1 2025:CGHC:37011 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2158 of 2023 Padam Singh @ Rahul Rajput S/o Ramsingh Rajput Aged About 26 Years Resident Of Village-Khirkiya, Thana - Chhipabad, District Harda (M.P.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through - The Police Station Fingeshwar, District - Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Bhuvneshwar Singh Rajput, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Monika Thakur, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice Order on Board 29.07.2025 1. In compliance with the Court’s order dated 15.07.2025, the report was submitted on 29.07.2025 by the concerned Police Station to the Registrar (Judicial), informing that after being released on bail, the accused had absconded and, despite all efforts made by the police, could not be arrested. Consequently, a farari panchnama was issued against the appellant. However, considering that the accused remains untraceable and that his absconding cannot result in leaving the present appeal undecided for an indefinite period, this RAHUL DEWANGAN Digitally signed by RAHUL DEWANGAN 2 Court proceeds to hear the appeal. Mr. Bhuvneshwar Singh Rajput, Advocate, is present on behalf of the appellant. 2. The criminal appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.07.2023 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO) Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband (C.G.) in POCSO Case No. 45/2021 whereby the the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner: Sentence Conviction Under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. Rigorous Imprisonment for 05 years with fine amount of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine further RI for 02 months. Under Section 376 (2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years with fine amount of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine further RI for 02 months. Under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Acquitted. (Both the sentences will run concurrently) 3. Notice issued to PW-5 i.e. father of the victim has been served, but none appeared on her behalf to contest the present appeal. 3 4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that the father of the victim lodged a report at Police Station Fingeshwar stating that on 26.11.2020, at about 4:00 p.m., his daughter (the victim) left the house after informing her grandfather that she was going towards the colony to get a photocopy, but she did not return home till evening or late night. Thereafter, she was searched for at the residences of relatives and in nearby villages, but her whereabouts could not be ascertained. When she could not be traced, the complainant approached the police station and lodged a missing report on 29.11.2020, alleging that his minor daughter had been lured away by some unknown person. On the basis of the said missing report, FIR No. 225/2020 dated 29.11.2020 (Ex.P-11) was registered under Section 363 IPC against an unknown person and investigation commenced. On the same day, the victim’s Class 10th mark-sheet (Ex.P-14) relating to her date of birth was seized in the presence of witnesses. A requisition was sent on 30.11.2020 to the Superintendent of Police, Gariyaband, seeking CDR, SDR, and CAF details of the seized mobile (Ex.P- 15), and the report was received. A spot map of the place (Ex.P- 12) of incident was prepared on 01.12.2020. 5. On 16.12.2020, a requisition was sent to the Inspector General of Police, Raipur, through the Superintendent of Police, Gariyaband, for locating the accused, and permission was obtained. On the same date, a letter was also sent to the Station-in-Charge, Chhipabad, District Harda, for assistance in tracing the victim. On 4 that date itself, the recovery panchnama of the victim was prepared, and a separate panchnama regarding the destruction of the mobile phone used in the incident by the accused was drawn in the presence of witnesses. A notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C. was served upon the accused for production of the motorcycle used in the incident, which was thereafter seized in the presence of witnesses. 6. Subsequently, on 17.12.2020, the accused was taken into custody, and the underwear allegedly worn by him at the time of the incident was seized. On perusal of the presented charge sheet and the attached documents, prima facie it appeared that the accused had committed the offence under Sections 366, 376 (2)(n) and 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012, hence charges were framed under the said sections. On being read out and explained the charge to the accused, the accused abjured his guilt and pleaded trial, saying that he was innocent. 7. The accused pleaded not guilty in the trial under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and he has stated that he has been falsely implicated but no witness has been examined in support of his evidence. 8. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses and 46 exhibited the documents. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the CrPC was also recorded in which he denied the material 5 appearing against him and stated that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the case. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trail Court has convicted the appellant/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC and sentenced him accordingly and he was acquitted of the charge under Section 363 of IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as mentioned in para 2 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. The victim is well aware of the consequences but she has not reported the matter at the time of commission of the offence therefore it is not believable that anyone can mislead her or prevent her to file the report in the pretext of marriage. The said incident seems that there is mutual consent between the appellant and the victim for which relevant documents for examining the age have not been submitted. The finding learned by the trial court is totally erroneous and that has been based on the surmises and conjunctures and without finding any legal proof, the learned trial court has held guilt of the appellant. 6 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident, the victim’s Class 10th mark-sheet (Ex.P-14) relating to her date of birth which contains the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.2004. The victim’s Class 10th mark-sheet (Ex.P- 14) is admissible piece of evidence to determine the age of the victim. Therefore there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court. The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the victim (PW-1) has clearly deposed the conduct of the appellant in her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and in the Court statement and the learned trial Court after considering the material available on record has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant, in which no interference is called for. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 12. In relation to the age of the victim, the victim herself (PW-01), of her chief examination before the Court, stated that a lady police officer had recorded her statement and, on the basis of the information provided by her parents, she had disclosed her date of birth as 11/07/2004. The grandfather of the victim (PW-03), in his deposition dated 20/07/2022, stated that the age of his granddaughter was around 17-18 years. The father of the victim 7 (PW-05) also stated that the date of birth of his daughter was 11/07/2004 and that she was studying in the first year of B.Sc. at that time. 13. The in-charge head teacher, Kamlesh Kumar Baghel (PW-06), stated that on requisition made by the Fingeshwar Police Station, he had provided certified copies of the Dakhil Kharij register and the affidavit register pertaining to the victim’s date of birth, which were seized vide Ex. P-21, and the original registers were handed over through Supurdnama (Ex. P-22). He deposed that as per entry no. 2430 in the said registers, the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 11/07/2004 in words and figures, and that she was admitted to Class-I on 08/07/2010. He clarified that these entries were not made by him but by the then teacher Baisakhu Ram Sahu. In cross-examination, he admitted that the said entries were not made in his presence. 14. Baisakhu Ram Sahu (PW-08), the retired head teacher, stated that he served at Government Primary School, Borsi, Fingeshwar, District Gariyaband (C.G.) from 2002 to 2012 and confirmed that the date of birth of the victim was entered as 11/07/2004 at serial number 2430 in both the Dakhil Kharij and affidavit registers. He further deposed that the affidavit bear the signature of the victim’s father in the parent/guardian column and that the father himself had presented the details at the time of admission. During cross- examination, he admitted that the father personally furnished the 8 particulars of the victim, acknowledged the overwriting in the date of admission column (where “0” was altered to “10”), and admitted that the reason for striking off earlier entries was not recorded. He, however, denied that the date of birth was entered on assumption rather than on the father’s statement. 15. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the father of the victim (PW-05) himself has admitted that he understated the age of his daughter by four to five months at the time of school admission and did not disclose her actual date of birth. In these circumstances, the entries relating to date of birth recorded in the Dakhil Kharij register and the affidavit register cannot be treated as conclusive proof of the victim’s real date of birth. The prosecution has also failed to produce any birth certificate, Kotwari register entry, or radiological/medical test report to substantiate the actual age of the victim. Accordingly, in the absence of reliable and corroborative evidence, the date of birth recorded in the school registers alone cannot be accepted to conclusively establish that the victim was a minor at the relevant time. 16. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : 9 “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 17. In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. It was observed as under “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove 10 the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 18. In the matter of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 11 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 12 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11 Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 19. Recently, in the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 846, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. 13 Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 14 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 20. Reverting to the facts of the present case and due consideration of the prosecution evidence, I find that no any clinching and 15 legally admissible evidence have been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the victim was minor on the date of incident, and the trial Court in the impugned judgment has rightly acquitted of the charge under Section 363 of IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 21. So far as the issue of forceful sexual intercourse by the appellant upon the victim is concerned, I have carefully perused the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 CrPC (Ex.P- 5). In her 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P-5), the victim (PW-01) stated in her deposition that she knew the accused. She testified that one day, at about 1:00 PM, while she was reading a book, a call was received on her grandfather’s mobile number from 8718994976. The caller introduced himself as “Rahul Rajput.” The victim further stated that the same person repeatedly called her 10–20 times later that evening, but she did not respond. At night, when she finally answered, the caller requested her friendship, assuring that he would stop calling if she agreed. Consequently, she befriended him, and both began conversing over the phone frequently. She further stated that during their conversations, the caller lured her by claiming that he had a lot of money, cars, bungalows, and jewellery. On 26 November 2020, around 4:00 PM, the caller asked her to come with him to Khirkia village and arrived at the bus stand on a motorcycle. When she refused, he threatened to kill her and her family members. On the same day, when she was going near the village bus stand to get some 16 documents signed by the Kotwar, the accused met her near a turn, coerced her to accompany him, and she, out of fear for her life, sat on the motorcycle. The accused took her to Khirkia, Madhya Pradesh, which took two to three days of travel. She also attempted to jump from the motorcycle en route and sustained injuries on her right heel. The victim stated that once they reached the accused’s house, he applied vermillion (sindoor) to her forehead in front of his family, declaring her as his wife, and thereafter had sexual intercourse with her for four days. She later came to know that the person who initially introduced himself as Rahul Rajput was actually Padam Singh Rajput. During the court proceedings, when shown the arrest memo photograph, the victim identified the accused as the same person, which was also admitted by the accused. She further deposed that she stayed at the accused’s house for about 18–19 days, during which she also experienced her menstrual cycle for ten days, and even then the accused continued to have sexual relations with her. She stated that she was treated like a servant at the accused’s house and was eventually recovered by her father, uncle, and police personnel from Fingeshwar Police Station while being taken somewhere by the accused’s family members. 22. The father of the victim (PW-05) deposed that he knew the accused. He stated that when his daughter did not return home until evening on the date of the incident, he searched for her among relatives for two days but could not trace her. Thereafter, 17 he lodged an FIR at Fingeshwar Police Station (Ex. P-11). He stated that on 15 December 2020, upon police summons, he went to Fingeshwar Police Station and accompanied the police to Khirkia Police Station, District Harda (Madhya Pradesh), where his daughter was recovered from the accused’s house. He also testified that seizure and recovery memos were prepared on the spot and that the mobile phone used by his daughter to communicate with the accused, as well as her Class 10 mark sheet, were seized (Ex. P-14). He further stated that his daughter informed him that the accused had lured her by claiming he had land and wealth. 23. Dr. P. Kudeshia (PW-02) stated that on 17 December 2020, at about 1:00 PM, the accused Padam Singh Rajput was produced before him for genital examination. He found the accused physically fit and capable of performing sexual intercourse. He prepared the examination report (Ex. P-06) and sealed the accused’s underwear, which contained stains, for chemical analysis (Ex. P-07). In cross-examination, the doctor admitted that the nature of the stains could not be confirmed without chemical examination. 24. Dr. Divya Kudeshia (PW-04) testified that she examined the victim at 1:15 PM on the same day. The victim was found to be physically and mentally sound, with no external or internal injuries on her private parts. The victim had narrated the acts committed 18 by the accused. The doctor opined that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse but did not show signs of recent sexual activity. The victim’s underwear was sealed and sent for chemical analysis (Ex. P-10). In cross-examination, the doctor denied the suggestion that no stains were present on the underwear. 25. From the testimonies, it is established that the victim and the accused were in constant telephonic contact prior to the incident and had developed familiarity. The victim admitted to befriending the accused, and the medical evidence indicates that she was habituated to sexual intercourse and did not bear any recent injuries. The absence of physical injuries and the prolonged stay of the victim with the accused without any escape attempt or alarm raised during those 18–19 days may suggest elements of voluntary companionship rather than abduction by force. 26. However, the prosecution’s case rests on the victim’s allegations of threats and coercion, while the defence argues that the relationship was consensual, and the victim accompanied the accused willingly. This aspect of consent versus coercion becomes central to determining the culpability of the accused in the present matter. 27. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony 19 of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 28. Considering the entire evidence available on record and the conduct of the victim, I am of the opinion that the victim and the accused were in constant telephonic contact prior to the incident and had developed familiarity. The victim admitted to befriending the accused, and the medical evidence indicates that she was habituated to sexual intercourse and did not bear any recent injuries. The absence of physical injuries and the prolonged stay of the victim with the accused without any escape attempt or alarm raised during those 18–19 days may suggest elements of voluntary companionship rather than abduction by force, further the the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim as a minor, and moreover she was a consenting party with the appellant. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Sections 366, 376 (2)(n) and 363 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act would not be made out against the appellant. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and conviction and order of sentence dated 26.07.2023 is set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from all 20 the charges. The appellant is on bail. He is not required to surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties stands discharged. 30. In view of the foregoing, the warrant of arrest earlier issued against the accused stands hereby cancelled. 31. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 32. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Rahul Dewangan