1 / 11 2025:CGHC:1586 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 9393 of 20 19 • Neel Kiran Tiwari S/o Late Shri Bharatlal Tiwari Aged About 62 Years Address Anand Nagar, Uslapur, Behind Mosaji White House, District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh through The Secretary, School Education Department Naya Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Secretary General Administration Department, Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Collector Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4. District Education Officer District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5. Block Education Officer Kota, District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Abhyuday Tripathi, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Faisal Akhtar, Advocate For Respondents-State : Mr. Pramod Ramteke, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu ORDER ON BOARD 09/01 / 2025 1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition questioning the legality and sustainability of the decision Annexure P-1 dated 12.11.2018 taken by Committee constituted for considering the representation of employees compulsorily retired from the service. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this petition are that petitioner was appointed as Asst. Teacher vide order dated 01.03.1984. While working PAWAN KUMAR JHA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR JHA 2 / 11 in the education department on the post of Head Master in Govt. Primary School, Moharkhar, Block Kota, Dist. Bilaspur, C.G., petitioner was compulsorily retired vide order dated 24.04.2018 issued by the District Education Officer, Bilaspur. The order dated 24.04.2018 was challenged by petitioner in a writ petition bearing WPS No. 5294/2018, which was disposed of directing the respondents therein to refer the case of petitioner to the committee constituted to ascertain the case of compulsory retirement. The committee considered the claim of petitioner ie. challenge to the order of compulsory retirement and recorded the impugned proceedings and recommended for rejection of representation/ claim of petitioner in paragraph 6 of the proceedings dated 12.11.2018. Aggrieved with the said proceedings of the committee, petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs. “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/ quash the enquiry report (P/1) issued by the School Education Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur, C.G. 10.2 Grant any other writ(s), order(s), relief(s) in favour of petitioner, which the Hon’ble Court deemed fit & just in the facts and circumstances of the case, including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the representation submitted by petitioner on 05.05.2018 has not been considered and decided. The reason assigned for compulsorily retiring the petitioner is not valid and reasonable because the appointment of petitioner was done under the handicapped quota and the reason given by the respondents for compulsorily retiring the petitioner is that the petitioner is “Unable to Speak”. Petitioner was retired at the age of 61 years and on the date of passing of order of compulsory retirement only one year of service was remaining. In the decision taken by the committee no cogent reason has been mentioned which shows that there is no application of mind on the 3 / 11 claim of petitioner. It is also contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the committee while assessing suitability of petitioner has not considered that there was no intimation/ notice to petitioner seeking explanation on his continuous lack in working and all of a sudden the order of compulsory retirement of petitioner was passed. There is violation of principles of natural justice of passing of an order of compulsory retirement against petitioner. 4. Learned State counsel opposes the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that the State Government has right to retire an employee after his attaining the age of 50 years or after completing 20 years of service, whichever is earlier. Rule 56 of the Chhattisgarh Fundamental Rules provides the right to the State Government to retire any government employee in public interest who is not suitable to continue. Similar provision is there under Rule 42(1)(a) & (b) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Pension) Rules 1976. State Government has also issued Circular in this regard on 25.04.2017 mentioning that to weed out the government servant after considering the entire service record as also the physical fitness of an employee. The committee constituted as per the policy/ circular issued on 25.04.2017 has assessed the entire service record, physical fitness of an employee and evaluated the working capacity as also the ACRs during the entire service period which is below grade ‘B’ and only thereafter the order of compulsory retirement of petitioner is passed. For evaluating the candidature of government employee, the Committee which was constituted was consisted of District Collector being Chairman, Additional Collector and the District Education Officer, being members of the committee. The Committee has evaluated the case of petitioner along with 14 other employees and upon screening the committee found that the performance of petitioner being reducing consistently and 4 / 11 recommended for compulsorily retirement which is evident from Annexure P-5. The ground which is taken in the writ petition that only because petitioner is ‘Unable to Speak’, he has been compulsorily retired is not correct as it is not the sole ground for passing of an order of compulsory retirement of petitioner. The other parameters provided in the Circular were also considered. The order of High Court challenging the order of compulsory retirement was followed by the Committee and the committee after considering the grounds raised and other proceedings has rightly refused to interfere with the order of compulsory retirement, hence, it does not call for any interference. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. M.E. Reddy reported in (1980) 2 SCC 15 and in the case of Baikunth Nath Das vs. Chief District Medical Officer reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents placed on record. 6. To appreciate the submission of learned counsel for petitioner, I find it appropriate to glance upon the relevant provisions under the Chhattisgarh Fundamental Rules as also Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976. 7. Rule 56 of the C.G. Fundamental Rules provides for age of superannuation. Under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 56, it envisaged that a Government servant may, in the public interest, be retired at any time after he had completed 20 years of qualifying service or attained the age of 50 years without assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing. In the proviso, it is also mentioned that such Government servant may be retired forthwith and on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rate at which he 5 / 11 was drawing them immediately before his retirement or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months. 8. Rule 42 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 provides for retirement on completion of 20 years of qualifying service. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Baikunth Nath Das (supra) has considered the challenge to the order of compulsorily retirement by a Government servant and had observed that the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma or any suggestion of misbehavior. The principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. The relevant portion of the order in the above decision is extracted below for ready reference. “34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary — in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter — of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks 6 / 11 lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above. 35. Before parting with the case, we must refer to an argument urged by Sri R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] and submitted on that basis that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice — audi alteram partem — is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words, the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi- judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Sri Shyam Lal Sharma reported in (1971) 2 SCC 514 while considering the issue of compulsory retirement of a Government servant in a challenge to the order of High Court, wherein the order of compulsory retirement was set aside, had allowed the appeal and held that the High Court fell into error of holding that the order of compulsory retirement in the present case contained stigma by going behind the order of retirement and also by misreading the letter, dated February 14, 1962 in the manner not warranted by the letter itself containing a mere proposal for compulsory retirement. In the said decision, Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered its earlier decision on the issue and observed thus: 7 / 11 “13. The following propositions can be extracted from these decisions. First, in ascertaining whether the order of compulsory retirement is one of punishment it has to be ascertained whether in the order of compulsory retirement there was any element of charge or stigma or imputation or any implication of misbehaviour or incapacity against the officer concerned. Secondly, the order for compulsory retirement will be indicative of punishment or penalty if the order will involve loss of benefits already earned. Thirdly, an order for compulsory retirement on the completion of 25 years of service or an order of compulsory retirement made in the public interest to dispense with further service will not amount to an order for dismissal or removal as there is no element of punishment. Fourthly, an order of compulsory retirement will not be held to be an order in the nature of punishment or penalty on the ground that there is possibility of loss of future prospects, namely, that the officer will not get his pay till he attains the age of superannuation, or will not get an enhanced pension for not being allowed to remain a few years in service and being compulsorily retired.” 11. In the aforementioned decision, Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down principles that for ascertaining whether the order of compulsory retirement is one of the punishment it has to be ascertained whether in the order of compulsory retirement there was any element of charge or stigma or imputation or any implication of misbehavior of incapacity against the officer concerned and other factors as mentioned therein. 12. In the case at hand, copy of order of compulsory retirement dated 24.04.2018 (Annx. P-2) is not challenged. The order does not mention any element of charge, stigma, imputation, implication, misbehavior of incapacity except in public interest. From the pleadings in the writ petition also, it is not appearing that the grievance of petitioner to the order of compulsory retirement dated 24.04.2018 to be stigmatic. The only ground raised referring to Annexure P-5 that the committee evaluating the employee who had completed 50 years of service or 20 years of qualifying service and considered 15 employees including petitioner. While evaluating the candidature of petitioner, the Committee 8 / 11 noted that the petitioner is ‘unable to speak’, ‘very less working efficiency’, ‘reduction in working efficiency’. These parameters which were considered by the committee cannot be said to be adverse remarks but it is only assessment to reconsider the suitability of an employee for his continuing in service and the opinion of the committee is recorded wherein the committee has only proposed based on the evaluation of the employee for his compulsory retirement. 13. Petitioner has not challenged the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the order is passed with malafide or in the order of compulsory retirement there is element of charge or stigma or imputation or any implication of misbehavior of incapacity against the petitioner. In absence of any challenge as mentioned above, the order of compulsory retirement in normal course is not to be interfered as the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and it implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehavior. 14. The Committee, before whom the representation/ claim of petitioner against the challenge to the order of compulsory retirement was made, had considered the material placed before it and thereafter recorded that no new fact has been revealed which was not considered at the time of making proposal for compulsory retirement. From the said observation of the Committee it is apparent that the committee has also considered all the relevant material and has come to the conclusion that no further consideration is required on the challenge to the order of compulsory retirement which is placed before the committee. 15. Sofar as the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that the petitioner was not given any prior notice of any adverse remarks in the ACR is concerned, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Baikunth Nath Das (supra) has observed that principles of natural justice have not pressed in the context of an order of compulsory retirement and further 9 / 11 observed that the High Court or the Supreme Court would not examine the material as the appellate court and they may inform if they are satisfied that the order is passed with mala fide or it is based on no evidence or that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material that if it is found to be a perverse order. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. J.N. Sinha reported in (1970) 2 SCC 458 quoted A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262, has observed as under: “8. … It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because it must be presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.” 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Lalsa Ram reported in (2001) 3 SCC 389 taking view of its earlier judgment in Baikunth Nath Das (supra) has observed as under: 15. Incidentally, the five guiding principles as laid down in Baikuntha Nath case [(1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 521 : (1992) 21 ATC 649] by this Court stand accepted in another three-Judge Bench's judgment of this Court in Posts and Telegraphs Board v. C.S.N. Murthy [(1992) 2 SCC 317 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 710 : (1992) 21 ATC 664] wherein this Court observed that whether the conduct of the employee is such as to justify a conclusion of compulsory retirement but the same is primarily for the departmental authorities to decide. The nature of the delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to require the compulsory retirement, the courts have no authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of power if arrived at bona fide on the basis of the 10 / 11 material available on record: Usurpation of authority is not only unwarranted but contrary to all norms of service jurisprudence.” 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Chandel vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 8 SCC 58 has observed thus: 19. In Rajendra Singh Verma [(2011) 10 SCC 1 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 129 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 489] this Court restated what has been stated in earlier decisions that compulsory retirement from service is neither dismissal nor removal; it differs from both of them, in that it is not a form of punishment prescribed by the rules and involves no penal consequences inasmuch as the person retired is entitled to pension and other retiral benefits proportionate to the period of service standing to his credit. An order of compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse consequence, principles of natural justice have no application. This Court took into consideration a long line of cases including State of U.P. v. Bihari Lal [1994 Supp (3) SCC 593 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 177 : (1994) 28 ATC 586] , Union of India v. V.P. Seth [1994 SCC (L&S) 1052 : (1994) 27 ATC 851] , Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer [(1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 521 : (1992) 21 ATC 649] , Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa [(1989) 4 SCC 664 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 38 : (1989) 11 ATC 886] , Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha [(1970) 2 SCC 458] , All India Judges' Assn. (1) v. Union of India [(1992) 1 SCC 119 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 9 : (1992) 19 ATC 42] and All India Judges' Assn. (2) [(1993) 4 SCC 288 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 148 : (1993) 25 ATC 818] and culled out the legal position in para 183 of the Report as follows: (Rajendra Singh Verma case [(2011) 10 SCC 1 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 129 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 489] , SCC p. 75) “183. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that while considering the case of an officer as to whether he should be continued in service or compulsorily retired, his entire service record up to that date on which consideration is made has to be taken into account. What weight should be attached to earlier entries as compared to recent entries is a matter of evaluation, but there is no manner of doubt that consideration has to be of the entire service record. The fact that an officer, after an earlier adverse entry, was promoted does not 11 / 11 wipe out earlier adverse entry at all. It would be wrong to contend that merely for the reason that after an earlier adverse entry an officer was promoted that by itself would preclude the authority from considering the earlier adverse entry. When the law says that the entire service record has to be taken into consideration, the earlier adverse entry, which forms a part of the service record, would also be relevant irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned was promoted to higher position or whether he was granted certain benefits like increments, etc.” 18. The provision under Rule 56(2)(a) of the C.G. Fundamental Rules specifically provides that the Government servant may in the public interest be retired at any time after completion of 20 years of qualifying service or attaining the age of 50 years without assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing and the period of notice is also prescribed as three months. The rule does not envisage for providing an opportunity of hearing, it only mentions that three months’ prior notice or in lieu of notice the employee would be entitled for the salary for the said period. Petitioner has not pleaded that he was not given three months notice or salary in lieu of the notice period. 19. For the foregoing discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above as also the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue of compulsory retirement, I do not find any infirmity or perversity in the decision taken by the Committee constituted by the State Government to consider the challenge of Government servant against the compulsory retirement calling interference of this Court. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of substance which is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge pwn