APHC010463252025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3548] WEDNESDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA WRIT PETITION NO: 24020 of 2025 Between: 1. P V L SURESH KUMAR, S/O LATE P.G.V. PRASAD RAO, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMN) GOVERNMENT GENERAL HOSPITAL, ONGOLE, PRAKASAM DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HEALTH, MEDICAL AND FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT AT VELAGAPUDI AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 2. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND FAMILY, WELFARE DEPARTMENT, GOLLAPUDI, VIJAYAWADA. 3. ANTICORRUPTION BUREAU, REP. BY ITS DSP, CENTRAL INVESTIGATION UNIT, HYDERABAD, STATE OF TELANGANA. RESPONDENT NO.3 IMPLEADED AS PER C.O. DT 19-11-2025 VIDE IA NO.2/2025 ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDAMUS to direct the respondents to immediately promote the petitioner as Joint Director since the respondent authorities have included the petitioner in the panel according to innpugned G.O.Ms.113, 2 Health Medical and Family Welfare (B2) Department, dated 22.08.2025 and deferred the claim of the petitioner only because of pendency of disciplinary proceedings which is per se contemptuous and further declare the action of the respondent authorities, as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, in the interest of justice and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to direct the respondent authorities immediately promote the petitioner as Joint Director, since DPC have already considered and included his name in the panel for the panel year of 2024-2025, in the interest of justice and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to permit the petitioner to implead the proposed respondent number 3 i.e.. Anti-corruption Bureau, represented by DSP, Central Investigation Unit, Hyderabad, State of Telangana, as a respondent number 3 in the Writ Petition, in the interest of justice and pass Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. C SRINIVASA BABA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR SERVICES I The Court made the following 3 ORDER: This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India with the following prayer: “may be pleased to issue a Writ Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDAMUS to direct the respondents to immediately promote the petitioner as Joint Director since the respondent authorities have included the petitioner in the panel according to impugned G.O.Ms.113 Health Medical and Family Welfare B2 Department dated 22 08 2025 and deferred the claim of the petitioner only because of pendency of disciplinary proceedings which is per se contemptuous and further declare the action of the respondent authorities as illegal arbitrary and contrary to law and violative of Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India in the interest of justice and pass orders”. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2. 3. As seen from the affidavit, the petitioner appears to have been trapped by the ACB on 05.02.2011, while working in the O/o RDMBHS, Hyderabad on the allegation of demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs.40,000/-. He was placed under suspension vide G.O.Rt.No.366, HM&FW (VC.1) Dept., dated 18.02.2011 and was reinstated into service on 30.11.2013 and thereafter, a case was registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Crime No.3/ACB-CIU- HYD/2011 under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 34 IPC. Thereupon, the charge sheet is filed on 10.07.2014 on the file of the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad. 4. Simultaneously, the Departmental Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide G.O.Rt.No.623, HM&FW (VC.1) Dept., dated 24.05.2014 for non-submission of APRs and non-intimation prior to purchase of property. 4 Thereafter, after the State bifurcation, his service was allocated to the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Government decided to proceed with the inquiry and appointed Inquiry Officer vide G.O.Rt.No.630, HM&FW(VC.1) Dept., dated 22.09.2025 to conduct inquiry against the petitioner, who was the formerly Deputy Director (Admn.,) O/o RDM&HS, Zone-VI, Hyderabad. 5. The arguments advanced by the petitioner is that, this is the third round of litigation knocking the doors of this Court for consideration of his case for promotion. Initially W.P.No.18959 of 2024 was filed wherein, this Court after examining the contour of facts disposed of the writ petition. The operative portion of the said order reads as follows: “6. Given the facts and circumstances of the case, without touching the merits of the matter, the Writ Petition is disposed of at the stage of admission with the consent of both the learned counsel, directing the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion in terms of G.O.Ms.No.257 General Administration (SER.C) Department, dated 10.06.1999, if the petitioner is in the zone of consideration and fulfills all requisite qualifications. The respondent authorities shall also conclude the inquiry within six months in accordance with Rules”. 6. When the case was not considered, despite the orders of this Court, he again filed W.P.No.17117 of 2025 and this Court on 10.07.2025 disposed of the writ petition, reiterating the same order passed in the earlier writ petition by slightly modifying the period by which time, the Departmental proceedings should be completed i.e., six (6) months to three (3) months. But the direction, directing the respondents to consider the case for promotion is not altered or dispensed with. 7. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has drawn the attention of this Court to the counter affidavit by reading the 5 G.O.Ms.No.257 wherein the instructions were drafted by the State regarding promotions and transfer to the higher category of employees who are facing disciplinary cases. There is no dispute regarding the said G.O., since this Court has already passed orders in the earlier two writ petitions which attained finality. 8. The version of the learned Assistant Government Pleader who vehemently contended that as per the directions of this Court, the name of the petitioner was included and thereafter deferred and so the orders of this Court are judicially complied with. This Court is not in agreement with the said arguments since when the initial judicial authority passed the order, the application of mind is very much to be present in the said order. As stated supra, both the orders of this Court in W.P.Nos.18959 of 2024 and 17117 of 2025 contain two limbs. The two limbs are to be effectively complied with. The 1st part is to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion and the 2nd part is to complete the enquiry within the period stipulated by this Court. Ignoring the 2nd part, the State again represented that the orders are taken into consideration and placed the petitioner’s name in the list. Even otherwise, assuming for a moment that the State has included the name and deferred, the reasons for deferment are also to be known to the petitioner, which are conspicuously absent. Even this Court, when reading the said deferment order is unable to trace the reasons for the said deferment. The reasons are also not assigned as to why the departmental proceedings initiated against the 6 petitioner are not completed. So there is no legal conundrum regarding the mentioning of the reasons. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basudev Dutta vs. The State of West Bengal and Others1, held as follows: “12.2. It is settled law that every administrative or quasi-judicial order must contain the reasons. Such reasons go a long way in not only ensuring that the authority has applied his mind to the facts and the law, but also provide the grounds for the aggrieved party to assail the order in the manner known to law. In the absence of any reasons, it also possesses a difficulty for the judicial authorities to test the correctness of the order or in other words, exercise its power of judicial review. In this context, it will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan [(2010) 9 SCC 496], wherein after a detailed analysis of various judgments, it was held as follows: 27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of Kerala [(1979) 4 SCC 782 : AIR 1979 SC 1918] V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (see SCC p. 788, para 14 : AIR p. 1922, para 14). 28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 197] this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : AIR 1974 SC 87], held that “rubber-stamp reason” is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra), SCC p. 854, para 28, to the extent that: “28. … Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions.” (See AIR p. 377, para 18.) 29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. [(1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] while giving the majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p. 658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p. 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: “Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.” 1 2024 INSC 940 7 30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that : (H.H. Shri Swamiji case [(1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] , SCC p. 658, para 29) “29. … „reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself‟.” (See AIR p. 11, para 29.) ……… 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. Of Maharashtra Ltd. [(1990) 3 SCC 280] a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set-up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various fields of public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific justifications for not doing so (see SCC pp. 284-85, para 10). ……….. 46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984] in SCC p. 602, para 11 : AIR para 11 at p. 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as “the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review”. In S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984] this Court relied on the decisions of the US Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corpn. [87 L Ed 626 : 318 US 80 (1942)] and Dunlop v. Bachowski [44 L Ed 2d 377 : 421 US 560 (1974)] in support of its opinion discussed above. 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. 8 (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision- making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37]). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.” 12.3. That apart, before passing the termination order, no opportunity of personal hearing was provided to the appellant to defend his stand effectively. In Mazharul Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P.[(1979) 4 SCC 537], it was categorically held by this Court that „personal hearing should be given, before termination of employee from service‟. The relevant paragraph of the same is quoted below for ready reference: “25. It was observed in that case that it is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the rights of any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his 9 case. The main requirements of a fair hearing, as pointed out by this Court earlier, are: (i) A person must know the case that he is to meet; and (ii) he must have an adequate opportunity of meeting that case. These rules of natural justice, however, operate in voids of a statute. Their application can be expressly or implicitly excluded by the legislature. But, such is not the case here. On the contrary, the two circulars issued by the State Government, to which a reference has been made earlier, expressly imported these principles of natural justice and required that in all cases in which the services of an officer or servant were to be determined on the ground of his unsuitability, they must be given an opportunity of personal hearing by the Committee. The whole purpose of the personal interview was that, when it was proposed to declare an official unsuitable for absorption, the Committee had to afford him an opportunity to appear before it and clear up his position. Since it is nobody‟s case that such an opportunity was afforded to the appellant, we would hold that the order dated August 26, 1967 (of termination of his services passed by the State) suffers from a serious legal infirmity and must be quashed. He will, therefore, have to be treated as having continued in service till the age of superannuation and entitled to all the benefits incidental to such a declaration.” 12.4. In S.Govindaraju v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [(1986) 3 SCC 273] again, this Court held thus: “7…..There is no dispute that the appellant‟s services were terminated on the ground of his being found unsuitable for the appointment and as a result of which his name was deleted from the select list, and he forfeited his chance for appointment. Once a candidate is selected and his name is included in the select list for appointment in accordance with the Regulations, he gets a right to be considered for appointment as and when vacancy arises. On the removal of his name from the select list serious consequences entail as he forfeits his right to employment in future. In such a situation even though the Regulations do not stipulate for affording any opportunity to the employee, the principles of natural justice would be attracted and the employee would be entitled to an opportunity of explanation, though no elaborate enquiry would be necessary. Giving an opportunity of explanation would meet the bare minimal requirement of natural justice. Before the services of an employee are terminated, resulting in forfeiture of his right to be considered for employment, opportunity of explanation must be afforded to the employee concerned. The appellant was not afforded any opportunity of explanation before the issue of the impugned order; consequently the order is rendered null and void being inconsistent with the principles of natural justice…” 12.5. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa [(2024) 1 SCC 632], in an unequivocal terms observed as follows: 10 “73. This Court has repeatedly observed that even when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them. 74. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the victim / complainants and wrap up the complaints expeditiously, the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to the appellant. It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justice must not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done. The principles of audi alteram partem could not have been thrown to the winds in this cavalier manner.” 12.6. It is manifestly clear from the above judgments that reasons are heartbeat of every order and every notice must specify the grounds on which the administrative or quasi-judicial authority intends to proceed; if any document is relied upon to form the basis of enquiry, such document must be furnished to the employee; it is only then a meaningful reply can be furnished; and the failure to furnish the documents referred and relied in the notice would vitiate the entire proceedings as being arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice; and before taking any adverse decision, the aggrieved person must be given an opportunity of personal hearing. In the light of the same, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of termination passed against the appellant is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice and it cannot be sustained. 10. This Court, without going into the facts of the case, straightly questioned the learned Assistant Government Pleader as to the status of the criminal case and also the Departmental inquiry i.e., whether they are pending or completed as per the directions of this Court. For which, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has fairly stated that there is nothing mentioned in the counter. 11. Without hesitation, this Court finds that the earlier orders passed by this Court have become final and the promotion on the ground that the proceedings are pending is denied to the petitioner. In the order in the 2nd writ petition, dated 10.07.2025, three months’ time was granted to the respondents to complete the Departmental inquiry. However, even as on today, there is no progress. 11 12. The learned Assistant Government Pleader drawn the attention of the Court regarding the proceedings issued by the Government dated 22.08.2025 vide G.O.Ms.No.113 which contains that DPC was constituted for filling up of the vacant posts of Joint Director (Administration) from the feeder category of Deputy Director (Administration) for the supplementary panel year 2024-2025. He points out that the petitioner’s case was considered and placed at Sl.No.3 in the seniority list. In the remarks column, it is mentioned that his case was included & deferred. Nothing else is pointed out in the said G.O.Ms.113, as to why the petitioner’s case is deferred despite the direction by this Court to consider his case, if he falls in the zone of consideration. 13. At the cost of reiteration, this Court earlier directed to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion, if he falls under the zone of consideration as per the G.O.Ms.No.257. The other limb is to complete inquiry within a period of three months. Both the directions run concurrently and State/Respondents has the duty to complete the inquiry within the stipulated period as directed by this Court in the earlier orders, failing to do so, an application for extension need to be moved before this Court and in the absence of the same, this Court shall construe that the Departmental inquiry is still in progress and has not been concluded. For the fault of the Government, the employee cannot be penalized in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Pilla Sitaram Patrudu and Others vs. Union of India and Others2. 2 (1996) 8 SCC 637 12 14. In the present case, the latches on the part of the Government are clearly echoing and hence this Court deems it proper to dispose of the writ petition, directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner to the post of Joint Director dehors pending Departmental inquiry and this will not preclude the Department to conclude the inquiry and take appropriate action pursuant to the outcome of the inquiry. 15. In fine, this Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA Date:17.12.2025 KNN/BMS 13 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA W.P.No.24020 of 2025 17.12.2025 KNN/BMS