1 2025:CGHC:4745 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2502 of 2018 1. C.B. Agro Farm, SECL, GM OfÏce Road, In Front Of Kali Mandir, Mudapar, Korba District - Korba, Chhattisgarh, Through Proprietor Smt. Champa Banerjee, District - Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2. Smt. Champa Banerjee W/o Shri Devbrat Banerjee Aged About 50 Years Proprietor - C.B. Agro Farm, SECL, GM OfÏce Road, In Front of Kali Mandir, Mudapar, Korba District - Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioners versus 1. Ritendra Ahar S/o Shri Nathuram Ahar R/o – Village - Tor, Post- Barbanda, Police Station - Vidhansabha, Raipur, Tahsil And District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. The State of Chhattisgarh Through - The District Collector, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Petitioners : Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate. For Respondent No. 01 : Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate. For Respondent No. 02/State : Ms. Ankita Shukla, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Order on Board 27.01.2025 1. Heard Mr. Saket Pandey, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Keshav Dewangan, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 01 and Ms. Ankita Shukla, learned 2 Panel Lawyer, appearing for respondent No. 02/State. 2. By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 (for short, the Cr.P.C.) the petitioners seek to challenge the order dated 12.10.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Raipur in Criminal Revision No. 236/2018 by which the criminal revision preferred by the accused/petitioners herein has been dismissed and afÏrmed the order of the registration of complaint by the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Criminal Case No. 1938 of 2015 vide order dated 11.04.2018. 3. Brief facts of the case is that the complainant (Respondent No. 1) filed a complaint case (No. 1938/2015) before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Raipur (CG), against the accused persons. The complaint alleged that Accused No. 1, a registered firm, and the other accused, competent persons of the firm, engaged in rabbit farming. They allegedly lured the complainant with promises of better earnings, inducing him to invest Rs. 1,50,000/- in the firm on various dates. When the complainant demanded a refund, the accused persons gave him a cheque dated April 11, 2015, for Rs. 1,50,000/- drawn on SBI, New Shanti Nagar, Raipur. However, the cheque was dishonored due to insufÏcient funds in Accused No. 3's account. Consequently, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the competent Court at Raipur. 4. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, took cognizance of the offense on September 23, 2015, and issued summons to the accused. After their appearance, the petitioners moved an 3 application (Annexure P-2) on February 11, 2016, seeking discharge. The Trial Court rejected this application on April 11, 2018 (Annexure P-3), holding that discharging the accused would amount to reviewing its earlier order. The petitioners challenged this order through Criminal Revision No. 236/2018 before the Sessions Judge, Raipur. However, the revision was dismissed on October 12, 2018 (Annexure P-4), afÏrming the Trial Court's order (Annexure P-3). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order dated 12.10.2018 (Annexure P-4), is bad in law, thus, liable to be set-aside. He submits that the trial Court had proceeded U/s. 200 of Cr.P.C., thereafter taken cognizance U/s. 203 of Cr.P.C. thereafter, issued summons to the accused. The accused having been served the summons of the case appeared before the trial Court and moved an application for discharging themselves, deemed to be filed U/s. 204 of Cr.P.C. It is to say and submits that the trial Court has jurisdiction to recall order the of registration under the said provision but the Courts below had wrongly rejected the application holding the recall of order would amounts to review of earlier order, is absolutely meritless and without application of mind. 6. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 01 and respondent No. 02/State supported the orders passed by the learned trial Court as well as learned revisional Court. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the prayers and pleadings made in the petition along with the annexures annexed in the petition. 4 8. From the perusal of the order passed by the revisional Court, it was held that the accused individuals 1 and 2 were issued a cognizance order by the trial Court on 23.09.2015, and an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was registered, along with a summons issuance order. If the cognizance taken against the accused individuals 1 and 2 on 23.09.2015, was not lawful and was illegal, then the accused individuals 1 and 2 could have challenged the said order. However, as per the order dated 23.09.2015, the accused individuals were ordered to be issued a summons/notice, and on 11.02.2016, the accused individuals/petitioners appeared before the trial Court. Nevertheless, the application for discharge was submitted to the trial Court with considerable delay on 11.02.2016. The application for discharge submitted by the accused individuals/petitioners on 11.02.2016, implies that the trial Court's order dated 23.09.2015, would be set aside. In other words, the said application actually challenged the order dated 23.09.2015. However, the prescribed time limit for challenging the order dated 23.09.2015, has expired. Therefore, the order dated 23.09.2015, cannot be challenged separately through a delayed application for discharge. If the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are examined, there is no stage in summonable cases where an application for discharge can be submitted. Clearly, the petitioners/accused individuals intend to have the order dated 23.09.2015, set aside, which leads to the trial Court's conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to review its previous order dated 23.09.2015. Since the said order was not 5 challenged within the prescribed time limit before the competent Court, the accused/petitioner cannot now challenge the fact that cognizance was taken against them under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the alleged offense. Therefore, the impugned order of the revisional Court is just and proper. 9. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and also considering the impugned order passed by the revisional Court as well as learned trial Court, I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned revisional Court as well as the learned trial Court do not call for any interference and accordingly, the present petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. - Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Abhishek ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Digitally signed by ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Date: 2025.01.28 15:53:29 +0530