Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 4368 (GAU)

Smti Yana Rangmo v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh

BA/29/2025 · 2025-03-26

Parthivjyoti Saikia

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Page No.# 1/9 GAHC040004262025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : BA/29/2025 Smti Yana Rangmo Wife of Tabing Lamgu, resident of Upper Nyorch, Yupia, PO and PS Doimukh, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh. VERSUS The State of Arunachal Pradesh represented by the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : J Tsering, Logsang Yountan,Tonni Gammi,Dejum Tally,Tanur Gao,Tsering Gyatso,Adam Tatak Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, :: PRESENT :: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA For the Petitioner : Mr. J. Tsering, Advocate. For the Respondent: Ms. T. Jini, Addl. Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh. For the Informant : Mr. A. Tiwari, Advocate. Date of Hearing : 24.03.2025. Date of Judgment : 27.03.2025. Page No.# 2/9 O R D E R (CAV) Heard Mr. J. Tsering, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh as well as Mr. A. Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for the informant. 2. This is an application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, whereby the petitioner has prayed for releasing her husband Sri Tabing Lamgu (accused in the present case) on bail after he was arrested in connection with Chayangtajo P.S. Case No.06/2023 under Sections 103(2)/238(a) and 61(2) of BNS, 2023. 3. On 15th December, 2023, late Takom Dada and late Longya Lamgu had a dispute regarding ownership of Mithun. In that dispute, late Longya Lamgu attacked late Takom Dada with a sharp weapon. In his defence, Takom Dada also attacked Longya Lamgu with another sharp weapon. In that counter attack, Longya Lamgu sustained injuries. A police case being SPA P.S. case No.118/2023 under Sections 326 of the Indian Penal Code along with some other sections of the said Code came into being. In the same night, the present accused Tabing Lamgu along with 12 other persons (specifically named in the FIR) had caused damage to a building of late Takom Dada. They even set the residential house of Takom Dada on fire. A large amount of money was also taken away. 4. It may be stated that late Longya Lamgu had to be sent to Guwahati for better medical treatment. Thereafter, on 29th April, 2024, Longya Lamgu died a natural death. 5. Thereafter, on 13.12.2024, late Takom Dada disappeared. Next day, his dead body was found lying over a big stone in the middle of a river. The dead body had several cut injuries. The informant being the son of late Takom Dada, has claimed that the present accused Tabing Lamgu and other 12 persons who are specifically named in the FIR, had committed murder of late Takom Dada. Page No.# 3/9 6. Police registered the case as Chayangtajo P.S. Case No.06/2023 under Sections 103(2)/238(a) and 61(2) of BNS, 2023. 7. The present accused tried for getting anticipatory bail. When he failed to get favourable orders, he approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. On 21.02.2025, in the petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 2761-2762/2025, the Supreme Court rejected the prayer for pre-arrest bail and directed the accused to surrender before police. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that if the accused surrenders before police, and thereafter applies for regular bail, such application shall be considered as per its own merit. 8. Accordingly, the accused Tabing Lamgu surrendered before police. He was produced before the learned Executive Magistrate, Seppa, East Kameng, Arunachal Pradesh. It may be stated that he was produced before the Executive Magistrate probably there is no judicial courts at Seppa. 9. The accused prayed before the court that he was suffering from non- reconstructible peripheral artery disease (Beurger’s disease), and other related ailments. The accused submitted that a Board of Doctors has recommended that he is not fit to be remanded to police custody. 10. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned Executive Magistrate, Seppa directed the Investigating Officer, to obtain a Fitness Certificate from the Board of Doctors of District Hospital at Seppa and to produce the accused thereafter before the court for further orders. 11. The Board of Doctors opined that the accused was not fit to be kept under custody. 12. Thereafter, the accused was allowed to go to Delhi for getting medical treatment at Medanta Medicity Hospital. 13. Mr. J. Tsering has submitted that when the accused surrendered before police Page No.# 4/9 and when police arrested him and produced before the Magistrate, the law laid down in Section 47 and 48 of the BNSS, 2023, were not complied with. According to Mr. Tsering, the so-called arrest of the accused was in violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 14. In order to buttress his points, Mr. Tsering has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court that was delivered in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254. Paragraphs 28, 29, 45 and 48 of the said judgment are quoted as under: “28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the “grounds” of “arrest” or “detention”, as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned. 29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be. 45. We are of the firm opinion that once this Court has interpreted the provisions of the statute in context to the constitutional scheme and has laid down that the grounds of arrest have to be conveyed to the accused in writing expeditiously, the said ratio becomes the law of the land binding on all the courts in the country by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in Page No.# 5/9 the phrase “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest”. The “reasons for arrest” as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters viz. to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to the investigating officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the “grounds of arrest” would be required to contain all such details in hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the “grounds of arrest” would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the “reasons of arrest” which are general in nature.” 15. In respect of old section 50 A of the CrPC (new Section 48 of the BNSS 2023), Mr. Tsering relied upon Vihaan Kumar (supra), where it has been held as under— “3. The purpose of inserting Section 50A of the CrPC, making it obligatory on the person making arrest to inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure that they would able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person as permissible under the law. The arrested person, because of his detention, may not have immediate and easy access to the legal process for securing his release, which would otherwise be available to the friends, relatives and such nominated persons by way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of the detained person on bail at the earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue, and in addition to his relatives as mentioned above is not merely a formality but to enable the detained person to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity to him through his relatives, friends or nominated persons to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the requirement Page No.# 6/9 of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal. 16. In Vihaan Kumar (supra), it is further held as under: 21. Therefore, we conclude: a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1); b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved; c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1); d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non- compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1); e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory Page No.# 7/9 restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established. 25. A contention has been raised in the written argument that the grounds of arrest were incorporated in the remand report. This contention has been raised for the first time in written submissions before this Court. This is not pleaded in the reply filed before the High Court and this Court. The police submit a remand report before the learned Magistrate for seeking remand without serving a copy thereof to the arrestee. The reason is that the Police cannot divulge the details of the investigation to the accused till the final report is filed. Mentioning the grounds of arrest in the remand report is no compliance with the requirement of informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. 26. The stand taken before the High Court was that the appellant's wife was informed about the arrest. Information about the arrest is completely different from the grounds of arrest. The grounds of arrest are different from the arrest memo. The arrest memo incorporates the name of the arrested person, his permanent address, present address, particulars of FIR and Section applied, place of arrest, date and time of arrest, the name of the officer arresting the accused and name, address and phone number of the person to whom information about arrest has been given. We have perused the arrest memo in the present case. The same contains only the information stated above and not the grounds of arrest. The information about the arrest is completely different from information about the grounds of arrest. Mere information of arrest will not amount to furnishing grounds of arrest.” 17. Ms. Jini has submitted that at present, she has information that the accused is not in judicial custody as police had allowed him to go to New Delhi for medical treatment. Ms. Jini, therefore, submits that since the accused is not in judicial custody, he cannot file bail application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023. 18. I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides. 19. This is a peculiar case. Probably, none associated with our judicial system have come across such a peculiar case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had rejected the anticipatory bail application of the accused and directed him to surrender before Page No.# 8/9 police. He surrendered accordingly. On 19.03.2025, police produced him before an Executive Magistrate and sought 3 days police custody. The accused pleaded before the Magistrate that he was suffering from certain ailments. Therefore, the learned Magistrate directed police to produce the accused before a Medical Board of doctors of District Hospital at Seppa. The three member Medical Board opined that the accused was not fit to be remanded to custody. Thereafter, police allowed the accused to go to New Delhi for taking medical treatment. 20. In the Case Diary, there is an order dated 24.03.2025, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Kemang District, Seppa. This order shows that the Investigating Officer informed the court that the accused was admitted at TRIHMS for further treatment and on 20.03.2025, the doctors at TRIHMS had referred the accused to Medanta Hospital at New Delhi for stem cell therapy and the accused had already left for Delhi to get that treatment. 21. All those acts, are clear violations of statutory laws of our country. But one thing is clear that the accused obeyed the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. But the local police did not comply with all the provisions of law. 22. Mr. Tsering has submitted that since the accused surrendered before police and he was officially produced before the Executive Magistrate, it must be presumed that he is still under judicial custody and therefore, he is entitled to be released on bail. 23. As it is observed hereinbefore, that it is a fact that pursuant to the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the accused surrendered before police. It is also a fact that he was produced before the Executive Magistrate, who instead of remanding him to custody, directed the police to produce him before a Medical Board and the Medical Board opined that the accused was not fit to be remanded to custody. After that, there is no record, as to what had happened to the accused. It is Ms. Jini who submitted that she has information that police had sent the accused to New Delhi for getting medical treatment. But this is not an official act on the part of police. Page No.# 9/9 24. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court has reason to hold that the accused Tabing Lamgu is officially in judicial custody and therefore, he is entitled to file bail application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023. 25. The allegation brought against the accused shows that the informant had a long pending dispute with him. Police examined some witnesses. I have gone through the statements of those witnesses available in the Case Diary. There are no incriminating materials against the present accused, to justify his detention in custody. 26. Now, this Court is of the opinion that the accused deserves to be released on bail. Accordingly, the accused Tabing Lamgu who was arrested in connection with Chayangtajo P.S. Case No.06/2023 under Sections 103(2)/238(a) and 61(2) of the BNS, 2023, shall be released on bail of ₹50,000/- with a surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Kemang District, Seppa. 27. With the aforesaid direction, the bail application is disposed of. Case Diary shall be returned. JUDGE Comparing Assistant