in new Khasra No.1621, measuring 8-6-16 bighas in Mohal Mahadev, Tehsil Sunder Nagar, 1Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes. 2 District Mandi was acquired for construction of Beas Satluj Link Project by the Bhakra Beas Management Board under the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In lieu of acquisition, the compensation as assessed was duly paid to the recorded owners including petitioner’s father late Shri Kaka Ram. The acquisition proceedings were finalized in the year 1972. Mutation No.162 was accordingly attested on 30.03.1972. Post-acquisition, some land parcels were declared surplus by the State Revenue Department and vested in the State Revenue Department vide mutation No. 1393 dated 01.07.2000. (ii). Petitioner claims return of his land primarily on the basis of an office letter dated 24.05.2001 (Annexure P-3) issued by the Financial Commissioner-cum- Secretary (Revenue). This letter orders to return specific parcels of surplus land as identified therein, which was not required by the State. 4. The respondents in their reply have admitted that under the office letter dated 24.05.2001 (Annexure P- 3), such surplus land which was not required by the government was returned to some land owners. Admittedly, petitioner’s land is not part & parcel of Annexure P-3. This office letter cannot be construed as general policy directive for returning all surplus acquired 3 land (wherever the acquired lands were declared surplus) to the original land owners. The respondents have categorically pleaded that decision to return surplus land depended entirely upon requirement of government. Individual officials have no authority to determine the requirement of the State. The letter dated 24.05.2001 was a specific one time permission limited to the return of specific land parcels identified therein which was not required for public utilization. The said return was also conditional upon repayment of compensation by the original owners/ successors. It is the stand of the respondents that petitioner’s land neither falls within the scope of aforesaid administrative communication nor any such permission was ever given by the respondents- State for transferring petitioner’s land back to the land owners. Petitioner for the first time represented for returning his land on 31.01.2018. The respondents in their reply have taken the stand that they do not desire to return petitioner’s land which was duly acquired for, in accordance with law in the year 1972. That even otherwise Jal Shakti Board has constructed a pump house on the land. 5. Merely because some portion of land is presently lying vacant cannot be construed to mean that 4 land is not required by the respondents-State. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Jai Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others2 in support of the relief prayed in the instant petition. Facts of Jai Singh2 are different from the facts of instant case. Some portion of land belonging to Shri Jai Singh acquired by the respondent- State was not only declared surplus but was being put to auction. Jai Singh desired that it be sold back to him. The Competent Authority accordingly submitted the proposal for necessary instructions. The decision thereupon was not being taken. In the aforesaid situation, the Court directed the Competent Authority to pass appropriate orders for complying with the order dated 20.07.2007 whereby part of land was declared surplus and put to action. V.Chandershekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others3, holds that once the land is vested in the State free from all encumbrances it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would not lapse even if an award is not made within the statutory stipulated period. Land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure 2CWP No.5206/2021, decided on 13.05.2024. 3(2012) 12 SCC 133 5 holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. Some of the relevant paras from this judgment are as under: - “25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure holders/persons- interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. 27. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of word 'vesting' varies as per the context of the Statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under.- 6 "In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any condition or ; limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration.” 28 ……………………….. 29 ……………………….. 30. In Govt. of A.P. V. v. Syed Akbar, this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be re-conveyed to the persons interested/tenure holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not arise.” The Hon’ble Court summarized the law that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner, whether the land is being used for the purpose, for which it was acquired or for any other purpose, he becomes persona non-grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to re-convey the land to the person- interested, nor can such 7 person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect. In Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal and others4, it was held that once title vests in the State under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, divesting of title is not a possibility at all…… Once vesting takes place and is with possession after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State…….. Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013, does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. There is neither a specific provision made for divesting, nor does the Act of 2013 by necessary intendment, imply such a drastic consequence. Divesting cannot be said to have been intended. 4(2020) 8 SCC 129 8 The relevant para from the decision is as under:- “364. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return of unutilized land. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is "When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized". Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 101 of the Act of 2013. Five years' logic has been carried into effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the land remaining unutilized under Section 24(2).” In view of above, relief as prayed for by the petitioner cannot be granted to him. There is no merit in the writ petition, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Jyotsna Rewal Dua August 10, 2026 Judge yogesh