1 2025:CGHC:26356 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 172 of 2023 Sulochana W/o Narendra Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Nirmal Sahu (Died) Through Legal Representative S/o Late Mahtar Ram Sahu R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 1.1 - (1a) Omprakash Sahu S/o Late Nirmal Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 1.2 - (1b) Ansuiya Sahu D/o Late Nirmal Sahu, W/o Rohit Sahu Aged About 32 Years R/o Amapara, Mohan Nagar, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 1.3 - (1c) Sundari Bai Wd/o Nirmal Sahu Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 2 - Kunwar Singh Aged About 70 Years, S/o Mehatar (Died) Through Legal Representative 2.1 - (2a) Krishna Kumar Sahu S/o Kunwar Singh Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 2.2 - (2b) Chandrashekar Sahu S/o Kunwar Singh Aged About 54 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 2.3 - (2c) Thagiyabai W/o Late Kunwar Singh Aged About 80 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 2.4 - (2d) Madhavi Sahu D/o Kunwar Singh Aged About 52 Years R/o Khaprikala, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 3 - Hemlal S/o Mehtar Aged About 82 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 4 - (Dorelal Aged About 71 Years, S/o Sukhri (Died Through Legal Representative) 4.1 - (4a) Narendra S/o Dorelal Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2025.06.23 17:54:13 +0530 2 4.2 - (4b) Rajkumar S/o Dorelal Aged About 37 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 4.3 - (4c) Ramotin Bai D/o Dorelal W/o Bharat Aged About 35 Years R/o Parsahi, Tahsil Khariagarh, District Khairagarh Chhuikhadan Gandai (C.G.) 4.4 - (4d) Pushpa Bai D/o Dorelal, W/o Chandrashekhar Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Kaldabri, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 5 - Ashwani S/o Sukhiram Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 6 - Janak S/o Sukhiram Aged About 45 Years (Indiya, Aged About 70 Years, (Died)) R/o Village Belgaon, Tahsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 7 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate For Respondent No.1a : Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate For Respondent No.4a : Mr. Rahul Agrawal, Advocate For Other respondents : None present, though served (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 20.6.2025 1. This miscellaneous appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenging Order dated 14.9.2023 passed by Upper District Judge, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon in MJC No.08/2022, whereby application filed by the appellant-Sulochana under Order 41 Rule 21 (wrongly mentioned as 19 in the application) of CPC for restoration of Civil Appeal No.02A/2015 has been dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Civil Suit bearing No.4A/2011 was filed by Nirmal Sahu against Kunwar Singh and 7 others. That suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge Class-I, Dongergarh vide judgment dated 24.6.2015. In appeal preferred by plaintiff Nirmal Sahu bearing Civil Appeal No.02A/2015, the learned Upper District Judge, Dongergarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon, reversed the finding and granted decree in 3 favour of the plaintiff. In that civil appeal, earlier the appellant/original defendant No.8-Sulochana was represented by her counsel, however, her counsel died in the year 2020, therefore, she could not be represented, hence, ex-parte proceedings was initiated against the appellant/defendant No.8 and judgment dated 04.8.2022 was passed by the first appellate Court. Learned counsel further submits that after obtaining decree, the plaintiff started saying in the village that he has succeeded in the civil suit, and then defendant No.8 came to know about the said judgment dated 04.8.2022. Thereafter, she filed application under Order 41 Rule 21 (wrongly mentioned as Rule 19) CPC for restoration of Civil Appeal No.2A/2015, but the same has been rejected by the first appellate Court vide impugned order dated 14.9.2023. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is a resident of remote village of Dongargarh Tahsil, she was represented by a counsel, but her counsel died during corona period, due to which, she could not know about the judgment dated 04.8.2022 passed by the first appellate Court. As soon as she came to know about passing of aforesaid judgment, she filed restoration application on 05.11.2022, thus, delay is not deliberate or malafide, rather it was filed within 03 months from the date of judgment. He would further submit that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser, therefore, she wants to contest the civil suit on merit, but the learned Upper District Judge, Dongargarh, without considering the aforesaid facts in its true perspective, dismissed the application filed by the appellant, therefore, impugned order dated 14.9.2023 may be set aside by allowing instant appeal and the first appellate Court may be directed to restore Civil Appeal No.2A/15 in its original number and decide the same after providing due opportunity of hearing to the appellant. To substantiate his argument, learned counsel 4 placed reliance in the matter of Dwarika Prasad (D) thr. LRS. vs. Prithvi Raj Singh reported in AIR Online 2024 SC 876. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1a would submit that appellant Sulochana remained absent before the trial Court and subsequently, before the appellate Court also. He would further submit that counsel of the appellant was absent in appeal from 12.5.2016, which shows that the appellant was not vigilant about her own case, therefore, ex-parte order was passed by the first appellate Court, hence, it is prayed that the appeal may be dismissed or it may be allowed by imposing heavy cost. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No.4a extended his support on the contention made by learned counsel for respondent No.1a. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Though as stated by learned counsel for respondent No.1a that counsel of the appellant was absent in civil appeal since 12.5.2016 and subsequently he is said to be dead in the year 2020 during corona period, but it seems that the appellant herself was not vigilant about the proceedings of her appeal. But considering the fact that the appellant is a lady, resident of remote village and she filed application for restoration under Order 41 Rule 21(wrongly mentioned as 19) CPC, within three months from the date of judgment dated 04.8.2022 passed by Upper District Judge, Dongargarh in Civil appeal No.02A/2015, which shows that she wants to contest the appeal on merits. 7. It is settled proposition of law that the Courts ought to have decided the case on merits and not on technical ground so that the parties can get justice. 5 8. The Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] has observed that the sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not deliberate and mala fide. Paras 11 & 12 of the said decision are as under: “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitation newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. 6 There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari {AIR 1969 SC 575) and State of West Bengal Vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (AIR 1972 SC 749)." 9. In B.S. Sheshagiri Setty and others Versus State of Karnataka and others [(2016) 2 SCC 123], their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that when what is at stake, is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "28. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable time frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constant litigation has been carried on by the appellants, and therefore they cannot be accused of suddenly waking up after 13 years to claim their land. Further, in the context of limitation, it has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. " 7 10. On due consideration of the fact-situation of the instant case and in the light of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court, I feel inclined to allow the instant appeal subject to payment of cost by the appellant/defendant No.8. 11. Consequently, instant appeal is allowed. Impugned Order dated 14.09.2023 passed by Upper District Judge, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon (CG) passed in MJC No.08/22 is set aside, subject to payment of cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only), which shall be paid by the appellant/defendant No.8 Sulochana to the Lrs. of original plaintiff Nirmal Sahu, within 30 days from the date of restoration of civil appeal, before the first appellate Court. As such, the application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 21(wrongly mentioned as 19) CPC is also allowed. Resultantly, Judgment and decree dated 04.8.2022 passed by Upper District Judge, Dongargarh, Distt. Rajnandgaon in Civil Appeal No.02A/2015 is set aside. It is directed that Civil Appeal No.2A/2015 be restored in its original number and after providing due opportunity of hearing to the parties, it be decided in accordance with law expeditiously. The concerned Upper District Judge is further directed that, after restoration of the appeal, notice be issued to the plaintiffs, if required. 12. Both the parties are also directed to cooperate with the trial for expeditious disposal of the appeal. 13. This misc. appeal is accordingly disposed of. Pending interim application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chadnravanshi) Judge Bini