1 CRA No.1418 of 2016 2025:CGHC:45306 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1418 of 2016 Mukesh Kumar Jurri S/o Late Hemchand Jurri, Aged About 26 Years R/o Murumpara Village Tasi, Police Station Charama, Revenue And Civil District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Kotwali, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Ajay Kumar Chandra, Advocate For Respondent/State: Ms. Isha Jajodiya, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board 04/09/2025 1. This appeal filed by the appellant is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17/10/2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge F.T.C., North Bastar, Place Kanker, in Sessions Case No.60/2015 whereby the appellant has been sentence and convicted as under:- Conviction : Sentence Under Section 304-B of the IPC : Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.09.09 10:48:59 +0530 2 CRA No.1418 of 2016 2. Facts of the case, in brief, is that on 07.04.2015, the complainant Amar Chandra PW-2, Uncle of the appellant, along with Gayturam Jurri and Manbhar Nag, informed at Police Station Charama, that his niece-in-law, Savita Jurri/deceased was married to the appellant Mukesh Jurri about a year ago. After the marriage, Savita lived with her husband Mukesh in his house. He also stated that when he returned home from the field around 11:00 AM, the appellant informed him that the deceased had hanged herself in the room. When he reached the spot, he found the deceased hanging, thereafter, after opening the knot, placed her body on a cot. It is further alleged that the appellant is a habitual drinker and used to quarrel with the deceased. During the investigation, family members of deceased stated that after the marriage, the appellant started demanded Rs.50,000/- from the deceased and used to quarrel with her in this regard. After completing of investigation, final report was prepared. 3. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was also recorded in which he denied the material appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the case. 4. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced 3 CRA No.1418 of 2016 him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. (a) Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the case. There is no allegation of demand of dowry soon before the death of deceased. Learned counsel submits that there is a delay in lodging the FIR and no explanation has been given in this regard. He submits that the marriage of the deceased and appellant has been solemnized in the month of April 2014, and the incident has been taken place on 07/04/2015, between that period, there is no any compliant or FIR has been made by the deceased or by her parents regarding allegation of demand of dowry. The trial Court has not appreciated the evidence properly and came into erroneous conclusion while passing the judgment of conviction which is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the independent witnesses are declared hostile by the prosecution and in their statements there are full of contradictions and omissions. (b) Learned counsel further stated that the deceased has not even disclosed about any harassment by appellant, soon before her death regarding the demand of dowry. He submits that there is no evidence produced by the prosecution that at any point of time i.e. after marriage and soon before the incident, the appellant made any specific demand of dowry from the deceased and only 4 CRA No.1418 of 2016 general and bald allegation has been made against him without there being any specification regarding nature of alleged demand of dowry. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and stated that there are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellant is guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant which does not require for any interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. PW-12, Rikeshwari, sister of deceased, stated in her evidence that after the marriage, during the rice harvesting season, around November-December, her sister and the appellant visited her home in village Bhind. Her sister told her that the appellant was demanding Rs. 50,000/- from her and asked her to give money. She stated that because of lack of funds, she could not provide it. She further stated that her sister also informed her that if she did not give her money, the appellant would beat her after consuming alcohol. However, in cross-examination, she admitted that both the appellant and the deceased visited her home together. She 5 CRA No.1418 of 2016 stated that her sister needed money of Rs.50,000/- and asked her to give. In Para 12, she stated that she did not know why the deceased hanged herself. In para 13, she stated that she had not seen the appellant while assaulting her sister in an inebriated condition. 9. PW-1, Sukhdev, father of deceased, stated in his evidence that the marriage was solemnized between the appellant and deceased in the month of April, 2014. He stated that the deceased told him that the appellant used to assault her and saying her to bring money from her father. In para 8 of cross-examination, he stated that when the deceased called him during the paddy harvesting season, she only told regarding the trivial dispute. She did not told anything about money-related matters or being assaulted by the appellant. He further stated that when his daughter disclosed the fact that the appellant started demanding money from her, he did not report the matter to the police. He further stated that from the time of her marriage until her death i.e. a period of about one year, his daughter made a complaint only once with regard assault made by her husband and demand for money. 10. PW-3, Likhanram, brother of deceased, stated in his evidence that the appellant used to call him regarding the demand of money many times. When he told his sister that the appellant caller him 6 CRA No.1418 of 2016 over phone and used to demand money, then she told that the appellant is a habitual drinker and he has not paid the installment of motorcycle, that is why, he demanded money. However, in cross-examination, he stated that he did not depose in police statement that the appellant had come to take his sister back in a drunken condition. He further stated that his sister told him that the appellant demanded money for repayment of installment of motorcycle and harassed her to bring money, but this fact has not been recorded in his police statement. 11. PW-13, Dr. Seema Singh, who conducted the postmortem of deceased, and found that there was stiffness (rigor mortis) present in the hands and legs of the deceased. Due to pressure on the lower back, red-colored patches (hypostasis) were observed. The entire body of the deceased was swollen. Her mouth was partially open, and both eyes were half-open. Redness was present in both eyes, and the nails had turned blue. There was a crescent-shaped mark on her neck, located above the thyroid cartilage. The length of the crescent-shaped mark was 19 cm, and its width was 6 cm. However, in cross-examination, she stated that there were no injury marks or scratch in the body of the deceased. 12. From bare perusal of aforesaid evidence, it is manifest that the marriage of deceased was solemnized in the month of April 2014 7 CRA No.1418 of 2016 according to hindu rites and rituals. PW-12, Rikeshwari, sister of deceased, deposed that her sister needed money of Rs.50,000/- and for that, the deceased requested her to give and in her cross- examination, she stated that she did not know why the deceased committed by hanging herself and she also stated that she had not seen the appellant while assaulting the deceased in an intoxication condition. PW-3, Likhanram, brother of deceased deposed that his sister told him that the appellant demanded money for repayment of installment of motorcycle and harassed her to bring money, but this fact has not been recorded in his police statement. PW-1, Sukhdev, father of deceased, deposed that when his daughter disclosed the fact that the appellant started demanding money from her, he did not report the matter to the police and also stated that from the time of her marriage until her death i.e. a period of about one year, her daughter Savita made a complaint only once, regarding being assaulted by her husband and demand for money. 13. In view of foregoing discussion, it is manifest that the period between after the marriage and before suicide, no complaint was made by the deceased or her parents regarding the harassment or any demand of dowry by the appellant. The appellant had asked the deceased for money and also he had called PW-3, brother of deceased, over phone for money, but for payment of installment of motorcycle, not in the form of dowry. This fact came 8 CRA No.1418 of 2016 in the statement of PW-3 that his sister told him that the appellant purchased a motorcycle and for repayment of installment, the appellant demanded money. PW-12, sister of deceased deposed that she gave money to the deceased as she requested her for money. But, the deceased did not tell her sister that the appellant demanding money in the form of dowry. 14. As per the postmortem report of deceased, which was conducted Doctor PW-13, no injury or scratch mark was found on the body of the deceased. 15. In such circumstances, allegation against the appellant for harassment to the deceased in the form of dowry is completely absent, as the deceased was never harassed by the appellant soon before death and no complaint was made against the appellant before the death regarding the demand of dowry. 16. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act presumes as to dowry death, provision of which is extracted below for ready reference. “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).]” 9 CRA No.1418 of 2016 17. The aforementioned provision mentions that the person to be treated with cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry soon before her death. 18. Provision of Section 304-B of IPC is also extracted below for ready reference. “304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 19. In the aforementioned provision, it is provided that if a death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death it is subjected to cruelty or harassment. 20. A conjoint reading of both the provisions would show that it would not be enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time for invoking 10 CRA No.1418 of 2016 Section 304-B of IPC. But it is for the prosecution to prove that it happened “soon before her death”. The proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression and is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. The Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal and others vs. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi reported in 2003 AIR SCW 3570 observed that the expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression “soon before” is not definite. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 21. The Supreme Court in case of Kaliyaperumal and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2004) 9 SCC 157 while considering the appeal against the conviction under Section 304- B of IPC has held thus: “4. Section 304B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows: 11 CRA No.1418 of 2016 "304B. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation – For the purpose of this sub- section 'dowry' shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:- (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii)She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 12 CRA No.1418 of 2016 Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:- "113B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation – For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre- existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: 13 CRA No.1418 of 2016 (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC). (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 5. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession 14 CRA No.1418 of 2016 of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live- link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 22. Yet, in case of Manohar Lal (supra) considering the judgment in case of Hira Lal (supra) with approval has held thus: “20. The expression “soon before her death” used in the Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by this Court in Hira Lal & Others vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80,which reads as under: “8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows: “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub- section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning 15 CRA No.1418 of 2016 as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows: 16 CRA No.1418 of 2016 “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. —When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. [pic]Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on “Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry- related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been “soon before her death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or in connection with the demand of dowry”. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304- B IPC.) 17 CRA No.1418 of 2016 (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” Similar observation was made by this Court in Balwant Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab (2004) 7 SCC 724. In the said case this Court held: (SCC p. 728, para 10) “10. These decisions and other decisions of this Court do lay down the proximity test. It has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court that “soon before” is an expression which permits of elasticity, and therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts must show the existence of a proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death of the victim.” ” 22. The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific. No specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty or harassment made by the accused-Manohar Lal. Her statement is not reliable and not trustworthy. Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made none of the witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon before her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. The accused appellant was charge-sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but the Trial Court has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. In this background, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the accused harassed the deceased soon before her death for or in connection with a demand of dowry.” 23. In the present case, upon consideration of the evidence on record, it is evident that the allegations made against the appellant are 18 CRA No.1418 of 2016 omnibus and the same are insufficient to sustain the charges against the appellant. Soon before death, no fact has been attributed that the appellant had harassed the deceased in form of demand of dowry. 24. Applying the well settled principles of law and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the appeal is Allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. Earlier the appellant was released on bail by order dated 4-1-2017, however, subsequently, pursuant to the non-bailable warrant issued against him, he has been arrested and sent to jail on 21-11-2023, thus, as on date he is in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case, on furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as required under the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. The appellant shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 25. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep