APHC010505342025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY,THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA WRIT PETITION NO: 25970 OF Between: 1. GAYATRI CHILDREN BASED ECO TOURISM PROJECTS, REP BY ITS PROPRIETOR INDUKURI KRISHNAM RAJU, 58 NO.502, SRI KRISHNA TOWERS, APSEB COLONY, BUTCHIRAJUPALEM, N.A.D.KOTHA ROAD, VISAKAPATNAM 027. 1. THE STATE OF AP, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, TOURISM AND CULTURE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, VELLAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DIST. 2. THE A P TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REP BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, 5TH FLOOR, STALIN CORPORATE OFFICE. AUTO NAGAR, INDUSTRIAL AREA, VIJAYAWADA. 3. THE DISTRICT TOURISM COUNCIL, VISAKAPATNAM, REP BY ITS CHAIRMAN THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, VISAKAPATNAM. 4. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TOURISM, AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, A.P.T.D.C, VISAKAPATNAM. Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. G SAI NARAYANA RAO Judgment reserved on 15.10.2025 Judgment pronounced on 18.11.2025 Judgment uploaded on 18.11.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) DAY,THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD PETITION NO: 25970 OF 2025 GAYATRI CHILDREN BASED ECO TOURISM PROJECTS, REP BY ITS PROPRIETOR INDUKURI KRISHNAM RAJU, 58-20-7/13, FLAT KRISHNA TOWERS, APSEB COLONY, BUTCHIRAJUPALEM, N.A.D.KOTHA ROAD, VISAKAPATNAM ...PETITIONER AND THE STATE OF AP, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, TOURISM AND CULTURE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, VELLAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DIST. THE A P TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REP BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, 5TH FLOOR, STALIN CORPORATE OFFICE. AUTO NAGAR, INDUSTRIAL AREA, VIJAYAWADA. THE DISTRICT TOURISM COUNCIL, VISAKAPATNAM, REP BY ITS CHAIRMAN THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, VISAKAPATNAM. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TOURISM, AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, A.P.T.D.C, VISAKAPATNAM. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: G SAI NARAYANA RAO 15.10.2025 18.11.2025 18.11.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3328] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA GAYATRI CHILDREN BASED ECO TOURISM PROJECTS, REP BY 7/13, FLAT KRISHNA TOWERS, APSEB COLONY, BUTCHIRAJUPALEM, N.A.D.KOTHA ROAD, VISAKAPATNAM- 530 ...PETITIONER THE STATE OF AP, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, TOURISM AND CULTURE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, THE A P TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REP BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, 5TH FLOOR, STALIN CORPORATE OFFICE. AUTO NAGAR, INDUSTRIAL AREA, VIJAYAWADA. THE DISTRICT TOURISM COUNCIL, VISAKAPATNAM, REP BY ITS CHAIRMAN THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, VISAKAPATNAM. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TOURISM, AND EXECUTIVE ...RESPONDENT(S): 2 Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR TOURISM 2. SRINIVASULA REDDY VAJRALA SC FOR APTDC Ltd The Court made the following ORAL ORDER: Heard U. Nagendra Babu, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri G. Sai Narayana Rao, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and Sri V. Srinivasula Reddy, Ld. Standing Counsel for the APTDC Ltd. 2. This Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief: “It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings of the 2nd Respondent vide Lr No. APTDC/19029/ 2020-AMC, dated:17.09.2025 in terminating the Agreement dt:30.10.2020 and asking the Petitioner to vacate Shop No.9A, on Rushikonda Beach, Visakapatnam without considering the Petitioner’s representations and replies as arbitrary, illegal, violative of Principles of Natural Justice and violative of Articles 21 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and to consequently Set aside the same and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice.” 3. FACTS OF THE CASE: The facts as projected by the Writ Petitioner are that the Writ Petitioner is in the business of running food shops/small eateries in the Food Courts at tourist places; that the Respondent Authorities who have built shops on Rushikonda Beach as part of Andhra Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation and with a view to make the Rushikonda Beach as a “Blue Flag Beach”, the Respondent Authorities have issued a Tender Notification vide APTDC/O&M/1/2020 dated 18.05.2020; that vide the said Notification, the Respondents have called for bids from interested parties for shops; that the Writ Petitioner herein, which had bidded for the shops, allotted Shop No.9A vide ‘Letter of Intent’ (LoI) bearing APTDC/O&M/9A/10-2020 dated 10.09.2020 3 (Ex.P.1); that on 03.10.2020, the Writ Petitioner herein had entered License Agreement (Ex.P.3); that the terms mentioned under the License Agreement dated 03.10.2020 (Ex.P.3) are that the License Agreement is valid only up to 30.10.2025 (that is for a period of five years from the date of License Agreement dated 03.10.2025); that there shall be a lock-in period of two years, thereby, preventing the licensee from terminating the License Agreement. 4. Clause-7 (Termination) of the License Agreement dated 03.10.2020 stipulates the terms and conditions of the license which stipulates that the license can be terminated on account of either default or if the nature of business is changed than what has been declared and also for violation of any other terms and conditions of the License Agreement. It is further submitted that Respondent No.2 herein has issued a Preliminary Notice to the Writ Petitioner on 10.04.2025 (Ex.P.5). Para-2 of the said Preliminary Notice would indicate that the Writ Petitioner has not adhered to the terms and conditions of the License Agreement for a long time and that there have been multiple breaches on the part of the Writ Petitioner including the default in payment of rental arrears. The Writ Petitioner was therefore required to submit ‘Performance Security’ for an amount of Rs.1,54,608/- in the form of a bank guarantee within ten (10) days. The Writ Petitioner has submitted a Reply on 18.04.2025 (Ex.P.6) to the Preliminary Notice. On perusal of the said Reply, it is noticed that the Writ Petitioner had admitted the fact that he had not been able to pay rent for some months on account of multiple problems. The Writ Petitioner has also stated certain other reasons and complaints against the Respondent No.2. 5. Subsequently, the Respondent No.2 has issued a Letter of Termination (impugned herein) dated 17.09.2025 (Ex.P.7). Para-6 of the said impugned Notice issued by the Respondent No.2 would indicate that on inspection of the premises it has been noticed that the shop of the Writ Petitioner had remained closed for the past four (04) months and the operations have not been 4 resumed by the Writ Petitioner. It has also stated that the Writ Petitioner did not respond to the phone calls nor had submitted the required Performance Security for an amount of Rs.1,54,608/-. Having been aggrieved by the Notice of Termination dated 17.09.2025 (Ex.P.7), the Writ Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition. 6. As an interim relief, the Writ Petitioner was seeking stay of the impugned Notice dated 17.09.2025. 7. This Court, after having perused the License Agreement dated 30.10.2020 (Ex.P.3) and after having perused the correspondence between the Writ Petitioner and the Respondent No.2 (Ex.P.5 to Ex.P.7), this Court had indicated on 23.09.2025 that it is settled law that a licensee cannot seek an interim Order suspending the Termination Notice. It is also indicated by this Court that although the correspondence between the Writ Petitioner and the Respondent No.2 (Ex.P.5 to Ex.P.7) has interchangeably referred to lease amount, the reference to lease amount is only treated as a casual reference because the agreement subsisting between the Writ Petitioner and the Respondent No.2 is essentially in the form of a License Agreement. The entire Agreement describes the nature of the agreement as only a license and has not been construed as Lease Agreement. This Court, having indicated that it is not inclined to grant any interim relief or even admit the Writ Petition, had rather granted time to the Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner to look up the law and assist the Court in this regard only with a view to accord an opportunity to submit before the Court any judgments which may be in favour of the Writ Petitioner. 8. When the matter was again listed on 25.09.2025, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner had sought further time for research. During the interregnum, the Respondent No.2 has issued another Notice to the Writ Petitioner for vacating the premises and for handing over of the possession of the shop. This Notice was shown as urgency by the Writ Petitioner and got the matter listed in the Lunch Motion before another Bench, as the Ld. Judge (Myself) 5 was on leave on the said date, and secured an interim order on 06.10.2025, wherein, the Writ Petitioner was directed by the Ld. Single Judge to pay 50% of the outstanding amount of Rs.7,22,498/- within a period of one week and till such time, the Respondents are restrained from taking possession of the subject property from the Writ Petitioner. ANALYSIS: 9. The law has been well settled wherein the distinction between the lease and license has now come to be well defined. It is also a settled law that a licensee cannot seek any interim relief restraining the licensor/owner of the property from terminating the license. It is also a settled law that the only remedy available to the licensee is to file a suit and seek damages even if the license has been terminated by the licensor without a valid reason. In other words, the Courts are restrained from injuncting the licensor either from cancellation/termination of the license or from evicting the licensee after terminating the license. The law is also well settled that a licensee is protected against immediate eviction only if the licensor has not exhibited due diligence in taking steps from evicting the licensee after the license is terminated. It is also settled law that once a licensee is always a licensee and such licensee can get no better rights even with respect to the enjoyment of the premises after termination of the license. 10. In Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi; 1977 SCC OnLine Del 130 : (1979) 15 DLT 168 (FB), a Full Bench of the High Court of Delhi had held in Para-25 as under: “25. There is a catena of authorities in support of the proposition, that in the case of a license there is something less than a right to enjoy the property in the license; it cannot be exercise by servants and agents and is terminable while on the other hand, in the case of a lease, there is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property or in other words the lessee is entitled to enjoy the property. A bare licensee having no interest in the property cannot maintain an action for its possession. A mere licensee has only a right to 6 use the property. Such a right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property but is only a personal privilege to the licensee. After the termination of the license, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree of the Court to obtain this right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. If however, the licensor uses excessive force, he may make himself liable to be punished under a prosecution, but he will infringe no right of the licensee. No doubt a person in exclusive possession of the property is prima facie to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he would not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh; (1985) 2 SCC 332, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para-8 as under: “8. The respondent was a licensee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. It is not open to him, during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else. It is his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately in case he has acquired title to the property subsequently through some other person. He need not do so if he has acquired title to the property from the licensor or from someone else lawfully claiming under him, in which case there would be clear merger. The respondent has not surrendered possession of the property to the appellant even after the termination of the licence and the institution of the suit. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to recover possession of the property. We accordingly allow the appeal with costs throughout and direct the respondent to deliver possession of the property to the appellant forthwith failing which it will be open to the appellant to execute the decree and obtain possession.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In Corpn. of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan; (2002) 5 SCC 361, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para-7 as under: 7 “7. “Lease” has been defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the relevant portion whereof reads thus: “105. Lease defined.—A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.” “Licence” has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to mean a grant by one person to another or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. Section 53 specifies the persons who can grant a licence and Section 54 lays down that the grant may be express or implied whereas Section 55 defines accessory licences. According to Section 56, only certain types of licences enumerated thereunder are transferable and not all. Duties of the grantors are specified in Sections 57 and 58 whereas Section 59 says that grantor's transferee is not bound by the licence. Section 60 provides grounds for revocation of licence and Section 62 the contingencies under which a licence is deemed to be revoked whereas Section 61 lays down that revocation of licence may be express or implied. Rights of a licensee, whose licence has been revoked in accordance with law, to remain in occupation of the property for a reasonable time after its revocation, have been enumerated in Section 63. Under Section 64, even if a licensee is evicted, though grounds for revocation of licence do not exist or forcefully evicted, his only remedy is to recover compensation from the grantor and not to resume occupation which undoubtedly would never mean that a licensee can be forcefully evicted by the grantor without taking recourse to the provisions of law. We may usefully refer to the provisions of Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 which run thus: “52. Licence defined.—Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.” 8 (emphasis added) 13. The Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh had dealt with the similar situation in Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) and others v. M/s. Hotel Malligi Pvt. Ltd.; 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 1; (2017) 2 ALD 476 (DB). The Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh had held in Para-26 as under: “26. The concept of a licence, being wholly different from that of a lease, it is not open to the licensee to assert any leasehold rights over the licensed premises after expiry of the licence period and seek to prolong its occupation thereof. Its status upon expiry of the licence period is that of a trespasser. In any event, even if the licensee is in a position to establish that it was lawfully deprived of the benefits of the licence during its subsistence, the only relief that it can seek is in the form of compensation/damages. There is no legal and tenable basis for a licensee to assert a right to continue in occupation of the licensed premises after expiry of the licence period. The Court below seems to have been unmindful of the distinction between a licence and a lease, as is clear from the order dated 29.09.2016 passed in Arbitration O.P. No. 2229 of 2016, where it used the terms licence and lease interchangeably.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while upholding the ratio decided in Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority’s case (extracted supra) had held that unlike a lessee, the legal incidence of a license, in normal parlance, is that licensee has no right to possession of the demised property as the legal possession always remains with the licensor. Para Nos.17 and 18 of the above Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Samarpan Varishtha Jan Parisar and Others Vs. Rajendra Prasad Agarwal and Others; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 564 is usefully extracted hereunder: “17. In Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) v. Hotel Malligi Pvt. Ltd., the respondent was granted a licence by the appellant over the land admeasuring 2500 square meters. The Court reiterated the principle that unlike a lessee, the legal incidence of a 9 licence, in normal parlance, is that the licensee has no right to possession of the demised property as the legal possession always remains with the licensor. Thus, it was held as under: “26. The concept of a licence, being wholly different from that of a lease, it is not open to the licensee to assert any leasehold rights over the licensed premises after expiry of the licence period and seek to prolong its occupation thereof. Its status upon expiry of the licence period is that of a trespasser. In any event, even if the licensee is in a position to establish that it was lawfully deprived of the benefits of the licence during its subsistence, the only relief that it can seek is in the form of compensation/damages. There is no legal and tenable basis for a licensee to assert a right to continue in occupation of the licensed premises after expiry of the licence period. The Court below seems to have been unmindful of the distinction between a licence and a lease, as is clear from the order dated 29.09.2016 passed in Arbitration O.P. No. 2229 of 2016, where it used the terms licence and lease interchangeably.” 18. The Division Bench of Madras High Court in a judgment reported as General Merchant Association rep. by Secretary and Treasurer v. The Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner, Chennai held that appellants were allottees of a shop in the Corporation Fruit Market. The shopkeepers challenged the action of the Corporation terminating their licence and calling upon the licencees to vacate and surrender possession of the respective shops in their occupation. It was held, while dismissing the writ petitions, as under: “24. The entire case law on the subject revolves around the cardinal touch stone at which the relationship between the parties who claim to be licensors or licensees or lessors or lessees has to be decided is whether the grant creates an interest or estate in the property within the subject matter of the agreement. Delivery of exclusive possession, as has been held would not be conclusive to hold that the grant is a lease. The surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties as in the present case show that no interest in the property have not been created at any point of time in favour of the writ petitioners/licensees of the Municipal 10 Corporation stalls and the claims of the petitioners that they are lessees is far-fetched and cannot be sustained. xxx xxx xxx 26. It is also equally well settled the position of a licensee after termination becomes unlawful and the licensee is not entitled to any injunction restraining the licensor from evicting him as unlike a tenant a licensee does not have judicial possession and the possession always remains with the licensor and what was granted is a privilege in terms of the licence, which in the absence of such a grant becomes unlawful. 27. The occupation of the writ petitioners with respect to the stalls/shops in public market is referable to the licence originally granted as their status is that of a licensee. Once such a licence is terminated, the possession of the stalls become unlawful as they have no right and the possession of such possession after termination is not protected by any statutory provision. In terms of Section 63 of the Easements Act 1982, where licence is revoked the licensee is entitled to reasonable time to leave the property for removing all his goods which he has been allowed to place. A person continuing in the premises after the termination of licence, his status is as already pointed out is unlawful and he has no semblance of any right to continue in the premises.” 15. As recently as in the year 2023, the Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the similar situation in Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi, (2023) 7 SCC 361, wherein it had held in Para-11 as under: “11. At the cost of repetition, the suit is for eviction of the appellant-defendant from the suit premises and for recovery of mesne profits on the ground that after the appellant-defendant has parted with the possession of the property in favour of the respondent-plaintiff in part- performance of the agreement, he has no right to disturb his possession. He is simply a licensee and the licence having been terminated, he has no right to remain in possession but to restore possession to the person having rightful possessory title over it.” 11 16. Analysis of the above judgments would clearly indicate that a licensee cannot seek a preemptive injunction from termination of license. It is also settled law that the only recourse that is available to the licensee is to seek compensation for the loss suffered but the licensee cannot secure an order of injunction of termination of license by the licensor. Collating these principles with the facts of the present case, it clearly emerges that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable despite the fact that the Respondent No.2 is a State under Article 12, inasmuch as the Writ Petitioner would be required to file a suit for seeking compensation, if it is so advised. It must be held that the notice of eviction issued by the Respondent No.2 on 03.10.2025 is only a consequence of the Termination Notice dated 17.09.2025 (Ex.P.7). The correspondence (Ex.P.5 to Ex.P.7) between the Petitioner and the Respondent No.2 would indicate that there are certain breaches by the Petitioner herein. In this view of the matter, the Writ Petitioner which is a licensee is not entitled for any relief. 17. In the above premise, this Writ Petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 18. Needless to state that the Interim Order dated 06.10.2025 granted by this Court shall stand vacated. In terms of the Interim Order if the Writ Petitioner has deposited 50% of the outstanding amount, the same shall be appropriated. Also, needless to state that the Writ Petitioner is at liberty to file a suit for compensation, if so advised. It is also made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merit and the observations in the present order were made only for deciding the issues arising in the present Writ Petition. They shall have no bearing in any other proceeding in future. 12 19. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order. _________________________________ GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J Dt: 18.11.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked. B/o. MNR 13 06 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD WRIT PETITION No.25970 OF 2025 Dt: 18.11.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked. B/o. MNR