1 2025:CGHC:43495-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4600 of 2025 Anv Digi Solutions Pvt. Ltd., A Company Duly Constituted Under The Provisions Of The Companies Act 2013, Having Its Registered Office At B4, Central Avenue, Smriti Nagar, Bhilai, District - Durg Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank Through Its Chairman, Plot No. 47, Sector 24, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - General Manager (Administration), Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank Plot No. 47, Sector 24, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Government E- Marketplace (Gem) A Company Duly Incorporated Under The Provisions Of The Companies Act 2013, Through Its Chief Executive Officer Cum Director 407-408/4 Vishwa Deep Distt Centre Janakpuri Delhi West 4 - Shriram Computers Ram Kunj, Opposite Radha Mohan Complex, Agrasen Marg, Samta Colony, Raipur Chhattisgarh 5 - Heliocentrix Technology Pvt Ltd 27, Aakar Society Nr. Saman Complex, Satellite Ahmedabad Gujarat ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.08.29 10:43:51 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 28.08.2025 1) Heard Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. N. Naha Roy, learned counsel for respective respondent. 2) The present petition has been filed seeking following relief(s): “10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record concerning the issuance of the bid process in Bid No. GEM/2025/B/6455990 dated 16.07.2025 by the respondents for its kind perusal and consideration. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ quashing and setting aside the bid rejection order of the petitioner on 19.08.2025 (ANNEXURE P-1) in Bid No. GEM/2025/B/6455990 issued on GeM Portal by respondent No. 1. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ setting aside and quashing the financial bid evaluation dated 21.08.2025 (ΑΝNEXURE P-2) whereby respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have been declared as L-1 and L-2, respectively, in Bid No. GEM/2025/B/6455990 issued on GeM Portal by respondent No. 1. 10.4 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue 3 an appropriate writ directing the respondents to consider the bid submitted by the petitioner. 10.5 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court, may deem fit and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3) Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the Authorised Vendor for servers, desktop, laptops, and all in one desktop for Acer India Private Ltd. and have been authorised to participate and submit bid for the purpose of supply of the following goods manufactured by Acer India Private Ltd. as also to sign and negotiate the contract for the said purpose. Respondent No. 1 is a bank sponsored by the State Bank of India and has a share contribution comprising of 50% of central government, 15% of the state government and 35% of the sponsor bank. Respondent No. 3 is a National Public Procurement Portal, (section 8 Company registered under the companies Act, 2013), GeM SPV builds, operates and maintains the GeM platform, which provides an end- to-end online Marketplace for Central and State Government Ministries / Departments, Central & State Public Undertakings (CPSUs & SPSUs), Autonomous institutions and Local bodies, for procurement of common use goods & services in transparent and efficient manner. The respondent bank issued a NIT bearing No. GEM/2025/B/6365994 for supply of entry and mid level desktop, computer computers, and scanners on 20.06.2025. The said NIT contained conditions which indicated that the said tender was 4 issued deliberately to favour a desired bidder and it was for the said reason that the petitioner raised objections in response to the said tender process, since it violated the qualifications as have been specified by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India. Similar objections were submitted by various other prospective bidders as well, and therefore the said NIT was later cancelled. Pursuant to the cancellation of the above NIT, the respondent issued a fresh NIT dated 16.07.2025 being Bid No. GEM/2025/B/6455990, for submission of bids in response to supply of entry and mid-level desktop computer. The qualifications, conditions and specifications mentioned in the said bid document were in such a manner that it raised an apprehension that the said NIT was issued only to enable company being HP to supply the said product. Objections were raised by prospective bidders from the entire country and since the tender was issued on the GEM portal, the queries seeking clarification was also uploaded on the said portal. The petitioner in furtherance of the clarification as given by the respondent bank submitted its bid and as per the rules of the GEM portal, the respondent raised a request on 04.08.2025 at 11.31 hour that the petitioner had submitted OEM authorization certificate being the Manufacturers Authorisation Form (MAF), which was digitally signed, whereas they required the certificate being ink signed. On the same day at 11:37 hour, 2 further 5 requests were raised pointing out the compliance with the power efficiency as also the compliance of operating system. The petitioner forthwith submitted its response to the said request on 05.08.2025 itself and pointed out that the reference to the operating system and power efficiency had already been clarified by the respondents and therefore the said objection was misconceived. Furthermore, as regard the submission of digitally signed certificate was concerned, the petitioner duly submitted the ink signed authorization certificate as well. It is therefore evident that the petitioner duly satisfied the requests raised by the respondent and submitted the requisite details as sought for. Unfortunately, on 13.08.2025, the petitioner was declared disqualified on the GeM Portal for the reason that ink signed MAF was dated after BID end date and the same was not verified. As also for the reason that there was non-compliance of the BoQ. The petitioner forthwith submitted its response on 14.08.2025 itself that the MAF as sought was duly submitted and the same was duly verified by the original manufacturer vide its email dated 07.08.2025. Furthermore, the petitioner complied with the BoQ specifications. Considering the said response, the respondent rejected the bid submitted by the petitioner vide its response dated 19.08.2025 for the reason that the MAF submitted was after the bid end date which was not acceptable. Hence this petition. 4) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents 6 clearly reflect that the illegality on the face of record. The petitioner was sought to be non-suited by one or the other way from the very inception itself. The NIT was issued with such arbitrary conditions that at the stage of clarification itself, the respondents modified the stipulations. The bid document contained the standard forms are old tenders and the requirement of submission of ink signed certificate has been consistently avoided by all the departments since it raises chances of fabrication. Even the respondent bank had previously not insisted for submission of ink signed certificate. Be that as it may, even when the ink signed certificate was asked for from the petitioner, the petitioner forthwith submitted the same. There was no delay on part of the petitioner in submission of the said certificate and therefore the reason for rejection of the bid which is highly competitive and can save public money in such trivial ground prima facie appear to be a deliberate attempt to avoid competition. He further submits that out of 13 participants, only 2 have been held to be qualified and that too only of 1 OEM being HP. Under the GFR rules for procurement, under any bid of such a high value, there has to be at least 2 OEMs and 3 bidders else the bid process has to be cancelled. The object is to have the maximum participation from the public at large and also to have most competitive bidding. The present tender process is therefore being conducted contrary to the rules. Further, insistence of ink signed certificate is prima facie arbitrary since the digitally signed 7 document was consistently accepted by the respondent bank in all its tenders. Even the Government of India under all its tenders accept digitally signed documents which are more secure and authentic. Be that as it may, the petitioner even submitted the ink signed certificate as requested by the respondents. 5) Learned counsel for the petitioner also submit that after the bid submitted by the petitioner having being rejected on 19.08.2025, the petitioner was taking immediate urgent steps for challenging the said order of rejection before this Hon'ble Court and before the petitioner could prefer the writ petition, the respondent authorities hurriedly opened the financial bid on 21.08.2025 wherein Shriram Computers was declare as L- 1 while Heliocentrix Technology Private Limited was declared as L-2. The rates as declared by both the bidders would clearly demonstrate that there was a cartel as between both the bidders since both the bidders had offered the desktop unit of HP make. The rates per unit is Rs. 73,529/- and the different between L-1 & L-2 is only Rs. 73 per unit. It is pertinent to mention that in the tender process which was conducted in the last year purchase, the price for per unit computer was Rs. 46,929/. The difference of price as between the rate of computer in the previous year and in the present year is Rs. 26,600/- per unit which is excessive. The excessive high rate as has been quoted by L-1 & L-2 clearly reflected that there was a deliberate mischief with a predetermination with that respondent 8 authorities whereby they deliberately disqualify other competitors only to ensure that 2 bidders survive and both the bidders had excessive prices for the desktop as was offered by them. This is grossly arbitrary since such an act vitiates the fairness in award of public contracts and clearly cause loss of public money. The manner and reason for which the petitioner has been declared disqualify clearly show that the respondent authorities where predetermines to award the contract only to the private respondents. 6) On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner has no indefeasible right merely by participating in the tender process. Even being an eligible bidder does not automatically confer any enforceable claim for award of contract unless and until the competent authority accepts the bid and communicates allotment. The petitioner was disqualified strictly in terms of the bid conditions. The requirement of submission of an ink-signed Manufacturer’s Authorization Form (MAF) was clearly stipulated. The petitioner admittedly submitted an ink-signed MAF only after the bid end date. Compliance made after the cut-off cannot cure the defect, as it would violate the principles of equal treatment of all bidders. The insistence on ink- signed MAF is neither arbitrary nor mala fide. Such a requirement ensures authenticity and accountability of OEM authorization. It is 9 incorrect to allege that digitally signed documents are uniformly accepted in all tenders. Different procuring entities may adopt different safeguards based on their assessment of risks. Futher, the allegation of cartelization between two successful bidders is speculative and unsubstantiated. Merely because the rates are close or higher than past years does not establish collusion. The prices in public procurement are subject to market variations, exchange rates, and supply-chain factors, which may legitimately lead to higher prices. The entire tender process was conducted through the GeM Portal, which is a national public procurement platform designed to ensure transparency, competition, and fairness. The queries, clarifications, and bid status were all duly uploaded and available for public view. Hence, the allegation of favoritism is misconceived. Lastly, the petitioner’s bid was disqualified on valid grounds. He has not suffered any financial loss since his bid was not even opened at the financial stage. No earnest money or deposit has been withheld. The challenge is therefore more in the nature of a grievance of “apprehension” rather than a demonstrable infringement of right. 7) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto. 8) In nutshell, the grievance of the petitioner is that he was wrongfully and arbitrarily disqualified from the tender process on trivial technical grounds (ink-signed MAF and BoQ compliance), 10 despite complying with requirements. Further, the tender was made in such a way that it only suited HP products, and finally only two bidders with HP computers were selected and this was done to avoid fair competition, which also caused loss of public money because the selected bidders quoted very high prices. 9) It is well settled that there is least scope of judicial intervention in tender matters. Recently, the Apex Court, in the matter of Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others, {Civil Appeal No. 11005 OF 2024, decided on 04.10.2024}, taking note of the decisions rendered in various other celebrated judgments, observed as under: “21. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition propounded in catena of decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned counsels for the Respondents to the effect that the Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities must have a freedom of entering into the contracts. However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the government/ its instrumentalities must be free from arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and public interest even while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process and that the entire bidding process is carried out in absolutely transparent manner. 22. At this juncture, we may reiterate the well-established tenets of law pertaining to the scope of judicial intervention in Government Contracts. 11 23. In Sterling Computers Limited vs. M/s. M & N Publications Limited and Others1, this Court while dealing with the scope of judicial review of award of contracts held: - “18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the “decision making process”. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] where it was said that: (p. 144a) “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” By way of judicial review the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time as was said by the House of Lords in the aforesaid case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] the courts can certainly examine whether “decision-making process” was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 24. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India2, this Court had laid down certain priniciples for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. 1 (1993) 1 SCC 445 2 (1994) 6 SCC 651 12 (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 25. It has also been held in ABL International Limited and Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Others3, as under: - “53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 3 (2004) 3 SCC 553 13 26. In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others4, this Court after discussing number of judgments laid down two tests to determine the extent of judicial interference in tender matters. They are: - “22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 27. In Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. and Others5, while observing that the government contracts granted by the government bodies must uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with the contractual matters, it was observed in Para 50 as under: - “50. In view of the above, it is apparent that in government contracts, if granted by the government bodies, it is expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The transparent bidding process is favoured by the Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied. It is said that the constitutional guarantee as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. It is expedient that the degree of 4 (2007) 14 SCC 517 5 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 574 14 compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest.” 28. It was sought to be submitted by the learned Counsels for the Respondents relying upon the observations made in Central Coalfields Limited and Another vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and Others6, that whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. However, in the said judgment also it is observed that if the employer has exercised the inherent authority to deviate from the essential term, such deviation has to be made applicable to all the bidders and potential bidders. It was observed in Para 47 and 48 as under:- “47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but alsofrom the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed in Michigan Rubber [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216]. 6 (2016) 8 SCC 622 15 48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489]. However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even that decision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot.” 10) Also, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the matter of Tata Motors Limited Vs. The Birhan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST) and Ors., {MANU/SC/0608/2023}, observed as under: “52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/1013/2004: (2005) 1 SCC 679. 16 53. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., reported in MANU/SC/3402/2000: (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers Under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. 54. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0090/2007: (2007) 14 SCC 517, that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.” 11) In light of the above, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to establish any arbitrariness, mala fides, or illegality in 17 the tender process. The petitioner’s disqualification was strictly in terms of the bid conditions, and no vested right to award of contract accrues in his favour merely on account of participation. Further, the allegations of favoritism is unsubstantiated and cannot be a ground for interference in judicial review, particularly in matters relating to commercial contracts where the scope of writ jurisdiction is inherently limited. 12) Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed as devoid of merit. 13) No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Manpreet