1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 13820 OF 2024 BETWEEN: 1 . SRI. SAMPATHRAJ S/O RAVINDRA .M AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS R/AT SANNIDHI, KALKAR BAJAL POST, MANGALURU TALUK D.K. DISTRICT-575 027. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. K. RAVISHANKAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . SMT. VRINDA SHETTY W/O DIVAKAR SHETTY AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS R/AT NO.401 FATHIMA APARTMENTS FALNIR, MANGALURU D K DISTRICT-575 001. REP BY HER SON AND GPA S/O DIWAKAR SHETTY AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT NO.401, FATHIMA APARTMENTS BRITTO ROAD, FALNIR MANGALURU, D.K. DISTRICT-575 001. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. RENSPRE PRITHESH D'SOUZA, ADVOCATE) R 2 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 29.11.2024 PASSED IN CRL.R.P NO.228/2023 PASSED BY THE III ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE D.K MANGALURU. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 09.09.2025, THIS DAY ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM C.A.V ORDER This petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. assailing the order of the revisional Court passed in Crl.R.P.No.228/2023 wherein the dismissal of the complaint for default by the learned Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short "N.I. Act") is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Magistrate. 2. The facts leading to the case are as under: Respondent/complainant instituted a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable 3 Instruments Act. Upon recording the sworn statement of the complainant, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and ordered issuance of summons to the petitioner/accused. As the petitioner/accused though appeared failed to appear on subsequent dates, a non-bailable warrant was issued. Despite the same, the petitioner/accused could not be secured. Consequently, the complainant invoked Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. seeking issuance of proclamation, which was accordingly ordered by the learned Magistrate. The petitioner/accused was thereafter declared as a proclaimed offender, and the complainant was directed to furnish details of the accused’s property so as to enable further proceedings under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C. 3. The learned Magistrate, however, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complainant failed to furnish the property particulars of the accused as required under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C. The said order was assailed before the Revisional Court, which, upon consideration, allowed the revision petition. 4 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, placing reliance on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Crl.P.No.201462/2019, contends that dismissal of the complaint by the learned Magistrate on account of non- compliance amounts to an acquittal within the meaning of Section 255 of the Cr.P.C., and therefore the complainant ought to have invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court instead of filing a revision petition. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the complainant submits that the dismissal was not on merits of the case but only on account of non-compliance with the requirement under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C., and therefore the same cannot be treated as an order of acquittal. It is further contended that in such circumstances, the revision petition was perfectly maintainable. 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and have perused the order of the Revisional Court with care. 5 7. The following points, therefore, arise for consideration: "(i) Whether dismissal of the complaint filed for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act post-appearance, on the ground of non-production of property detail under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C., can be construed as an acquittal under Section 255 of the Cr.P.C., thereby rendering the revision petition under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. not maintainable? (ii) What order?" FINDINGS ON POINT No.(i): 8. It is true that Section 204(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in express terms, does not make any specific reference to dismissal of a complaint on the ground of non-furnishing of property particulars. The said provision, by its plain language, contemplates dismissal of a complaint where the complainant fails to pay the requisite process fees within a reasonable time. However, the legislative intent underlying Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. is not confined merely to the payment of process fees; rather, it embodies a broader 6 principle that a private complaint cannot be permitted to proceed when the complainant fails to perform an act essential for the effective service of process and for enabling the Court to take further steps in accordance with law. 9. In this context, the rationale of Section 204(4) extends to other instances where the complainant’s omission stalls or frustrates the procedural progression of the case. Thus, even though the non-furnishing of property particulars required under Section 83 Cr.P.C. is not specifically mentioned in Section 204(4), the underlying purpose of both provisions must be harmoniously construed. Section 83 mandates the furnishing of details of the property sought to be attached as a precondition for effective execution of a proclamation or attachment order. If the complainant fails to comply with such a statutory requirement, the Magistrate is justified in treating such non-compliance as a failure to take necessary steps for the continuation of proceedings. 7 10. It must also be borne in mind that under Section 204(4), the power of dismissal is exercisable before the issuance or service of process upon the accused, i.e., prior to his appearance. The object of this provision is to ensure that the machinery of criminal law is not set in motion in a casual or defective manner and that the complainant diligently pursues all procedural obligations. Therefore, when a Magistrate is satisfied that the complainant has failed to furnish mandatory particulars such as those contemplated under Section 83 Cr.P.C. despite being afforded adequate opportunity, the Magistrate may, in the exercise of powers akin to those under Section 204(4), dismiss the complaint for non-compliance. 11. Such dismissal cannot be said to be beyond jurisdiction, for the Magistrate retains inherent authority to regulate proceedings and to prevent abuse of process at the pre-summoning stage. The dismissal, in effect, operates as a procedural consequence of the complainant’s failure to comply with statutory requisites indispensable for further action under 8 the Code. Hence, even in the absence of an express stipulation in Section 204(4) referring to Section 83 Cr.P.C., the principle of dismissal for want of necessary procedural compliance stands well within the contemplation of the Code, particularly when the complaint has not yet reached the stage of appearance of the accused or commencement of trial. 12. At the pre-appearance stage, the proceeding has not yet ripened into a “hearing” with the accused before the Court. The Code contemplates two common situations here. First, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. after examining the complainant and the materials, if no sufficient ground for proceeding is made out. Secondly, even after process is directed, the matter may still fail to move forward because the complainant defaults in taking necessary steps such as non-payment of process fee or failure to furnish process particulars invoking the principle of Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. or the Court’s incidental power to regulate its process before effective service. In either situation, the dismissal is a procedural termination anterior to 9 the accused entering appearance; it is not a judgment after trial within the meaning of Chapter XX. Section 255 Cr.P.C. contemplates a judgment of conviction or acquittal only “after taking the evidence and hearing,” which has not occurred at this stage. Nor is Section 256 Cr.P.C. attracted, because that provision presupposes “the day appointed for the appearance of the complainant, or any day subsequent thereto.” Consequently, a pre-appearance dismissal neither records an acquittal nor attracts the bar of Section 300 Cr.P.C. 13. After appearance of the accused- dismissal for default operates as acquittal under Section 256: Once the accused has entered appearance or is required to appear in a summons-case instituted upon complaint, the proceeding stands on a different footing. From that point, any subsequent date is “a day subsequent thereto” within Section 256(1) Cr.P.C. If on such a date the complainant does not appear, the statute prescribes the consequence in mandatory terms: the Magistrate “shall acquit the accused,” unless it is proper to adjourn the hearing or the complainant’s attendance 10 is dispensed with. This is a statutory acquittal for default; it does not adjudicate guilt or innocence on the merits, yet the Code expressly confers the legal effect of an acquittal. The order therefore carries the full incidents of acquittal, including the bar under Section 300 Cr.P.C., unless the acquittal is set aside in accordance with law. Correspondingly, the complainant’s regular remedy is not a restoration motion but an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C., subject to obtaining special leave. 14. The Court retains discretion to avoid undue hardship by adjourning the case or formally dispensing with the complainant’s presence where sufficient cause is shown such as representation by counsel or a short, satisfactorily explained absence but in the absence of such reasons, Section 256(1) operates in terms. 15. Distinction from an acquittal on merits under Section 255: The Code differentiates clearly between an acquittal after trial and an acquittal for default. Section 255 Cr.P.C. is 11 engaged only after commencement of trial ,evidence is taken and the parties are heard, resulting in a judicial determination on the merits of the accusation. Section 256 Cr.P.C., by contrast, brings about an acquittal because of the complainant’s non-appearance after the accused’s appearance; it is a procedural termination that the statute nonetheless treats as an acquittal. For the purposes of Section 300 Cr.P.C., both are “acquittals,” but only a Section 255 order reflects an adjudication on guilt or innocence; a Section 256 order reflects non-prosecution at a post-appearance stage. 16. For completeness, a different scheme applies outside summons-cases instituted on complaint. In warrant- cases on complaint, Section 249 Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to discharge (not acquit) the accused if the complainant is absent and the offence is compoundable or non-cognizable, provided the case is still at the pre-charge stage. Separately, in summons-cases instituted otherwise than on complaint, Section 258 Cr.P.C. permits stopping of 12 proceedings; depending on the procedural stage, the resulting release may have the effect of discharge or acquittal. The present delineation, however, concerns summons-cases on complaint, where the bright-line rule is anchored to the accused’s appearance: prior to appearance, dismissal does not amount to acquittal; after appearance, a dismissal for default attracts Section 256 and results in acquittal in the eye of law. 17. In this context, valuable guidance may be drawn from the authoritative pronouncements of the Kerala High Court in Tom Thomas v. E. Abdul Lathief and Another [2005 Cri. L.J. 313] and Krishnankutty v. Ramani and Another [2004 (1) KLT 355], wherein an identical question came up for consideration namely, whether an order passed under Section 204(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure dismissing a complaint for non-payment of process fee or failure to take requisite steps amounts to an “acquittal” within the meaning of Sections 255 or 256 of the Code. 13 18. In both decisions, the Kerala High Court has unequivocally held that an order of dismissal under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. is purely procedural in nature and does not partake the character of a judgment of acquittal. The Court observed that such a dismissal takes place at a stage prior to the appearance of the accused and before the commencement of trial, and therefore, it cannot be treated as an adjudication on the merits of the complaint or as a discharge of the accused from liability. The underlying object of Section 204(4), as explained in these rulings, is to ensure that the complainant diligently performs acts necessary to enable the Court to issue and serve process effectively. Failure to do so only results in a procedural termination of the proceedings at the pre-appearance stage, it does not bring about the legal consequence of an acquittal. 19. The Kerala High Court has further clarified that the proper remedy against an order of dismissal under Section 204(4) is not an appeal, which is competent only against a judgment of conviction or acquittal under Chapter XX, but a 14 revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Such orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or the High Court, since they amount to irregular or improper exercise of jurisdiction rather than a final adjudication of criminal liability. The ratio of these decisions reinforces the distinction between a dismissal for procedural default before appearance of the accused, which is revisable, and a dismissal for default after appearance of the accused, which is covered by Section 256 Cr.P.C. and amounts to a statutory acquittal appealable under Section 378(4) of the Code. 20. Thus, the settled legal position, as enunciated in Tom Thomas and Krishnankutty, is that a complaint dismissed under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. stands on a different footing altogether it neither terminates the prosecution with an acquittal nor bars a fresh complaint on the same facts, and the complainant’s recourse lies only in invoking the revisional powers of the competent Court to test the legality and propriety of such an order. 15 21. In the present case, a perusal of the record would unmistakably indicate that the petitioner/accused had entered appearance before the learned Magistrate through his advocate on 04.09.2014, as is evident from the order sheet dated 04.09.2014, furnished by the petitioner himself. It was only thereafter that the petitioner failed to appear on the subsequent dates of hearing, which compelled the learned Magistrate to issue a bailable warrant for securing his presence. However, since the warrant remained unexecuted, the petitioner was declared as a proclaimed offender in accordance with law. In this background, the complainant was constrained to invoke the provisions of Section 82 Cr.P.C. by filing an application seeking issuance of a proclamation against the petitioner/accused. The said application was duly allowed, and upon the accused being declared a proclaimed offender, the learned Magistrate directed the complainant to furnish the details of the properties of the accused to facilitate further action under Section 83 Cr.P.C. The order impugned further 16 discloses that the petitioner/accused was later found to be in judicial custody in connection with certain other criminal cases 22. It is evident from the record that despite several opportunities being afforded, the complainant was unable to furnish the requisite details of the properties of the accused. The learned Magistrate, taking note of this non-compliance, proceeded to dismiss the complaint, invoking Section 204(4) Cr.P.C., on the ground that despite sufficient opportunity, the complainant had failed to perform the procedural requirement necessary for continuation of proceedings. However, such dismissal, in the context of the present case, cannot be treated as a mere technical dismissal or a procedural termination under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. The crucial fact that the accused had already entered appearance before the Court, and that the complaint was dismissed post-appearance, renders the nature of the order substantively different. Once the accused has appeared, the proceedings transcend the pre- summoning or pre-process stage contemplated under Section 204. Consequently, any dismissal of the complaint thereafter 17 cannot be relegated to the status of a pre-appearance procedural default but must be regarded as a final adjudicatory order having the effect of an acquittal under Section 255 Cr.P.C. 23. Since the dismissal occurred after the accused’s appearance, the proceeding had already passed the preliminary threshold of Section 204. Thus, the dismissal was not at a stage covered by Section 204(4) Cr.P.C., but rather, it effectively terminated the complaint after the commencement of proceedings. Consequently, the order of dismissal partakes the character of a final adjudicatory order and, in law, must be construed as an acquittal under Section 255 Cr.P.C. 24. Once the accused has entered appearance and the complaint is dismissed for any reason whether for want of prosecution, non-compliance, or failure to take further steps, the dismissal cannot be treated as a mere procedural default. The stage of pre-appearance having concluded, the only permissible form of termination under Chapter XX is either 18 conviction or acquittal. Hence, in the present case, the dismissal of the complaint amounts to an acquittal in the eye of law, carrying all legal consequences contemplated under Section 300 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the complainant’s remedy, if aggrieved, would be by way of an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C., and not by way of a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The revisional Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition against such an order. 25. In light of the foregoing analysis, it is manifest that the order of the learned Magistrate, though styled as one under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C., in substance amounts to an order of acquittal under Section 255 Cr.P.C., rendered after the accused’s appearance and at a stage when the complaint was in continuation of trial proceedings. Consequently, the revision petition before the revisional Court was not maintainable and was liable to be quashed. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the affirmative. 19 26. On a comprehensive consideration of the statutory framework and the judicial precedents, the following conclusions emerge: (I) The power under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. operates at the pre-appearance stage, enabling the Magistrate to dismiss a complaint where the complainant fails to take steps necessary for issuance or effective service of process, such as non-payment of process fees or non-furnishing of requisite particulars. Such dismissal is procedural in character, does not adjudicate upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, and therefore cannot be equated with an acquittal. The proper remedy against such an order lies by way of a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C., and not by appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. (II) A dismissal of a complaint for non-compliance with an order passed under Section 83 Cr.P.C., where such dismissal occurs prior to the appearance of the accused or at the pre-summoning stage, falls within the ambit of Section 20 204(4) Cr.P.C . In such circumstances, the complainant’s omission to furnish property particulars, which are essential for continuation of proceedings, constitutes a failure to perform an act required for the issuance or execution of process. Hence, the resultant dismissal is covered under Section 204(4) and is revisable under Section 397 Cr.P.C., not appealable as an acquittal. (III) Once the accused has entered appearance, the proceeding crosses the preliminary threshold of Section 204. Thereafter, any dismissal of the complaint whether for default, non-compliance, or failure to take steps cannot be regarded as a technical or procedural dismissal. At that stage, the complaint can only culminate in a conviction or acquittal under Chapter XX of the Code. (IV) Accordingly, where the accused has appeared, and the complaint is later dismissed, such as for non-furnishing of property details pursuant to an order under Section 83 Cr.P.C. the dismissal partakes the character of a final adjudicatory 21 order amounting to an acquittal under Section 255 Cr.P.C . The complainant’s recourse in such cases lies in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C., and not in a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (V) Conversely, if the complaint is dismissed before the appearance of the accused, including at the pre-summoning or pre-process stage, the order is purely procedural and falls squarely within the scope of Section 204(4). Such orders, being non-final in nature, are amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (VI) In the present case, the accused had already appeared, and the complaint was dismissed thereafter upon the complainant’s failure to furnish property particulars. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be treated as one under Section 204(4) Cr.P.C. but must be construed as a final order of acquittal under Section 255 Cr.P.C. The revision petition before the revisional Court was thus not maintainable. 22 27. In view of the above recorded findings, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The order dated 29.11.2024 passed in Crl.R.P.No.228/2023 passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, D.K., Mangaluru, is hereby quashed and set aside. (iii) Liberty is reserved to the complainant to prefer an appeal. (iv) In the event the complainant chooses to file such an appeal within a period of four weeks from receipt of order copy, the time spent before the revisional court and this Court stands excluded for the purpose of limitation . Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE ALB