- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, KALABURAGI BENCH DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 200251 OF 2023 (378(Cr.PC)/419(BNSS)) C/W CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 200250 OF 2023 IN CRL.A. NO.200251 OF 2023 BETWEEN SMT. PRABHAVATI D/O NINGANGOUDA PATIL AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS OCC.H.H.WORK R/O SINDAGI, TQ. SINDAGI DIST . VIJAYAPURA ... APPELLANT (BY SRI.SHRAVAN KUMAR MATH, ADVOCATE) AND SMT. SHARADABAI W/O MALLU CHAVAN AGED ABOOUT 46 YEARS OCC.CONTRACTOR R/O BANDAL ROAD OPP.SAW MILL SINDAGI TQ. SINDAGI, DIST.VIJAYAPURA …RESPONDENT (BY SRI.R.S.LAGALI, ADVOCATE) THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL BY SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 15.07.2022 PASSED IN C.C.NO.37/2020 BY THE COURT OF CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT SINDAGI, FURTHER TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED/RESPONDENT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND TO GRANT ANY OTHER REMEDY TO WHICH THIS APPELLANT IS FOUND ENTITLED IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. Digitally signed by SREEDHARAN BANGALORE SUSHMA LAKSHMI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 IN CRL.A. NO.200250 OF 2023 BETWEEN SMT. NEELAMMA W/O SIDDANAGOUDA PATIL AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS OCC.H.H.WORK R/O SINDAGI, TQ. SINDAGI DIST . VIJAYAPURA ... APPELLANT (BY SRI.SHRAVAN KUMAR MATH, ADVOCATE) AND SRI.MALLU S/O REVU CHAVAN AGED ABOOUT 54 YEARS OCC.CONTRACTOR R/O BANDAL ROAD OPP.SAW MILL SINDAGI TQ. SINDAGI DIST.VIJAYAPURA …RESPONDENT (BY SRI.R.S.LAGALI, ADVOCATE) THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL BY SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 15.07.2022 PASSED IN C.C.NO.289/2019 BY THE COURT OF CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT SINDAGI, FURTHER TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED/RESPONDENT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND TO GRANT ANY OTHER REMEDY TO WHICH THIS APPELLANT IS FOUND ENTITLED IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 08.04.2025 AT KALABURAGI BENCH AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, BEFORE THE PRINCIPAL BENCH AT BENGALURU, THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 IN CRL.A. NO.200251 OF 2023: CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH) This appeal is filed by the appellant/complainant being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 15.07.2022 in C.C. No.37/2020 on the file of the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sindagi, wherein the accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act (for brevity, ‘N.I.Act’). 2. Factual matrix of the case are as under: The accused had borrowed a hand loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the complainant in the month of June, 2019 promising to repay the same with interest shortly. However, he failed to do so. After repeated request, the accused issued a cheque bearing No.006268 dated 10-12-2019 for Rs.5,00,000/- drawn on Vijayapura District Central Co-operative Bank, APMC Yard Branch, Sindagi in favour of the complainant. When the same was presented for encashment, the same came to be dishonoured with memo dated 18.12.2019 as “Funds Insufficient”. The legal notice was issued on 23.12.2019. Despite service of notice, no reply was given. Hence, a - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 complaint came to be registered before the jurisdictional Magistrate. 3. The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the complaint has been filed before the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice, which is contrary to the Clause (C) of proviso of section 138 of N.I. Act. Therefore, it is premature complaint and section 138 of N.I.Act, not attracted on such complaint. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant/complainant is before this Court. 4. Heard Sri Sharavan Kumar Math, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri R.S.Lagali, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the legal notice as per Ex.P.3 was served on the appellant on 27.12.2019. The case came to be registered on 21.09.2017. However, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and proceeded with the case. In fact, before taking cognizance of the offence, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered the same and should have returned the complaint to the complainant to present it later. However, the Trial Court has - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 committed error which is contrary to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajanand Burange Vs Laxmi Chand Goyal in Crl.A.No.1229/2022 dated 12.08.2022. Making such submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the appeal. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted that the premature complaint is not the complaint in the eye of law as the said complaint is contrary to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandy and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713. Therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court has to be upheld. Making such submissions, learned counsel for the respondent prays to dismiss the appeal. 7. Having considered the said rival submissions, it is necessary to proceed with the facts of the case to determine as to whether the Trial Court has proceeded in accordance with law. Admittedly, the cheque was presented for the encashment on the date of its execution and the same came to be dishonoured on 18.12.2019. The legal notice was issued on - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 23.12.2019 and the same was served on 27.12.2019 and the complainant presented the complaint on 12.01.2020. 8. In the context of rival submission of the respective parties, it is relevant to refer the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajanand Burange Vs Laxmi Chand Goyal as stated supra wherein the paragraph No.8 reads as under: “8. However, on behalf of the respondent, it has been urged that the second issue which was raised before the three- Judge Bench has been dealt with in the following terms: “41… Now, since our answer to Question (i) is in the negative, we observe that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. This direction shall be deemed to be applicable to all such pending cases where the complaint does not proceed further in view of our answer to Question (i). As we have already held that a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the court of sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.” - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 9. It is also relevant to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 wherein the paragraphs Nos. 31 to 37 reads as under: 31. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.” - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 9. It is also relevant to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 wherein the paragraphs Nos. 31 to 37 reads as under: 31. Section 138 of the NI Act has been analysed by this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 546 : AIR 2000 SC 954] wherein this Court said that the following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act : (SCC p. 753, para 10) “(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.” 32. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 33. In K.R. Indira [K.R. Indira v. G. Adinarayana, (2003) 8 SCC 300 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 2002 : AIR 2003 SC 4689] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act could be completed if all the above components are satisfied. 34. Insofar as the present reference is concerned, the debate broadly centres around clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. The requirement of clause (c) of the proviso is that the drawer of the cheque must have failed to make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Clause (c) of the proviso offers a total period of 15 days to the drawer from the date of receipt of the notice to make payment of the cheque amount on its dishonour. 35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines “complaint”. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of the law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of the law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. 36. A complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 546 : AIR 2000 SC 954] and which we have approved, must be - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. 37. We, therefore, do not approve the view taken by this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia [Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1326] and so also the judgments of various High Courts following Narsingh Das Tapadia [Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1326] that if the complaint under Section 138 is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused the same is premature and if on the date of taking cognizance a period of 15 days from the date of service of notice on the drawer/accused has expired, such complaint was legally maintainable and, hence, the same is overruled.” 10. On careful reading of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court headed by three Judges Bench opined that a complaint filed before the expiry of fifteen days on which the notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to be disclosed the cause of action in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso of section 138 of N.I. Act and upon such complaint, the Court is precluded from taking cognizance. It is needless to say that, the findings of the three Judges Bench is held to be considered as ratio decidendi as against ratio of two Judges Bench. In other wards, the ratio laid down by the three Judges - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 Bench prevails over the ratio of Two Judges Bench. Therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandy stated supra held to be binding precedent. Hence, the findings of the Trial Court appears to be proper. 11. Hence, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER i. The appeal filed by the appellant/ complainant is dismissed. ii. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 15.07.2022 in C.C. No.37/2020 on the file of the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sindagi, stands confirmed. iii. The registry is directed to send the records along with this order to the Trial Court forthwith for necessary action. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 IN CRL.A. NO.200250 OF 2023 CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH) This appeal is filed by the appellant/complainant being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 15.07.2022 in C.C. No.289/2019 on the file of the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sindagi, wherein the accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act (for brevity, ‘N.I.Act’). 2. Factual matrix of the case are as under: The accused had borrowed a hand loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the complainant on 14.03.2017 promising to repay the same with interest shortly. However, he failed to do so. After repeated request, the accused issued a cheque bearing No.006262 dated 22.08.2017 for Rs.5,00,000/- drawn on Vijayapura District Central Co-operative Bank, APMC Yard Branch, Sindagi in favour of the complainant. When the same was presented for encashment, the same came to be dishonoured with memo dated 30.08.2017 as “Funds Insufficient”. The legal notice was issued on 07.09.2017. Despite service of notice, no reply was given. Hence, a - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 complaint came to be registered before the jurisdictional Magistrate. 3. The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the complaint has been filed before the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice, which is contrary to the Clause (C) of proviso of section 138 of N.I. Act. Therefore, it is premature complaint and section 138 of N.I. Act, not attracted on such complaint. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant/complainant is before this Court. 4. Heard Sri Sharavan Kumar Math, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri R.S.Lagali, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the legal notice as per Ex.P.5 was served on the appellant on 11.09.2017. The case came to be registered on 21.09.2017. However, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and proceeded with the case. In fact, before taking cognizance of the offence, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered the same and should have returned the complaint to the complainant to present it later. However, the Trial Court has - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 committed error which is contrary to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajanand Burange Vs Laxmi Chand Goyal in Crl.A.No.1229/2022 dated 12.08.2022. Making such submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the appeal. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted that the premature complaint is not the complaint in the eye of law as the said complaint is contrary to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandy and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713. Therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court has to be upheld. Making such submissions, learned counsel for the respondent prays to dismiss the appeal. 7. Having considered the said rival submissions, it is necessary to proceed with the facts of the case to determine as to whether the Trial Court has proceeded in accordance with law. Admittedly, the cheque was presented for encashment on the date of its execution and the same came to be dishonoured on 30.08.2017. The legal notice was issued on 07.09.2017 and - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 the same was served on 11.09.2017 and the complainant presented the complainant on 21.09.2017. 8. In the context of rival submission of the respective parties, it is relevant to refer the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajanand Burange Vs Laxmi Chand Goyal as stated supra wherein the paragraph No.8 reads as under: “8. However, on behalf of the respondent, it has been urged that the second issue which was raised before the three- Judge Bench has been dealt with in the following terms: “41… Now, since our answer to Question (i) is in the negative, we observe that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. This direction shall be deemed to be applicable to all such pending cases where the complaint does not proceed further in view of our answer to Question (i). As we have already held that a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the court of sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.” - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 9. It is also relevant to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 wherein the paragraphs Nos. 31 to 37 reads as under: 31. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.” - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 9. It is also relevant to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandey and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 wherein the paragraphs Nos. 31 to 37 reads as under: 31. Section 138 of the NI Act has been analysed by this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 546 : AIR 2000 SC 954] wherein this Court said that the following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act : (SCC p. 753, para 10) “(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.” 32. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 33. In K.R. Indira [K.R. Indira v. G. Adinarayana, (2003) 8 SCC 300 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 2002 : AIR 2003 SC 4689] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act could be completed if all the above components are satisfied. 34. Insofar as the present reference is concerned, the debate broadly centres around clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. The requirement of clause (c) of the proviso is that the drawer of the cheque must have failed to make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Clause (c) of the proviso offers a total period of 15 days to the drawer from the date of receipt of the notice to make payment of the cheque amount on its dishonour. 35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines “complaint”. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of the law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of the law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. 36. A complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 546 : AIR 2000 SC 954] and which we have approved, must be - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. 37. We, therefore, do not approve the view taken by this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia [Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1326] and so also the judgments of various High Courts following Narsingh Das Tapadia [Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1326] that if the complaint under Section 138 is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused the same is premature and if on the date of taking cognizance a period of 15 days from the date of service of notice on the drawer/accused has expired, such complaint was legally maintainable and, hence, the same is overruled.” 10. On careful reading of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court headed by three Judges Bench opined that a complaint filed before the expiry of fifteen days on which the notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to be disclosed the cause of action in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso of section 138 of N.I. Act and upon such complaint, the Court is precluded from taking. It is needless to say that, the findings of the three Judges Bench is held to be considered as ratio decidendi as against ratio of two Judges Bench. In other wards, the ratio laid down by the three Judges Bench prevails - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-K:5778 CRL.A No. 200251 of 2023 C/W CRL.A No. 200250 of 2023 over the ratio of Two Judges Bench. Therefore, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. Savitri Pandy stated supra held to be binding precedent. Hence, the findings of the Trial Court appears to be proper. 11. Hence, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER i. The appeal filed by the appellant/ complainant is dismissed. ii. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 15.07.2022 in C.C. No.289/2019 on the file of the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sindagi, stands confirmed. iii. The registry is directed to send the records along with this order to the Trial Court forthwith for necessary action. Sd/- (S RACHAIAH) JUDGE JS List No.: 19 Sl No.: 2