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2025 DAILYLAW 43740 (KAR)

KASHINATH S/O MARUTI YAMALE v. ANAND S/O RAYAPPA PUJARI

RFA/100115/2023 · 2025-03-11

G Basavaraja, Sachin Shankar Magadum

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Judgment text

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- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 100115 OF 2023 (DEC/INJ) BETWEEN: 1. KASHINATH S/O. MARUTI YAMALE AGE. 45 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. 2. DHAREPPA S/O. BHUJAPPA PASANE AGE. 67 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI. PIN 591317 …APPELLANTS (BY MISS SANJANA S. MUDHOL, ADV. FOR SRI. SHIVARAJ P. MUDHOL, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. ANAND S/O. RAYAPPA PUJARI (SINCE DEAD, HIS LR ALREADY ON RECORD AS RESPONDENT NO. 2) 2. SANTOSH S/O. RAYAPPA PUJARI AGE. 20 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. 3. VIVEK S/O. VASANT GHATAGE (DIED, ON RELIEF IS CLAIMED AGAINST HIM AND NO DECREE WAS PASSED AGAINST HIM) 4. VINOD S/O. VASANT GHATAGE AGE. 42 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, Digitally signed by MALLIKARJUN RUDRAYYA KALMATH Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. 5. SMT. KASHAWWA W/O. VASANT GHATAGE AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. 6. SMT. SHRUTI W/O. AMMANNA HEGADE AGE. 29 YEARS, OCC. HOUSE HOLD WORK, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. 7. SMT. KALPANA W/O. VINOD GHATAGE AGE. 37 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG, DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317. (NOTE: THE DEFENDANT NO.6 WAS DIED DURING PENDENCY OF THE SUIT I.E., 24.05.2021, HER LEGAL HEIRS ARE ALREADY ON RECORD) …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. RAMACHANDRA A. MALI AND SRI. SUNIL KHOT, ADVOCATES FOR R4, R5 AND R7; SRI. SHRIHARSH A. NEELOPANT, ADVOCATE FOR R2; R1-DECEASED; R2 IS LR OF DECEASED R1; R3-DECEASED; V/O. DATED 24.11.2023 THERE IS NO NEED FOR BRINGING LR’S OF DECEASED R3; NOTICE TO R5 SERVED) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC., PRAYING TO, SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 28.06.2022 PASSED IN O.S. NO.42/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS AT RAIBAG, AND DISMISS THE SUIT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NOS.1 AND 2 BY ALLOWING THIS APPEAL, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) Captioned appeal is by the defendant Nos.4 and 5 assailing the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2022 passed in O.S. No.45/2017 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Raibag [for brevity, ‘the trial Court’]. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. Before we delve into the case on hand, we deem it fit to cull out the family tree of plaintiffs which is as under: Siddappa (propositus; grandfather) Tangewwa (D6; grandmother, now deceased) Rayappa (deceased; father of the plaintiffs) Anand Shruti Santosh (Pltff.No.1) (Deft.No.7) (Pltff.No.2) 4. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 are sons of one Sri.Rayappa. The plaintiffs herein have filed a suit seeking a declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit schedule properties. They trace title over these properties based on the compromise decree recorded in O.S. - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 No.142/2010. Under the said compromise decree, plaintiffs assert that suit land is allotted to the plaintiffs’ share. 5. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 dispute the plaintiffs' title and, instead, assert ownership based on a registered sale deed executed by defendant No.5, who acted as the General Power of Attorney (GPA) for defendant No.6. According to defendant Nos.4 and 5, defendant No.6 was the absolute owner of the suit lands bearing Nos. 46/1B and 53/A and had lawfully executed a GPA in favor of defendant No.5, authorizing the sale of the property. They argue that, since their title is derived from a registered sale deed, these lands could not have been included in the compromise petition. Additionally, they contend that the compromise decree was never implemented, demonstrating a clear intent on the part of the plaintiffs, defendant Nos.6 and 7, and the deceased Sri Rayappa. Furthermore, they assert that the decree passed in O.S. No.142/2010 is null and void. 6. In support of their respective claims, both the plaintiffs and defendant No.4 have presented oral and documentary evidence. The plaintiffs examined one of the plaintiffs as PW1 and submitted nine documents, marked as - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 Exs.P1 to P9. Defendant No.4, in turn, testified as DW1 and introduced an additional witness as DW2, producing ten documents, marked as Exs.D1 to D10. The trial Court, after considering the compromise decree recorded in O.S. No.142/2010 on 13.12.2010, rejected the assertions of defendant Nos.4 and 5. The Court held that, unless defendant Nos.4 and 5 formally challenge the compromise decree, they lack the legal standing to dispute the plaintiffs’ title to the suit lands as per the terms of the compromise in O.S. No.142/2010. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, defendant Nos.4 and 5 have now challenged the decision. 7. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel representing defendant Nos.4 and 5 as well as the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. After carefully considering the pleadings of both parties, we have also conducted an independent assessment of the oral and documentary evidence presented. The key issue that arises for our consideration is as follows: “Whether the finding of the trial Court while answering issue No.1 in the affirmative that the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving the title and - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 lawful possession of the suit schedule property is perverse and palpably erroneous.” 8. Before proceeding with an analysis of the present case, it is essential to consider the pleadings in the written statement, particularly paragraph 4. Notably, the defendants have acknowledged their awareness of the compromise decree recorded in O.S. No.142/2010. Given the significance of this admission, we find it necessary to take cognizance of the pleadings in paragraph 4, which is reproduced below: “4) The allegations made in par no.2 of the plaint regarding O.S. No.142/2010, the filing of the compromise petition and the passing of the decree in Lok Adalat appears to be correct on the basis of the copy of the decree and compromise petition produced by the plaintiffs. This defendant submits he had no knowledge of the said decree until he received the summons of this suit and only after going through the copy of the decree produced by the plaintiffs he has come to know of the same. This defendant submits that the compromise entered into in O.S. No 142/2010 is not legal and valid and it is a collusive in nature and the decree passed on the basis of the said compromise is illegal and null and void and it is got by the present - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 plaintiffs, defendant 6 and 7 and deceased Rayappa by playing fraud on the court and suppressing the true facts.” 9. We are also inclined to take cognizance of the cross-examination of defendant No.4, who is examined as D.W.1. The same is extracted, which reads as under: “£À£ÀUÉ ªÁ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀ UÉÆvÀÄÛ. ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ, ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ £ÀA.6,7 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ MªÀð ¥ÁgÀªÀé EzÉà £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è C.zÁ.£ÀA.142/2010 gÀ°è ¨sÁUÀPÁÌV zÁªÉ ¸À°è¹zÀÝgÀÄ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. D zÁªÉAiÀİè CªÀgÀÄ gÁf rQæ ªÀiÁrPÉÆArzÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÁQë £Á£ÀÄ F zÁªÉ ¸À°è¹zÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ D «µÀAiÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ w½¬ÄvÀÄ JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. zÁªÁ D¹ÛUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀ ºÉ¸ÀjUÉ §A¢ªÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. 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LzÀ£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ AiÀiÁªÁUÀ®Æ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è EgÀÄvÁÛgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. £Á£ÀÄ ªÁnß ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆÃr®è. D §UÉÎ £Á£ÀÄ w½zÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄvÀß ªÀiÁr®è. £Á£ÀÄ zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀAUɪÀé¤UÉ ªÁnß ¥ÀæPÁgÀ §A¢gÀĪÀÅzÁV ¸ÀļÀÄî ºÉüÀÄwÛzÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 £Á£ÀÄ ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ Rjâ ¥ÀvÀæUÀ¼À°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ, ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ 6 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 7 gÀªÀgÀ ¸À»UÀ¼ÀÄ E®è. 7 £Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ £À£Àß «gÀÄzÀÞ G¥À «¨sÁUÁ¢üPÁjUÀ½UÉ ªÉÄîä£À« ¸À°è¹zÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. C.zÁ £ÀA.678/2012 gÀ°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ C.zÀ.£ÀA.142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. C.zÁ £ÀA.678/2012 gÀ ªÁzÀ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß £Á£Éà ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹zÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. CzÀgÀ°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ C.zÀ.£ÀA 142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj, C.zÁ £ÀA.678/2012 ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ ºÁdgÁUÀ¢zÀÝ PÁgÀtPÉÌ ªÀeÁ DVzÉ JAzÀgÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. ¤r-1 gÀ°è vÀAUɪÀé£À ºÉ§ânÖ£À UÀÄgÀÄvÀ£ÀÄß AiÀiÁgÀÆ PÀÆqÀ UÀÄgÀÄw¹®è JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. C¢üPÁgÀ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß LzÀ£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¸Àȶ֪ÀiÁr ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹zÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. ¤r-5 gÀ°è ªÁnß §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À E®è JAzÀgÉ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. C.zÀ.£ÀA 142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ 7 £Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¸À°è¹zÀ jmï Cfð ªÀeÁ DVzÉ JAzÀgÉ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. J¯Áè zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÁªÀÅ £ÀªÀÄä EZÉÑAiÀÄAvÉ ¸ÀÈ¶× ªÀiÁr ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹ ¸ÀļÀÄî ¸ÁPÀëå £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄwÛzÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è.” 10. In the light of the stand taken by defendant Nos.4 and 5 in paragraph 4 of the written statement, it is clearly evident that defendant Nos.4 and 5 were clearly aware of the pendency of the suit in O.S. No.142/2010. The suit instituted in O.S. No.142/2010 ended in a compromise and accordingly, compromise decree was drawn on 13.12.2010. In view of the compromise decree, the suit lands are allotted to the plaintiffs. 11. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 claim ownership of the suit lands through a sale deed dated 01.12.2011, which was executed by defendant No.5 in his capacity as the General - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 Power of Attorney (GPA) of defendant No.6. However, the validity of this transaction is in serious question, as the compromise decree in O.S. No.142/2010 was already passed on 13.12.2010. At the time of the sale deed execution, an injunction was in force, restricting any alienation of the suit lands. Despite this legal restraint, defendant No.5, acting under the GPA executed by defendant No.6, proceeded with the sale of the property after the compromise had been recorded and the decree had been drawn. The crucial legal issue that arises is whether defendant No.5, as a mere agent under a GPA, could convey a valid title when defendant No.6 had already lost her ownership rights under the compromise decree. 12. It is well settled in law that a person can only transfer ownership of a property if they possess a valid title at the time of execution. In the present case, by virtue of the compromise decree in O.S. No.142/2010, the suit lands had already been allotted to the plaintiffs as early as December 2010. Consequently, defendant No.6 no longer had any saleable interest in the property as of 01.12.2011, the date of the impugned sale deed. Since defendant No.6 had already divested her rights in favor of the plaintiffs through the - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 compromise decree, the GPA executed by her in favour of defendant No.5 became ineffective for purposes of transferring title. As an agent, defendant No.5 could not have conveyed a better title than what his principal, defendant No.6, possessed. Since defendant No.6 had no title to transfer after the compromise decree, the subsequent sale made by defendant No.5 on 01.12.2011 is legally inconsequential. In terms of Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, a person must have ownership and the legal right to transfer property both of which were absent in the case of defendant No.6 at the time of the sale. Consequently, the sale deed executed by defendant No.5 based on the GPA did not, and could not, confer any valid title upon defendant Nos.4 and 5. 13. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 have also attempted to challenge the validity of the compromise decree recorded in O.S. No.142/2010 by claiming that it is null and void. However, such a contention cannot be accepted in light of the legal position explained above. As on the date of the sale deed, defendant No.6 had already lost any saleable interest in the property due to the compromise decree. Further, once the principal (defendant No.6) had lost ownership, the agent - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 (defendant No.5) automatically lost the authority to act on her behalf in matters of alienation. The law is clear that an agent’s authority cannot extend beyond the rights of the principal. Hence, defendant No.5 had no legal competence to execute a valid sale deed in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5. 14. Additionally, defendant Nos.4 and 5 have attempted to rely on the dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012, a suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated 01.12.2011 was not binding on them. They argue that since this suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, the plaintiffs were precluded from maintaining the present suit. However, this argument lacks merit. Significantly, there are no specific pleadings in the written statement to substantiate how the dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012 would bar the plaintiffs’ present claim. Furthermore, upon examination of the documents produced, particularly the order sheet in O.S. No.678/2012 and a copy of the plaint (marked as Exs.D-9 and D-10), it is evident that the earlier suit was filed when the plaintiffs were minors. The suit was initiated through their guardian, defendant No.6, and was later dismissed for non-prosecution. Importantly, the present suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs after attaining - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 the age of majority, thereby entitling them to seek an independent adjudication of their title, unaffected by the dismissal of the earlier suit. 15. Although defendant Nos.4 and 5 have produced documents related to O.S. No.678/2012 as Exs.D-9 and D-10, these documents do not contain any material to establish that the plaintiffs are legally barred from asserting their rights in the present proceedings. There are no specific averments in the written statement that demonstrate how the plaintiffs’ claim is extinguished solely due to the dismissal of the earlier suit. In the absence of any cogent legal basis, the reliance placed by defendant Nos.4 and 5 on the dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012 is wholly misplaced. 16. Given that the sale deed executed by defendant No.5 on 01.12.2011 is subsequent to the compromise decree recorded in O.S. No.142/2010, it holds no legal sanctity. Even if defendant Nos.4 and 5 claim to have purchased the property through defendant No.5, they have failed to establish how they acquired a valid title over the suit lands. The trial Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the plaintiffs are the absolute - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 owners by recognizing the effect of the compromise decree recorded in O.S. No.142/2010. The judgment and decree of the trial Court correctly declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners, in accordance with both law and factual circumstances. Moreover, defendant Nos.4 and 5 have unequivocally admitted in their written statement, as well as in cross-examination, that the suit lands were allotted to the plaintiffs (who were minors at the time) under the terms of the compromise decree. In view of this clear admission and the established legal position, defendant Nos.4 and 5 cannot claim any valid right or title over the suit lands based on a sale deed that was executed after the compromise decree had already taken effect. 17. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for defendant Nos.4 and 5 are not applicable to the case on hand. 18. The appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we answer the above point in the negative and proceed to pass the following; ORDER The appeal is dismissed. - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB RFA No. 100115 of 2023 No order as to the costs. In view dismissal of the appeal, pending I.As., if any, do not survive for consideration and the same are dismissed. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE Sd/- (G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE RSH, MBS / CT-CMU LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 18