1 2025:CGHC:25651-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2129 of 2023 Kapur Das Mahant S/o Shri Lakhan Das Mahant Aged About 25 Years Resident Of Lalbhatiya, Hardibazar, Police Station- Kusmunda, Presently Resided At- Darrakhancha, Hardibazar, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station- Ajak, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Vivek Bhakta, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Hariom Rai, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 19/06/2025 1. The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, the Cr.P.C.) questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.09.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C. (POCSO) Katghora, District Korba, in Special Case No. 53/2020 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: 2 Conviction under Section Jail Sentence (Rigorous) Fine Default Sentence 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the IPC) Life imprisonment till natural death Rs. 2,000/- 3 months 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, the Atrocities Act) Life imprisonment Rs. 1,000/- 2 months 3(1)(w) of the Atrocities Act 2 years Rs. 5,00/- 1 month All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that in March 2018, the appellant / accused used to come to the victim's house on the pretext of getting a job for her mother. That is when the victim got acquainted with him and since then the accused used to visit her house and talk to her daily. On 05.03.2018, at around 9:00 a.m., when she was alone at home and her parents had gone to work, the accused came to her house and said that he likes her and will marry her and forcibly took the victim inside the house and threw her on the cot in the room and forcefully made physical relation with her and said that whatever happens, he would be responsible for it and he would marry her and keep her as his wife. Thereafter he used to come to the victim’s house everyday on one pretext or another and also used to take her out for walk and continued making physical relationship. During this the victim's menstruation stopped and when her mother came to know about it she told her mother that the accused had done bad things with her and due to fear she was not telling the above thing. After that her mother took her to the doctor where it was found that she was pregnant. Then the victim's mother called the accused and explained to him, upon which the accused refused to keep 3 the victim with him, after keeping her in his house for only two days. Thereafter, the victim filed a written complaint about the above incident at Police Chowki, Hardibazar. 3. On the written complaint of the victim, a crime was registered by the police post Hardi Bazaar, Kusmunda Police Station. During the investigation, after taking consent from the victim and her mother, the victim's private parts was medically examined and pregnancy test were conducted and the victim's class VIII progress card, two vaginal slides, pregnancy kit, pubic hair were seized. Since the case was related to an offence against a member of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, it was sent to Aajak police station on 30.10.2018 for further investigation and the seized exhibits were sent to FSL, Bilaspur for forensic test. 4. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the Court concerned. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant under the relevant Sections of the IPC and the Atrocities Act which were read out and explained to him. The appellant denied the charges and prayed for trial. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses namely, Mrs. Lalita Kanwar (PW-01), Constable Manoj Kumar (PW-02), the victim (PW-03), mother of the victim (PW-04), Puran Singh Markam (PW-05), Deputy Superintendent of Police D.S. Dewan (PW-06), Dr. Mrs. R. Dahire (PW-07), Sub-Inspector Karamusai Paikra (PW-08), Dr. O.S. Kanwar (PW-09) and Dr. Dilish Singh (PW-10) and exhibited as many as 22 exhibits. 6. The statement of the convict/appellant was recorded under section 313 C.rP.C wherein he has expressed his ignorance about most of the 4 questions, however, some of them were denied as well. He stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. In defence, the appellant got the police statement of mother of the victim exhibited as Exhibit D/1. 7. The learned trial Court, after considering the statement of witnesses and evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant/ accused as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant/convict. 8. Mr. Vivek Bhakta, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. There are omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses and the conviction is based on conjecture and surmises. Even the parents of the victim could not properly state with regard to the age of the victim. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the victim was a minor as on the date of incident. In fact it was a consensual relationship out of love affair between them and only when the victim became pregnant, the FIR was lodged. are unaware of the actual date of birth of the victim. The victim, in her deposition before the learned trial Court herself has admitted that she was having love affair with the appellant and they used to meet often and that she alongwith the appellant were living as husband and wife. Hence, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges. 9. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/ respondent submits that the learned trial Court was fully justified in convicting and sentencing the convict/appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph. There is ample evidence on record to hold the appellant guilty of the offence. The order passed by the learned trial Court needs no interference and the appeal filed by the convict/appellant be dismissed. 5 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. The appellant/convict is alleged to have made physical relationship with the victim multiple times on the pretext of marriage. According to the prosecution, the victim was aged about 15 years 4 months on the date of incident. It is not in dispute that the victim belongs to Gond caste which falls under the Scheduled Tribe category and the appellant belongs to Mahant caste. 12. The victim (PW-3) stated that her age at the time of incident was 16 years. She has also deposed that after the first incident, the accused/appellant used to come to her house frequently and used to make physical relationship. After six months, she became pregnant and when she was taken to the Doctor. She went to the house of the accused where she found that the appellant was already residing with another lady and he denied to keep the victim alongwith him and thereafter they went to lodge the FIR. She has informed the Court that she was Class 8 th passed. She has admitted that she and the accused had love affair which continued for about one year but now she doesn’t love him anymore. She further stated that she was fully aware that on making physical relationship, a girl can become pregnant and that the accused had made physical relationship with her for 13 times and that the relationship was established by consent of both of them. She further stated that had she not become pregnant, she would not have lodged any complaint. She has further stated that even after knowing that the accused appellant was a married person, she stayed in her house for two days. She has stated her date of birth to be 20.10.2002 and that she was admitted in the 6 school by her uncle (Chacha). She further stated that she cannot say as to whether the date of birth recorded in her 8th Class marksheet as 20.10.2002 is correct or not. 13. The mother of the victim (PW-4) had deposed that the age of the victim was 16 years but she was not aware of the exact date of birth. She stated that when the health of the victim was not good, she used to ask questions with regard to her period but she never stated that her period had stopped. When she was taken to the Doctor, it was revealed that the victim was pregnant. When she scolded the victim, then only she revealed that she was pregnant because of the appellant. 14. For determination of the age of the victim, the prosecution has examined Smt. Lalita Kanwar, Teacher (PW-1) of Government Primary School, Bhantapara, Hardibazar. The police had seized the admission/discharge register (Exhibit P/2) and the said witness has stated that the date of birth mentioned in the said register was 20.10.2002. She further stated that she cannot state as to who had made the entries in the said register as she was posted elsewhere at the relevant time. She admitted that for recording the date of birth, the birth certificates are demanded but the birth certificate of the victim was not available and hence, the same was not given to the police. 15. Dr. Dilesh Singh (PW-10) is the Radiologist who had conducted the sonography test of the victim wherein he found pregnancy of 28 weeks and the weight of the fetus was 1219 grams and the expected date of delivery was 29. 01.2019. In the MLC report (Exhibit P/13) the Doctor has found the victim to be of average built, secondary sexual organs were developed, breast developed, no external injuries were found. On examination of her private part, the same were found to be well 7 developed and without any injuries. Dr. Smt. R.Dahire (PW-7), Medical Officer of Community Health Centre, Katghora had examined the victim who had found the hymen to be torn but no internal injuries were found. The victim was found to be pregnant of 28 weeks. She had opined that the victim was habitual of sexual intercourse. She had advised for sonography test for examination of her fetus. 16. From the deposition of the victim (PW-3) herself, it is amply clear that it is not a case rape or forceful sexual intercourse but they were in love with each other. The complaint was lodged only when the mother of the victim came to know that the victim was pregnant because of the appellant and not before that. 17. From the deposition of the mother of the victim, it is evident that she was not aware of the actual date of birth and she came to know that her daughter was aged 16 years when the police had asked for the marksheet of the victim. She was not at all aware as to what was the date of birth of the victim. She further stated that there was no birth certificate of the victim available with her. She was further not aware as to what was the date of birth written while admitting the victim in the school. 18. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. 8 19. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana {(2013) 7 SCC 263}, the Supreme Court, at paragraph 23 has observed as under: “23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 20. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, {(2006) 5 SCC 584}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “26. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, this Court held: (SCC p. 619, para 15)] 9 “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another v. State, represented by Inspector of Police, {(2011) 2 SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. xxxx 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "14…..The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the 10 correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "16….The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. xxxx 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "38….The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; 11 registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 22. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, {2022 8 SCC 602}, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. xxxx xxxx xxxx 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On 12 the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 13 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 23. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, {2023 SCC Online SC 846}, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW- 3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the 14 offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was 15 only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 24. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which 16 was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 25. In the present case, the victim was not under detention or captivity and she was all the time free and had it been a case of forceful sexual intercourse, she had the opportunity to take help of anyone, either the police or her parents. But in the instant case, even as per the deposition of the victim, she had a love affair with the appellant and the FIR was lodged only when the mother of the victim came to know about the victim being pregnant from the appellant. It has been admitted by the victim 17 also that if she would not have been pregnant, she would not have lodged the FIR. 26. In view of the above discussion, and in light of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court needs interference and as such, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.09.2023 is hereby set aside and the appellant/convict is acquitted of the charges. 27. Resultantly, this appeal stands allowed. 28. The appellant/convict is reported to be in jail. He is directed to be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. {Section 481 of the BNSS}, the accused-appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties in the like amount before the court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court. 29. Registry is directed to transmit the trial court record along with a copy of this order to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.06.20 18:57:11 +0530