[2025:RJ-JP:43153] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 374/2024 Munnalal Sharma S/o Rameshwar Prasad Sharma, Resident of House No.24, Sitarampuri, Aamer Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan Presently Driver Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, Sanganer Depot (Rajasthan). ----Appellant Versus 1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Through Managing Director, Headquarter Office Chaumu House, Under Ajmer Pulia, Jaipur (Raj). 2. Executive Director (Operation), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, Headquarter Office Chaumu House, Under Ajmer Pulia, Jaipur (Raj). 3. Deputy General Manager (Zonal), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, Headquarter Office Chaumu House, Under Ajmer Pulia, Jaipur (Raj). 4. Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, Sanganer Depot, Jaipur (Raj). ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Arvind Sharma, Mr. Sunil Sharma For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 28/10/2025 1. Instant Civil Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC has been directed by and on behalf of plaintiff against judgment dated 16.09.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge No.3, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, dismissing plaintiff's first appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2020 passed by the Additional Civil Judge and Metropolitan Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan [2025:RJ-JP:43153] (2 of 6) [CSA-374/2024] in Civil Suit No.47/2012 whereby and whereunder plaintiff's suit for declaration was dismissed on merits. 2. Heard counsel for appellant and perused the material available on record. 3. It appears from the record that appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred as plaintiff) filed a civil suit for declaration to declare the punishment order dated 21.04.2010 so also the order of Appellate Authority dated 22.02.2011 as null and void, alleging inter alia that same are violative to the Principles of Natural Justice. Vide impugned punishment order, plaintiff was punished with stoppage of two annual grade increments pursuant to charge- sheet dated 10.02.2005 and amended charge-sheet dated 13.07.2009. Plaintiff came up with a case, as pleaded in the plaint, that before passing the punishment order, the Principles of Natural Justice were not adhered to as the copy of charge-sheet was not supplied to him timely and he was not given sufficient opportunity to defend the charges nor opportunity of personal hearing was accorded. The defendants in written statement, refuted the averments of plaint and contended that the plaintiff participated in the departmental enquiry which was conducted and concluded following the procedure envisaged under the Standing Orders of RSRTC and the punishment order does not vitiate in any manner. 4. It is to be noted here that plaintiff was served with charge- sheet with an allegation of driving the bus rashly and negligently and hitting a motorcycle due to which the motorcycle rider died on the spot and pillion rider suffered serious injuries. [2025:RJ-JP:43153] (3 of 6) [CSA-374/2024] 5. Learned trial Court, after framing issues and recording evidence of both parties, recorded a fact finding that plaintiff himself has admitted in his cross-examination that reply to the charge-sheet was submitted by him, he cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and was given an opportunity of personal hearing as well. The trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, concluded that from the evidence of plaintiff, it has nowhere been established that the enquiry against the plaintiff was conducted in breach of Principles of Natural Justice. 6. The trial Court noted in the impugned judgment that plaintiff has not disputed the occurrence of accident on 13.12.2004 and also the fact that he was driving the bus at the time of accident and his defence is only in respect of having no negligence on his part in occurrence of such accident. The trial Court noted in the impugned judgment that the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of the evidence, which came on record during course of departmental enquiry, passed the punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments which cannot be said to be irrational to the nature of charges and finally plaintiff’s suit was dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 25.02.2020. 7. Plaintiff preferred civil first appeal thereagainst which was considered on merits and vide judgment dated 16.09.2023, the first appeal was dismissed affirming the fact findings of the trial Court. 8. During the argument before this Court, counsel for appellant plaintiff contended that plaintiff was acquitted in the criminal case [2025:RJ-JP:43153] (4 of 6) [CSA-374/2024] vide judgment dated 29.09.2010, hence, for the similar nature of charges, he could not have been penalized. 9. The above contention of counsel for appellant has already been considered and dealt with by both the Courts below and it has been observed that the parameters for holding the accused guilty for commission of an offence, are altogether different than the criteria to prove guilt in civil proceedings of departmental enquiry. It was observed that the acquittal of appellant is based on lack of prosecution evidence and due to granting benefit of doubt, which is a cardinal principle applicable in the criminal cases. On the strength of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India Vs. Dalbir Singh [2021 AIR (SC) 454], the Appellate Court observed that once the charges levelled against the plaintiff in the charge-sheet stand proved by the evidence which came up on record, during course of enquiry, merely on the basis of acquittal of plaintiff in the criminal case, that evidences, may not be brushed aside. This Court does not find any manifest illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in such fact findings of the two Courts below, rejecting the contention of appellant. 10. No other legal submissions have been made in the present second appeal and no substantial question of law arises therein. The substantial questions of law as suggested in the memo of appeal are mixed questions of fact and law, which cannot be considered as a substantial question of law. 11. The scope of the High Court to grant indulgence in concurrent fact findings recorded by the two courts below, is extremely limited and confined to the existence of a substantial [2025:RJ-JP:43153] (5 of 6) [CSA-374/2024] question of law, while exercising its power and jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. In a series of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been categorically held as an established principle of law that the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or to come to its own conclusion. The High Court cannot set aside the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below, when such findings are based on appreciation of evidence. In this regard, reference may be given to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of S. Subramanian Vs. S. Ramasamy [(2019) 6 SCC 46]. The relevant portions of the judgment i.e. Paragraphs 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, are being reproduced hereunder:- “7.4 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per a catena of the decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 CPC, the second appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam' , in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal. 7.5. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1 SCC 434]. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: "Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second [2025:RJ-JP:43153] (6 of 6) [CSA-374/2024] situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise." 7.6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and the substantial questions of law formulated/framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be substantial questions of law.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case C. Doddanarayan Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy [(2020) 4 SCC 659], has observed that where two courts have reached a finding, which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against provisions of law and neither can it be said that any Judge acting judiciously and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then High Court is not required to interfere with such fact findings while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 13. As a final result, the present second appeal is devoid of substance & merits, hence same is hereby dismissed. 14. Record of the Courts below be sent back forthwith. 15. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. (SUDESH BANSAL),J NITIN /53