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2025 DAILYLAW 43711 (KAR)

MALLAPPA S/O KALLAPPAP SHIRBADGI v. SHIVAYOGI S/O SHANKARAPPA KUPPAST

RFA/100209/2017 · 2025-04-01

G Basavaraja, Sachin Shankar Magadum

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Judgment text

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- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.100209 OF 2017 (DEC/INJ) BETWEEN: MALLAPPA S/O. KALLAPPA SHIRBADGI AGE: 24 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: SEMIKERI, TQ/DIST: BAGALKOTE. …APPELLANT (BY SMT. PALLAVI PACHCHAPURE, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. F.V.PATIL, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SHIVAYOGI S/O. SHANKARAPPA KUPPAST SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs., 1(A). SMT. GANGUBAI W/O. SHIVAYOGI KUPPAST AGE: 72 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: PLOT NO.M23, “ MATRU KRUPA”, SECTOR NO.63/A, NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOTE. 1(B). SMT. MEENA W/O. MAHADEV KAPASI D/O. SHIVAYOGAPPA KUPPAST, AGE: 52 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: #402, CHATTER ONI, YAMAKANAMARADI, TQ: HUKKERI, DIST: BELAGAVI. 1(C). SMT. SAVITA W/O. VISHWANATH BAGEWADI D/O. SHIVAYOGAPPA KUPPAST, AGE: 50 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: NEAR GOURI TEMPLE, NIDAGUNDI, TQ: NIDAGUNDI, DIST: VIJAYAPUR. Digitally signed by MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH Date: 2025.04.19 11:13:32 +0530 - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 1(D). SMT. ANITA W/O. VEERESH CHOLAKE D/O. SHIVAYOGAPPA KUPPAST, AGE: 49 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: #7, SHRIJI TOWERS, KALA NAGAR, BUS STOP, INDIRA NAGAR, NASHIK, DIST: NASHIK, MAHARASHTRA STATE. 1(E). SRI. SHANKAR S/O. SHIVAYOGI KUPPAST AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: PLOT NO.M23, “ MATRU KRUPA”, SECTOR NO.63/A, NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOTE. 1(F). SMT. VEENA W/O. SHARAD SOLAPURE D/O. SHIVAYOGAPPA KUPPAST, AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: #554, WARD NO.2, CHATI GALLI, JATT, TQ: JATT, DIST: SANGLI, MAHARASHTRA STATE. 2. SRI. NAGARAJ S/O. SHANKARAPPA KUPPAST AGE: 44 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: BALAPPAGOL STREET, WARD NO.4, HOUSE NO.372, BAGALKOTE. 3. SRI. CHANNABASAPPA @ CHANNAPPA S/O. SHANKARAPPA KUPPAST, AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: BALAPPAGOL STREET, WARD NO.4, HOUSE NO.372, BAGALKOTE. 4(A). SRI. MRUTHANJAYA S/O. SHANKARAPPA KUPPAST, SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs., SMT. SUJATA W/O. MRUTHANJAYA KUPPAST AGE: 34 YEARS, OCC: HOMEMAKER, R/O: TALIKOTI, TQ: MUDDEBIHAL, DIST: BIJAPUR. 4(B). KUMAR. SHANKAR @ SHANKREPPA S/O. MRUTHANJAYA KUPPAST, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 AGE: 12 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT, SINCE MINOR REPTD. BY MINOR GUARDIAN MOTHER/ RESPONDENT NO.4A. 5. SRI. BASAPPA S/O. KALLAPPA SHIRBADGI AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: SEMIKERI, TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOTE. 6. SHANKRAPPA S/O. KALLAPPA SHIRBADGI AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: SEMIKERI, TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOTE. 7. SRI. KALLAPPA S/O. MALLAPPA SHIRBADGI AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: SEMIKERI, TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOTE. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. PRAKASH N.HOSAMANE, ADVOCATE FOR R1(A TO F) AND R4(A); R4(B) IS MINOR REP. BY R4(A); SRI. B.S.KAMATE, ADVOCATE FOR R2 AND R3; R5 AND R6 ARE SERVED; SRI. M.M.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R7) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 READ WITH ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF CPC 1908 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 13.04.2017 PASSED IN O.S.NO.94/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE I- ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, BAGALKOT, DISMISSING THE SUIT FILED FOR DECLARATION AND PERPETUAL INJUNCTION. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) The captioned appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiff who has questioned the dismissal decree rendered by the Court below in O.S.No.94/2012. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. The family tree is as under: Mallappa (original propositus) Kallappa (Deft 7) Pandappa (dead) Basappa Shankrappa Mallappa (Deft No.5) (Deft No.6) (Plaintiff) 4. The facts leading to the case are as under: Plaintiff is the youngest son of Defendant No.7/Kallappa. Plaintiff has instituted the suit in O.S.No.94/2012 assailing the sale deed executed by his father- defendant No.7 on 24.08.1995, thereby selling the - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 suit schedule property in favour of defendants 1 to 4. In the suit, plaintiff has alleged that though suit schedule property was allotted to plaintiff and his brothers namely defendants 5 and 6, who were minors in a family partition and they were represented by their uncle Pandappa, who was a minor guardian, their father defendant No.7 acting adversely to the interest of plaintiff and his brothers has illegally alienated the suit schedule property without seeking permission from the Court and therefore, the present suit is filed seeking relief of declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant No.7 as null and void and not binding on plaintiff's share. A further declaration is sought to declare plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6 as absolute owners and in possession of suit land and for consequential relief of perpetual injunction against defendants 1 to 4 from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession. 5. On receipt of summons, defendant No.2 has filed the written statement and has stoutly denied the - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 entire averments made in the plaint. Defendant No.2, on the contrary, justifying the alienations has specifically pleaded that the sale transaction by defendant No.7, who is the father of plaintiff was for family necessity and defendants 5 and 6 are benefited by the said transaction and therefore, it is binding on plaintiff and other defendants. The defendant No.2 contended that pursuant to alienation by defendant No.7, defendants 1 to 4 having acquired valid right and title are in exclusive possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. Defendant No.2 further contended that the present suit is tainted with mala fides and therefore contended that the sale by defendant No.7 was to clear their family debts and therefore, the sale deed executed by defendant No.7 in favour of defendants 1 to 4 is binding on the plaintiff and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suit. 6. Plaintiff and defendants to substantiate their respective claims have let in oral and documentary evidence. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 7. The Trial Court after having assessed the oral and documentary evidence let in by both the parties, answered Issue No.2 in the negative and issue No.3 in the affirmative. While answering Issue No.2 in the negative, Trial Court held that plaintiff has failed to prove that the Registered sale deed dated 25.5.1995 executed by defendant No.7 is not binding on the plaintiff and has failed to substantiate as to how the sale deed is not binding on him. While answering Issue No.3 in the affirmative, trial Court held that defendants 1 to 4 have succeeded in substantiating that they are the bona fide purchasers of suit schedule property for valuable sale consideration without notice. The trial Court accordingly, proceeded to dismiss the suit. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memo would vehemently argue and contend that since defendant No.7 was addicted to vices, propositus-Mallappa, who is the grandfather of plaintiff allotted the suit schedule property - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 in favour of plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6 and the mutation vide Ex.P1 clearly demonstrates that Pandappa, brother of defendant No.7 acted as a guardian and therefore, she would point out that the subsequent mutation vide Ex.P3 is illegal and based on this Ex.P3 plaintiff's father Kallappa viz., defendant No.7 could not have alienated the suit schedule property in favour of defendants 1 to 4. Referring to the cross-examination of plaintiff, she would point out that the trial Court has virtually misread the alleged admissions elicited in the cross-examination of plaintiff. Pointing out the relevant portion of cross-examination, she would point out that plaintiff nowhere admitted that defendant No.7 gave instructions to draft the plaint. Referring to the relevant cross-examination, she has brought to our notice that this suggestion is rightly denied by plaintiff. By misreading this crucial alleged admissions, trial Court has proceeded on an assumption that this suit is orchestrated by defendant No.7 and at his instance, the present suit is filed. Referring to the provisions of Section 6 of Hindu - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, she would point out that since the suit schedule property was allotted to plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6, who were minors at the time when the oral partition was recorded in the family, this property has to be treated as minors' property and therefore, she would contend that the alienation of the property of minors without seeking permission, is null and void and therefore, the sale deed executed by defendant No.7 in favour of defendants 1 to 4 is not binding on plaintiff. 9. She has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the court in the case of Mallikarjuna vs. Mareppa and others1. Citing the said judgment, she would point out that defendant No.7, without previous permission of the Court could not have sold the minors’ property in favour of defendants 1 to 4. Citing the law laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench in a reported judgment, she would contend that defendant No.7 could not have 1 2008 (2) Kar LJ 227 - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 sold the suit property in favour of defendants 1 to 4. She has also placed reliance on the judgment by the court in the case of Ganapathi Santaram Bhosale vs. Ramachandra Subbarao Kulkarni and others2. Citing said judgment, she would point out that alienation made in 1995 is not at all hit by limitation, more particularly, Article 60 of the Limitation Act. Referring to the dictum, she would point out that in the present case, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that the sale was for legal necessities. Emphasis is laid on paragraph 21 of the said judgment to point out that in the absence of legal necessities, sale would not be binding on the plaintiff. She would then place reliance on the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of M.R. Vinoda vs. M.S. Susheelamma (D) by LRs. and others3. Citing this judgment, she has persuaded this Court to take cognizance of paragraph 12 of the judgment. 2 1985 (2) Kar LJ 104 3 (2021) 20 SCC 180 - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 10. Learned Counsels appearing for defendants 1 to 4 arguing in the same vein, have contended that the present suit is a collusive suit and therefore, request is made not to grant any indulgence. Both the learned Counsels have taken this Court through cross-examination of the plaintiff. Reading the relevant portion, they have brought to the notice of this court that the documents produced by the plaintiff were, in fact, applied and secured by defendant No.7, who is the father of the plaintiff and therefore, referring to this crucial admission elicited in the cross-examination, both the Counsels have contended that this admission is conclusive and fatal and goes to the root of the case. 11. Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, and meticulously examining the pleadings of the parties and also independently assessing the oral and documentary evidence let in by both the parties, the following points would arise for our consideration: - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit schedule property can be treated as minors’ property? 2. Whether the present suit filed by the plaintiff is a collusive suit and the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit? 3. Whether the trial Court was justified in non- suiting the plaintiff by answering Issue No.3 in the affirmative and holding that defendants 1 to 4 are the bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule property? 4. Whether the plaintiffs have made out case that they are entitled for relief as sought in IA.I of 2023? Finding on Point No.1: 12. The central contention raised by the plaintiff in the present suit is that defendant No.7 had no legal authority to interfere with or alienate the suit property on the pretext that it belonged to a minor. The plaintiff asserts that, given the nature of the property, defendant No.7 could not have lawfully exercised any power to sell or - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 transfer it in favour of defendants 1 to 4. In evaluating the merits of this argument, it becomes necessary to consider the statutory framework governing the rights and powers of guardians in relation to a minor’s property. In this regard, we find it pertinent to refer to Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the "1956 Act"). The relevant provision reads as follows: “6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.— The natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are— (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother: Provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl—the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl—the husband: Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section— (a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or (b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi). Explanation: In this section, the expressions "father" and "mother" do not include a step- father and a step-mother.” 13. Upon a careful reading of Section 6 of the 1956 Act, it becomes evident that the provision delineates the persons who are legally recognized as natural guardians of a Hindu minor, both in respect of the minor’s person and the minor’s property. However, it is significant to note that the provision specifically excludes from its purview a minor’s undivided interest in joint family property. This exclusion is critical and underpins the plaintiff's contention. Thus, where the property in question comprises a minor’s undivided share in joint family property, such interest cannot be characterized as the minor’s separate or individual property, and accordingly, it does not fall within the domain of management by a natural guardian. - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 14. To further reinforce this interpretation, it is apposite to refer to Section 12 of the 1956 Act, which provides additional clarity on the legal treatment of a minor’s interest in joint family property. Section 12 reads as follows: “12. Guardian not to be appointed for minor’s undivided interest in joint family property.— Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such interest.” 15. This provision unequivocally establishes that where a minor possesses an undivided share in joint family property, and the said property is being managed by an adult family member, the appointment of a guardian specifically for the purpose of managing that undivided interest is statutorily prohibited. The only exception to this rule lies in the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 which retains discretion to appoint a guardian in exceptional circumstances. 16. Applying the above statutory framework to the facts at hand, it becomes apparent that the mutation entry which records the plaintiff’s uncle, Pandappa, as the natural guardian of the plaintiff, directly contravenes the mandate of Section 12. This is particularly so when it is undisputed that defendant No.7, Kallappa, who is the father of the minor and thus the natural guardian under Section 6(a), is alive. Further, it is not the case of the plaintiff that defendant No.7 is disqualified under the proviso to Section 6. Therefore, the act of recognizing Pandappa as the natural guardian, to the exclusion of Kallappa, lacks legal sanctity and is unsustainable. 17. Moreover, the property in dispute is admittedly a part of the co-parcenary property within a joint Hindu family setup. As such, the minor’s interest in it is undivided and inalienable except in accordance with law. It follows that this undivided share cannot be equated with - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 the minor’s separate property so as to warrant any intervention or transfer by a guardian, whether self- appointed or otherwise. 18. In this context, the plaintiff places reliance on the mutation entry marked as Ex.P1. Given the centrality of this document to the plaintiff's argument, it is appropriate to extract and analyze Ex.P1 in full to assess its evidentiary and legal value. ºÀPÀÄÌUÀ¼À ¥ÀwæPÉAiÀÄÄ UÁæªÀÄ £À.£ÀA.12 UÁæªÀÄ: ¹Ã«ÄPÉÃj £ÉÆA¢£À C£ÀÄPÀæªÀÄ £ÀA§gÀ ºÀQÌ£À ¥ÀæPÁgÀªÀÅ ¥sÉÃgÀ¥ÁgÀ DzÀ ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥sÉÆÃl »¸ÉìUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀ¥Á¸ÀuÉ CªÀÄ®ÄzÁgÀ ¸À» CxÀªÁ µÀgÁ 4291 C¥À¸ÁvÀ ªÁlt vÁjÃR.20.07.1993 ¨ÁdÄPÉ vÉÆÃj¹zÀ j.¸À.£ÀA. d«ÄãÀÄUÀ¼À ¸ÀzÀgÀ PÀ¨ÉÓzÁgÀgÁzÀ (1) PÀ®è¥Àà (2) ¥ÁqÀA¥Àà vÀAzÉ ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV EªÀgÀÄ C¥À¸Áw£À°è ¸Àé ¸ÀAvÉÆÃµÀ¢AzÀ vÀªÀÄä ¥ÀævÀåPÀë PÀ§eÉ, ¥ÀævÀåPÀë ªÀ»ªÁl ¥ÀæPÁgÀ PɼÀUÉ vÉÆj¹zÀAvÉ »¸Áì ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. CzÀgÀ «ªÀgÀ C£ÀA. ¸À.£ÀA. PÉëÃvÀæ DPÁgÀ AiÀiÁgÀ »¸Áì PÉÌ (1) 3/2 1-04 0-44 80/3 6-27 9-51 81/2 0-22 1-06 82/2 8-19 4-18 (2) 49/475 4-17 2-13 190 9-8 14-63 R0-3 F ¥ÀæPÁgÀ G¨sÀAiÀÄvÀgÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ zÁR®Ä ªÀiÁrzÉ. 3/2, 49/4+5, 81/2, 80/3, 82/1, 190, DgÀÄ ªÀiÁvÀæ £ÉÆÃn¸ÀÄ eÁj DVzÉ vÀPÀgÁgÀgÀÄ §A¢®è, ªÁlt ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ªÀÄAdÆgÀÄ. ¸À»/- 27/8/93 ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà vÀAzÉ ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV EªÀgÀ »¸Áì PÉÌ 1. §¸À¥Àà, 2.±ÀAPÀæ¥Àà 3. ªÀÄ®è¥Àà vÀAzÉ PÀ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV C/eÉÆÃ PÁPÁ ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV EªÀgÀ »¸Áì PÉÌ - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 19. Upon a close and meticulous examination of the mutation entry marked as Exhibit P1, we find that the narrative advanced by the plaintiff in the plaint that the suit schedule properties were exclusively allotted to the plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6 at the instance of the propositus Mallappa during his lifetime is entirely untenable and unsupported by the documentary evidence on record. Contrary to this assertion, a plain reading of the contents of the mutation certificate in Municipal Extract (ME) No. 4291 makes it abundantly clear that what is recorded is not a bequest or exclusive allotment to the minors, but a family partition arrangement between two adult brothers, namely, defendant No.7—Kallappa (the father of the plaintiff) and his younger brother Pandappa. 20. A careful scrutiny of Ex.P1 reveals that, in the course of this partition, specific properties were allotted to Kallappa. However, while reflecting Kallappa’s share, the names of the plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6 were also incidentally recorded, with Pandappa being described as - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 their guardian. It is important to underscore here that Pandappa is not the natural guardian under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, but merely the uncle of the plaintiff, despite being so recorded. Moreover, the entry does not indicate that the properties were carved out as the separate and exclusive properties of the minors; rather, the context clearly shows that these properties were part of a broader familial partition between the adult coparceners. 21. From the tenor of the mutation and the factual matrix emerging from it, it is manifest that the partition was effected between the two brothers, Kallappa and Pandappa, who were coparceners in the joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law. In that partition, among the properties divided were Survey No. 49/4+5 which forms the subject matter of the present suit and Survey No. 190, measuring a total of 9 acres and 8 guntas. These properties were allotted to the branch of Kallappa’s family, and it is only by virtue of Kallappa’s position as a - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 coparcener and head of his branch that his children, including the plaintiff and defendants 5 and 6, derive an interest in the said properties. 22. It is, therefore, legally incorrect to characterize these properties as the separate property of the minors. Under well-established principles of Hindu law, a minor’s undivided interest in joint family property cannot be treated as his or her separate property. Such an interest arises by birth and is inherently indivisible unless and until a valid partition takes place. The minor, as a coparcener, holds an undivided share in the joint family estate, and this share fluctuates with births and deaths in the family. Hence, any assertion that the property was exclusively allotted to the minors, thereby creating for them individual, separate ownership over the property, is fallacious and legally misconceived. 23. Furthermore, the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 specifically Section 12 categorically bar the appointment of a guardian in - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 respect of a minor’s undivided interest in joint family property, provided such property is under the management of an adult family member, which is the case here. The Act thus reinforces the traditional position in Hindu law that no one can be appointed as a guardian for such undivided interest unless exceptional circumstances exist, warranting intervention by the High Court in its parens patriae jurisdiction. 24. Given that the properties in question are traceable to the propositus Mallappa and were held by his sons as coparceners, the very origin and nature of the title indicates that these are joint family properties. Consequently, the plaintiff’s contention that the suit schedule property was separately allotted to him and his siblings, thereby making it their exclusive minor property, is both factually and legally unsound. The mere reflection of minors’ names in the mutation entry does not ipso facto vest them with separate ownership over the property. - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 What they hold is an undivided coparcenary interest, flowing from their membership in the joint family. 25. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the properties in question, including the suit schedule property, do not and cannot assume the character of minors’ exclusive property. To hold otherwise would amount to a distortion of settled principles of Hindu joint family law and the statutory framework laid down in the 1956 Act. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in the negative. Finding on Point no.2: 26. Plaintiff in the present suit has levelled serious allegations against his father defendant No.7. At paragraph 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has alleged that his father/defendant No.7 is addicted to vices and in lieu of his vices, adverse to the interest of minors, he has sold the schedule property in favour of defendants 1 to 4 vide registered sale deed dated 25.05.1995. We deem it fit to - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 cull out paragraph 8 of the plaint. The same reads as under: “8. As submitted already, plaintiff and the defendants No.5 and 6 are the owners and in possession of the suit land. Kallappa the defendant No.7 is neither owner, nor possessor of the suit land. It is found from the said sale deed that Kallappa as described himself as owner of the suit land and has sold the suit land to the defendants No.1 to 4. It is submitted that consideration was shown in the sale deed at Rs.one lakh, when theactual market value of the suit land at the time of sale i.e., in the year 1995 was not less than Rs.20 laksh. The defendant No.7 Kallappa wasadicted to bad habits and was moving in bad company and for satisfaction of his bad habits Kallappa has sold the suit land just for thrown away consideration. It is further submitted that since Kallappa was not owner he had no right to sell the property. The sale deed executed by Kallappa in favour of defendants No.1 to 4 has not conferred any right, or interest on the defendants No.1 to 4. In spite of the sale deed plaintiff and the defendants No.5 and 6 are continued to be the owners and n possession of the suit land.” - 24 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 27. However, there remains one critical and compelling aspect that merits the court’s careful consideration and scrutiny. This pertains to the restoration of the name of defendant No.7—Kallappa in respect of the suit schedule property. As reflected in the mutation entry bearing ME No. 5018, marked as Exhibit P3, defendant No.7 succeeded in securing the reinstatement of his name to the property. The grounds upon which such restoration was sought and granted are significant, as they shed light on the underlying circumstances that prompted this development. 28. A closer perusal of Ex.P3 reveals that defendant No.7 approached the revenue authorities and requested that his name be restored in the property records, citing pressing financial constraints and urgent domestic necessities as the primary reasons for his request. The mutation entry specifically notes that these hardships arising out of personal and familial obligations necessitated the re-entry of his name in the revenue records pertaining - 25 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 to the suit property. These circumstances are not merely incidental or perfunctory; rather, they underscore the real and continued interest of defendant No.7 in the property as a coparcener and adult member of the joint Hindu family. 29. In our considered view, it is necessary to extract and refer to the precise language and contents of mutation entry Ex.P3, as it offers valuable insight into the factual matrix and the motivations behind the action taken by defendant No.7. The language of the entry, which we shall extract hereunder, clearly conveys that the restoration was not arbitrary but was the result of a conscious and reasoned process based on substantive grounds. ºÀPÀÄÌUÀ¼À ¥ÀwæPÉAiÀÄÄ UÁæªÀÄ £À.£ÀA.02 UÁæªÀÄ: ¹«ÄPÉÃj £ÉÆA¢£À C£ÀÄPÀæªÀÄ £ÀA§gÀ ºÀQÌ£À ¥ÀæPÁgÀªÀÅ ¥sÉÃgÀ¥ÁgÀ DzÀ ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥sÉÆÃl »¸ÉìUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀ¥Á¸ÀuÉ CªÀÄ®ÄzÁgÀ ¸À» CxÀªÁ µÀgÁ 5018 £ÉÆÃn¸ÀÄ eÁjAiÀiÁVzÉ. vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ §A¢®è. C./¥Á/PÀrªÉÄ ªÀiÁrzÀÄÝ vÁjR 18/7/95 ¨ÁdÄPÉÌ vÉÆj¹zÀ j.¸À.£ÀA.49/4+5 gÀ PÉëÃvÀæ 4-17 DPÁgÀ 2-13 F d«ÄãÀPÉÌ (1) §¸À¥Àà (2) ±ÀAPÀæ¥Àà (3) ªÀÄ®è¥Àà vÀA/PÀ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV C./¥Á/ ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà CAvÁ EzÀÄÝ FUÀ ªÀÄ£ÉvÀ£ÀzÀ C£Á£ÀÆPÀÆ®vÉ zɸɬÄAzÀ FUÀ C®àªÀ¬ÄUÀ¼À ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß PÀrªÉÄ ªÀiÁr ªÉÆzÀ®Ä EzÀÝAvÉ PÀ®è¥Àà vÀA/ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV CAvÀ zÁR®Ä ªÀiÁqÀ°PÉÌ 49/4+5 MAzÀÄ ªÀiÁvÀæ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ªÀÄAdÆgÀÄ ¸À» 19/8/9 PÀAzÁAiÀÄ - 26 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 PÀ®è¥Àà vÀªÀÄä ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ²gÀ§qÀV EªÀgÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ C®à¬ÄUÀ¼À PÁ¸À vÀA¢ ºÁUÀÆ EzÀÝAvÀºÀ PÁ¸À CtÚ£ÁzÀ PÀ®è¥Àà vÀA/ªÀÄ®è¥Àà ¹gÀ§rV CAvÀ zÁR°¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ zÁR®Ä ªÀiÁrvÀÄ. ¤ÃjPÀëPÀgÀÄ PÀ¯ÁzÀV 30. Now, in this background, we would like to refer to relevant portion of the cross-examination of plaintiff. At page 25 of the paperbook, the same reads thus: “¥Ánà ¸ÀªÁ®Ä: 2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 3 ¥ÀgÀ ªÀQîgÁzÀ ²æÃ J¸ï.PÉ.ªÉÊ EªÀjAzÀ: ¥ÀæªÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è CA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £Á£ÀÄ ºÉüÀ®Ä ªÀiÁ»w ¤ÃrgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. zÁªÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÉÆqɸÀ®Ä £Á£Éà ªÀQîjUÉ ªÀiÁ»w ¤ÃrgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. zÁªÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀAUÀwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉAiÀĪÀgÀ ªÀQîjUÉ ªÀiÁ»w ¤ÃrgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ £Á£ÀÄ ªÁzÀ ¥ÀvÀæPÉÌ ¸À» ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÉÛÃ£É C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. £ÀªÀÄä CdÓªÀÄ®è¥Àà¤UÉ JµÉÖµÀÄÖ D¹Û EvÀÄÛ £À£ÀUÉ ªÀiÁ»w EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ªÀÄ®è¥Àà£À ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉUÉ JµÀÄÖ D¹ÛUÀ¼ÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛªÉ £À£ÀUÉ ªÀiÁ»w EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. £ÀªÀÄä CdÓ¤AzÀ £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉUÉ ºÁUÀÆ £ÀªÀÄä aPÀÌ¥Àà¤UÉ CzsÀð CzsÀ𠻸Éì §A¢gÀÄvÀÛªÉ. £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉ, £ÀªÀÄä aPÀÌ¥Àà HgÀ°è »jvÀ£À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. £ÀªÀÄä PÁPÁ ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà DvÀ£É ªÀÄ£ÉvÀ£ÀzÀ »jvÀ£À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. £ÀªÀÄä aPÀÌ¥Àà ¥ÁAqÀ¥Àà EvÀ£ÀÄ vÁ£É ¥Á®£ÀPÀvÀð£ÀÄ CAvÁ £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉ ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄ vÉUɹ DvÀ£À ºÉ¸Àj£À eÉÆvÉUÉ £ÀªÀÄä ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß ºÀaÑPÉÆArzÀÄÝ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. £ÀAvÀgÀ £ÀªÀÄä vÀAzÉ vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ vÉUÉzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É £ÀªÀÄä aPÀÌ¥Àà¤UÉ £À£Àß vÀAzÉAiÀÄ ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß zÁR¯ÉAiÀÄ°è £ÀªÀÄä ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß vÉUÉzÀÄ ºÀaѸÀ¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. 1995 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉvÀ£ÀzÀ°è DyðPÀ CqÀZÀuÉ EvÀÄÛ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. £ÀªÀÄä vÁ¬Ä vÀAzÉ J®ègÀÆ PÀÆrAiÉÄà EgÀÄwÛzÉݪÀÅ C£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d.” 31. Upon a comprehensive reading of the relevant portions of the cross-examination, a revealing and crucial dimension of the case emerges, which strikes at the very - 27 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 foundation of the plaintiff’s claim. One of the most telling aspects, successfully elicited by defendants 1 to 4 during the course of cross-examination, is the clear and unambiguous admission that it was not the plaintiff, but in fact defendant No.7 his father who applied for and secured the certified copies of the very documents upon which the plaintiff now places reliance. This single admission casts a long shadow over the genuineness of the plaintiff's case and raises serious doubts regarding the true motivation behind the institution of the present suit. 32. The contents of the plaintiff’s testimony, when juxtaposed with the documentary evidence particularly Exhibits P1, P3, and P5 make it evident that these documents were not independently obtained by the plaintiff in the normal course of events. Rather, they were procured by defendant No.7, who had previously executed the sale deed in favour of defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiff himself has unequivocally admitted that it was his father who applied for the said documents from the revenue - 28 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 authorities. This admission goes to the root of the matter and completely undermines the plaintiff's assertion that the suit is a bona fide effort to protect his supposed interest in the suit schedule property. 33. Further, the cross-examination reveals yet another crucial and revealing fact: the suit schedule property is proposed to be acquired, presumably for a public purpose. This revelation, in conjunction with the plaintiff’s admission regarding the source of the documents, sheds light on the real impetus behind the institution of this litigation. It is not the preservation of the minor’s interest in the property, but the opportunistic intent to nullify a valid sale deed executed nearly three decades ago, in 1995, by the very person who now stands behind the plaintiff, namely his father- defendant No.7. 34. This pattern is not unfamiliar in property disputes arising within joint Hindu families. It has become an increasingly common tactic for litigants who have alienated their properties for valid consideration, often due - 29 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 to financial distress or other legitimate familial pressures, to subsequently challenge those transactions indirectly. When such persons later perceive the potential for gain such as increased land value or acquisition compensation, they resort to launching suits through their children or other family members, under the guise of protecting minors' interests. These suits often allege want of authority, improper guardianship, or violation of personal laws, conveniently ignoring the fact that the alienation was lawful, necessary, and validly executed at the relevant time. 35. In the present case, the evidence overwhelmingly points to such a scenario. Defendant No.7, having sold the suit schedule property in 1995 due to financial hardship and domestic compulsions as noted even in the mutation records now appears to be using his children, particularly the plaintiff, as proxies to undo the transaction and regain control over the property. The fact that defendants 5 and 6, who were also minors at the time - 30 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 of the sale, have not challenged the transaction within the legally permissible period of three years from the date of attaining majority, further weakens the plaintiff’s case. Their silence and inaction reflect acquiescence, or at the very least, the absence of any genuine grievance against the sale. 36. Taken together, these facts compel us to conclude that the present suit is not a genuine exercise of legal rights but a calculated, collusive attempt to invalidate a valid and long-settled transaction. The active involvement of defendant No.7 behind the scenes, the timing of the suit in view of the proposed acquisition, the procurement of documents by the very seller seeking to undo his own sale, and the strategic use of his son’s name as plaintiff all point unmistakably to collusion. 37. We therefore hold, without hesitation, that the present suit is a collusive and mala fide attempt to circumvent the sale deed executed by defendant No.7 in favour of defendants 1 to 4. It is a classic example of how - 31 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 parties, having once alienated properties for lawful reasons, attempt to revisit and reverse those transactions through litigation initiated in the names of their children, thereby abusing the process of law. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered in the negative. Finding on Point No.3: 38. Defendant No.7, following the partition evidenced by Exhibit P1, once again approached the revenue authorities. By submitting a joint Wardi (statement/declaration) in conjunction with his brother Pandappa, Defendant No.7 succeeded in having his name restored in the RTC (Record of Rights, Tenancy, and Crops) pertaining to the suit schedule property. Upon restoration of his name in the official revenue records, Defendant No.7, citing pressing family necessities, made the decision to alienate the suit schedule property in favour of Defendants No.1 to 4. The mutation recorded under Exhibit P1, which has already been discussed in detail while answering Point No.2, explicitly reflects that - 32 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 Defendant No.7 was compelled by unavoidable circumstances to dispose of the property. 39. The sale deed, executed in the year 1995, is an admitted fact and forms a significant piece of documentary evidence. Defendants No.1 to 4, after conducting due diligence and verifying all relevant revenue and title records, bona fide accepted the proposal made by Defendant No.7 and purchased the property for a valid and valuable sale consideration. 40. Although learned Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that there is a lack of convincing evidence to prove that Defendant No.7 was under compulsion or faced legal necessity to sell the property, both the mutation entry under Exhibit P1 and the recitals within the registered sale deed clearly point to the contrary. These documents collectively demonstrate that the alienation of the suit schedule property was effected by Defendant No.7 in order to fulfill genuine legal necessities of the family. - 33 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 41. This position is fortified by the principles laid down by this Court in a reported judgment delivered in the matter of Smt. Channabasavva vs. Smt. Gourawwa, decided on 20.10.2022 in Regular Second Appeal No.822/2013. In paragraphs 27 and 28 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Court has exhaustively examined and articulated the legal burden of proof required to establish a plea of legal necessity in cases of sale by a coparcener. These observations are directly relevant to the present matter and lend substantial support to the defence set up by Defendants No.1 to 4.Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the judgment would be relevant and the same is extracted which read as under: “27. It is a trite law that a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case, assumes greater importance and cannot lightly be set aside; for it should be remembered that the actual proof of necessity which justified the sale deed is not essential to establish its validity. It is only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed, and that the alienee should have acted honestly and made proper enquiry to satisfy himself of its truth. Therefore, recitals in the sale deed after lapse of time would play significant role - 34 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 when proof of actual enquiry has become impossible. 28. The legal necessity cannot be confined to payment of Government revenue and debts or maintenance of coparceners and members of their families or marriage expenses of male coparceners and daughters or performance of necessary funeral or family ceremonies. The above incidents relating to legal necessity are not the only indices for concluding as to whether alienation was indeed for legal necessity. The plaintiffs have also not placed any credible evidence to indicate that Kartha, who was compelled to alienate a portion of the land was not prudent enough in assessing the situation, which warranted alienation of a Joint Family ancestral property. Therefore, the transaction in the present case on hand has to be regarded and presumed that it was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the family. What was the precise nature of the things, which compelled the Kartha to alienate a portion cannot be expected for alienee to demonstrate, that too after lapse of 29 years. The plaintiffs in the present case on hand to counter recital in regard to legal necessity have failed to prove that the alienation made by Kallappa was found to be imprudent. Therefore, the alienation made by Kartha would bind the plaintiffs and the sale deed executed by Kartha in favour of defendant No.6 does not get vitiated.” 42. The judgment referred to above has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby lending greater weight to the legal principles enunciated therein. In view of the law laid down by the learned Single Judge of - 35 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 this Court, which now stands affirmed by the Apex Court, the challenge to the sale transaction executed in the year 1995 raised only in the year 2012 appears not only belated but also untenable in the absence of compelling contrary evidence. 43. The mutation entry marked as Exhibit P1, when read in conjunction with the recitals contained in the registered sale deed, clearly indicates that the transfer of the suit schedule property by Defendant No.7 was carried out with the intention of addressing genuine legal and family necessities. The judgment cited supra, which has already been extracted earlier, specifically holds that the recitals in a sale deed alluding to legal necessity serve as significant evidence indicating that such necessity was, in fact, represented and acted upon. Thus, the legal presumption in favour of such recitals stands strengthened. 44. The contents of Exhibit P1, as well as the language employed in the sale deed, together lend strong - 36 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 probabilistic support to the case advanced by Defendants No.1 to 4 that the alienation of the suit property by the Kartha of the family (Defendant No.7) was necessitated by compelling family circumstances. Therefore, it is our considered view that the documentary evidence, namely, the mutation entry and the recitals in the sale deed, sufficiently establish and substantiate the defence taken by the defendants that the sale was effected to meet lawful and pressing family needs. 45. In light of the foregoing discussion, and having perused the evidence on record, we are inclined to concur with the finding of the Trial Court on Issue No.3. The Trial Court, while addressing this issue, rightly concluded that Defendants No.1 to 4 are bona fide purchasers for value. This conclusion is amply supported not only by the evidence led by the plaintiffs themselves but also by the contents of the sale deed marked as Exhibit D1. Consequently, we find no reason to interfere with the said finding, which is firmly rooted in both fact and law. - 37 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 Accordingly, Point No.3 is answered in the affirmative. Finding on point no.4: 46. In view of the findings recorded by us on Points No.1 to 3 as discussed above, we are not inclined to extend any indulgence to the relief sought in I.A. No.1 of 2023. The application lacks merit and does not warrant interference, particularly in the face of the well-established rights of Defendants No.1 to 4 over the suit schedule property. It is pertinent to note that the sale deed in question, under which Defendants No.1 to 4 claim title, was executed as far back as in the year 1995. Over the years, their rights have crystallized and matured in law and equity by the passage of time. 47. Allowing the application at this stage would not only unsettle the long-standing rights acquired by Defendants No.1 to 4 through a valid, registered, and lawful sale deed executed by Defendant No.7 for a valuable consideration but would also cause serious - 38 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 prejudice to their vested interests. The sale deed was executed to meet genuine family necessities, and there is no substantive material brought on record to invalidate the said transaction. Thus, the indulgence now sought by the plaintiff under the guise of this interlocutory application would unjustly disturb the status quo and adversely affect the legitimate interests of the purchasers. 48. Even assuming for a moment that the application deserves consideration, we are of the clear opinion that on equitable grounds alone, it does not merit acceptance. Hence, the application is devoid of merit and stands rejected. Accordingly, for the reasons detailed above, Point No.4 is answered in the negative. 49. Before concluding this judgment, we also find it appropriate to take note of certain relevant facts pertaining to the overall circumstances of the case. It is brought to our attention that the plaintiff’s family continues to retain ownership over an additional extent of land measuring 9 acres and 8 guntas situated in Survey - 39 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 No.190. In this context, the alienation made by Defendant No.7 in the year 1995 though effected when the plaintiff was a minor cannot be said to have caused any irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff’s rights, especially since substantial family property still remains available. 50. The plaintiff, if so advised, is at liberty to seek partition and assert rights in the remaining ancestral property, which remains undisputed. Furthermore, it is significant to observe that Defendants No.5 and 6, who also form part of the same family and were similarly situated, have not raised any objection or initiated any legal challenge to the sale transaction even after attaining the age of majority. This prolonged inaction on their part further fortifies the position that the sale deed is binding on them as well and remains unimpeached to date. 51. In light of all the foregoing circumstances, and considering the totality of facts and evidence on record, we find no justifiable reason to interfere with the transaction executed in favour of Defendants No.1 to 4. - 40 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5827-DB RFA No. 100209 of 2017 The rights flowing from the said sale deed stand affirmed and protected under law. In the light of the discussions made above, appeal fails and accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE Sd/- (G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE ALB,LNN Ct:vh List No.: 1 Sl No.: 23